That amendment refers only to suits brought | quirement in behalf of two classes of peragainst a state. But applying the same sons: First, 'the board of railroad commisprinciples of construction to the removal acts and to cases in which it is claimed that the state, though not the nominal, is in fact the real, party plaintiff, it may fairly be held that the state is such real party when the relief sought is that which inures to it alone, and in its favor the judgment or decree, if for the plaintiff, will effectively operate. Such a case was Ferguson v. Ross, 3 L. R. A. 322, 38 Fed. 161. There an action was brought in the name of Ferguson, a shore inspector, against Ross and others, to recover a penalty. The statute of New York authorized the suit to be prosecuted in the name of the inspector, but all the moneys recovered were payable into the treasury of the state, and it was held by the circuit court for the eastern district of New York that the action was one in which the real party plaintiff was the state. It was for its sole benefit that the action was brought, and it alone was to be benefited by the re covery. But this case is not like Ferguson v. Ross, and does not come within the rule above stated. It is not an action to recover any money for the state. Its results will not in ure to the benefit of the state as a state in any degree. It is a suit to compel compli ance with an order of the railroad commis sioners in respect to rates and charges. The parties interested are the railway company, on the one hand, and they who use the bridge, on the other; the one interested to have charges maintained as they have been, the others to have them reduced in compliance with the order of the commissioners. They [60] are the real *parties in interest, and in respect to whom the decree will effectively operate. It is true that the state has a governmental interest in the welfare of all its citizens, in compelling obedience to the legal orders of all its officials, and in securing compliance with all its laws. But such general governmental interest is not that which makes the state, as an organized political community, a party in interest in the litigation, for if that were so the state would be a party in interest in all litigation; because the purpose of all litigation is to preserve and enforce rights and secure compliance with the law of the state, either statute or common. The interest must be one in the state as an artificial person. Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & T. Co. 154 U. S. 362-390, 38 L. ed. 10141021, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 560, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1047. While not controverting these general propositions, the supreme court of the state was of the opinion that the state had a direct, pecuniary interest in the result of the litigation, by virtue, first, of its possible liability for costs, and, secondly, because were the litigation pushed to the extreme there might be penalties imposed which would, when collected, pass into the school fund of the state. We quote its language: "This section of the statute makes provision for a civil action to enforce the re sioners;' second, 'any person or company in- We are unable to concur in these views. Such Whatever may be the result of any subsequent or ancillary proceeding, the direct object of this suit is to obtain a decree of the court commanding the railway company to comply with the order of the commissioners. a decree is similar to the ordinary decrees of a court of equity, and it is familiar that a court of equity may enforce compliance with its orders and decrees by penalties upon the delinquents. So that if this possible pecuniary result is sufficient to make the state the real party plaintiff it would follow that in Missouri the state is the real party plaintiff in every equity suit, because in every equity suit such penalties may be imposed. Neither can it be held that the state's voluntary assumption of the costs of the litigation when the decree is adverse to the railroad commissioners makes it the real party plaintiff. That is simply an incidental matter, and does not determine its relations to the suit any more than its payment of the salary of the judge, fees of jurors, or any other expenses of the litigation. We are of opinion, therefore, that the party named in the record as plaintiff is the real party plaintiff, and that the voluntary assumption by the state of the costs in some contingencies of the litigation, or the indirect and remote pecuniary results which may follow from a disobedience of the orders of the court, do not make it the party to whom alone the relief sought inures, and in whose or direction of the commissioners and accepted by them for the use, purposes, or benefit of the District prior to March 14th, *1876. It was provided that all such claims [63] against the District should in the first instance be prosecuted before the court of claims by the contractor, his personal representatives, or his assignee, in the same manner and subject to the same rules in the hearing and adjudication of the claims as the court then had in the adjudication of claims against the United States. 