thusiasm for Italian freedom, we were half- fessed, ignoble. Her bitterest enemies can hardly deny her a love of peace for the sake of peace, and a dislike of war from a keen perception of the miseries it entails. And it is certainly true that a country discharges an important duty, not only to itself, but to the whole community of nations, by developing its own prosperity and increasing its own happiness. Still, it would be uncaudid to dispute that there is a certain admix-time would blunt Austrian bayonets, or teach ture of baser motives. England has a clear conviction that no change is likely to better her condition, and she therefore opposes herself to all change whatever. She has got her hands as full as is convenient, and therefore other people must be contented too. Satisfied with India, she objects to the increase of French influence in the East; she would willingly see Italy without Venetia rather than run the risk of any discussion which might open up the question of Gibraltar. Because we are now virtuous, having got everything we want, there must be no more cakes and ale for anybody else. We cannot see why disputes should arise at all; still less why we should bring our good-fortune into peril by taking part in them if they do arise. Disguise it as we may, the disposition, not of the Ministry, but of the nation, is to fight only when our interests are directly assailed. Many violent and oppressive acts have been done in Europe since 1815 we were roused to action by the violence of Russia alone. It may suit the Laureate to style the Crimean War a "war in the defence of the right," as the 66 wreaking of God's just wrath on a giant liar;" but the prose of the matter is, that England was alarmed for the Overland Route. the House of Hapsburg moderation. This dislike to look things plainly in the face, to hope against hope, is our besetting sin. "Why anticipate difficulties which may never arise?" said Lord Cowley to M. Drouyn de Lhuys. The Frenchman might have replied, that to do this was the peculiar duty of a statesman, that it was far wiser to anticipate difficulties than to be anticipated by them. But, on the whole, the country is more to blame for this than its leaders. Often when politicians discern and would provide against coming harm, the nation, with distorted vision, will see only what is pleasant and peaceful. From the nature of our Constitution, no ministry, however persuaded of the necessity for action, can act without the support of the people, and that support is never given unless the people chance to be in a passion. Thus, when Lord Russell, three years ago, foresaw and would have anticipated this very Danish difficulty, nobody heeded or would believe him. Prudential policy has little weight with the masses; they must be moved by romantic sympathy or roused by indignation. Two conditions at least must be fulfilled before England will fight; her statesmen must be convinced of the expediency of fighting, and the people must be in a paroxysm about some real or fanciful wrong. It is plain that these conditions will rarely concur with sufficient force to overcome our aversion to war, We may, if we please, dignify this policy by a fine name, and call it non-intervention. The title is flattering, but delusive. If nonintervention be taken as meaning a deter- But it is of no avail to keep ourselves in a mination not to interfere in the internal strug- fool's paradise, crying peace when there is no gles of other States, and not to permit others possibility of peace. We cannot expect a to do so, it is a principle worthy of all praise. universal acquiescence in our optimism and On such a principle we should have acted had conservatism. Nations less fortunate will be we opposed the intervention of Russia for the more warlike; less enamoured of things as suppression of the Hungarian revolt; on such they are. Venetia, Hungary, Turkey-these a principle we did act when, after Villafranca, names alone tell unmistakably of evils which we opposed the plans of France for the resto- will not sleep, of difficulties which must be ration of the Dukes of Parma and Modena and solved. No one will form a true judgment on the Grand Duke of Tuscany, and maintained the state of Europe who does not take into the right of the inhabitants of these countries account the growth of the principle of nationto settle their governments at their own plea-ality. This principle, as we before remarked, But non-intervention, as we commonly is new in politics. Europe has of old time use the word, does not deserve to be called a seen wars of religion, wars of independence, "policy;" it is nothing but a determination and wars of kings or of kings' mistresses; but not to fight. On such a determination Eng- this century alone has seen wars of nationaliland has of late years acted, combining with ty, that is, wars waged by various peoples in it an earnest desire that nobody else should order to establish for themselves a separate fight either. Thus, with all our paraded en- national existence. So too this principle has sure. occur to Austria. And even if these lofty conquerors do not quarrel over their ill-gotten gains, Nemesis may come from another quarter. Germany, it appears, now laughs at the warnings of England-to the great scandal of the Quarterly Review. A high authority has told us of what sort is the laughter of fools. But they are welcome to their