Opinion, per WANAMAKER, J. You cannot have intelligent legislation without intelligent definition, and definition necessarily presupposes classification. In definition we have two propositions involved: first, the genus of the thing defined, and, second, the differentia, or the things by which the particular thing defined is distinguished from other things of its class or group. In the nature of things, it would be impossible by any single ordinance or statute to include all of the things and persons under all circumstances that it was sought to regulate, hence legislative bodies have been given wide latitude in the exercise of their discretion in making classification of things or persons upon which any given ordinance or statute shall operate. The subject of classification in the exercise of legislative power has been before this court in a number of cases. In a consideration of the plumber's act, in State v. Gardner, 58 Ohio St., 599, the act was held unconstitutional because of an unreasonable classification between individuals engaged in the business of plumbing and firms and corporations engaged in the business of plumbing. The individual as such was required to secure a license, but that could be avoided if he became a member of a firm or a corporation, and this court wisely held that that was not the equal protection of the laws. In the third paragraph of the syllabus of that case the court laid down this fundamental doctrine: "But it is essential to the validity of an act undertaking to regulate the business, that it shall, in its requirements, operate equally." Opinion, per WANAMAKER, J. The legislative right to classification is further discussed in the case of Gentsch v. State, ex rel. McGorray, 71 Ohio St., 151. The first paragraph of the syllabus reads: "Classification is often proper and sometimes necessary in legislation, in order to define the objects on which a general law is to take effect and in order to definitely apply and effectuate the purposes of the legislation; but when classification is unnecessary, arbitrary, fictitious or otherwise faultily made and is used to evade the constitutional limitations under the form of general legislation, such legislation in relation to a class may be both special and unconstitutional." In a later case, The Steele, Hopkins & Meredith Co. v. Miller, 92 Ohio St., 115, the same doctrine is discussed in the second proposition of the syllabus: "A statute is general and uniform, within the requirements of the constitution, if it operates equally upon every person and locality within the circumstances covered by the act, and when a classification has a reasonable basis it is not invalid merely because not made with exactness or because in practice may result in some inequality." it This question has been before the supreme court of the United States more often probably than before any state court, by reason of the 14th Amendment, which directly and expressly guarantees "the equal protection of the laws." A case most often cited on this doctrine is that of the Central Lumber Co. v. South Dakota, 226 U. S., 157. Justice Opinion, per WANAMAKER, J. Holmes in that case lays down the following doctrine, at page 160: "If the legislature shares the now prevailing belief as to what is public policy and finds that a particular instrument of trade war is being used against that policy in certain cases, it may direct its law against what it deems the evil as it actually exists without covering the whole field of possible abuses, and it may do so none the less that the forbidden act does not differ in kind from those that are allowed." This doctrine would seem to squarely authorize the city of Xenia to deal against the evil of temporary obstructions by a single ordinance, and leave the subject of permanent obstructions to future legislation, without impairing the ordinance relative to either. To the same effect, Justice Holmes continues: "If a class is deemed to present a conspicuous example of what the legislature seeks to prevent, the Fourteenth Amendment allows it to be dealt with although otherwise and merely logically not distinguishable from others not embraced in the law." In Middleton v. Texas Power & Light Co., 249 U. S., 152, Mr. Justice Pitney says, at page 157: "There is a strong presumption that a legislature understands and correctly appreciates the needs of its own people, that its laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience, and that its discriminations are based upon adequate grounds. The equal protection clause does not require that state laws shall cover the entire field of proper legislation in a single enactment. If one entertained the Opinion, per WANAMAKER, J. view that the act might as well have been extended to other classes of employment, this would not amount to a constitutional objection." In a recent Ohio case, Hall, Supt. of Banks, v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U. S., 539, Mr. Justice McKenna, in discussing the Blue Sky Law of Ohio, which was claimed to be unconstitutional upon the ground of its discriminations amounting to a denial of the equal protection of the laws, said at page 556: "We cannot give separate attention to the asserted discriminations. It is enough to say that they are within the power of classification which a State has. A State 'may direct its law against what it deems the evil as it actually exists without covering the whole field of possible abuses, and it may do so none the less that the forbidden act does not differ in kind from those that are allowed." " He then cites and approves the doctrine announced in Central Lumber Co. v. South Dakota, supra. This court had before it in a recent case, Yee Bow v. City of Cleveland, 99 Ohio St., 269, this identical question as to classification and exemption, and this court unanimously concurred in the following paragraph of the syllabus: "When a city has the right, under its police power, to impose regulations upon a business, the validity of an ordinance cannot be attacked merely because its scope was not extended to cover the entire field of possible abuses which such ordinance seeks to prevent." The test, derived from the doctrines announced in both federal and state courts relative to classifica Opinion, per WANAMAKER, J. tion, is this: Is there a real and substantial distinction in the classification attempted, or is it merely artificial, arbitrary or fictitious, made for the purpose of avoiding constitutional requirements? The classification into things temporary and permanent is of such long standing, and so general in its application to all kinds of conditions and structures that to ask the question is to affirmatively answer it. Legislation for years has recognized this distinction in many departments of activity— the itinerant or temporary vendor as distinguished from the resident merchant; the itinerant doctor as distinguished from the resident physician, etc. These classifications, so far as they relate to such substantial distinctions, have always been upheld as within the constitutional provisions. Such has not only been the understanding and application in the courts of law, but likewise in the court of the common people in their daily transactions. The very context of the body of this ordinance clearly shows that it could have no possible relation or effect upon permanent obstructions, and the proviso would therefore be only so much verbal surplusage. The ordinance, in effect, gives a temporary license "to place or deposit any street, alley, sidewalk, coal, box, barrel, crate, * * * * upon any wood, for such rea sonable time as may be actually necessary for receiving or discharging the same from some store, building or other place." So that we have here the nature of the deposit, which is free and unattached from the public street, and the temporary use of the street for such pur |