upon no peculiar rules springing out of a prac tice of the Probate Court, in regard to the representatives of deceased persons, but it is to be ascertained upon principles of the common law, as applicable to cases generally, of which a variety of illustrations will be found in the books, especially 1 Stark. Law Ev. 217, et seq. Privity between one administrator and another does not depend upon, and cannot be created by, their being each of them the representative of the same intestate, though it be a duty in which they all unite. It has not been so re sissippi shall control that of Louisiana, that the administrator of the latter State was, in the proceedings in which judgment was recovered in the former, in privity with the defendant in that suit. The contrary has been distinely laid down by Justice Story, in his learned treatise on the Conflict of Laws, sec. 522. That is a direct authority upon the present case. It makes no difference that the judgment in the cases in Rawle, 431, to which he refers, was a judgment rendered in Barbadoes. The matter under consideration involves no discussion, as to the difference between the effect of a judg-garded in the English law, which until the 17th ment when rendered in a State jurisdiction, and when rendered in a jurisdiction out of the United States. The point decided there was, that there was no privity between one administrator and another administrator of the same intestate, when both administrations have been granted by different jurisdictions entirely separate and independent of each other. The jurisdiction of each State of this Union is sovereign and independent in granting letters of administration, as much so as that of any two foreign States. The grant, when made, invests the administrator under the authority of that State with the proprietorship of the effects of the intestate within that State, but, having no jurisdiction beyond its own limits, it can confer no property upon him out of those limits. Car. II. did not regard the administrator de bonis non in privity with an executor or administrator, to bring scire facias on the judgment which the executor or administrator had obtained. See authorities, 1 Lom. Ex. 325. So, if one brings several ejectments against several upon the same title, a verdict against one is not evidence against the rest, because the party against whom the verdict was had might be relieved against it, if it was not good, but the rest could not. 1 Stark. Law. Ev. 217; as the title under which all these defendants in ejectment claimed is the same, each of them, of course, must have held in privity to some one person, from whom all their titles were severally derived; nevertheless, that privity in one common title did not unité hem in privity to each other. The judgment, therefore therefore in Mississippi, against Ann Lee, administratrix of the assets of Charles S. Lee in Mississippi, could not bind the appellant, D. S. Stacy, administrator of the assets of C. S. Lee in Louisiana. Each administrator, when several administrations are granted in several States, is made the owner of a distinct property, wholly unconnected with any other out of the State. The authority under which each derives his title is a separate sovereign power; and it is exclu- The rule excluding res inter alios acta as a sively by that authority, not by virtue of testa-ground of action, or as a bar in the pleadings, mentary appointment of the dead, that they are invested with any interest or control in the respective estates; and it is entirely to the authority from which their rights are alone derived that they are in any manner accountable. In some sense they may severally be said to be a representative of the deceased. There would be no ground for asserting that these representatives in different States constitute one representative, as several executors under the same will, or administrators under the same jurisdiction, may constitute one executor or administrator, though the assets confided to each may be separated. It is believed that this doctrine, here attempted to be presented, of the relation in which the separate administrators under different jurisdictions stand in these United States, has been universally recognized by the States, 52*] except so far as by *statutory law (showing that the original principal was as here stated) the doctrine has been changed or modified. It would seem necessarily so, not only as regards the relation of the administrator, but as regards the rights of the executor as affecting the assets and the representative of the deceased, for he has no lien upon the fund in the hands of the representative as the debtor, but the person of the administrator, who is, in a measure, the officer or bailiff of the court appointing him, in respect of the assets which he has in his hands, is the debtor. 1 Lomax on Executors, 345; Ram. on Ass. 484. What constitutes privity between one representative of a dead man and another representative depends it is hardly necessary to remark, extends with equal stringency to exclude such matter as evidence at the trial. 