merriment while it lasts. A time may come, and come speedily, when there will be little laughter on their lips. If the French Emperor is possessed by anything of that grasping ambition which we so freely ascribe to him, Germany will yet bitterly atone for her present triumph. And should that day of need arrive, she will look in vain for aid to England. The favour of our Court will avail her nothing. The cheers which rang through the House of Commons when the result of the late sea-fight was announced, revealed a feeling in the country in antagonism to which the Crown would be worse than helpless. been altogether neglected in the great co- | out of question that similar thoughts may venants which have from time to time, determined the rights of European states. It was not dreamt of at the Peace of Westphalia, which respected religious but not patriotic feeling. It was flagrantly, violated by the Partition Treaty. It found no place in the negotiations of Utrecht. And it has been equally disregarded in what may be called the minor treaties of Europe: the Treaty of the Pyrenees and the Treaty of Nimeguen. Last of all, to quote the words of Lord Macaulay, Europe well remembers, and our latest posterity will, we fear, have reason to remember how coolly, at the last great pacification of Christendom, the people of Poland, of Norway, of Belgium, and of Lombardy, were allotted to masters whom they abhorred." The astute statesmen who arranged that pacification had recognised doubtless the growth of this new and dangerous principle, and were resolved to crush it. The French Revolution may be said to have given it birth, when, intoxicated with their new-found liberty, French Looking, then, on such a Europe as this, troops went forth to succour the oppressed in the urgent question is, What should be the every land. Napoleon, even at the height of future attitude of England? By what prinhis tyranny, professed it as a pretext. Tram- ciples should she be guided when she is not pled under foot at the Treaty of Vienna, it trammelled, as she was in the Danish and has since sprung up into renewed life and Polish questions, by past engagements? The vigour. Nor, in looking at the present aspect great fault of our diplomacy, at all times of Europe, can we see any signs that its force and under all administrations, has been its is abated or its career drawing to a close. want of consistency. Partly from the abNow, this principle or idea is essentially pro- sence of training in themselves, partly from vocative of disturbance. It is a new element. the recklessness of our Press, partly from the It was long utterly uncared for; it was of late publicity of Parliament, our statesmen are years sternly repressed; and in 1815 Europe sorely hindered in following out any farwas settled without regard for its claims. sighted line of policy. Hence they go on in Therefore, when it is at last rising into im- a sort of hand-to-mouth style, refusing, like portance and power, nay, when it has assert- Lord Cowley, to "anticipate difficulties." ed itself as the leading principle which should Now this will hardly serve us in times like regulate affairs, can we expect such a settle the present, when all Europe, to say nothing ment to endure? Take the case of Austria. of America, seems breaking up into new That power, both from interest and by dispo- combinations-when events like the Italian sition, is pacific, and yet is so based on a de- War, and a policy such as that of Lord Rusfiance of nationalism that her very existence | sell on the Polish question, are happily setis a cause of offence and a source of danger. | ting us free from the diplomatic fetters in Nor, in estimating the disturbing influences in Europe, can we leave the Danish War out of account. That war has done more than any event since 1815 to change the relations of the European States. What its results may be no man can say. But it requires no great gift of prophecy to foretell that these sults will not be altogether such as sanguine Germany expects. The happy dreams enjoyed by Professor Max Müller, and narrated by him in the Times last February, of a united Fatherland, are not quite certain to be realized. There is a chance that the minor German States may not clearly see how they have been gainers by a war which has but increased Prussian territory. Nor is it altogether which our forefathers had left us bound. It would be well, therefore, could we discover some principles of action, however general, by which we may abide when we find ourselves in new situations, untrammelled by old treaties and worn-out traditions. Many re-eminent men are of opinion that, in such circumstances, the safest, and, in the long-run, the most honourable policy for England will be found to be a policy of strict isolation ;' always able to defend herself, never caring for the affairs of others, living apart in the enjoyment of her own well-being, like the gods of Epicurus. Others, again, condemn such a policy as ignominious, and as unlikely even to secure the peace which it seeks by means so unworthy. Thus Lord half of its own interests, and the circumstances in which a nation is bound to go to war in behalf of the interests of others. "I must question the principle on which the noble Earl has acted, that we are not to use our power except when our own interests are immediately attacked. No one of your Lordships is more anxious