Based on current evidence, the November class is now given a [deleted] knot capability and we have [deleted] that the new streamlined Victor class can do at least [deleted] knots, [deleted] knots more than the previous estimate. The Soviet ballistic-missile nuclear powered submarine, the Yankee class, is estimated to be capable of making [deleted] knots. Compare the November class, the Soviets' first nuclear attack submarine, to our Nautilus. The Nautilus has a maximum speed submerged of about [deleted] knots which is some [deleted] knots less than the November class. The latest U.S. class of nuclear attack submarines, the Sturgeon class, has a maximum underwater speed of about [deleted]. The new nuclear submarines are [deleted] quieter than the earlier nuclear submarines, and it is certain that the Soviets are accelerating their efforts in this field. [Deleted.] Soviet submarines continue to operate out-of-area for longer periods and at greater distances than ever before. They actively use mobile task forces where the submarines are repaired from tenders-seagoing bases-while they are underway, thus vastly expanding their operating capability. These sea-going tenders can remain at sea for 6 months. One of these tenders accompanied by one small support ship has supported four submarines for 6 months, servicing and repairing them while they are underway. The Russians have 16 large submarine tenders and 6 small ones which can service the larger tenders. This type of operation permits the Soviets to substantially increase the time-on-station of their submarines. With this system, a submarine from the Russian Northern Fleet can leave its home base, run a patrol in the Atlantic, steam to Cape Verde off the coast of Africa, get refurbished and have a rest period alongside the tender, run a patrol in the Atlantic, and then go home. This shows great imagination and ability in operating submarines. With these assets they can make up a task force, move into the Indian Ocean, the South Pacific, the South Atlantic, or into any other area they wish. They transfer submarines from the Pacific to the Atlantic through the northern route in the summer. They transfer submarines from their Northern Fleet around South America to Vladivostok. They move nuclear submarines from the Northern Fleet under the ice cap, then under the North Pole, and finally through the Bering Straits to the Pacific. In 1972 Soviet FBM operations continued as in 1971. There were over 20 Yankee class SSBN missile patrols in the Atlantic during the year [deleted]. [Deleted.] Soviet submarine deployments to the Mediterranean continue to be made almost exclusively by Northern Fleet units. Out-of-area submarine ship days increased [deleted] over 1971. Normally six to eight diesel attack submarines are deployed and mass transits and turnovers continue to be observed every six months. The impressive threat to 6th Fleet ships posed by Soviet Charlie (SSGN), Victor (SSN), and Juliett (SSG) class submarines is a continuing one and the deployment patterns of these submarines enable cruise-missile coverage of both Mediterranean CVA's [deleted]. [Deleted] these submarines are operating in close proximity of the carriers, while the Juliett maintains centralized station with its longer range cruise missiles to target United States and friendly CVA's. The Soviet Union maintained either diesel or nuclear submarines in other strategically important ocean areas in 1972 [deleted]. Soviet naval deployments to the Caribbean continued during the past year and it is significant that a GOLF II ballistic missile submarine rendezvoused with a submarine tender in Cuba in April 1972. This represented the first visit of a Soviet ballistic missile submarine to any foreign country. Overall Soviet submarine out-of-area deployments increased [deleted] in 1972. The expanded construction capability, the appearance of new classes of submarines and the changing operational patterns all point to major advances in submarine capabilities and characteristics [deleted]. SPEED Soviet diesel submarines have been observed to make a maximum speed [deleted]. This speed compares favorably to our later classes of diesel submarines; however, the Soviet diesel submarine endurance is [deleted] that of the majority of U.S. diesels. [Deleted.] The new Charlie class cruise missile attack submarine has an estimated capability of [deleted] knots. The older November class attack boats are now credited with a maximum sustained speed of [deleted] knots. The earlier nuclear powered missile submarines are given about a [deleted] capability. In comparison, the most advanced U.S. nuclear attack submarines operational today can make a maximum speed [deleted] knots. The USS Skipjack, first of the high speed attack submarines built in 1959 can make [deleted] knots. However, due to increased weight brought about by additional military features, the speed of our submarines has steadily decreased over the years. The changing relationship in maximum speed capability between U.S. and Soviet nuclear attack submarines is shown below. This does not include the new U.S. high speed submarine (SSN-688 class) which is currently estimated will have a [deleted] capability. The technical problems facing the Soviets in nuclear propulsion plants up to the early 1960's have seemingly been resolved. Consid erable confidence appears to have been gained. Nuclear submarines are now operating independently, without escorts or prepositioned emergency assistance, over long distances