1 Stark. Law. Ev. 217; and 1 Greenl. Ev. sec. 522, et seq. The principle here contended for cannot be evaded by force of the statute of Mississippi, which seems, as is contended for, *to [*53 make the judgment recovered in Mississippi against Ann Lee, administratrix, have the effect of being a judgment recovered against Charles S. Lee, the intestate himself, because that suit was instituted against him in his lifetime. That statute enables the plaintiff to revive the suit pending against the intestate, and empowers the court to render judgment for or against such administrator, in the same manner as if the original party were in existence. How. & Hutch. Dig. 584. This Statute can mean nothing more than in the strongest expressions to remove merely the impediment thrown in the way of the proceedings of the plaintiff by abatement. It did not mean, by strict adherence to the same manner as if the original party were in existence, to preclude the administratrix from pleading pleas peculiarly allowed to executors and administrators 4 such as plene administravit, generally or specially, no assets, and the like; or to preclude the plaintiff from taking a judgment against the administratrix; and if so, the judgment could not be in the same manner as if the original party was in existence. If the Legislature had intended that, it would have adopted a provision like that in the 17th Car, II., c. 8. s. 1, where a party dies between ver dict and judgment, directing that the judg-| shows that the action was instituted against ment shall be entered as if both parties were living. See 1 Lom. Ex. 324, 325. The judgment rendered in this very case shows that such has not been the interpretation given to that statute, for it is a judgment not against the intestate, but against the administratrix. Whatever may be the interpretation to be put upon the statute, it is sufficient here to say, that the judgment taken was not in accordance with any directions that it should be rendered as if the party were living, but that was waived if the statute gave such power, and the plaintiff has taken a judgment against the administratrix; and taking it in that manner, the plaintiff subjects himself to all the consequences of that form of judgment. Lee in his lifetime, who appeared and pleaded; that before verdict he died, and his widow and administratrix, by the positive requirements of the laws of Mississippi, came in on scire facias, pleaded to, and defended the action. This, in Mississippi, merged the original cause of action, established the debt against the decedent estate, and was and is res adjudicata. The Act of Congress of 26th May, 1790, expressly requires that this judgment shall have full faith and credit given to it in every court within the United States, as it has by law or usage in the courts of the State of Mississippi. 1 Statutes at Large, p. 122. It undoubtedly has, in that State, the "faith and credit” of establishing or authenticating the In conclusion, the plaintiff in error is not debt against the estate of Lee, regardless of precluded from the grounds of error here at- whosesoever hands the estate may come to or tempted to be maintained by force of the 32d *be found in. It is not that it merely es- [*55 section of the Judiciary Act of 1789. That sec-tablishes the debt against the administratrix, tion was only intended to apply to proceedings Ann Lee; but against the estate of C. S. Lee. in actions at common law; not to proceedings The judgment, thus presented, either by by petition, according to the practice of Louis- suit, in the courts of Louisiana, or to the adiana. Even if it did, the exception taken in the ministrator, in Louisiana, for allowance or paycourt below cannot but be regarded as tanta- ment, must have the same "faith and credit" mount to a demurrer according to the requisi- accorded to it as in Mississippi. 6 Wheat. tions of that statute. That clause is a tran- 129; 7 Cr. 481; 13 Pet. 312. script of the provisions of 27th Eliz. c. 5, and 4th Anne, c. 16, for the purpose of curing mere defects of form, and requiring special demurrers, leaving matters of substance unaffected by its provisions, to be taken advantage of by general 54*] demurrer, *without setting down any special cause, or to be taken advantage of by errors in arrest of judgment, or by writ of error. See Bac. Abr. Pleas and Pleading; Stephens on Pleading, 140. Mr. Crittenden, Mr. Thrasher, and Mr. Henderson, for the defendant in error, sustained the judgment of the court below upon the same grounds, which are thus explained in the argument of Mr. Henderson: This Mississippi judgment, we say, conclusively established the plaintiffs' demand against the estate of the intestate Lee, not only in Mississippi, but in every State of the Union. We do not say but its ratable priorities and claims, as to order of satisfaction, are to be governed by the local law of the administration. The claim, however, is legally authenticated as against the decedent estate, so as to entitle it to payment and satisfaction, though put to judgment in a different State than that of the administration. 