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The exacting of a license tax as a condition to doing any particular business is a tax on the occupation, and a tax on the occupation of doing the business is a tax on the business.

Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, 6 L. ed. 678; Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275, 23 L. ed. 347; Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist. 120 U. S. 489, 30 L. ed. 694, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 45, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 592; Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U. S. 640, 32

ployment begins, even though the sale by him is conditional and the title remains in the foreign owner. South Bend v. Martin, 142 Ind. 31, 29 L. R. A. 531, 41 Ν. Ε. 315.

So, a state statute requiring licenses to be taken out by itinerant venders is not void as a tax upon interstate commerce as applied to the agents of a foreign corporation who sell medicines, the property of such corporation, in the same form and shape in which the goods were imported into the state. Com. v. Newhall, 164 Mass. 333, 41 Ν. Ε. 647.

And a license or tax required of peddlers and Itinerant venders of goods at retail is not invalid as a tax on interstate commerce as applied to the agents of a nonresident corporation engaged in selling the latter's goods in an original package. West v. Mt. Sterling, 23 Ky. L. Rep. 1670, 65 8. W. 120.

And a reasonable license fee charged upon Itinerant venders of drugs or articles intended for the treatment of diseases who publicly profess to cure or treat diseases is not an unconstitutional interference with interstate commerce, although the medicines sold are in original packages brought from another state. State v. Wheelock, 95 Iowa, 577, 30 L. R. A. 429, 64 N. W. 620.

A person bringing goods, wares, and merchandise into a state for the purpose of peddling them may be required to pay the peddler's license without violation of the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution. Rash v. Farley, 91 Ky. 344, 15 S. W. 862.

A peddler who brings his goods into the state from another state for sale, and delivers the goods, not in the original packages, to the purchaser at the time of taking the order, may be required to pay a license fee without any in terference with interstate commerce. Hall v. State, 39 Fla. 637, 23 So. 119.

The peddling of the separate articles after the package in which they were shipped from other states has been broken may be lawfully regulated under the police power of a state Com. v. Harmel, 166 Pa. 89, 27 L. R. A. 388, 5 Inters. Com. Rep. 89, 30 Atl. 1036.

The Imposition of a tax upon every person alike, whether a resident or a nonresident of the state, who sells within the state a newspaper of a designated character, is not an unconstitutional restriction of interstate commerce as applied to a sale within the state of a newspaper of that character published outside the state, Preston ▼. Finley, 72 Fed. 850.

L. ed. 311, 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 134, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1380; McCall v. California, 136 U. S. 104, 34 L. ed. 391, 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 181, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 881; Brennan v. Titusville, 153 U. S. 289, 38 L. ed. 719, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 658, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 829.

This case presents a very different question from that presented in Ficklen v. Shelby County Taxing Dist. 145 U. S. 1, 36 L. ed. 601. 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 79, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 810. These plaintiffs in error have not taken out licenses, and have not done a general brokerage business. They have acted as agents for certain nonresident principals, and have done no local or general business, and are not subject to state taxation.

Iron Range Co. v. Carver, 118 N. C. 328, 24 S.
E. 352.

Closely allied to these cases are those which hold that persons soliciting orders for goods manufactured in another state are not engaged in interstate commerce, where the orders are filled from a stock of goods kept within the state.

A municipal ordinance prohibiting peddling without a license is not obnoxious to the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution as applied to a resident of the state whose sales are made from a stock of goods kept in the state, and not in the original packages. People v. Sawyer, 106 Mich. 428, 64 N. W. 333.

And a state statute requiring peddlers to take out a license is not void as in violation of the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution as applied to a sale of goods manufactured in another state by an agent of the manufacturer, which goods were either delivered at the time of sale, or the orders were filled by the agent from the stock of goods within the state. v. Snoddy, 128 Mo. 523, 31 S. W. 36.

State

So, that part of a business conducted by a nonresident through local agents, which relates to the sale and delivery of picture frames from a stock kept within the state to persons who have given orders for portraits, there being no obligation to take and pay for the frames, is not interstate commerce protected by the Federal Constitution from municipal taxation, although no frames are sold except to persons who have ordered pictures. Chrystal v. Macon, 108 Ga. 27, 33 S. E. 810.

A tax Imposed by a state statute on every sewing machine company selling or dealing in sewing machines by itself or its agents within the state does not amount to an unlawful interference with interstate commerce, where machines have been brought into the state and have become subject to taxation therein. Singer Mfg. Co. v. Wright, 97 Ga. 114, 35 L. R. A. 497, 25 S. E. 249.

Persons engaged in taking orders by sample for a nonresident manufacturer, which orders are filled from a local distributing warehouse to which goods are shipped in advance of orders, and stored, are not engaged in interstate commerce, and may therefore be required to pay the license tax imposed upon canvassers by an ordinance of the municipality where such sales are made. L. B. Price Co. v. Atlanta, 105 Ga. 358, 31 S. E. 619.