21 Stat. at L. 284, 285, §§ 1, 2. By the same act it was provided that if no appeal was taken from the judgment of COLUMBUS J. ESLIN, Administrator of the court of claims in the cases therein proDaniel A. Connolly, Deceased, et al. (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 62-66.) Appeal statutes. The repeal, by the act of Congress of March 3, 1897, chap. 387 (29 Stat. at L. 665, 669), of the act of February 13, 1895, chap. 87 (28 Stat. at L. 664), and the enactment that all proceedings pending under the act so repealed shall be vacated, and that no judgment heretofore rendered in pursuance of said act shall be paid, precludes the Supreme Court of the United States from taking jurisdiction of an appeal by the District of Columbia from a judgment allowing certain claims, although the application for the appeal had been made and notice given before the repeal of the stat[No. 36.] ute. vided for, within the term limited by law for appealing from the judgments of that court, "and in all cases of final judgments by the court of claims, or, on appeal, by the supreme court where the same are affirmed in favor of the claimant, the sum due thereby shall be paid, as hereinafter provided, by the Secretary of the Treasury." § 5. These consolidated suits were brought under the above act, and within the time limited by its provisions. In the progress of the cause a judgment was rendered in one of the cases in favor of the District for $658.05, and in the others. the petitions were severally dismissed. New trials were granted in each case, and time was given for further proof. By an act of Congress approved February 13th, 1895, chap. 87, amendatory of the above act of June 16th, 1880, it was pro Argued October 23, 1901. Decided Novem- vided that in the adjudication of claims ber 4, 1901. A PPEAL from a judgment of the Court of bia. Dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Messrs. George A. King and J. W. Douglass argued the cause and filed separate briefs for appellees. Mr. William B. King also filed a brief for appellees. [62] *Mr. Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the court: By an act of Congress approved June 16th, 1880, chap. 243, the jurisdiction of the court of claims was extended to all claims then existing against the District of Columbia, arising out of contracts by the late board of public works and extensions thereof made by the commissioners of the District, as well as to such claims as had arisen out of contracts by the district commissioners after the passage of the act of June 20th, 1874 (18 Stat. at L. 116, chap. 337), and all claims for work done by the order NOTE. On the effect of statutes to defeat or preserve pending civil actions-see Pritchard v. Savannah Street & Rural Resort R. Co. (Ga.) 14 L. R. A. 721, and note. And see note to United States v. Tynen, 20 L. ed. U. S. 158. brought under the act of 1880 "the court of claims shall allow the rates established and paid by the board of public works; and whenever said rates have not been allowed, the claimant or his personal representative shall be entitled, on motion made within sixty days after the passage of this act, to a new trial of such cause." 28 Stat. at L. 664. The cases were heard on the exceptions of the defendant to a referee's report, and the aggregate amount found due from the District was $13,458.33. And the record states that upon the facts set forth in the referee's report "the court, under the act of February 13, 1895 (28 Stat. at L. 664, chap. 87), and in accordance with the agreement of the parties, decides, as conclusions of law as to the said sum of $13,458.33, so found due from the District of Columbia, that the several claimants named below each recover judgment against the United States in the amounts stated, viz." *Here follows, [64] in the record, a statement of the amount found due each claimant, the aggregate being the above sum. The order referring the cause for a statement of the several accounts was made after the passage of the act of February 13th, 1895, and the referee's report was made pursuant to the provisions of that act. In accordance with the findings of fact and of law the court, on the 22d of June, 1896, entered final judgment in favor of the respective claimants for the amounts found government. It seems, therefore, clear that due them respectively, the judgment upon its face purporting to be "within the intent and meaning of the act of February 13th, 1895." On the 3d of September, 1896, the District of Columbia, by the Attorney General of the United States, made application for and gave notice of an appeal to this court. Subsequently, February 25th, 1897, the District moved to set aside the judgment of June 22d, 1896, and to grant a new trial. • While the motion for new trial was pending Congress passed the act of March 3d, 1897, chap. 387, making appropriations for the expenses of the government of the District for the fiscal year ending June 30th, 1898. That act, among other things, provided that the above act of February 13th, 1895, "be, and the same is hereby, repealed, and all proceedings pending shall be vacated, and no judgment heretofore rendered in pursuance of said act shall be paid." 29 Stat. at L. 665, 669. Our attention was called by counsel to the case of Re Hall, 167 U. S. 38, 41, 42 L. ed. 69, 70, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 723, 724, in which it is stated that the court of claims made the following general order: "The act of 13th February, 1895, 28 Stat. at L. 664, chap. 87, having been repealed by Congress, it is ordered in all suits brought under or subsequent to said act that motions a declaration by this court in relation to power that it should have authority to en- for new trial, applications for judgments, 13 How. 40, 46, 14 L. ed. 42, 44; Re Sanand all other papers in such suits be re- born, 148 U. S. 222, 37 L. ed. 429, 13 Sup. stored to and retained upon the files of the Ct. Rep. 577; and Interstate Commerce Comcourt without further proceedings being mission v. Brimson, 154 U. S. 447, 483, 486, had." This order is not found in the pres. ent record. What was the effect of the act of 1897 upon the power of this court to re-examine the final judgment of the court of claims in these cases? In our opinion, there can be only one solution of this question. The present cases were brought under the [65]act of 1895, and *were determined with reference to its provisions. In view of the repeal of that act by Congress, the requirement that pending