13 Pet. 312. Notwithstanding all that is said in the books upon original and ancillary administrations in different States, we insist the administrative tribunals of a decedent's effects in no one State can reject the allowance of a creditor's claim from another State, if legally established. The Constitution of the United States gives to the citizens of each State the privileges and immunities of the citizens of the several States. State tribunals, therefore, cannot regard a co-State creditor as a foreign creditor, and so administer the effects of the decedent within a State, to the exclusive use of creditors within that State. And so is it implied in 3 Pick. 128; and so, undoubtedly, is the requirement of the Constitution of the United States, above quoted. The record of this judgment in Mississippi Now, this "faith and credit" is not so conceded to a foreign judgment. Hence the case in 2 Rawle, 431, which was a judgment from Barbadoes, sued on in Pennsylvania. All the pleas in that case imply the opinion of the pleader, that, had it been a judgment from another State of the Union, the defense could not have been relied on; nor does the court say otherwise. Another well established rule of decision sustains the point we contend for-namely, that the judgment of a competent State court merges and extinguishes the original cause of action as to all parties and privies whether privies by blood or estate in all other States of the Union. 3 Wash. C. C. R. 17; 1 Pet. 692, 693; 16 Mass. 71. But a foreign judgment does not so extinguish the cause of action, if again sued on here, as to bar recovery for this cause. Again. Our petition makes no personal demand against the defendant; but, setting forth a claim against the estate of Lee, by authentication of a judgment, duly obtained, in contest with the administratrix in Mississippi, seeks its satisfaction out of Lee's estate in Louisiana, represented by the defendant as administrator. But the spirit of his objection is personal to himself. It is not that he questions but the cause of action has been established in judgment, by a court of competent jurisdiction, as against Lee's estate, so far as represented by his administratrix in Mississippi; but defendant objects, the estate is not thereby liable in Louisiana, till he, defendant, has litigated the same question over again. And for what good? Is there in the Constitution of the United States, and the laws of Congress, any sensible purpose or policy that this question should be twice litigated, in order to conclude the estate of Lee, as represented by this administrator, any more than if this judgment had been rendered against Lee, in his lifetime? Suppose this judgment in Mississippi had been rendered in the United States Circuit Court, and then sued on as now in the United | privity has no application here, and can never States Circuit Court of Louisiana; could this be interposed, but as to parties who may be defense be heard? Now, the 31st section of the affected in their personal rights. A trustee of Judiciary Act of 1789 provides that where the a legal title for the heirs cannot object to the 56*] defendant dies pending the *suit, his rep | judgment against the ancestor as incompetent resentatives may be brought in by scire facias, evidence in suit against him to recover the trust as in this case, and "the court may render property, on the ground that he is not a privy judgment against the estate of the deceased to the judgment. And so of the administrator, party." But what a silly provision of law, if, who is but a trustee for the creditors and diswhen they have so rendered judgment, the tributees. same controversy shall be tried over again in every other State where the judgment may be carried for enforcement and satisfaction, against the same decedent's "estate." As this pretended right of defense does not go to bar the original cause of action, it is a mere technical objection, without semblance of merit. For, on any supposition that the first judgment was fraudulently obtained, the defendant here could undoubtedly make that defense by plea. But, with no objection against the justice or integrity of the judgment, that the defendant may relitigate it from mere caprice is certainly a most idle rule of construction, for no possible good. The only pretense of legal rule which can be offered in vindication of this claim of the defendant to litigate the original cause of action in this case over again is, that as between the defendant with whom it was contested in the State of Mississippi, and this defendant in Louisiana, there is no privity; and hence the judgment is not evidence against him. But we deny the fact that there is no privity. There is, in all truth, and in the rationale of the thing, a clear privity of estate. On Lee's death, his estate, everywhere throughout the United States, was liable to payment of his debts. No one anywhere could take possession of this estate, either by lawful administration or by tort, that did not hold in privity to the creditor's claim, as verily as to the claims of heirs and distributees. The decedent's estate, to this end and responsibility, is but a unit, though possessed by a dozen administrators in different States of the Union. And in what sense can an administrator claim to be a privy at all? No connection of blood, nor the agent's claim which he has to the estate, could give him, as administrator, the relation of privity in any legal sense. Had this judgment been granted against Lee in his lifetime, this objection would have the same force. His