than myself to avoid all unnecessary interference with foreign Powers; no one feels more strongly the impolicy of meddling in affairs which do not concern us; but, on the other hand, I have always felt, and I trust all your Lordships will agree with me, that the civilized nations of the world have a strong interest in preventing injustice being inflicted on any of their number; and the best security for the peace of Europe and the world, is a general persuasion among the great Powers of the world that it any one of them openly and notoriously violates the principles of justice, and is guilty of oppression towards his weaker neighbours, other nations will stand forward to defend those neigh bours, and among the nations ever ready to come forward in a case of justice and reason England will not be the last." Mr. Göschen, the seconder of the Address in the Commons, held language of the same purport, in the course of a speech of unusual grasp and vigour : It is, indeed, desirable that international law should be upheld, but we are not called upon to uphold it with the same zeal and the same sacrifices as if we were repelling aggression. We must be ready and willing to protect ourselves, our dependencies, and our allies, and we are. doubted, could stand now, as she has stood England, it cannot be before, against the world in defence. But, except in defence, our statesmen have no right to bring upon the people, or allow the people to bring upon themselves, the miseries of a prolonged and doubtful war. A country so exposed as ours is was never intended to play, single-handed, the part of the redresser of the world's wrongs, or conservators of the world's peace. We cannot be expected to be knights-errant or even general policemen. Standing alone, therefore, our policy must be, in a sense, isolated; but We but confuse ourselves and obscure the it is an abuse of language to call it selfish. truth, by transferring the ideas or the phraseology of individual morality to the transactions of States. It is not selfishness in an English statesman to care more for the happiness of the people of England than for the happiness of the people of Africa. Onethird of the population of this country is dependent for its very existence on merce; the example of America has shown this particular question it ought to throw its that, in the present state of naval science, all weight; and he believed it had not yet made up our power might be insufficient to save that its mind that the doctrine of non-intervention commerce from destruction; and are we to could be of universal and absolute application. encounter this great wretchedness in the vain If it were meant that the Government should attempt to recall the vanished dream of Polish stand aloof whatever principles were at stake, independence? Take a yet stronger inor whatever interests might be involved, the stance. Had we interfered to stop the incountry would be unable to comprehend how, while the barriers separating different nations vasion of Jutland, it is plain we must have were being thrown down every day by increas- done so alone. Now, would such a proceeding intercourse, by the surrender of ancient pre-ing have been justifiable? Setting aside our judices, by treaties of commerce, and by the inculcation of the principle of universal benevolence, the first utterance of England on the approach of a novel danger should be to proclaim an utterly selfish and isolated policy, repudiating not only her international obligations, but also, he might say, her international interests. It seemed to him as impossible as it would be inconsistent and improper for England in the face of Europe to lay down a rule of absolute non-intervention. Those professing to desire peace at any price seemed often unwilling to pay the heavy price which might be asked for it; and that was war itself." "At the present moment, as in all continental struggles, the idea uppermost in every mind was whether England was likely to be drawn in. The country was divided between the modern policy of non-intervention and its traditional regard for international law; it appeared to de bate with some uneasiness into which scale on Now, with the utmost respect for these able speakers, it seems to us that their views are at least too broadly stated. There is a wide difference between the circumstances in which a nation is bound to go to war in be com alleged promises on the one hand, and the complex question of the Duchies on the other, let us look at the simple question, Would English statesmen have acted aright in risking a single-handed war with Germany for the protection of Danish territory? To refuse to shed the blood of Englishmen in such a quarrel would be no selfishness, but rather our bounden duty. The point is susceptible of a very simple illustration. The police must always be the stronger side. There should never be any doubt as to the result of a conflict between guardians and the disturbers of the peace. If any such doubt is allowed to exist, the law can no longer be administered. Exactly the same holds good with regard to the law and the police of nations. If wrong is to be sent give no strength to such an alliance as we have in view. Her position is that of one who seeks rather than affords help. It is to France therefore that we must turn. With France and England disunited, every angry passion and every idle ambition is set loose