A German U-Boat Claims Address by Admiral von Capelle German Naval Secretary DMIRAL VON CAPELLE, the German Secretary of the Navy, delivered an address before the Reichstag, April 17, 1918, in which he asserted that the submarine warfare of Germany was a success. In the course of his speech he said: "The main question is, What do the western powers need for the carrying on of the war and the supply of their homelands, and what amount of tonnage is still at their disposal for that purpose? All statistical calculations regarding tonnage are today almost superfluous, as the visible successes of the U-boat war speak clearly enough. The robbery of Dutch tonnage, by which the Anglo-Saxons have incurred odium of the worst kind for decades to come, is the best proof of how far the shipping shortage has already been felt by our opponents. In addition to the sinkings there must be added a great amount of wear and tear of ships and an enormous increase of marine accidents, which Sir J. Ellerman, speaking in the Chamber of Shipping recently, calculated at three times the peace losses. Will the position of the western powers improve or deteriorate? That depends upon their military achievements and the replacing of sunken ships by new construction." Dealing briefly with Sir Eric Geddes's recent speech on the occasion of the debate on the naval estimates, Admiral von Capelle declared: "The assertion of the First Lord of the Admiralty that an unwillingness to put to sea prevailed among the German U-boat crews is a base calumny." LOSSES AND CONSTRUCTION As regards the assertions of British statesmen concerning the extraordinarily great losses of U-boats, Admiral von Capelle said: "The statements in the foreign press are very greatly exaggerated. Now, as The before, our new construction surpasses our losses. The number of U-boats, both from the point of view of quality and quantity, is constantly rising. We can also continue absolutely to reckon on our military achievements hitherto attained. Whether Lloyd George can continue the naval war with prospects of success depends, not upon his will but upon the position of the U-boats as against shipbuilding. According to Lloyd's Register, something over 22,000,000 gross register tons were built in the last ten years before the war in the whole world-that is, inclusive of the construction of ourselves, our allies, and foreign countries. entire output today can in no case be more, for difficulties of all kinds and the shortage of workmen and material have grown during the war. In the last ten years-that is, in peace time-800,000 gross register tons of the world's shipping was destroyed annually by natural causes. Now in wartime the losses, as already mentioned, are considerably greater. Thus, 1,400,000 gross register tons was the annual net increase for the entire world. That gives, at any rate, a standard for the present position. America's and Japan's new construction is to a certain extent destined for the necessities of these countries. "In the main, therefore, only the figures of British shipbuilding come into question. About the middle of 1917 there was talk of 3,000,000 tons in official quarters in Great Britain. Then Lloyd George dropped to 2,000,000, and now, according to Bonar Law's statement, the output is 1,160,000 tons. As against, therefore, about 100,000 tons monthly put into service there are sinkings amounting to 600,000 tons, or six times as much. In brief, if the figures given are regarded as too favorable and new construction at the rate of 150,000 tons monthly-that is, 50 per cent. higher -be assumed, and the sinkings be reduced to 450,000 tons, then the sinkings are still three times as large as the amount of new construction. THE COMING MONTHS "One other thing must especially be taken into consideration for the coming months. Today every ship sunk strikes at the vital nerve of our opponents. Today, when only the absolutely necessary cargoes of foodstuffs and war necessities can still be transported, the sinking of even one small ship has quite a different significance as compared with the beginning of the U-boat war. Moreover, the loss of one ship means a falling out of four to five cargoes. In these circumstances even the greatest pessimist must say that the position of our opponents is deteriorating in a considerably increasing extent and with rapid strides, and that any doubt regarding the final success of the U-boat war is unjustified." Replying to a question of the reporter, Admiral von Capelle said: "Our opponents have been busily endeavoring to strengthen their anti-submarine measures by all the means at their disposal, and, naturally, they have attained a certain success. But they have at no time had any decisive influence on the U-boat war, and, according to human reckoning, they will not do so in the future. The American submarine destroyers which have been so much talked about have failed. The convoy system, which, it is true, offers ships a certain measure of protection, has, on the other hand, also the great disadvantage of reducing their transport capabilities. The statements oscillate from 25 to 60 per cent. "For the rest, our commanders are specially trained for attacks on convoys, and no day goes by when one or more ships are not struck out of convoys. Experienced commanders manage to sink three to four ships in succession belonging to the same convoy." THE STEEL QUESTION Admiral von Capelle then dealt with the steel question as regards shipbuilding, which, he said, "is practically the determinative factor for shipbuilding." He continued: "Great Britain's steel imports in 1916 amounted to 763,000 tons, and in 1917 only amounted to 497,000 tons. That means that already a reduction of 37 per cent. has been effected, a reduction which will presumably