Opinion, per ROBINSON, J.

court, where the opinion states the law, and the syllabus or headnote prepared by the reporter, or the editor, states a synopsis of what he conceives the court to have decided), the practitioner and the court are often misled into following the less accurate and less authoritative statement of a proposition.

If the bench and bar in the consideration of Ohio cases were to keep Rule 6 in mind, and the comparative authority of the syllabus and the opinion, the administration of the law in Ohio would more nearly approach an exact science.

Naturally the query, why then an opinion, since the court is bound only by the language of the syllabus. A satisfactory answer is difficult. However, in so far as an opinion applies the law to the facts of the case, and states the process of reasoning by which the court arrived at its judgment and its declaration of the law in the syllabus, it undoubtedly serves a useful purpose. Beyond that it may indicate rather the divergence of the opinion of the member rendering the same from the judgment of the majority, and become the cradle of legal heresy and serve to befog and unsettle rather than to clarify and establish the law.

The judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

NICHOLS, C. J., JOHNSON and AVERY, JJ., concur. JONES, MATTHIAS and WANAMAKER, JJ., dissent.

Statement of the Case.

THE STATE OF OHIO V. NIETO.

Criminal law-Carrying concealed weapons-Section 12819, General Code-No exception as to home, when-Charge to jury - Carrying of weapon in bunkhouse.

On the trial of one accused of the crime of carrying concealed weapons, as defined by Section 12819, General Code, where the evidence is that the accused, at the time he was carrying the weapon concealed on his person, was in a bunkhouse, belonging to his employer, where he and other employes of the same employer lived and slept during their employment, a charge of the court that if this bunkhouse was the accused's place of living, where he slept, then it was his home, and he had a right, as a matter of law, to carry a weapon concealed on his person while in that bunkhouse, and must be acquitted of the charge in the indictment, is erroneous. The statute makes no such exceptions.

(No. 16624-Decided December 6, 1920.)

EXCEPTIONS by the Prosecuting Attorney to the Decision of the Court of Common Pleas of Stark county.

At the January term, 1920, of the court of common pleas of Stark county, Mike Nieto was indicted and tried for the crime of carrying concealed weapons, as defined by Section 12819, General Code, the indictment charging that he did on or about the 26th day of December, 1919, unlawfully and feloniously "carry concealed on and about his person a certain dangerous weapon, to-wit, a revolver." The verdict of the jury was "Not guilty."

There were but three witnesses testifying at the trial, two private police officers and the accused himself. The testimony of the police officers was to the effect that, having been called to the plant of

Statement of the Case.

the United Alloy Steel Company in the northeastern end of the town of Alliance, on the morning of the 26th day of December, 1919, they went there at about 6 or 6:30 o'clock, to a bunkhouse on that property, which was known as Bunkhouse No. 2, and was one of a camp of some six or seven bunkhouses between plants A and B of the United Alloy Steel Company; that they found the accused, Mike Nieto, a Mexican in the employ of the United Alloy Steel Company, reclining uncovered, but fully dressed, on a bunk within the same; that he had his coat on and was lying in a half-reclining position on his right side, propped up on one arm, and was a little drunk; and that they searched through his clothes on his left-hand side and then turned him over to search on the other side, whereupon a pistol containing four loaded cartridges dropped out of his right-hand trousers pocket onto the bunk upon which he was lying.

It is apparent from the testimony why these police officers went there on that morning. It was because of a complaint they had received from the cook of the camp, denied, however, by the accused, that the accused while drunk on the night before had threatened to kill the cook with the pistol in question.

This bunkhouse was provided by the United Alloy Steel Company and was occupied by some twenty or thirty other men, who, with the accused, were employes of that company and worked at that plant.

The testimony of the accused was to the effect that the bunk upon which he was lying was his

Counsel for Parties.

bunk, that is, it had been assigned to him by his employer's foreman; that he had been living there in that bunkhouse for a couple of months while working there in the employ of the United Alloy Steel Company; and that he did not have this pistol in his pocket, but had it under his pillow instead.

The court in its charge to the jury said, in part: "Something has been said about the place at which this defendant was arrested. I say to you, gentlemen, that if at the time of his arrest on the 26th day of December, 1919, this defendant, Mike Nieto, lived at Bunkhouse No. 2 where he was arrested, if that was his place of living, where he slept, then that was his home, and being his home he had a right, I say to you, as a matter of law, to have a pistol, either loaded or empty, with him and in his possession, or concealed on his person. And if you find that that was his home, his place of sleeping and staying then I say to you it is your duty and you shall return a verdict finding this defendant not guilty."

To this charge the prosecuting attorney excepted, and, under the provisions of Sections 13681 to 13684, inclusive, General Code, brings the case here on his bill of exceptions, in order that this court may render a decision upon the point presented therein, to determine the law to govern in a similar case.

Mr. Walter S. Ruff, prosecuting attorney, for the exceptions.

Mr. Abram W. Agler, against the exceptions.

Opinion, per AVERY, J.

AVERY, J. There is no doubt in our minds that the court of common pleas erred in its charge to the jury in this case, in the respect excepted to by the prosecuting attorney.

Section 12819, General Code, since its amendment in 1917 (107 O. L., 28), reads as follows:

"Whoever carries a pistol, bowie knife, dirk, or other dangerous weapon concealed on or about his person shall be fined not to exceed five hundred dollars, or imprisoned in the county jail or workhouse not less than thirty days nor more than six months, or imprisoned in the penitentiary not less than one year nor more than three years. Provided, however, that this act (G. C. 12819) shall not affect the right of sheriffs, regularly appointed police officers of incorporated cities and villages, regularly elected constables, and special officers as provided by sections 2833, 4373, 10070, 10108 and 12857 of the General Code to go armed when on duty. Provided further, that it shall be lawful for deputy sheriffs and specially appointed police officers, except as are appointed or called into service by virtue of the authority of said sections 2833, 4373, 10070, 10108 and 12857 of the General Code to go armed if they first give bond to the state of Ohio, to be approved by the clerk of the court of common pleas, in the sum of one thousand dollars, conditioned to save the public harmless by reason of any unlawful use of such weapons carried by them; and any person injured by such improper use may have recourse on said bond."

This statute is plain and unambiguous in its terms. It contains no exception in favor of place.