like the statute of any State; or the admission On the trial it was proved "that a Legislaof the State into the Union by Congress, sub-ture of the State of Michigan, duly elected sequently with the Constitution and political and returned, was organized and duly qualiorganization under which the statute was fied under the constitution of the State of passed, must bring it under our consideration Michigan on the 3d November, 1835; and that as a statute passed by the State-a competent Stevens T. Mason, having been duly elected State-leaving, as in other cases, merely its and returned, was on the same day qualified as subject matter to be examined in order to see governor, etc. That the Act entitled 'An Act if it violates or not any acts or provisions of to incorporate the members of the Detroit the general government. Young Men's Society' was approved 26th March, 1836.”

It was proved, by reputation, that John S. Horner purported to act as territorial governor of Michigan until sometime in the year 1836, and that George Morell and Ross Wilkins acted as judges until June of that year. That a session of the Territorial Court was held on the first Monday of January, 1837.

The State of Michigan was admitted into the Union by the Act of the 26th January, 1837. On the trial, the counsel moved the court to instruct the jury, that the Act "to incorporate the members of the Detroit Young Men's *Society" was not of binding force, [*380 "unless the jury should find that the State government of the State of Michigan was, at the time of the passing and approval of said act, established, and in full and legal force and operation."

The question of their competency is not, however, thus made a closed one, but may be discussed before the proper political tribunals. And where, under particular laws, their competency is not conceded, it may come under the consideration and decision of the State courts, and probably of those of the United States. All we decide in this instance is, that it is not one of the grounds for our re-examination of decision on it, under the Judiciary Act. And it is no more objectionable to shut out such a question from revision in that way, than numerous others which are not included either in the words or objects of that act. Indeed, there were, and still are, some of the highest motives of expediency and sound public policy not to entangle this court with the reconsideration in this way of a matter so purely political and often so full of party agitation. 379*] It is pretty *strong evidence that this The twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary view of the Judiciary Act, and our duties Act of 1789 provides, "that a final judgment under it, must be the correct one, when, on or decree in any suit, in the highest court of full examination of the precedents, no case can law or equity of a State in which a decision in be found where an objection of this character the suit could be had, where is drawn in questo a statute of a State has ever been sustained, tion" "the validity of a statute of, or an auor deemed even a proper ground for exception thority exercised under, any State, on the below, and afterwards brought under the re-ground of their being repugnant to the Convision of this court by a writ of error. The case | stitution, treaties, or laws of the United States, of Owings v. Speed et al. 5 Wheat. 421, be- and the decision is in favor of such their validfore cited, comes nearest to this. Taking it for ity," may be re-examined in this court by a granted, then, we have shown that the revision writ of error. in a case like this must be of a "statute" and a statute of a "State," and not of a territory, or corporation, college, or unacknowledged political body, and considering these as concessions, or admitted data, before the jurisdiction arises to issue a writ of error, and look into the subject matter of such statute in order to ascertain whether in its terms or operation it runs counter to the powers of the general government, and that it is acknowledged on both sides there is nothing exceptionable in the subject matter of this statute, it follows that there is nothing to revise or correct, which is within the purview of the judicial functions of the general government under the Judiciary Act. Let the writ of error be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

Mr. Justice McLean:

I think there is jurisdiction in this case. The Detroit Young Men's Society, in their corporate capacity, brought an action of ejectment against Scott and Boland to recover possession of the lot in question.

The deed under which the lessors of the plaintiff claimed was dated the 1st July, 1836, and was signed by three judges of the Territory of Michigan. In making the conveyance, the judges acted under a law of Congress of the 21st April, 1806. As regards this question, it is not important to examine the execution of this trust.

This act of incorporation was given in evidence, as a part of the plaintiff's title; and on the validity of the act his right to a recovery depended. The deed having been made to the lessors of the plaintiff as corporators, they could recover only in that capacity. The validity of this statute was questioned, as appears from the record, on the ground that it was passed before the State was admitted into the Union; and the court held that the statute was valid. By the Constitution, Congress has power to admit into the Union "new States." The time of admission is a question of law, and not a political question. At the present term we have had occasion to decide the date of the admission into the Union of the States of Florida and Iowa.