proceedings be vacated, and the express prohibition of the payment 38 L. ed. 1047, 1059, 1060, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 545, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1125. It results that, as no judgment now rendered by this court would have the sanction that attends the exercise of judicial power, in its legal or constitutional sense, the present appeal must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction and without any determination of the rights of the parties. It is so ordered. of judgments theretofore rendered, any dec- GULF & SHIP ISLAND RAILROAD COM PANY et al., Plffs. in Err., v. GEORGE P. HEWES, Tax Collector, etc. (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 66-78.) laration by this court as to the correctness of the final judgment entered by the court of claims under the act of 1895 would be useless for every practical or legal purpose, and would not be in the exercise of judicial power within the meaning of the Constitution. It was an act of grace upon the part of the United States to provide for the payment by the Secretary of the Treasury of the amount of any final judgment rendered under that act. And when Congress 1. A bill averring that a railroad charter, and by the act of 1897 directed the Secretary not to pay any judgment based on the act of 1895, that officer could not be compelled by the process of any court to make such payment in violation of the act of 1897. A proceeding against the Secretary having that object in view would, in legal effect, be a suit against the United States; and such a suit could not be entertained by any judicial tribunal without the consent of the Corporations - charters - exemptions from taxation-impairment of obligation of contract-repeal of exemption. an exemption from taxation for a term of twenty years contained therein, constitute a contract with the state, which is violated by a bill for an injunction against the collecsubsequent legislation repealing the exemption of taxes assessed against a railroad com. tion, raises a Federal question for which there Is sufficient color to sustain the jurisdiction pany. Affirmed. of the Supreme Court of the United States on writ of error to a state court which has decided against the exemption. 2. A certificate of the chief justice of a state court, stating that the validity of state legislation subsequent to the charter of a corporation was drawn in question upon the ground that it impaired the obligation of a contract, and that the decision was in favor of the va lidity of such legislation, may be resorted to, In the absence of an opinion, to show that a Federal question which was otherwise raised in the record was actually passed upon by the court. 3. The charter of the Gulf & Ship Island Rallroad Company granted by Miss. act February 23, 1882, even if it be considered as a revival of the rights and privileges which had formerly belonged to a company chartered in 1850, is taken subject to the provision of Miss. Const. 1869, which requires the property of such corporations to be taxed, like that of individuals, in proportion to its value. 4. A subrogation by statute of one corporation to the rights and privileges of a former cor poration does not include an immunity from taxation. 5. The exemption from taxation for a term of twenty years, which Miss. act February 23, 1882, § 18, assumes to give to the railroad company thereby incorporated, must, in the light of the state Constitution, providing for the taxation of the property of corporations in proportion to its value, and of the prior decisions of the state courts, be deemed to be subject to the power of the legislature to alter, amend, or repeal it. 6. The question whether or not a repealable exemption from taxation, given by state law, has been in fact repealed by a subsequent statute, is one which turns upon the construction of a state law, and is not reviewable on writ of error from the Supreme Court of the United States to a state court, although it would be otherwise if the exemption were ir repealable and thus constituted a contract. 7. Taxes upon the privileges of corporations, being taxes upon their property, are subject to the limitations of Miss. Const. 1869, art. 12, §§ 13, 20, requiring the property of corporations to be taxed, like that of individuals, In proportion to its value. [No. 5.] Statement by Mr. Justice Brown: *This was a bill in equity filed in the court [67] of chancery of Harrison county, Mississippi, The bill averred in substance the incoгро- pany, its stock, its railroads and appurte- To this bill defendant interposed a de Argued October 15, 16, 1901. Decided No- plaintiff sued out a writ of error from this vember 18, 1901. N ERROR to the Supreme Court of the State of Mississippi to review a decision affirming a decree sustaining a demurrer to from taxation-see Hogg v. Mackay (Or.). 19 L. R. A. 77, and note. On the effect of decisions of state courts in Federal courts-see notes to United States ex rel. Butz v. Muscatine, 19 L. ed. U. S. 490, and Forepaugh v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. (Pa.) 5 L. R. A. 508. That the United States Supreme Court will not review decisions of state courts construing state statutes, unless specially authorized see note to Commercial Bank v. Buckingham, 12 L. ed. U. S. 169. court, which defendant moved to dismiss. As to what laws are void as impairing obligation of contracts-see notes to Franklin County Grammar School v. Bailey (Vt.) 10 L. R. A. 405; Fletcher v. Peck, 3 L. ed. U. S. 162; McCanna & F. Co. v. Citizens' Trust & Surety Co. 24 C. C. A. 20; Montana Gre-Purchasing Co. v. Boston & M. Consol. Copper & Silver Min. Co. 35 С. С. А. 12. On change of decision of state courts as impairing obligation of contract-see note to Los Angeles v. Los Angeles City Water Co. 44 L. As to construction and