remote from home, occasionally under ice, and for extended periods of time. Unsupported SSBN operations in excess of 60 days now appear to be routine. In one instance a nuclear submarine has remained at sea for an extended period [deleted] during which it was supported by a underway support group. In contrast, as recently as 1963 these submarines rarely left local waters and then only when accompanied by supporting surface ships. OPERATING DEPTHS The operating depths of Soviet nuclear submarines [deleted]. [Deleted.] NOISE WEAPONS Weapons available to the Soviet submarine forces include torpedoes mines, cruise and ballistic missiles. TORPEDOES AND MINES Current operational torpedoes include anti-surface ship and acoustic homing ASW weapons, some of the latter having active/passive capabilities. Soviet torpedoes have performance characteristics comparable to U.S. torpedoes. Development programs indicate a continuing emphasis on more sophisticated and longer-range torpedoes for both roles. It is believed that the Soviets have for some years had nuclear warheads available for these weapons [deleted]. The Soviet have historically regarded naval mines as essential and highly effective weapons for delivery by a variety of carriers. Their present stockpile is estimated to contain large numbers of conventional moored and bottom types, of both contact and influence variety [deleted]. MISSILES The submarine missile inventory includes the SS-N-3 [deleted], SS-N-7 [deleted] cruise missiles and the SS-N-4, SS-N-5, SS-N-6 and SS-N-8 ballistic missiles. SS-N-3 The SS-N-3 is a surface-launched turbojet cruise missile with an estimated capability [deleted] to a maximum [deleted] range of 400 NM. [Deleted.] Although the SS-N-3 [deleted] is believed to be primarily designed for use against naval surface vessels [deleted] could be employed in the strategic attack mission against land targets. [deleted]. SS-N-7 The SS-N-7 is a [deleted] cruise missile with a maximum operational range of about [deleted] NM. [Deleted.] SS-1 The first known sea-launched ballistic missile was a naval variant of SS-1, the first Soviet ballistic missile, which became operational in 1957. Between 1956 and 1958, it is believed that a variant of the SS-1 was fired by some of the [deleted] Zulu-conversion SSB's. The first generation Soviet sea-launched ballistic missile had a range [deleted]. SS-N-4 Firings of the [deleted] surface-launched SS-N-4 began sometime in 1958 and initial use by the fleet was reached about 1960. All GOLF class SSB's as well as all HOTEL class SSBN's were originally equipped to fire the SS-N-4. SS-N-5 In mid-1962, a modified GOLF class SSN began test firings of a 700 nautical mile ballistic missile, the [deleted] SS-N-5. Initial operation was reached in 1963 with conversion of the first HOTEL class SSBN for firing the SS-N-5 vice SS-N-4. [Deleted.] SS-N-6 First introduced in 1968, this missile increased Soviet [deleted] ballistic missile range potential from 700 to 1,300 miles. [Deleted.j It is deployed in the 16-tube Yankee class SSBN's. SS-N-8 The SS-N-8 may be the SAWFLY, paraded for the first time in November 1967. SAWFLY is a [deleted] missile, claimed by the Soviets to be underwater-launched [deleted] and to have an operational range of "slightly greater than Poseidon". In fact, the SS-N-8, [deleted] is now assessed to have a 4,000 NM [deleted] range, three times that of the SS-N-6. [Deleted.] The Delta class is believed to carry 12 of these missiles. APPENDIX V STATUS OF SOVIET SURFACE FLEET March 1973 [Deleted.] SOVIET SURFACE FLEET progress The developments in the Soviet surface fleet have in many respects paralleled what we have seen in their submarine arm. Where has been noted as phenomenal in submarines, there are areas in naval surface ships equally as impressive. In 1972 Soviet naval development continued trends of steady growth in force level and a high tempo of operational deployment in foreign waters. The cumulative impact of this growth in size, sophistication, staying and striking power over the last decade has confirmed the status of the U.S.S.R. as a great sea power. Most of the impetus for this development is derived directly from the Soviet desire to maintain a military posture capable of coping effectively with that of the United States. But some of the impetus stems from a historical drive for decisive influence on the seas. Concurrently with this increase in strength, Soviet naval doctrine has been expanded. Doctrinal statements and writings over the past several years have stressed the independent, far-ranging, offensive nature of the navy's mission. The thrust of these assertions projects the navy's role beyond the defensive and retaliatory contexts adhered to in the past. BACKGROUND Immediately following World War II, the U.S.S.R. embarked on a program to reconstruct and improve war-damaged shipyards, to build new facilities and to construct new naval ships. The program was unprecedented in size and effort for a nation not at war. This period can be divided into four somewhat overlapping stages: the first corresponding roughly to a decision to build naval ships and to rebuild shipyards, the second calling for preparation and execution of plans to replace wartime losses and to construct a force capable of defending the sea frontiers of the U.S.S. R., the third requiring the introduction of wholly modern units, and the fourth initiating qualitative refinement of the present fleet and development of new classes of ships and weapons. |