The above facts present the very case provided by the statute for the exercise of jurisdiction by this court. A right was set up under the statute of a State, and that statute was alleged to be repugnant to the Constitution and laws of the United States; and the decision of the State court was in favor of the validity of such statute. No case, it would seem, could arise, more completely within the letter and spirit of the twenty-fifth section.

It is said that the act upon its face does not purport to be repugnant to the Constitution or laws of the United States. If this be admitted, it by no means follows that the act is constitutional. Whether constitutional or not must be

determined by the effect of the act. But in my judgment this act is repugnant to the Constitution and laws of the Union.

power to surrender the fugitive in the federal government, as such power was not conferred by the laws of nations, but must be given by a Michigan was an organized territory of the treaty, or by reciprocal legislation. Still, as the United States. Its governor, judges, and all foreign intercourse was vested in the general other territorial officers, were in the discharge government, no part of it could be exercised by of their various functions. The sovereignty of the States without conflicting with the federal the Union extended to it. Under these cir-power. Now, the conflict of power, in the case cumstances, the people of Michigan assembled under consideration, is clear and direct. The by delegates in convention, and adopted a *two sovereignties of the State and the [*382 constitution, and under it elected members of territorial government cannot exist at the same both branches of their Legislature, governor, time within the same limits. The territorial and judges, and organized the State govern-government exists in full vigor until it is abolment. No serious objection need be made, in ished by the admission of the State. There my judgment, to the assemblage of the people was, then, a direct and irreconcilable repugin convention to form a constitution, although nance in the exercise of the sovereign power by it is the more regular and customary mode to the State, so long as the federal authority was 381*] proceed under the sanction of *an act exercised in the territory. of Congress. But until the State shall be admitted into the Union by act of Congress, the territorial government remains unimpaired.

No act of the people of a territory, without the sanction of Congress, can change the territorial into a State government. The Constitution requires the assent of Congress for the admission of a State into the Union; and "the United States guaranty to every State in the Union a republican form of government." Hence the necessity, in admitting a State, for Congress to examine its constitution.

Mr. Justice Wayne concurred, that this court had not jurisdiction in this case, but did not assent to any conclusions in the opinion on the merits in this controversy involving the political relations of Michigan with the United States before Michigan was admitted into the Union.

Mr. Justice Nelson concurred with the opinion of Mr. Justice McLean.

Order.

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the Supreme Court of the State of Michigan, and was argued by counsel; on consideration whereof, it is now here ordered and adjudged by this court, that this cause be, and the same is hereby dismissed, for the want of jurisdiction.

V.

THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES.

Maryland statute-an instrument drawn by one government on another in form of bill of exchange is not subject to protest and damages, not being governed by the law merchant.

The Act "to incorporate the members of the Detroit Young Men's Society," was the exercise of sovereign power-a power totally repugnant to the sovereignty of the Union, in its territorial form. Until the 26th of January, 1837, Michigan was not admitted into the Union and recognized as a State. Whatever effect this admission may have, by way of relation, on the exercise of the political powers of the State prior to that time, is not now a question. The question of jurisdiction relates to the time the act was passed, and its validity. THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiffs in Error, This act of incorporation was repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, under which the territorial government was organized. It was repugnant to the laws of Congress which formed that organization. It was an exercise of sovereignty incompatible with the sovereignty of the Union, in all its legal forms. And this act was declared by the Supreme Court of Michigan to be valid. I cannot conceive of a clearer case for jurisdiction. In Holmes v. Jennison, 14 Peters, 540, the governor, in the exercise of a supposed power in the State, directed a fugitive from justice, claimed by the Canadian government, to be delivered up; and the Supreme Court of that State, having brought the accused before it by a habeas corpus, remanded him to custody. This court, under the twenty-fifth section, took jurisdiction of the case, on the ground, in the language of the Chief Justice, "that the exercise of the power in question by the States is totally the Circuit Court of the United States HIS case was brought up by writ of error from contradictory and repugnant to the power granted to the United States." And again he says, "All the powers which relate to our foreign intercourse are confided to the general government." "If there was no prohibition to the States, yet the exercise of such a power on their part is inconsistent with the power upon the same subject conferred on the United States."

In the case of the United States v. The Bank of the United States (2 Howard, 711), the court is of opinion that the question on the structure of the bill is an open question, and for the first time presented to this court for decision.

The statute of Maryland of 1785, in its terms,

does not embrace a bill of exchange drawn on a foreign government.

ernment on another, as this was, is not and cannot A bill of exchange in form, drawn by one govbe governed by the law merchant, and therefore is not subject to protest and consequential damages.

