Opinion, per MERRELL, J. et al., Exrs., 30 Ohio St., 647, and First Natl. Bank of New Bremen v. Burns et al., 88 Ohio St., 434.) Applying this doctrine to the facts of the instant case we have apparently the situation of the insurer issuing to the insured a contract which the former knows to be void and worthless from its inception. Pursuing the supposed case further we find the insured, having suffered a loss, endeavoring to recover under a contract concededly void unless the effect of the restrictive provisions of the policy can be avoided by parol evidence of the true situation as between the insured and the insurer, the latter of course represented by its agent. That parol evidence cannot be received to vary or modify the terms of the written policy is the substantial ground of the decision in Northern Assurance Co. v. Grand View Bldg. Assn., supra. At page 361 Justice Shiras says: "Contracts in writing, if in unambiguous terms, must be permitted to speak for themselves, and cannot by the courts, at the instance of one of the parties, be altered or contradicted by parol evidence, * * * this principle is applicable to cases of insurance contracts as fully as to contracts on other subjects.' Two further steps in the process of reasoning led the court to a final judgment for the insurance company. They are, first, "The insured is presumed, as matter of law, to be aware of such limitations" the voidance and non-waiver clauses and, second, "There is no finding that the agent communicated to the company * * the fact that there was existing insurance on the property, Opinion, per MERRELL, J. and that he had undertaken to waive the applicable condition." It is impossible to accept this reasoning. It is indeed true that the insured cannot by parol vary a written obligation by which he has undertaken. to be bound, or one which he has accepted as the measure of his rights, either knowing its contents or having had a reasonable opportunity to know them. In either case he is held to the terms of the writing because he has made it his own. This is quite another thing from presuming him to know what in fact he does not know. If in such case he is held to the terms of a writing which he has not read, it is because his neglect to read after opportunity to do so is his deliberate acceptance of the writing, or, rather, his election to be bound thereby, whatever its contents. If, again, in such case, the insured is deprived of his fancied security by the express terms of the written policy, he cannot plead his own neglect to circumvent the consequence of a written contract, which, so far as is known by the other contracting party, is in all respects open and fair. These observations, however, have no just application to the conceded facts of the Northern Assurance case, nor to the facts of the case at bar. In neither instance does the insurer plead his own negligence to avoid the consequences of his written obligation, rather does he plead that the other party to the writing, the insurer, has taken advantage of his neglect to foist upon him a contract which, in view of facts at the time known to such other, in one breath creates an obligation Opinion, per MERRELL, J. and in the next takes it away; in fine, a contract which is no contract. This plea is in effect an appeal to the chancery powers of the court to enjoin the other party, the insurer, from setting up the restrictive clauses of the policy in defense of an action at law by the insured on the policy, and this on the ground that to permit the defense at law would be to work inequity or perhaps fraud on the insured. Where fraud is the basis of appeal, the negligence of the party defrauded is not an answer. By this plea, substantially that of estoppel, there is clearly no attempt to set aside or infringe upon the parol evidence rule. It remains to consider whether the plea so defined is borne out by proof that the agent of the insurance company who procured the insurance in question knew at the time the policy was issued the fact as to the title of the insured, or as in the Northern Assurance case, the fact of prior insurance. This, in truth, is the turning point in the instant case as it was in the above case, where the majority opinion (the Chief Justice and two associates dissenting) finds that the insurance company had no notice of the defect in the position of the insured, by reason of the knowledge thereof had by its agent. The insured was conclusively "presumed" to know the contents of the policy, but no such presumption was indulged to make the knowledge of the agent that of his company, as to the nature of the title of the insured. In the present connection it will suffice to say the latter presumption, or more accurately, rule of law, is well established in the law of this state. It Opinion, per MERRELL, J. is but a corollary of the doctrine of respondeat superior and is widely recognized. From this viewpoint and with reference to the facts of the instant case the so-called "non-waiver" clause is peculiarly ineffective. That clause is here invoked not so much to limit the power of the agent to contract on behalf of his principal, as in an effort to exonerate the insurance company from the application of the generally recognized principle of law whereby the agent's knowledge is imputed to his principal. Without considering whether a party to such a contract may stipulate his exemption from a broad rule of the common law, it will suffice to observe that the terms of the "non-waiver" clause are inapt to the purpose. Thus Commissioner Pound, speaking for the court, in German Ins. Co. v. Shader, 68 Neb., 1, says at page 4: "The general rule that an insurance company can not take advantage of conditions in a policy whereby such policy is to be void by reason of circumstances existing at the time the policy issued, in case the facts were known to its agent at the time, has been recognized universally," and further adds, "Including our own court, the courts of some twenty-seven states, at least, have, upon one ground or another, adhered to this doctrine in the face of these provisions as to waiver." In many jurisdictions the conclusion indicated is reached on the theory of estoppel, as in Wood v. The American Fire Ins. Co., 149 N. Y., 382. The same result is necessitated if the word "void" in the policy is construed to mean "voidable" at the option of the company. (Ewart, Waiver Dis Opinion, per MERRELL, J. tributed, 210.) On this theory, the company, in the present case, having accepted the payment of premiums for twenty-eight years, with knowledge imputed to it of facts as to the title of the insured, entitling it to avoid the obligations of the policy, will be deemed to have elected the position of responsibility thereunder. In accordance with the views expressed will be found an impressive majority of the courts of last resort in the several states, and also many of the text-writers. 3 Cooley, Briefs On Law of Insurance, 2619 et seq.; 2 Joyce on Law of Insurance (2 ed.), Section 439 et seq.; Elliott on Insurance, Section 188; Bowers' Law of Waiver, Section 279 et seq., and Annotations 107 American State Reports, 99 to 149. See also Ewart, Waiver Distributed, Chapter X, and the many cases cited in the works referred to. However, it is strongly insisted by counsel for the insurance company that the issue in the present case has already been decided by this court in favor of the insurer in the case of The Ohio Farmers' Ins. Co. v. Titus, supra. And such was the view of the court of appeals. In the Titus case the insurer, after a fire loss, brought action on the policy, and was met by an answer pleading that clause of the policy rendering the same void "if the subject of insurance or any part thereof, or the real estate or any part thereof *** now is, or shall hereafter be incumbered by mortgage or otherwise," and also a "non-waiver" clause the same as that invoked as in the case at bar. The answer further averred, in the language of the |