Diplomacy cast aside its accustomed reserve, and Ministers adopted what Lord Russell has termed the " grave," and as we consider it, the unconstitutional and unprecedented course, of referring to the matter in a paragraph of the Queen's Speech at the opening of the session of Parliament, where mention is made of claims being advanced “which do not appear to me to come within the reference;" it being added that her Majesty had directed "a friendly communication" to be addressed to the Government of the United States on the subject.

Of this proceeding, we repeat that it was most injudicious, as well as contrary to usual practice. It was an announcement from the Throne to the two Houses of Parliament of certain views as to the carrying out of the provisions of a Treaty already agreed upon, and of full operative force,—views diametrically opposed to those just formed by the other party to the Treaty; thus inviting a decision, by authority of the three Estates of the realm, condemnatory of the conduct of that party, being a friendly power. A declaration thus solemnly adopted could have but one effect, namely, to render terms of accommodation, involving the slightest concession on either side, impossible; and no "friendly communication," following upon it, could remove or smooth the difficulty thus recklessly conjured up. But in truth, whatever hope there might have been of extracting anything from the generous humour of the government of the United States by this clumsy and humiliating appeal, was, on the very evening when the fact was announced, dashed to the ground by the unfor

tunate temper of the intractable Premier, who, far from imitating the judicious reserve of his noble colleague in the other House, denounced, and that in most violent, dogmatic, and offensive language, the conduct of the United States, and noisily challenged the whole world to dispute his own constructions of the terms of the Treaty, as being "the meaning, the only meaning, the rational meaning, the direct grammatical meaning." All this could only imply that the Government of the United States, supposing it to be gifted with ordinary intelligence, must have been guilty of deliberate dishonesty and attempted extortion, in putting forward pretensions which were subject to be repudiated in such emphatic terms; and it is not to be surprised at that, upou this, if upon no other grounds, that Government has persistently declined, in spite of our reiterated appeals, to withdraw, or modify, one iota of their case, and thereby involve the risk of appearing to plead guilty to Mr. Gladstone's unhandsome imputation.

The long and dreary correspondence which has since taken place between Lord Granville and Mr. Fish has thrown little new light upon the subject. We are sorry to add that neither in matter nor in manner does it redound in any way to the honour of diplomacy as a profession, being at once dogmatic and undignified; dealing throughout in that lowest form of homely contention, known as "fending and proving," in the course of which, averments on either side are often demurred to on the other, in a manner which approaches very nearly

that simple process, familiarly described as "giving the lie."

A lamentable instance of this occurs whilst yet we are writing. Sir Stafford Northcote, one of the Commissioners, after long enforced silence, gave utterance to a speech at Exeter, early in the month of May, in which, in confutation of positive statements by Mr. Fish and General Schenck, to the effect that there was no waiver of the indirect claims at the Conference at Washington, he deliberately stated: "We (the Commissioners) are distinctly responsible for having reported to the Government that we understood a promise to be given that these claims were not to be put forward, and were not to be submitted to arbitration,"-adding, "that being so, we are, of course, brought into painful relations with, and painful questions arise between ourselves and our American colleagues upon the Commission." The cool simplicity of all this would be laughable, if it were not painful to think that a British diplomatist should pretend to invoke an "understanding" as qualifying a written contract. Moreover, the very reference to such "understanding," if it existed, would imply that the written document, unqualified by such oral understanding, would have carried the interpretation it is sought by us to controvert. It is not surprising that this charge should be looked upon as a serious matter in the United States; and accordingly we find General Butler taking it up, and moving in the House of Representatives, "that the President be required to inform the House if a promise to the effect stated by Sir Stafford North

cote had been made; if so, by whom, and under what authority; and if the Senate is controlled or influenced by such a proceeding." The Foreign Affairs Committee, to whom this motion was referred, have reported in favour of its being entertained; so here is a new sore opened up between the two countries and their Commissioners.

But hardly had the excitement occasioned by this extra-judicial announcement by Sir Stafford Northcote subsided, when Professor Bernard, one of the British Commissioners, in his ill-judged lecture at Oxford, threw a new cloud of mystery over the subject, by suggesting that with a view to conciliation, the Treaty was purposely made a little ambiguous. After observing that a treaty "is an instrument which you cannot send to be settled in a conveyancer's chamber, nor commit to a knot of wrangling attorneys," he says it is one in which the "punctilios of self-respect of Governments have to be consulted, and discussion must never be suffered to degenerate with altercation." And for this reason "it is often necessary for the sake of agreement, to accept a less finished, or even a less accurate expression, instead of a more finished or more accurate one ; and it must be construed liberally and reasonably according to what appears to be the true intention of the contracting parties." In contradistinction to this theory of the advantages of adopting "less accurate" language in order to facilitate an agreement, however, Professor Bernard, in another passage says: "The Treaty of Washington was carefully framed to embrace only specific claims, such as had

previously become known to both Governments under the name of the Alabama Claims, [but the indirect claims had also become known to both Governments], for losses and damages caused by the acts of certain vessels." These last words do not correspond with the words of the Treaty, which speaks of losses " growing out of," but they are decidedly more exact, and intelligible, and it is only to be regretted that Professor Bernard did not think of this in time to persuade his brother Commissioners to adopt them in the Treaty.

But whilst all this undignified squabbling has been going on, it is most regrettable and humiliating to find that the British Government have thought it becoming to enforce their demand for the withdrawal of the indirect claims, by holding out the threat of resorting, in case of refusal, to an alternative utterly inconsistent with justice, and therefore utterly unworthy of a great nation. All who justly appreciate the sanctity of international engagements must indignantly repudiate the theory which has been propounded day after day, in certain quarters, in and out of Parliament, that because there arises a misunderstanding as to the construction of a treaty, either party to it is at liberty to tear it up like a piece of waste paper; nay more, that a treaty is a thing of so fragile a nature, that it ceases to exist if any disagreement be raised about its import. Yet in the perplexing case before us such a doctrine has been propounded; and we have been coolly told that if we are not at one with the United States upon the interpretation of this particular Treaty,