privity, as administrator on the estate of Lee, would have been precisely what it now is-namely, he would have been no party to the judgment, nor would he be holding any part of the estate, by virtue of his administration in Louisiana, which the judgment directly bound, or could be levied on. Yet, surely, this plea could not avail in such case; and equally clear, on the same principles, it cannot avail here. But if there were any room to distinguish the legal effect of a judgment obtained against the decedent, and one obtained by suit against his administrator, then we reply, that this suit, having 57*] *been instituted against the decedent in person, and who became party to the record, the same privity in succession connects this defendant with this record and judgment, as if the decedent had survived till the verdict was rendered against him. If the case in 16 Mass. 71, would seem to conflict with this last position, that of 3 Rand. 287, sustains a contrary rule. The authority of the late Justice Story, in his Conflict of Laws, sec. 522, has been referred to in support of the defendant's objection. In a clear case of conflict of laws, where the foreign claim was "to affect assets" of the local administrator, to the prejudice of local creditors, the rule insisted on might, to some form and extent, be applicable. But the conflict of laws, as between nations foreign to each other, not bound to recognize each other's judgments, nor to recognize the claim of the foreign creditor on the same ground as the domestic creditor-such conflict of laws is not predicable of the subsisting relations of these United States. The judgments of the several States under the Constitution and laws of Congress, before referred to, are not foreign to each other in the sense of the common law. And the Constitution of the United States secures each creditor of the different States the same rights in prosecuting his claims in any other State, whether against the living man or the estate of the dead, as are secured to the citizens of the State where the same is prosecuted. If, therefore, the rule as now contended for was intended to be asserted by Justice Story as applicable to these States, we are bound to say his assertion is without authority, and against the paramount laws of the Union. Mr. Justice Grier delivered the opinion of the court: John B. Thrasher, the plaintiff below, commenced this action by a petition (according to the practice of the courts of Louisiana) in the nature of an action of debt upon a judgment. He claimed as assignee of a judgment obtained in the Circuit Court of Claiborne County, in the State of Mississippi, by Dart & Gardner against Ann Lee, administratrix of C. S. Lee, deceased. David S. Stacy, the defendant below, is the administrator of Lee in the State of Louisiana, where he had his domicil *at [*58 the time of his death. In his pleas he has set forth six several grounds of exception against the plaintiff's right to recover, the last of which is in the nature of a demurrer to the declaration, or a denial of the plaintiff's right to recover on the case set forth in his petition. As the decision of this point will be conclusive of the whole case, it will be unnecessary to notice the others. The question presented by the demurrer is, whether the judgment against Ann Lee, the administratrix of Charles S. Lee in Mississippi, is evidence by itself sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to recover against Stacy, the administrator of the same intestate in Louisiana. Or, to state the point disconnected with the acciBut the truth is, the doctrine of personal dents of the case, Will an action of debt lie against an administrator in one of these United | the same rights of property." Greenleaf on States, on a judgment obtained against a different administrator of the same intestate appointed under the authority of another? This is a question of great practical importance, and one which, we believe, has not yet been decided. The administrator receives his authority from the ordinary or other officer of the government where the goods of the intestate are situate. But coming into such possession by succession to the intestate, and encumbered with the duty to pay his debts, he is considered in law as in privity with him, and therefore bound or estopped by a judgment against him. Yet his representation of his intestate is a qualified one, and extends not beyond the assets of which the ordinary had jurisdiction. He cannot, therefore, do any act to affect assets in another jurisdiction, as his authority cannot be more extensive than that of the government | from whom he received it. The courts of another State will not acknowledge him as a representative of the deceasd, or notice his letters of administration. See Tourton v. Flower, 3 P. Wms. 369; Borden v. Borden, 5 Mass. 67; Pond v. Makepeace, 2 Metcalf, 114; Chapman v. Fish, 6 Hill, 554, etc. Ev. sec. 523. Privies are divided by Lord Coke into three classes-1st, privies in blood; 2d, privies in law; and 3d, privies by estate. The doctrine of estoppel, however, so far as it applies to persons falling under these denominations, applies to them under one and the same principle, namely, that a party claiming through another is