Lapas attēli
PDF
ePub

of 1862, whilst the outbreak of the insurrection took place early in December, 1860, nearly a year and a half previously. With nothing that occurred between these two periods has the Court of Arbitration any concern, and the reference to the occurrences and discussions which may have taken place during that interval, can only have been made with the object of showing an evil animus on the part of Great Britain, and thereby of aggravating against her any damages accruing for specific acts which occurred after its expiring. In ordinary judicial procedure the interpolation of such allegations would be denounced as "impertinent," and might vitiate the whole case as for "uncertainty," that is, as rendering it impossible to define the portion of damage properly attributable to the conduct of the respondent before, and after, the date at which the matters under reference commenced.

Of such materials, nevertheless, is more than the half of this "Case" composed. The British Government, in its Counter-case, very properly "distinctly refuses to enter upon the discussion of these charges," as being "inconsistent with the selfrespect which every Government is bound to feel," and also, "because the matter in dispute is action, and not motive, and therefore the discussion is irrelevant." If in these pages we refer briefly to one or two of these complaints, it will be purely as a matter of history, and not as having any import upon the merits of the questions in dispute.

The first ground of complaint against us is the promptitude with which the Southern States were

recognized as belligerents, and the Queen's proclamation thereon, issued on the 13th May, 1861, after the declaration of blockade by the United States Government. It is not pretended to deny our Sovereign right to make that recognition, and to issue that proclamation, but it is declared that "in making this matter part of this "Case" (which we maintain cannot properly be done), "the United States Government, with deep and unfeigned regret, have been forced to conclude, from all the circumstances, that Her Majesty's Government was actuated at that time by a conscious unfriendly purpose towards the United States."

In answer to this whining appeal, it may be remarked that without belligerency there could be no neutrality, and consequently no application of the provisions of the Foreign Enlistment Act. The Queen's Proclamation accompanying the recognition of the Confederates as belligerents, gave solemn notice of the fact, and recognized the Blockade proclaimed by the United States, enjoining her subjects to respect it; and Her Majesty's Government continued to recognize such blockade afterwards, notwithstanding that it was commonly known that through the weakness or inefficiency, or both, of the United States Marine, that blockade, as states the British Counter-case, was "very imperfectly maintained," and that the British Government was in consequence "frequently urged to disregard it, both by the Confederate States, and by persons desirous of trading with them." But, as the British Counter-case Counter-case points out,

the British Government was not premature,-was not the first, in giving practical effect to the declaration of belligerency. The United States Government had already put the blockade in force, within the State of Virginia, as early as the 30th April, (thirteen days before the Queen's Proclamation), and it was extended to the other Confederate States before the end of May. A considerable number of neutral ships and cargoes were captured for breaking the blockade, some at or near blockaded ports, others on the high seas. Vessels or cargoes so captured were carried before, and condemned by, American prize courts, and the validity of the sentences so pronounced, was upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States. Mr. Justice Grier, in delivering the judgment of the Court on this question, said: "To legitimate the capture of a neutral vessel or property on the high seas a war must exist de facto, and the neutral must have a knowledge or notice of the intention of one of the parties belligerent to use this mode of coercion against a port, city, or territory in possession of the other;" and in another part he said: "The proclamation of the blockade is itself official and conclusive evidence to the Court that a state of war existed which demanded and authorized a recourse to such a measure."

One would have thought that, upon reflection, the American Government would have seen it prudent, as well as respectable, to allow this weak and silly charge of "unfriendliness" to pass without further notice, in the hope that it might be forgotten. But

no; in their Counter-case they return to the charge, and impute to us that in this recognition of belligerency we had assumed that "these rebels against the United States were invested with some undefined political attributes ;" and that "this was the origin of certain errors which run through the Case of Her Majesty's Government." Whereas, all that we did was, whilst acknowledging the belligerent action of the United States in establishing a blockade over a wide sea-board of their territories, to recognize also the belligerency of the revolted provinces with whom they were at war; which latter, by the primary rules of natural law, we were bound to do. Further than that, we did not go; we did not send a Minister to Mr. President Davis, we did not receive his ministers or agents, nor in any way hold those relations with the Confederate States, which are usual between Sovereign States. Nay more, the American " Case," with consistent inaccuracy, when contrasting our conduct during the civil war with that of other states, instances the fact that "the Russian Government ordered that even the flags of men-of-war belonging to the seceded States must not be saluted." It is a fact that our Government issued similar orders addressed to all the Governors of British Colonies. Experience gives hard lessons. Had our Government foreseen the manner in which their loyal and considerate conduct was to be requited by the United States, they would, perhaps, have done well to disregard the United States blockade and belligerent position altogether, letting things take their chance, fully pre

pared to accept the less onerous responsibilities of belligerents if required.

The affair of the "Trent," in which the British Government promptly and righteously resented an unparallelled outrage offered to its flag, is, with equal reasonableness, complained of as having “indicated an unfriendliness so extreme as to approach to a desire for war." There can be no doubt that from one end to the other of the land, and throughout the colonies where the news of the event had reached, there was not a "desire," but a determination, as out of solemn duty, to resort to war, if fitting reparation were not made for this outrage; and preparations were promptly set afoot in all our arsenals, which took our American friends a little aback. But our Government behaved with great consideration, not to say leniency in the matter. In the first place, the release of the captured agents of the Southern States was demanded, together with "an apology" for the outrage; but when Lord Russell received from Mr. Adams an assurance that the act complained of had not been authorized by the American Government, he consented to accept that statement in lieu of the "apology" demanded. What “unfriendliness," then, it may be asked, could be construed out of our taking exception to an act of violence committed by a person ostensibly acting in the service of another power, but who, in fact, was not authorized by it to commit the wrong complained of? As an instance of the candour and bond fides which mark, throughout, this extraordinary state document, we must add that the "Case" follows up its previous

« iepriekšējāTurpināt »