Admiral RICKOVER. Not so far as I know, sir. The same safeguards will apply. If you are talking about a Dr. Strangelove incident we have exactly the same problem with ULMS as with Polaris. There is no difference. I don't know the exact details of the system, but I know it is a pretty safe system. I suspect ULMS will have improvements in this area but I am not familiar with the details.

Senator BAKER. Apropos the point Senator Pastore was making with respect to concealability of the ULMS and the long-range missiles, is it fair to say that the command and control function for the underwater platform is not as secure as a land-based one?

Admiral RICKOVER. In one sense I think it is more secure.

Senator BAKER. Would you explain how?

Admiral RICKOVER. In a submarine you have people who are completely on the alert 24 hours a day because they have a ship actually operating. It is difficult in a land-based situation where people have nothing to do to keep operators on the alert. That isn't the situation on a submarine. It is operating submerged and people have to be on their toes every second of the time. They have to be on alert in the control room where they would receive any signals.

Senator BAKER. What about communications reliability?
Representative HOLIFIELD. What do you mean, Senator?

Senator BAKER. I am thinking of the comparative reliability of communications for the purpose of command and control for the launch of weapons from the land-based station versus an underwater system. Representative HOSMER. You always have time to wait to get the information before you are anywhere

Senator BAKER. I am not arguing the merits. I am trying to get information.

Chairman PASTORE. I think the Admiral misunderstood.

Is the question clear now?

Mr. WEGNER. From the standpoint of Polaris and ULMS, I don't think there is any difference.

Senator BAKER. That was my first question.

The question now is a comparison between the land-based system and the Polaris or ULMS.

Mr. WEGNER. I don't know the answer to that.

Mr. LEIGHTON. May I make a comment?

This is an area in which we do not have expertise. The way I would answer your question is that the area has been evaluated by the Weapons System Evaluation Group, which is an independent group, and has been carefully evaluated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and others in the Pentagon, all of whom have decided in favor of proceeding with the ULMS system.

Senator BAKER. I think it is highly likely their judgment is correct. I am not certain that is so, but in any event a resolution of that question has a very substantial bearing on the desirability of the weapons system.

Admiral RICKOVER. May I make arrangements to have someone who is familiar with this subject brief you?

Senator BAKER. You surely can, Admiral.

I might say, for your information, on the whole system of command and control and security of weapons that the staff of the joint committee has arranged for a fairly extensive briefing for me at other locations and points around the country. I intend to finish that as soon

as I can, some time this month, hopefully. After that I expect to ask the joint committee staff to inquire of you and other appropriate defense agencies if I may have a briefing on security, command, and control of submarines and other aspects of the weapons system.

Admiral RICKOVER. Once I hear from the committee staff, I will personally arrange it for you.

One difference, of course, is that the submarine is continually under U.S. command. There is no question about it. If it were with NATO, there would be a question.

Senator BAKER. There are counterbalancing forces. Obviously this is superior to the situation we have in some of these Asiatic areas where there are nuclear weapons and some eastern European areas where there are nuclear weapons. That they are in fact so inviolately in the control of American personnel is a substantial plus, but that isn't a total plus. That can be outweighed by other factors such as communications and such as the lack of positive command and con

trol

Representative HOSMER. Will the gentleman yield?

I think there is one point that should be brought out. In connection with Polaris you have longer than the 20 to 30 minutes for a landbased ICBM to exercise your decision. They can even launch a preemptive attack. Our submarine can be temporarily out of communication just by being hidden. It can eventually get the information and determine whether or not the country has been attacked or whether or not a retaliatory order has been given. In that sense it is more secure because it is not so time dependent.

Chairman PASTORE. I think Mr. Baker has brought up a very important point and I would hope the staff would look into it and see if we can't get somebody up here to answer the questions he has raised. I think these are important questions. We have been addressing in this committee right along the question of PAL's, and off the record(Comment off the record.)

Naturally a submarine is under complete control of the skipper. I think these are important questions. I think we ought to have them answered but we don't want to get into the fail-safe

Senator BAKER. I am trying to pursue this as a separate inquiry because in my mind it does bear directly on the desirability of the weapons system and, therefore, is relative to this authorization procedure.