throughout Europe; did a frank and close alliance subsist between them, we might hope not only for the maintenance of peace, but of the settlement of continental troubles. It is no slight satisfaction to know that such are the sentiments of the ablest political writer in Europe, M. Forcade, who thus expresses himself in the Revue des Deux Mondes for 1st March :— "Ill était manifeste pour l'Europe entière qu'entre eux et nous une alliance active immé liate était impossible. Cette conviction générale a tait beau jeu aux petites cours allemandes, à la Prusse et à l'Autriche. Quand les deux puissances occidentales sont séparées, lorsqu'elles sont coupées, le reste de l'Europe peut passer au travers, et l'on se permet bien des fantaisies. prevented, the force brought to bear upon | date; but it is clear that Italy could at prethe wrong-doer must be such that resistance would be vain. Interposition not supported by overwhelming force is as powerless for good as the use of "moral influence," and far more powerful for mischief. Had France, Russia, and England declared that crossing the Eider would be to each and all of them a casus belli, Germany would have paused. But the single voice of England would have been powerless to restrain the enthusiasm of forty millions. And what would have been the result had her voice been raised? Laying aside the suffering and the grief, we hold it clear that the end in view of those who advocate such a policy, i.e., the increase of a respect for law, would have been the last thing attained. After a long and bloody contest, justice and forbearance would become of less account in the dealings of nations than before. By interfering in defence of right in such force that perseverance in wrong is at once relinquished, reverence for right becomes extended and strengthened. But by interfering so as merely to create doubtful strife, law is at once brought into disrepute, and passions prompt to violate it are roused into activity. Better utter lawlessness than vain endeavours to enforce Single-handed, then, we cannot effectively discharge the duties of European police which Lord Grey would impose upon us. And if we cannot discharge them efficiently, it were best that we should not attempt them. · Disputes may yet occur in which we may be mixed up diplomatically, owing to past engagements, as we were in the Polish question; but except in such instances, we must steadily hold aloof, if we insist on acting, as Harry Wynd fought, for our own hand and at our own discretion. There is much to be said on behalf of such a policy; though it will be found difficult to reconcile the proud and dictatorial temper of the English people to its observance. On the other hand, if we think this undignified, and possibly unsafe, an alternative is open to us. We can seek for allies, acting in concert with whom our interference in European politics will have sufficient weight to preserve peace and enforce law. But there is no third course possible. We must choose between isolation and cordial action with one or other of the Great Powers; and the sooner our choice is made, the better at once for our honour and our safety. This is the great lesson which the events of the last two years teach in a manner not to be mistaken. L'enseignement qui sort donc avec une lumineuse évidence de la confusion politique dont nous sommes témoins, c'est que le maintien de la paix et de l'ordre en Europe, c'est que la conlaw.servation du prestige et de l'influence des deux uations occidentales sont au prix de la bonne France ni l'Angleterre ne peuvent s'engager entente de la France et de l'Angleterre. Ni la avec succès en Europe dans des entreprises politiques importantes, si d'avance elles ne sont sûres de leurs bons sentimens mutuels, et si l'influence de leur accord ne domine pas et ne contient point les autres puissances. Cet enseignement, nous l'espérons, ne sera perdu ni pour les Anglais ni pour nous. Nous croyons que l'œuvre du rapprochement des deux politiques fait des progrès réels. Les faits déplorables qui se sont passés entre l'Allemagne et le Daneinark auraient été prévenus assurément, si la mort du roi Frédéric VII. eût trouvé la France et l'Angleterre décidées à marcher d'accord; mais les pires conséquences que l'on peut redouter da conflit dano-allemand ne seront conjurées que par l'alliance intime et active des deux pays.' We may look forward with confidence to a cordial understanding between this country and the new kingdom of Italy. We may hope too that this may come at no distant So far as the two peoples are concerned, our intimacy with France is becoming closer every year. Englishmen may not yet be very popular in France; but at least they are never insulted as they were not so long ago at Bonn. The treaty, too, is gradually doing its work. Therefore the old feeling in favour of the German States as our "natural allies" is fast dying away. It had its origin in the espousal of the Jacobite cause by France, and in the partialities of our Hanoverian kings; and it cannot live in the altered circumstances of the present time. It has indeed been defended on the ground that England will always, to use a slang expression, pull well with Germany, because there can be no for the blessings of order which he has secured to them :* that is no affair of ours, and it is plainly not germane to the matter in hand. But we could say a good deal, did our