be further considerably increased during 1918. Restriction of imports of ore from other countries, such as America, caused by the U-boat war will also have a hampering effect on shipbuilding in Great Britain. It is true that Sir Eric Geddes denied that there was a lack of material, but expert circles in England give the scarcity of steel as the main reason for the small shipbuilding output. "American help in men and airplanes and American participation in the war are comparatively small. If later on America wants to maintain 500,000 troops in France, shipping to the amount of about 2,000,000 tons would be permanently needed. This shipping would have to be withdrawn from the supply service of the Allies. "Moreover, according to statements made in the United States and Great Britain, the intervention in the present campaign of such a big army no longer comes into consideration. After America's entry into the war material help for the Entente has not only not increased, but has even decreased cinsiderably. President Wilson's gigantic armament rogram has brought about such economic difficulties that America, the export country, must now begin to ration instead of, as it was hoped, increasingly to help the Entente. To sum up, it can be stated that the economic difficulties of our enemies have been increased by America's entry into the war." "ENGLAND'S DANGER POINT" Later in the debate Admiral.von Capelle said: "The salient point of the discussion is the economic internal and political results of the U-boat war during the coming months. The danger point for England has already been reached, and the situation of the western powers grows worse from day to day." Admiral von Capelle then briefly dealt with that calculation of the world tonnage made by a Deputy which received a some attention in the Summer of last year. "This calculation," he said, "shows difference of 9,000,000 tons from the calculation of the Admiralty Staff. In my opinion, the calculation of the Admiralty Staff is correct. Whence otherwise comes the Entente's lack of tonnage, which, in view of the facts, cannot be argued away? The Admiralty Staff in its calculation adapted itself to the fluctuating situation of the world shipping. At first each of the enemy States looked after itself. Later, under Great Britain's leadership, common control of tonnage was established." Admiral von Capelle quoted the calculation of the American Shipping Department, according to which the world tonnage in the Autumn of 1917 amounted to 32,000,000, of which 21,000,000 were given as transoceanic. He insisted, however, that so much attention must not be paid to all these calculations, but exhorted the people rather to dwell on the joyful fact that the danger point for the western powers had been reached. At the close of the sitting Admiral von Capelle stated that all orders for the construction of U-boats had been given independently by the Naval Department and that the Naval Administration had never been instructed to give orders for more U-boats by the Chancellor or the Supreme Army Command. Every possible means, he said, for the development of U-boat warfare had been done by the Naval Department. Admiral von Capelle in a supple mental statement before the Reichstag, May 11, in discussing the naval estimates, said: The reports for April are favorable. Naturally, losses occur, but the main thing is that the increase in submarines exceeds the losses. Our naval offensive is stronger today than at the beginning of unrestricted submarine warfare. That gives us an assured prospect of final success. The submarine war is developing more and more into a struggle between U-boat action and new construction of ships. Thus far the monthly figures of destruction have continued to be several times as large as those of new construction. Even the British Ministry and the entire British press admit that. The latest appeal to British shipyard workers appears to be especially significant. For the present the appeal does not appear to have had great success. According to the latest statements British shipbuilding fell from 192,000 tons in March to 112,000 in April; or, reckoned in ships, from 32 to 22. That means a decline of 80,000 tons, or about 40 per cent. [The British Admiralty stated that the April new tonnage was reduced on account of the vast amount of repairing to merchantmen.-Editor.] America thus far has built little, and has fallen far below expectations. Even if an increase is to be reckoned with in the future, it will be used up completely by America herself. In addition to the sinkings by U-boats, there is a large decline in cargo space owing to marine losses and to ships becoming unserviceable. One of the bestknown big British ship owners declared at a meeting of shipping men that the losses of the British merchant fleet through marine accidents, owing to conditions created by the war, were three times as large as in peace. The Admiral's Statements Attacked The British authorities asserted that Admiral von Capelle's figures were misleading and untrue. The losses published in the White Paper include marine risk and all losses by enemy action. They include all losses, and not merely the losses of food ships, as suggested in the German wireless message dated April 16. Even in the figures of the world's output of shipbuilding von Capelle seems to have been misled. He states that something over 2,000,000 gross tons were built annually in the last ten years, 66 including allied and enemy countries." The actual figures are 2,530,351 gross tons. He further states that the entire output today can in no case be more, owing to difficulties in regard to labor and material. The actual world's output, as shown in the Parliamentary White Paper, excluding enemy countries, amounted to 