Mr. LEIGHTON. The subject has been gone into in great length in the Pentagon. We are not expert witnesses on that.

Chairman PASTORE. I know that, so I am asking our staff to see who in the Pentagon will give us a little further information on this. Admiral RICKOVER. I would like to emphasize one point that has been mentioned. A submarine displacing [deleted] tons, must have a lot of reserve power in case something happens. It takes a lot of power to maneuver a submarine that large. I know. I am talking from personal experience because I take charge of every initial trial of every nuclear-powered submarine. If you don't have power, you can get into situations where you might lose the ship.1

Chairman PASTORE. All right, Admiral.

We have some questions we want to submit to you and we hope you will supply the answers for the record.

1 See pp. 38-41, 70-79, and 139, for additional information on Trident.

Representative HOSMER. Mr. Chairman, when you address the light water breeder, Admiral, would you specify what steps are being taken by you to see that the information is being made available to the industry.

Admiral RICKOVER. I will answer that as part of the record.

Representative HOSMER. Yes, I want you to do it as part of the

record.

Chairman PASTORE. I want to say, Admiral, that though you are never "always" right, and I have never "always" agreed with you, God bless the day when you decided to go to Annapolis.

Good-day, gentlemen.

Admiral RICKOVER. Thank you very much.

(Whereupon at 4:15 p.m. the meeting was adjourned.)

(Subsequent to the hearing Admiral Rickover submitted the following information in response to questions submitted by Chairman Pastore and Representative Hosmer.)

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

STATUS OF HIGH-SPEED SSN-688 CLASS SUBMARINE

Chairman PASTORE. What is the status of the high-speed submarine. program?

Admiral RICKOVER. Construction contracts for the first 12 submarines in the high speed SSN-688 class have been awarded. On January 8, 1972, Mrs. Holifield authenticated the keel of the lead ship of this new class named the Los Angeles class.

In the principal address at the Los Angeles keel laying ceremony, Mr. Holifield very forcefully emphasized the need for nuclear-powered warships. The Navy was also honored to have Mr. and Mrs. Price present for the keel laying. Unfortunately Senator Pastore could not be with us, but his telegram was read and appreciated by all those present.

The proposed fiscal year 1973 Department of Defense budget includes funds for construction of six Los Angeles class submarines, the 13th through 18th in the class. Also the budget includes $125 million advance procurement funds for long leadtime items for five

more.

The fiscal year 1966 shipbuilding program was the last program which included six attack submarines. Without the help of this committee and others in Congress we would not have our submarine construction program today.

At long last, the Los Angeles class is under construction. However, after several years of reviews and studies, some systems analysts in the Department of Defense still persist in questioning the need for high speed attack submarines. The issue of building high-speed submarines has been argued out time and time again, but the systems analysts continue to ask the Navy for more studies and cost estimates to resume construction of the slower SSN-637 class attack submarine. Presently the Navy's attack submarine construction program is based on continuing construction of the high speed Los Angeles class. These submarines with their improved capabilities are urgently needed and I strongly urge this committee to continue its support for the high speed attack submarine program.

22-214-74—6

NEED FOR ULMS SUBMARINES

Chairman PASTORE. Admiral, could you summarize for us what you see as the need for the proposed ULMS program?

Admiral RICKOVER. Yes, sir; in doing so I will repeat some of the information in my testimony so as to summarize my views on the ULMS program in one place.

A nuclear war deterrent exists only as long as the potential enemy believes he cannot effectively counter it. Our Polaris/Poseidon missile submarine force is such a deterrent. We have no reason to believe the Soviets can neutralize it today. However Polaris/Poseidon is recognized by the Soviets as a potential threat to them, and they are expanding major resources trying to neutralize it. The Soviets have been working toward that goal since the first Polaris submarine went to sea 12 years ago.

The Soviets have been investing heavily in antisubmarine warfare research and development, and have built and continue to build improved nuclear attack submarines-one of their best ASW weapons. They also have invested large resources in ASW surface ships. Also, we know the Soviets are attempting to establish a [deleted] area antisubmarine surveillance system presumably aimed at locating our Polaris/Poseidon submarines.