effect of state laws and Constitutions and state decisions in regard ed. U. S. 886. : 1. The motion to dismiss must be over ruled. Counsel for the railroad company appears to have invoked the contract clause of the Constitution upon the original argument; but whether this be so or not the bill was subsequently amended under leave of the court, by averring that the charter and the exemption from taxation contained in the 18th section constituted a contract between the plaintiff corporation and the state of Mississippi that the state would not demand any taxes upon its capital, property, or stock for the term of twenty years from the enactment of the charter; and that, if said exemption from taxation had been repealed, which the company denied, it was not within the power of the state to repeal such exemption, for the reason that the same constituted a contract upon which the company had acted, and upon the faith of which it had constructed the road; and that such repeal was a violation of the contract clause of the Constitution. The Federal question was properly raised, and there is at least sufficient color for it to sustain our jurisdiction. No opinion was delivered by the supreme court, but the chief justice certifies that the validity of the state legislation subsequent to the charter of 1882 was drawn in question upon the ground of its impairment of the contract contained in such charter, and that the decision was in favor of the validity of such legislation. While such a certificate is insufficient to give [69]us jurisdiction, where *such jurisdiction does not appear in the record it may be resorted to, in the absence of an opinion, to show that a Federal question which was otherwise raised in the record was actually passed upon by the court. Armstrong v. Athens County Treasurer, 16 Pet. 281, 10 L. ed. 965; Yazoo & M. Valley R. Co. v. Adams, 180 U. S. 41, 48, 45 L. ed. 415, 418, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 256; Mississippi & M. R. Co. v. Rock, 4 Wall. 177, 18 L. ed. 381; Parmelee v. Lawrence, 11 Wall. 36, 20 L. ed. 48; Gross v. United States Mortg. Co. 108 U. S. 477, 27 L. ed. 795, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. Rep. 940. 2. The bill set out, and, until the argument in this court, the plaintiff company relied solely upon, a charter granted February 23, 1882, by the legislature of Mississippi, to incorporate the Gulf & Ship Island Railroad Company, the 18th section of which declared "that in order to encourage the investment of capital in the works which said company is hereby authorized to construct and maintain, and to make certain in advance of such investment, and as an inducement and consideration therefor, the taxes and burdens which this state will and will not impose thereon, it is hereby declared that said company, its stock, its railroad and appurtenances, and all its property in the state necessary or incident to the full exercise of all the powers herein granted, shall be exempt from taxation for a term of twenty years from the passage of this act." To strengthen its position, and to enable the company to rally to its support an exemption antedating the Constitution of 1869, upon which the defendant relies, the plaintiff calls to our attention an act passed in 1850 to incorporate the Gulf & Ship Island Railroad Company, and a further act approved March 1, 1854, amendatory of that act, the 11th section of which declares "that the property and investments of the company connected with this enterprise, within this state, shall not be subject to taxation until the road shall be in full operation and completed." The position of the plaintiff in this connection is that prior to the Code of 1857 there was no general law and no constitutional provision in any way restraining the legislature from granting irrepealable exemptions, and that the charter of 1882 was a mere continuance of the original charter of 1850-1854; that the construction of the road authorized by that charter *had never [70] been abandoned; and that so late as 1872 the legislature had adopted a memorial to Congress praying that a land grant made by Congress in 1858 for the benefit of the Gulf & Ship Island Railroad Company, and which had lapsed to the United States by the in tervention of the Civil War, might be revived in favor of that railroad. But we are of opinion that the charter of 1882 cannot be considered as a revival or continuation of the charter of 1854, since the names of the incorporators are entirely different, the routes of the two railroads are also different, and no reference is made in the charter of 1882 to the prior charters, although the names of the two corporations are identical. There is nothing in the act of 1882 to indicate even the existence of a prior act incorporating a road under the same name. It is true that at the same session of the legislature (1882) another memorial to Congress was adopted by the legislature for a revival of the grant of publie lands made by the United States in 1856 to aid in the construction of the Gulf & Ship Island Railroad, but in this very memorial it was stated that "at its present session our legislature has granted a new act of incorporation with liberal provisions, thus again attesting the abiding and earnest interest felt by our people in this important work." It is also true that on March 13, 1884, the legislature passed another act to facilitate the construction of the Gulf & Ship Island Railroad, and for other purposes, the 8th section of which declared "that said Gulf & Ship Island Railroad Company are hereby subrogated to all the rights and privileges heretofore granted by the state of Mississippi to the Gulf & Ship Island Railroad Company, and shall have the right to use and enjoy such field notes, maps, and surveys as have been heretofore made in the interest of said road as were authorized |