THIS

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and was a continuation of the same case, between the same parties, which was reported in 2 Howard, 711.

Being sent back to the Circuit Court, it came

NOTE.-Bill of exchange, requisites of. What constitutes a bill of exchange. 3 Kent's Com. 74; Bayley on Bills, 1: Harvey v. Kay, 9 Barn. & Cress. 356; Randolph v. Parish, 9 Port. Now, in the case of Holmes, there was no Ala. 76; Potter v. Tyler, 2 Metc. 58; Miller v.

up for trial in November, 1844, when the jury, | change, drawn and dated at the Treasury Deunder the instructions of the court, found a partment of the United States, Washington, 7th verdict for the defendant below, viz., the bank.

At the trial, the following bill of exceptions was filed, which brought the case again to this court:

Bill of Exceptions.

Be it remembered, that at the sessions of April, A. D., 1838, came the United States of America into the Circuit Court of the United 383*] *States for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and impleaded the President, Directors and Company of the Bank of the United States, in a certain plea of trespass in the case, etc., in which the said plaintiffs declared (prout narr.) and the said defendants pleaded (prout pleas). And thereupon issue was joined be

tween them.

February, 1833, by the Secretary of the Treasury on the Minister and Secretary of State for the Department of Finance of the kingdom of France for 4,856,666 66-100 francs, payable at sight to the order of defendants' cashier (prout bill); and the several indorsements thereon (prout); and a writing of the same date with the said bill, under the seal of the United States and hand of the President, dated at Washington (prout); and the presentment and refusal of payment and protest of said bill, at Paris, on the 22d of March, 1833 (prout); protest, and a notice thereof by defendants, through their cashier, to the said Secretary of the Treasury, in a letter of 26th April, 1833 (prout); and the return of said bill and protest to the said Secretary of the Treasury, in a letter from the And afterwards, to wit, at a session of said said defendants' cashier, dated 13th May, 1833, court, held at the city of Philadelphia, before with an account annexed; in which letter and the Honorable Archibald Randall, judge of the account demand was made of the payment of said court, on the day of November, A. D., the principal of the said bill, with costs and 1844, the aforesaid issue between the said par- charges of protest and interest thereon, and ties came to be tried by a jury of the said dis- damages on said principal, at fifteen per cent. trict, duly impaneled (prout jury), at which day (prout letter and account); and proved the then came as well the plaintiff as the said defendant, rate of exchange to have been as therein stated; by their respective attorneys; and the jurors and gave in evidence a statute of the [*384 aforesaid, impaneled to try the issues aforesaid, State of Maryland (prout), passed in 1785, and being also called, came, and were then and there an article of the commercial code of France in due manner chosen and sworn, or affirmed, to (prout); and the correspondence (prout) betry the said issues; and, upon the trial, the tween the Secretary of the Treasury and the counsel of the said plaintiff's stated their de- defendants, concerning said bill, before and mand to be for $170,041.18, with interest—the after the drawing thereof, and proved the albalance unpaid-due to the plaintiffs as holders lowance by the Secretary of the Treasury of a of 66,692 shares of the capital stock of defend-credit for, and payment thus made, of the prinants, of $3.50 per share, being the amount of a dividend of half-yearly profits declared by the defendants in the month of July, A. D. 1834. And to maintain the said issue on the part of the plaintiffs, proved that they were then the holders of said shares of stock, and gave in evidence a resolution of the directors of the said defendants made on the 7th July, 1834 (prout), and their advertisement in one of the daily newspapers of Philadelphia (prout), and the account of the said defendants in their books with the plaintiffs for the first half-year of 1833 (prout).

And the defendants, to maintain the said issue on their part, gave in evidence a bill of exThompson, 3 Mann. & Gr. 576; Byles on Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes, 1, 4.

A check upon a bank partakes more of the character of a bill of exchange than of a promissory note. A check payable to bearer passes by delivery, and the bearer may sue on it às on an inland bill of exchange. Cruger v. Armstrong, 3 Johns. Cas. 5; Conroy v. Warren, 3 Johns. Cas. 259; Woods v. Schroeder, 4 Harr. & J. 276; Bohem v. Sterling, 7 Term. R. 430; Walker v. Geisse, 4 Wheat. 252; Serle v. Norton, 9 Mees. & W. 309; Wookey v. Pole, 4 B & Ald. 1.