Meanwhile the Soviets are continuing to expand rapidly their own ballistic-missile submarine program. They now have in operation about 20 nuclear and diesel ballistic-missile submarines of older classes and about 26 of the new Yankee class; 16 other Yankee class submarines are in various stages of completion and they are [deleted] expanding their submarine building facilities. They already have the largest and most modern submarine building yards in the world which give them several times the nuclear submarine construction capacity possessed by the United States.

Also, the Soviets have tested a new long range missile. This new missile could give their submarines the capability to strike us from points only a few days from Soviet bases. In a sense, the Soviets may already be building their equivalent of our ULMS missile. These developments increase the threat to our land based strategic forces and increase the reliance we must place on our sea based strategic deterrent. The Soviets are credited with a nuclear submarine production capability of 20 ships a year on a single shift basis. They have the facilities to increase this rate of production considerably. At present, while our Poseidon conversions are going on, the maximum U.S. capacity to build nuclear submarines is less than half that of the Soviets. Upon completion of these conversions-about 1977-the best we could do with our present facilities would still be well below the Soviet capacity.

Our Polaris/Poseidon submarines are limited in their patrol area by the range of their missiles. This forces our submarines to operate in close range to foreign shores, thus bringing them within range of Soviet shore based aircraft. This limited patrol area simplifies the Soviet antisubmarine problem by allowing them to concentrate their sea and air forces in a much smaller area. The ocean patrol area available to our submarines increases by more than the square of the missile's range. Thus, with a longer range missile, ULMS submarines will have significantly more ocean area in which to operate. ULMS

will not require foreign basing and can be within firing range of the targets as soon as they leave U.S. ports. ULMS will incorporate improvements in quieting and other features which decrease chance of detection. All of these improved features can only be achieved by building new ULMS submarines.

The Soviets have a more modern ballistic missile fleet than we do. They are building more missile launching submarines today, while we funded our last Polaris construction in fiscal year 1964, and finished it in 1967.

By the time the first ULMS submarine is built and tested, our first Polaris submarine will be 20 years old and with no further capacity for modernization. ULMS will not only augment our sea based strategic forces; it will also provide for orderly replacement as our Polaris submarines reach the end of their useful lives. These submarines operate at sea a higher fraction of the time than our other naval ships since we operate them with two crews. Their heavy duty cycle causes them to age even though we do as much maintenance as we can in the time available. When the major machinery wears out it would be very expensive to replace it. Further, even if we went to the expense of rebuilding our present fleet of Poseidon submarines to extend their life, we could not incorporate the basic improvements planned for ULMS submarines. These improvements are necessary to increase the survivability and reliability of the new submarines.

You will recall that the Washington Naval Conference of 1921 provided that no new capital ships except those already being constructed, were to be laid down for 10 years thereafter. [Deleted.] Even now, the earliest possible date we could get the first ULMS submarine to sea is the late seventies. By that time, the Soviets could have twice as many submarine launched missiles as we have.

Modern complex defense systems take many years to design, develop, and produce. ULMS has already been in the research and development stages for 3 years. We have given the system careful evaluation during this period and we are now ready to move into detailed design and construction.

The Soviets have a growing nuclear weapons capability. As Secretary of Defense Laird has said:

"It would be diplomatically and politically unacceptable for the United States to allow the Soviets to achieve a large numerical superiority in both land based and sea based strategic missiles. Moreover, there would be an increasing military risk."

Because of the rapidly increasing Soviet strategic forces I fully support proceeding on an urgent basis with he ULMS program in accordance with the funding plan included in the President's fiscal year 1973 budget. In addition to research and development funds, this plan provides just enough shipbuilding funds-$361 million SCN in fiscal year 1973-to get manufacturers of long lead components to establish and commit sufficient manufacturing facilities for these components to establish and commit sufficient manufacturing facilities for these components so as to permit orderly ship construction schedules. These funds are required for ship design, for ordering the longest lead time items for the first [deleted] ships and for some components for the [deleted] ship.