space permit, on his external policy, and the manner in which, with regard to foreign affairs, he has borne himself towards England. Our experience of him has now lasted through the varying fortunes of fourteen years. During all that time a large proportion of our public men, and our press with hardly an exception, have steadily refused to trust him; have too often heaped upon him the grossest abuse. What has been his demeanour through it all? At times he has not been able to conceal his sense of the injustice; but his fidelity to his *At the same time it is worth while to remem rivalry between them. But this argument | vernment of Louis Napoleon. It may be will not bear examination. It is quite a that France has given up too much in return mistake to suppose that political friendships are best secured by diversity of interests and of aims. On the contrary, such diversity always implies diversity of feeling; and disputes more frequently arise from opposing feelings than from conflicting interests. Look at the present instance. Prussia is no rival on the sea, does not compete with us in trade, has no colonial power to irritate us; and yet, could we be more entirely alienated from any nation? And this, too on a question of pure feeling by which our interests are in no way affected. With France, on the other hand, we have similarity of interests; we are, in some respects, rivals; but the very existence of those interests and that rivalry afford the best security against our quarrelling. The more France gives hostages to fortune by extending her colonies, and developing her commerce, the more she regards her material prosperity, and appreciates the blessings of free trade, the more reason she will have to draw to us, and the firmer friends we shall become. Nothing, therefore, can be more short-sighted as well as more ungenerous than to carp at the extension of French influence in the East or elsewhere. The more she perseveres in such aims the better for both. A large mercantile marine is the most pacific of all influences. Besides these common interests and common pursuits, France and England are actuated by similar leanings in continental politics. Whatever France may be at home, abroad she favours freedom. She goes even further than we do in regarding the desires of the people; she continues to be the champion, as she was the originator, of that idea of "nationalities," which, until lately, at least, commanded our sympathies hardly in a less degree. ber from how great curses of disorder he relieved them. The following analysis of disturbances in Paris before he took it in hand was given by the Quarterly in review of Mr. Kinglake's Crimea :— Beginning from 1830, there were the three days of July. On February 14 and 15, 1831, the sack of St. Germain l'Auxerrois and the Archevêché. In June of the same year, riots at the trial of Polignac. On June 5 and 6, 1832, Paris was in insurrection, and declared in a state of siege at the funeral of General Lamarque; great slaughter of the, insurgents ensued; but the troops and National Guards alone, under Soult, lost 102 killed and 396 wounded. Garnier Pagès, Cabet, Laboisserie, Châteaubriand, the Duc de FitzJames, Hyde de Neuville, Berryer, etc., were arrested within a few days of each other, and confined in seizure of some of the foremost men in France' the Conciergerie-the precedent, perhaps, for the on the 24 December 1851. In 1834, April 13 and 14, there were émeutes and barricades in Paris, and great slaughter. What occurred in the Rue Transnonain has been already stated. In 1835, tion under Barbes and Bernard. In 1848, after July 5, Fieschi's plot. In 1839, May 12, insurrecserious fighting and oodshed, the Republic was proclaimed; in February the mob attacked the Hôtel de Ville; on the 15th they invaded the National Assembly. In June the bloodiest insurrection that had ever taken place in Paris occurred; 60,000 well armed men from the clubs, secret societies, and ateliers nationaux, were opposed by 30,000 troops, bataillons de guerre,' brought up to Paris by the Republican General Cavaiguae; 11 general officers were killed or wounded, the Archbishop of Paris was murdered whilst conveying a message of peace to the insurgents, General Brea was assassinated in a parley, and 1,440 insurgents killed. In 1849 there were two attempts at insurrection, and in 1851 two more. Were it necessary to look at the other side of the account, it would be easy to show that we have never taken very much by our German alliances. A most unpleasant monotony runs through all our relations with that country, from the wars of William III. down to the wars of the first Napoleon. It is the same story over and over again: England paying money to induce Germans to do what every feeling of patriotism and manliless should have made them do for themselves; shaping our policy in deference to no émeutes or barricades in Paris since 4th Decemtheir view, preferring their interests to our ber 1851. This fact should be remembered, and own; and finding our reward in delays, luke-this one, moreover-that after the 4th December warmness, selfishness, and sometimes actual There have been the French funds rose at once, and France emerged from almost a state of bankruptcy into a condition of daily increasing material wealth and prosperity. So much for Mr. Kinglake's assertion that the great city was struck down as though by a plague.' |