A bill or note is not confined to any set form of words. But it must be absolutely and exclusively for the payment of money. Jones v. Fales, 4 Mass., 245 Lawrence v. Dougherty, 5 Yerg. 435; Ellis v. Ellis, Gow. 216; Eddison v. Collingridge, Law Jour. Rep. Com. Pleas, Sept. 1850, p. 268; Rhodes v. Lindly, 3 Hamm. 51; Atkinson v. Manks, 1 Cow. | 691: Morris v. Lee, 2 Ld. Raym. 1396; Jerome v. Whitney, 7 Johns. 321; 321; Thomas v. Roosa, 7 Johns. 461; Peay v. Pickett, 1 Nott. & McC. 254.

In England, negotiable paper must be for the payment of money in specie, and not in bank notes. But in this country a note payable in bank bills is a good negotiable note, if confined to a species of paper universally current as cash. Bayley on Bills. 6 Story on Bills, 53; Whitman v. Childress, 6

*

cipal of said bill; and further proved the presentment to the accounting officers of the treasury, and their rejection and disallowance of a claim on the part of the defendants, for a credit of the said fifteen per cent. thereon, and said cost and charges of protest (prout exemplification); and the said defendants claimed on the said trial a credit for and to set off defalk.: the same claims being, as they allege, in amount equal to the claim of the plaintiffs.

And the said plaintiffs, to rebut the aforesaid claim of the said defendants to a set-off, relied upon and gave in evidence a convention between the United States of America and France, made the 4th day of July, A. D. 1831, and Humph. (Tenn.) 303; Keith v. Jones, 9 Johns. 120; Judah v. Harris, 19 Johns. 144; Sweetland v. Craight, 15 Ohio, 118; But see McCormick v. Trotter, 10 Serg. & R. 94; Gray v. Donahoe, 4 Watts. 400; Hasbrook v. Palmer, 2 McLean, 10..

The payment must not rest upon any contingency, except the failure of the general personal credit of the person drawing or negotiating the instrument. Dawkes v. DeLorane, 3 Wils. 207; Beardsley v. Baldwin, 2 Str. 1151; Roberts v. Peake, 1 Burr. 323; Cook v. Satterlee, 6 Cow. 108; Van Vacter v. Flack, 6 Sm. & M. (Miss.) 393; Seacord v. Burling, 5 Den. 444.

The event on which the instrument is to become payable must be fixed and certain, or which must inevitably happen. Cook v. Colehan, 2 Str. 1217; Andrews v. Franklin, 1 Str. 24; 1 Wils. 262; 3 Wils. 213; Moffatt v. Edwards, 1 Carr. & Marsh. 16; Walker V. Roberts, 1 Carr. & Marsh. 590; Colehan v. Cook, Willes, 396; Pearson v. Garrett, 4 Mod. 242; Jocelyn v. Lacier, 10 Mod. 294, 316; Appleby v. Biddulph, 8 Mod. 363; Jenny v. Herle, Ld. Raym. 1361; Barnsley v. Baldwin, 7 Mod. 417; Palmer v. Pratt, 2 Bing. 185; Carlos v. Fancourt, 5 Term. 482; Worley v. Harrison, 3 Ad. & Ell. 669 Goss v. Nelson, 1 Burr. 226; Stevens v. Blunt, 7 Mass. 40.

cannot be sued; and from the unavoidable use of commercial paper by the United States, they are as much interested as the community at large in maintaining this principle.

ratified the 2d day of February, A. D. 1832 (prout same), together with an Act of Congress passed the 13th day of July, 1832 (prout), by the seventh section of which it was made the duty of the Secretary of the Treasury "to cause the several installments, with the interest pay-sue for a debt due to them as a government, able thereon, payable to the United States, in virtue of the said convention, to be received from the French government and transferred to the United States in such a manner as he may deem best, and the net proceeds thereof to be paid into the treasury." And also a letter of Edward Livingston, Department of State, dated Washington, 8th February, 1833, to Nathaniel Niles, Esq., Paris. (Prout same.)

And the counsel for the said plaintiffs requested the learned judge to charge the jury

1. That the evidence in the cause does not show a contract between the government and the bank for the sale of a bill of exchange, but an undertaking on the part of the defendants, as the agents of the plaintiff, to transfer to the United States the first installment due under the treaty with France, and that the bill was only one of the instruments for carrying the same into effect. And further, that the question of agency is for the jury to decide.

