The American Case enters into a long and not very lucid disquisition as to what should be considered as constituting the "due diligence" applicable to these matters, which the British Government in its Counter-case, after an attempt at discussion, sums up with the discouraging conclusion that according to the American theories, if taken literally, "no Government can be held to have done its duty, which has not been completely successful." But the onerousness and hardship of the position is brought to the highest point of tension when we find the American Government, in another part of their Case, which appears to have been overlooked by the compilers of our Counter-case, proceeding to insist, "with great confidence," that in respect of matters of complaint to be brought forward by them before the Tribunal of Arbitration, the latter will"assume that the burthen of proof will be upon Great Britain to establish that they could not be prevented;"-certainly a "new rule" of practice in judicial procedure, as startling as any of the new doctrines of principle so confidently laid down in this astounding production.

Such are the arbitrarily-instituted principles of international law upon which the Government of the United States seeks to enforce against us heavy claims for damages "direct" and "indirect" occasioned during the late civil war. We regret to observe that the extraordinary pretensions thus put forward have engaged the attention, and excited the alarm of the Government and of the country, more on account of the enormous amount of the payments

possibly claimable under them, than of the principles involved in them. Let us therefore consider for an instant what would be a reasonable monetary outcome of the matter on the American's own showing.

The American Case cites as a precedent for giving compensation in the event of breaches of neutrality such as are now in question, the conduct of the United States on the occasion of the depredations committed by the French privateers in 1793. But it should be recollected that there were peculiarities in the circumstances of the case, and in the relative positions of the parties in those days, which are not exactly paralleled at present. As the American Case states it, "The capital was at Philadelphia, several hundred miles from Charleston," where the practices complained of took place; added to which "the Government of the United States was in its early infancy," and “it had not been tested whether the powers confided to it would prove sufficient for any emergency that might arise in its Foreign relations. It had neither navy, nor force that could be converted into one, and no army on the sea-coast, and it was obliged to rely upon, and did actually call out, the irregular militia of the States, to enforce its orders." Thus circumstanced, wanting the essential conditions of a civilized state, it was a matter of moral obligation as well as a matter of necessity, that the United States should yield to our demand for a municipal law to prohibit practices through which other nations suffered intolerable grievances and wrongs, and to make compensation under certain circumstances.

In effect, says the Case, it was "agreed between the two Governments that in cases where restitution of the prizes should be impossible, the amount of the losses should be ascertained by a method similar to that provided by the Treaty of Washington, and that a money payment should be made. by the United States to Great Britain, in lieu of restitution."

It will be remarked that herein there is nothing said of consequential damages; merely restitution, or a money equivalent. Moreover, even this limited compensation provided for by the Treaty of 1794, was administered on very different principles to those to be made applicable at Geneva. First, the Treaty was not retrospective, or only to a limited extent, the 5th June, 1793, being arbitrarily fixed, earlier than which date no complaint should originate; although it was well established that the fitting out of the obnoxious privateers had commenced two months previously. Secondly, it was not applicable except in cases where the prizes had been brought into an American port-the owners of vessels which the captors had destroyed at sea not being entitled to compensation. Thirdly, when the prize had been brought into an American port, no compensation was to be awarded unless proceedings had been instituted and efficiently carried to judgment in a district Court of Admiralty. The British Countercase too clearly shows, that with all these restrictions and drawbacks, the principle of compensation adopted by the American Government in 1794, and so ostentatiously referred

to in the American Case, was very little, if at all, operative.

Upon the whole, it may be said of the new code of International law, propounded by the United States, as a means of sustaining certain pecuniary demands, under what are termed the "Alabama Claims," that, however exorbitant the possible amount of those claims may turn out to be, the money sacrifice involved in them sinks into insignificance, when compared with the inconveniences, and damage which must result to communities from the adoption of the code itself. The sacrifice occasioned by the claims themselves is capable of being measured in figures, which once disposed of the affair is at an end; but the "new rules" of neutrality pretended to be forced upon the world, will involve all neutral states in responsibilities attended by dangers and losses incalculable to the end of time.

SUPPLEMENTAL NEGOCIATIONS, TO "SAVE THE TREATY." THE frantic negociations which have taken place since the discovery of the "misunderstanding" between the two Governments, on the subject of the "indirect losses" under the " Alabama Claims," are certainly entitled to the distinction of being without precedent in the whole history of diplomacy. Whatever condemnation may be due to the negociators of the Treaty for their careless and slovenly wording of its terms in this matter, the revelations which have been made since, both by the executive, and by two at least of the High Commissioners (the Marquis of Ripon has judiciously hugged himself in a compa

rative reserve) surpassing in weakness and blundering all that had gone before. And what is well worthy of remark, looking at the whole story of the affair, is this-that but for the publication, contrary to usual etiquette, by the United States of their "Case," at the time of its presentation, it is not at all unlikely that the agitation to which it has given rise would never have taken place; and that our incomparable Ministers would have slumbered in agreeable unconsciousness over the matter, until almost too late to meet the danger which it threatened.

Mr. Gladstone has admitted that although, as he had since ascertained, a copy of the Case had been sent to him, it did not reach his hands, and that he never took the trouble of inquiring for a document so important, which he knew was to be looked for at a certain date.

Earl Granville, on the other hand, though he received the document, in ordinary course together with other official papers, being at the time suffering from a fashionable indisposition, did not trouble himself to open it, naturally taking it for granted that the "Case" was "all right” and a mere matter of detail and routine, in accordance with the so clearly defined provisions of the Treaty. Aroused at length by the clamour from without, his lordship appears to have incontinently glanced over the ugly document, the contents of which, as he humourously described it in the House of Lords, gave rise to feelings "which were anything but a panacea for the gout!" Then came that injudicious and unprecedented reference to the subject in the speech from