estopped by that which estopped that other respecting the same subject matter. Thus, an heir who is privy in blood would be estopped by a verdict against his ancestor, through whom he claims. An executor or administrator, suing or sued as such, would be bound by a verdict against his testator or intestate, to whom he is privy in law. With regard to privies in estate, a verdict against feoffer would estop feoffee, and lessor, the lessee, etc. An administrator under grant of administration in one State stands in none of these relations to an administrator in another. Each is privy to the testator, and would be estopped by a judgment against him; but they have no privity with each other, in law or in estate. They receive their authority from different sovereignties, and over different property. The authority of each is paramount to the It follows as a necessary inference from other. Each is accountable to the ordinary these well established principles, "that, where from whom he receives his authority. Nor does administrations are granted to different persons the one come by succession to the other into in different States, they are so far deemed in- the trust of the same property, encumbered by dependent of each other, that a judgment ob- the same debts, as in the case of an administained against one will furnish no right of ac- trator de bonis non, who may be truly said to tion against the other, to affect assets received have an *official privity with his prede- [*60 by the latter in virtue of his own administra-cessor in the same trust, and therefore liable tion; for in comtemplation of law there is no to the same duties. In the case of Yare v. privity between him and the other administra- Gough, Cro. Jac. 3, it was decided that an tor." See Story, Confl. of Laws, sec. 522; | administrator de bonis non could not have scire Brodie v. Bickley, 2 Rawle, 431. The same doc- facias upon a judgment obtained by his pretrine is recognized in the case of Aspden v. decessor on a debt due to the intestate "for Nixon, 4 How. 467, by this court. default of privity." But in Snape v. Norgate, Cro. Car. 167, it was decided that a scire facias would lie against an administrator de bonis non, on a judgment against the executor; and the court attempt to make a distinction between that and the preceding case, on the ground that "he cometh in place of the executor;" or in other words, by reason of an official succession or privity. These cases cannot be well reconciled on principle; but the difficulty was remedied in England by the statute of 17 Charles II. c. 8. The Court of Appeals of Virginia have considered the latter case as founded on more correct principles than the first, and have overruled the doctrine of Yare v. Gough. Dykes v. Woodhouse, 3 Randolph, 287. But it is contended, that, however applicable 59*] these principles *may be to judgments against administrators acting under powers received from States wholly foreign to each other, they cannot apply to judgments against administrators in different States of this Union, because of the provision of the Constitution, which ordains that "full faith and credit shall be given in each State to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other State." The Act of Congress of 26th May, 1790, which prescribes the mode of authenticating records, and defines their "effect," enacts, that they "shall have such faith and credit given to them in every court within the United States as they have by law or usage in the courts of the State from whence the said records are or shall be taken." The question, then, arises, what is the "effect," or the "faith and credit," given to the judgment on which this suit is brought, in the courts of Mississippi? The answer to this must be, that it is evidence, and conclusive by way of estoppel, 1st, between the same parties; 2d, privies; and 3d, on the same subject matter, where the proceeding is in rem. But the parties to these judgments are not the same. Neither are they privies. "The term privity denotes mutual succession or relationship to We may assume, therefore, that in the State of Mississippi, as in most other States in the Union, the administrator de bonis non is treated as privy with his predecessor in the trust, and estopped by a judgment against him; but the question still recurs as to the effect of a judgment in that State as against one who has neither personal nor official privity with the defendant. Each administrator is severally liable to pay the debts of the deceased out of the assets committed to him, and therein they resemble joint and several co-obligors in a bond. A judgment against one is no merger of the bond, nor is it evidence in a suit against the other. Their common liability to pay the same debt creates no privity between them, either in law or in estate. The judgment of the Circuit Court must, therefore, be reversed. Mr. Justice McLean and Mr. Justice Wayne dissented. Order. This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Louisiana, and was argued by counsel; on consideration *whereof, it is now here ordered [*62 and adjudged by this court, that the judgment of the said Circuit Court in this cause be, and the same is hereby reversed, with costs; and that this cause be, and the same