2. That the Act of Maryland of 1785, under which the defendants claim damages, does not extend to the United States.

In the present case, the United States do not but as stockholders or copartners for their proportion of the profits accruing on the use of their money, which they have invested in the stock of the corporation, and are to be treated in all respects like any ordinary stockholder, who would be bound to pay a debt due to the bank before he could sustain an action for his dividends.

The remaining objections are, that if the Maryland Act of 1785 does embrace bills drawn by government, then this, being a bill drawn on a particular fund, is not a bill of exchange in the legal meaning of the term; and that if it is such a bill, the bank was not the holder or owner of it at the time of protest, and therefore is not entitled to the damages given by the statute.

These questions appear to me to have been determined by the Supreme Court of the United States in the present cause in favor of the defendants; whether they were rightly determined, it is not for us to inquire; that determination is binding on us, and until reviewed by themselves must be considered the law of the land. If I have mistaken their views on this, or erred in any other point of the cause, it will be corrected by a re-examination of the case in that court; but a construction of their opinion, given by the jury, is only capable of being re-examined in this court, which may lead to a new trial and lengthen litigation, to the disadvantage of all parties, as it will undam,doubtedly be only finally determined in the court of the *last resort. This being, [*386 then, my view of the law, in my opinion the defendants are entitled to the verdict.

3. That the bill in question, being drawn by one government upon another and upon a particular fund, is not a bill of exchange within the legal meaning of the terms, and is not embraced by the statute.

4. That the defendants, being indorsers of the bill, and not the holders or owners at the time of protest, are not entitled to the ages, since they have not paid them.

But the court refused to instruct the jury as requested by the plaintiffs' counsel, and charged them as follows, to wit.:

It is admitted, that if this was a suit between 385*] individuals, and the *defendant was the actual owner of a bill of exchange drawn by the plaintiff on a foreign country, and protested for nonpayment, he would be entitled to the damages now claimed by the bank; but it is contended, 1st, that the evidence in this cause does not show a sale of the bill of exchange to the bank, but an agency on the part of the bank to assist in procuring the transfer of the funds to the United States. The whole of the evidence on this subject is in writing, and therefore a matter of law, and, in my opinion, establishes a clear and unequivocal sale by the United States, and purchase and payment for the bill by the bank; and that in the endeavors to collect it there was no other agency than always exists between the owner and other parties to a bill of exchange. Again, it is said, that if this was a purchase of the bill by the bank, yet the defendants cannot set off this claim, because the Act of Maryland of 1785 does not extend to bills drawn by the government of the United States. When the United States, by its authorized officer, become a party to negotiable paper, they have all the rights, and incur all the responsibility, of individuals who are parties to such instruments; there is no difference, except that the United States

And thereupon the counsel for the plaintiff's excepted.

The cause was argued by Mr. Clifford (the Attorney-General) and Mr. Nelson for the United States, the plaintiffs in error, and by Mr. Sergeant for the bank.

Mr. Clifford assigned five causes of error, viz.:

1st. That the bill upon which the damages in controversy are claimed by the defendants in error, under the circumstances stated in the record, is not a bill of exchange and embraced by the Maryland statute of 1785.

2d. That if a bill of exchange within the terms of that statute, the statute does not extend to the United States, so as to render them liable to the payment of the fifteen per cent. damages claimed by the defendants.

3d. That the evidence in the cause does not show a contract between the plaintiff's and the defendants for the sale of a bill of exchange, but an undertaking on the part of the defendants, as the agents of the government, to transfer to the United States the first installment due under the treaty with the King of the French of the 4th July, 1831, and that the bill in question was one of the instruments for accomplishing that object.

4th. That the defendants, being indorsers of the bill, and not owners or holders at the time

of protest, are not entitled to damages, since they have not paid them.

5th. That there was error in the charge of the court below in having instructed the jury that the defendants were entitled to their verdict, thus withdrawing from the consideration of the jury the facts which they alone were competent to find.

After stating these points, the Attorney-General proceeded with the argument.

