Opinion Per Curiam. diction, and its decision thereon shall be final; provided, however, in case the final action of the board denies the right of claimant to participate at all in such fund on the ground that the injury was selfinflicted or on the ground that the accident did not arise in the course of employment, or upon any other ground going to the basis of the claimant's right, the claimant may appeal to the court of common pleas and be entitled to a trial in the ordinary way. It was under this provision that the first appeal was taken and an award made in the common pleas court. The right of the claimant to participate in the insurance fund, having been established in that proceeding, and that award having been certified to the Industrial Commission, the claim should have been thereafter treated in all respects as if the award had been rendered by such commission. Roma v. The Industrial Commission, 97 Ohio St., 247. Under the provisions of Section 1465-86, General Code, the Industrial Commission then had continuing jurisdiction of such matter, just the same as if the award had been made the claimant by the Industrial Commission instead of by the court upon appeal, and it was the duty of the Industrial Commission thereafter to consider and determine whether the physical condition of the claimant resulting from injuries sustained by her was such as to entitle her to continued payment of installments from the insurance fund. It is apparent that the Industrial Commission misconceived its duty in the premises, and not only Opinion Per Curiam. refused payment, but refused to consider the question of whether the claimant was entitled to any further payment, upon the ground that the entire matter had been adjudicated in a former proceeding in the common pleas court and the Industrial Commission had no further jurisdiction in the matter. Under the statute it was the clear duty of the commission, under its continuing jurisdiction as provided in Section 1465-86, General Code, to inquire and ascertain whether the claimant was entitled to further compensation. The statute at that time made no provision whatever for appeal from the action of the commission denying the right to continue to participate in said fund, and in the absence of such provision the right of appeal does not exist. For failure of the Industrial Commission to recognize and exercise its jurisdiction and consider the merits of the plaintiff's application for further compensation, the remedy was therefore not by way of appeal. Judgment reversed and judgment for plaintiff in error. NICHOLS, C. J., JONES, MATTHIAS, JOHNSON, and ROBINSON, JJ., concur. MERRELL, J., not participating. Statement of the Case. THE HIGBEE Co. v. JACKSON, ETC. Negligence-Master and servant - Respondeat superior-Scope of employment - Employe violates instructions - Automobiles -Infant or trespasser injured on truck - Liability of owner — Wanton and wilful negligence-Violation of statute or ordinance Questions for jury-Negligence and proximate cause. 1. Where an employe, to whom the owner has committed the operation of an auto-truck in the owner's business, permits an infant to ride on the truck in violation of his instructions and the infant is injured by the wanton and wilful conduct of the employe, while in the course and in the scope of his employment, the owner is responsible. 2. Where one is a trespasser on an auto-truck, which has been committed to an employe by the owner for operation in the owner's business, and the trespasser is injured by the wanton and wilful conduct of the employe while in the course and within the scope of his employment and while aware of a perilous position of the trespasser, the owner is responsible. 3. To constitute wanton negligence it is not necessary that there should be ill-will toward the person injured, but an entire absence of care for the safety of others, which exhibits indifference to consequences, establishes legal wantonness. Such a mental attitude distinguishes wrongs caused by wanton negligence from torts arising from mere negligence. 4. The simple violation of a statute or ordinance does not of itself constitute wilful and wanton negligence. The question whether there was such negligence, and if so whether it was the proximate cause of injury in a particular case, is one of fact to be determined by the jury in the light of all of the facts and circumstances shown by the evidence under proper instructions. (No. 16388-Decided February 24, 1920.) CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals of Cuyahoga county. Walter Jackson, an infant, brought suit by his next friend against The Higbee Company, a corporation engaged in the business of general mer Statement of the Case. chandising at Cleveland. The petition avers that the defendant owned and operated numerous automobiles for the delivery of its goods to its customers in the city of Cleveland and other cities and villages in Cuyahoga county; that on or about the 19th of September, 1916, about 7:30 P. M., one of its trucks in charge of a driver was being driven in a westerly direction on Euclid avenue in Cleveland, which at all of the times and places involved was much traveled by vehicular traffic; that as the truck passed the plaintiff and a companion, who were standing on the sidewalk, the driver recklessly permitted the boys to ride on the left-hand running board and cling to the side of the automobile as it ran along the street; that the driver of the automobile, while the said infant who was about 14 years old was on said running board, with full knowledge of the infant's perilous and dangerous position wilfully, wantonly, recklessly, negligently, and in violation of the statutory law of Ohio and an ordinance of the city of Cleveland, ran said automobile from the right, or north, side of the avenue over the center line and on to and along the left, or south, side, and ran the same at an excessive and unlawful rate of speed, to-wit, forty-five miles and hour; and that while so running the machine the defendant, through its operator, ran it on to and against a wagon, which was then and had been proceeding in an easterly direction on the south side of the avenue, and jammed and injured plaintiff in a manner detailed in the petition, to his damage in the sum of $10,000. A copy of the ordinance of the city requiring vehicles Opinion, per JOHNSON, J. to keep to the right side of the street, except when necessary to turn to the left when crossing or overtaking another vehicle, is attached to the petition. Defendant in its answer admits it is engaged in business in Cleveland and that it owned and operated automobiles for delivery of its merchandise, and denies the other allegations of the petition. It avers that plaintiff's injuries were caused by his own negligence and carelessness. At the conclusion of the plaintiff's evidence the trial court, on motion of the defendant, directed a verdict for the defendant. The judgment entered on this verdict was reversed by the court of appeals. That court included in its entry a statement that the judges finding that the judgment upon which they had agreed is in conflict with the judgment pronounced on the same question by the court of appeals of the eighth appellate district, in GoffKirby Coal Co. v. Skufca, 9 Ohio App., 177, therefore certified the record of this case to this court for review and final determination. Messrs. Howell, Roberts & Duncan, for plaintiff in error. Mr. S. V. McMahon and Mr. F. W. Zimmerman, for defendant in error. JOHNSON, J. Under the circumstances of this case was the injured infant entitled to invoke the rule respondeat superior? The answer to this question disposes of the entire case. The trial court having sustained the motion for a directed verdict at the close of plaintiff's testi |