is hereby remanded to the said Circuit Court, to be proceeded in according to law and justice, and in conformity to the opinion of this court. It is for those who assert this privity to show wherein it lies, and the argument for it seems to be this: that the judgment against the administrator is against the estate of the intestate, and that his estate, wheresoever situate, is liable to pay his debts; therefore the plaintiff, having once established his claim against the estate by the judgment of a court, should not be called on to make proof of it again. This argument assumes that the judgment is in rem, and not in personam, or that the estate has a sort of corporate entity and unity. But this is not true, either in fact or in legal construction. The judgment is against the person of the administrator, that he shall pay the debt of the intestate out of the funds committed to his care. If there be another administrator in another State, liable to pay the same debt, he may be subjected to a like judgment upon the same demand, but the assets in his hands can- MARY ANN VAN NESS, Plaintiff in Error, not be affected by a judgment to which he is 61*] personally a *stranger. A judgment may have the "effect" of a lien upon all the CORNELIUS P. VAN NESS, Administrator defendant's lands in the State where it is rendered, yet it cannot have that effect on lands in another State by virtue of the faith and credit given to it by the Constitution and act of Congress. The laws and courts of a State can only affect persons and things within their jurisdiction. Consequently, both as to the administrator and the property confided to him, a judgment in another State is res inter alios acta. It cannot be even prima facie evidence of a debt; for if it have any effect at all, it must be as a judgment, and operate by way of estoppel. V. of John P. Van Ness. Writ of error does not lie from order of Circuit Court to certify to court below findings of jury on an issue on trial out of court, not being final. The Act of Congress, passed on the 27th of February, 1801, 2 Stat. at Large, 103, authorizes a writ of error from this court to the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia in those cases only where there has been a final judgment, order, or decree in that court. Where the Orphans' Court directed an issue to be sent for trial in the Circuit Court, which issue was, "whether the petitioner was the widow of the deceased or not," and the Circuit Court proceeded to try the issue, and the jury, under the instructions of the court, found that the petitioner was not the widow, exceptions to these instructions cannot be reviewed by this court on a writ of error. mitted by the Circuit Court to the Orphans' Court, case of It is alleged by those who desire to elude this conclusion, while they cannot deny the correctness of the principles on which it is founded, that it is technical and theoretical, and leads to an inconvenient result. But every logical conclusion upon admitted legal principles may be liable to the same imputation. Decisions resting only on only on a supposed convenience, or principles accommodated to the circumstances of a particular case, generally form bad precedents. It may be conceded that in this case there is an apparent hardship; that the plaintiff who has established his claim after a tedious litigation in Mississippi should be compelled to go through the same troublesome process in Louisiana. But the hardship is no greater than if the administrators had been joint and several co-obligors in a note or bond. A plaintiff may be fairly presumed always to have the evidence of his demand in his possession, and the ability to establish it in any court. But if a judgment against an administrator in one State, raised up, perhaps, for the very purpose The case is this: John P. Van Ness, of the of giving the plaintiff a judgment, should be conclusive on the administrator in another same county and district, died intestate, and State, the estates of decedents would be sub-letters of administration were granted by the jected to innumerable frauds. And to what purpose is the argument that the defendant may be permitted to prove collusion and fraud, when, in order to substantiate it, he must com All the circumstances of the case are fully set forth in the opinion of the court, as delivered by Mr. Chief Justice Taney, from the commencement of which the Reporter extracts the following statement: A motion has been made to dismiss this case, which is brought here by writ of error directed to the Circuit Court for Washington County, in the District of Columbia. Orphans' Court to Cornelius P. Van Ness, his brother, who is the defendant in error. Ann Van Ness, the plaintiff in error, filed her Shortly after the letters were granted, Mary petition in the Orphans' Court, alleging that NOTE. As to what is a "final decree" or judgment of a State or other court from which appeal mence by proving a negative? This would be casting the burden of proof where it ought not to rest, and would cause much greater inconvenience and injury than any that can possibly lies, see notes to 5 L. ed. U. S. 302; 4 L. ed. U. S. result from the present decision. 97; 49 L. ed. U. S. 1001; 51 L. ed. U. S. 271; 62 L.R.A. 515. |