13th July, 1832, 4 Statutes at Large, 574, made it "the duty of the Secretary of the Treasury to cause the several installments, with the interest thereon, payable to the United States, in virtue of the said convention, to be received from the French government, and transferred to the United States in such manner as he may deem best." Congress conferred the power to cause the fund to be received and transferred. Under this act the Secretary had no right tọ The demand of the plaintiff's is not the sub- deal in exchange, or even to draw a bill except ject of dispute. The questions to be deter- as a means to accomplish the purpose described mined grow out of the set-off filed by the de- in the act itself. The Secretary of the Treasury fendants. That claim had its origin in an took this view of the law in his letter to the unsuccessful attempt of the Secretary of the president of the bank of the 31st October, 1832. Treasury, through the medium of the Bank of He commences by referring to the convention, the United States, to transfer to this country and remarks: "The Secretary of the Treasury the first installment payable to this government being charged by the Act of 13th July last by France, under the convention of the 4th with transferring to the United States the sevJuly, 1831. He proposed to discuss very brief-eral installments receivable under the convenly the several points taken in the bill of exception, I am desirous of effecting that object in tions, at the last trial in the court below. He such a manner as may be most beneficial to the had no doubt he might properly do so, notwith-interests of the claimants for whom the money standing the cause was formally before the is to be received, and with this view I shall be court on a previous occasion, when a decision glad to receive your suggestions in regard to was pronounced upon the points then presented the transfer of the first installment. The under the bill of exceptions at that term. See 2 Howard, 711. If it were not apparent then, the facts now disclosed afford convincing proof that the record in the former cause was in 387*] many respects incomplete. *Fortunately for both parties, the present record is sufficient- | ly full, and the exceptions broad enough, to open the whole merits of the dispute, and to warrant the parties in submitting the cause to a final decision.

*bank was thus officially apprised of [*388 the convention creating the fund to be transferred, and its attention specially directed to the act of Congress devolving that duty upon the Secretary of the Treasury. It was equally well advised, that the sole purpose of the head of that department was to effect the transfer of the first installment, in a manner most beneficial to the claimants. The president of the bank, in his reply of the 5th of November, 1. He submitted first the proposition, that evidently regarded the proposition as one inthe evidence in the cause does now show a con- voking the agency of the bank. He expresses tract between the plaintiffs and the defendants himself as very willing to offer such suggesfor the sale of a bill of exchange, but an un- tions as occur to him, in regard to the transfer dertaking on the part of the defendants, as the of the first installment. "After examining the agents of the government, to transfer to the subject in all its relations, with an anxiety to United States the first installment due under make the transfer on such terms as would the treaty, and that the bill in question was merely prevent a loss to the bank," etc. Havone of the instruments for accomplishing that|ing given various suggestions, he concludes by object. saying, that the bank "is influenced exclusiveWhatever the forms may have been, this ly by the belief that any other arrangement was a public transaction between two sovereign would be less advantageous to the treasury." independent nations, for the purpose of carry-On the 26th January, 1833, the Treasury Deing into effect a treaty stipulation. In this general view the real parties are, 1st. The United States; 2d. The government of France; 3d. The Bank of the United States, at that time the fiscal agent of the government, and authorized and commissioned to demand and receive from France a certain fund, and to transfer the same to this country. Such was the purpose. The instruments executed were such as the President of the United States, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the president of the bank deemed sufficient, and best calculated to effect this object. Leaving out of view the parties to the bill in London and Paris, and supposing it to have been presented by the cashier of the bank, in whose favor it was drawn, and protested for nonpayment as in this case, but without intervention-which is the strongest view that can be taken of the case for the bank-still the letters of the parties, and other instruments executed at the date of the bill, would determine the character of the contract. The Act of Congress of the

partment notify the president of the bank of their readiness to draw on the French government for the first installment payable under the convention. On the 30th January, the reply, marked confidential, after assigning reason for increasing the rate, adds: "Without looking, therefore, to any profit on the operation, but merely with the expectation of incurring no loss upon it." On the 6th of February, the Secretary of the Treasury accepts the terms. The bill was drawn on the 7th, and refers to the convention in these words: "Being the amount of the first installment to be paid to the United States, under the convention concluded between the United States and France, of the 4th of July, 1831 (after deducting the amount of the first installment to be reserved to France under the said convention), and the additional sum of nine hundred and forty thousand francs, being one year's interest at four per cent. on all the installments payable to the United States, from the day of the exchange of the ratifications to the 2d February, 1833."