2,703,000 gross tons, and the output is rapidly rising. Von Capelle tried to raise confusion with regard to the figures 3,000,000 and 2,000,000 tons and the actual output for 1917. The Admiralty says no forecast was ever given that 3,000,000 tons, or even 2,000,000 tons, would be completed in that year. Three million tons is the ultimate rate of production, which, as the First Lord stated in the House of Commons, is well within the present and prospective capacity of United Kingdom shipyards and marine engineering works. The exaggerated figures of losses are still relied on by the enemy. The average loss per month of British ships during 1917, including marine risk, was 333,000 gross tons, whereas Secretary von Capelle in his statement bases his argument on an average loss from submarine attacks alone of 600,000 tons per month. The figures for the quarter ended March 31, 1918, showed British losses to be 687,576 tons, and for the month of March 216,003 tons, the lowest during any month, with one exception, since January, 1917. With regard to steel, the First Lord has already assured the House of Commons that arrangements have been made for the supply of steel to give the output aimed at, and at the present time the shipyards are in every case fully supplied with the material. Quarter.... 687,576 435,934 1,123,510 Period. The Month's Submarine Record The British Admiralty, in April, 1918, discontinued its weekly report of merchant ships destroyed by submarines or mines, and announced that it would publish a monthly report in terms of tonnage. These figures are shown in the table above. The last weekly report was for the period ended April 14, and showed that eleven merchantmen over 1,600 tons, four under 1,600 tons, and one fishing vessel had been sunk. In regard to the sinkings in April, French official figures showed that the total losses of allied and neutral ships, including those from accidents at sea durthe month, aggregated 381,631 tons. Norway's losses from the beginning of the war to the end of April, 1918, amounted to 755 vessels, aggregating 1,115,519 tons, and the lives of 1,006 seamen, in addition to about 700 men on fifty-three vessels missing, two-thirds of which were declared to be war losses. The American steamship Lake Moor, manned by naval reserves, was sunk by a German submarine in European waters about midnight on April 11, with a loss of five officers and thirty-nine men. Five officers and twelve enlisted men were landed at an English port. Eleven men, including five navy gunners, were lost when the Old Dominion liner Tyler was sunk off the French coast on May 3. The Canadian Pacific Company's steamer Medora also was sunk off the French coast. The Florence H. was wrecked in a French port by an internal explosion on the night of April 17. Out of the crew of fifty-six men, twenty-nine were listed as dead or missing, twelve were sent to hospital badly burned, two were slightly injured, and only thirteen escaped injury. Of the twenty-three men of the naval guard only six were reported as survivors. Six officers and thirteen men were reported missing as the result of two naval disasters reported on May 1 by the British Admiralty. They formed part of the crews of the sloop Cowslip, which was torpedoed and sunk on April 25, and of Torpedo Boat 90, which foundered. According to Archibald Hurd, a British authority on naval matters, the area in the North Sea which was proclaimed by the British Government as dangerous to shipping and therefore prohibited after May 15 is the greatest mine field ever laid for the special purpose of foiling submarines. It embraces 121,782 square miles, the base forming a line between Norway and Scotland, and the peak extending northward into the Arctic Circle. A Secret Chapter of U-Boat History How Ruthless Policy Was Adopted 66 The causes that led to Germany's adoption of the policy of unrestricted submarine warfare on Feb. 1, 1917, were revealed a year later by the Handelsblad, an Amsterdam newspaper, whose correspondent had secured secret access to а питber of highly interesting and important documents" long enough to read them and make notes of their contents. The Dutch paper vouched for the accuracy of the following information: to T the close of the year 1915 the German Admiralty Staff prepared a semi-official memorandum prove that an unrestricted submarine campaign would compel Great Britain to sue for peace "in six months at the most." The character of the argument conveys the impression that the chiefs of the German Admiralty Staff had already made up their minds to adopt the most drastic measures in regard to submarine warfare, but that they wished to convince the Kaiser, the Imperial Chancellor, and the German diplomatists of the certainty of good results on economic and general, rather than merely military, grounds. To this end the memorandum based its arguments on statistics of food prices, freight, and insurance rates in Great Britain. It pointed out that the effects on the prices of es sential commodities, on the balance of trade, and, above all, on the morale of the chief enemy, had been such, even with the restricted submarine campaign of 1915, that, if an unrestricted submarine war were decided upon, England could not possibly hold out for more than a short period. The memorandum was submitted to the Imperial Chancellor, who passed it on to Dr. Helfferich, the Secretary of State for Finance. He, however, rejected the document on the ground that, in the absence of authentic estimates of stocks, it was impossible to set a timelimit to England's staying power, and also that he was exceedingly doubtful as to what line would be taken by neutrals, especially the United States. Dr. Helfferich maintained that so desperate a remedy should only be employed as a |