In Pegues v. Ray, 50 La. Ann. 574, 23 So. A state statute imposing a license on ped- 904, it appeared that orders for goods were takdlers, and providing that any person carrying a len by sample by representatives of a nonresiwagon, cart, or buggy to exhibit or deliver dent manufacturer. The employer kept a warewares or merchandise shall be considered a ped- house within the state where the goods were dler, is not, as applied to a foreign corporation stored in the original packages and from which doing business in the state, an unlawfül inter- deliveries were made to fill orders. The court ference with Interstate commerce Wrought held that a license tax could not, under such

Brennan v. Titusville, 153 U. S. 289, 38 L. ed. 719, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 658, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 829.

The statute is not valid because it is a tax on the occupation of merchandise broker.

Stratford v. Montgomery, 110 Ala. 619, 20 So. 127.

That plaintiffs in error reside in Hamilton county, Tennessee, and have offices or headquarters for the convenience of their business, are immaterial circumstances, not inconsistent with the fact that their business is exclusively interstate commerce.

Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U. S. 640, 32 L. ed. 311, 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 134, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1380; McCall v. San Francisco, 136 U. S. 104, 34 L. ed. 391, 3 Inters.

Com. Rep. 181, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 881; Norfolk & W. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 136 U. S. 114, 34 L. ed. 394, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 958; Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U. S. 47, 35 L. ed. 649, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 851; Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, 6 L. ed. 678; Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275, 23 L. ed. 347; Brennan v. Titusville, 153 U. S. 289, 38 L. ed. 719, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 658, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 829.

Mr. George W. Pickle submitted the cause for defendants in error.

*Mr. Justice Peckham, after making the[30] foregoing statement of facts, delivered the opinion of the court:

In this case we are bound to give the

circumstances, be imposed on such selling agents, as the goods must be held objects of interstate commerce, stopping merely at the place where the warehouse was situated on their way to a delivery destination contracted for by persons engaged in introducing into the state goods manufactured in another state.

A city ordinance prohibiting peddling with out a license is an unlawful interference with Interstate commerce as applied to a salaried distributing agent of a publishing firm in another state, where orders for books in several locali ties are sent to such firm by another salaried agent through a general agency located within the state, and, on being received by such agency, are repacked and shipped to various localities for distribution by such distributing agents. Huntington v. Mahan, 142 Ind. 695, 42 N. E. 463.

A license tax on the business of putting up lightning rods is not a tax on interstate commerce in the case of a person who puts up no rods except those which he sells as agent for a nonresident manufacturer, and which are shipped to him in quantities from which deliveries are made as needed, although he puts up such rods without extra charge. State v. Gorham, 115 N. C. 721, 25 L. R. A. 810, 20 S. E. 179.

commerce as applied to one who purchases erant merchants to be carried on without a license is not invalid as a regulation of interstate commerce as applied to one who purchases bankrupt stocks wherever he can obtain them to the best advantage, and sometimes buys them in other states, when it makes no discrimination between merchants whose goods are imported into the state and those whose goods are manufactured or purchased in the state, and does not impose any burden on sales in original packages brought into the state. Carrollton v. Bazzette, 159 Ill. 284, 31 L. R. A. 522, 42 Ν. Ε. 837.

Where the sales are made on the salesman's own account, and not as agent of the nonresident from whom the goods are obtained, the former is not engaged in interstate commerce.

Thus, one selling sewing machines on his own account is not engaged in interstate commerce so as to be protected against taxation by the Federal Constitution, although the machines are manufactured in another state. State v. Wessell, 109 N. C. 735, 14 S. E. 391.

So, one taking orders for lightning rods shipped direct to him, sometimes in advance of the orders, who, under his contract with the nonresident manufacturer, paid the freight and put up the rods at his own expense and was to share in the profits, is not engaged in interstate commerce so as to be exempted from the pay

And one selling goods by sample which are to be obtained by him from a nonresident is not engaged in interstate commerce so as to be protected by the Federal Constitution from state taxation, where the goods are consigned and charged to him individually and without reference to the purchasers, and are delivered by him, but not in the original packages. Kimmell v. State, 104 Tenn. 184, 56 S. W. 854.

And one who takes orders in his own name from house to house for articles manufactured in another state, and who in his own name sends a single order to a manufacturer without stating the names of his customers, and on receiving the package containing the articles delivers therefrom the separate article to his customers, is not engaged in interstate commerce so as to be exempt from a tax on the privilege of selling articles of that kind within the county. Croy v. Obion County, 104 Tenn. 525, sub nom. Croy v. Epperson, 51 L. R. A. 254, 58 S. W. 235.

Any discrimination in favor of peddlers of home manufactures and the manufactures of other states violates the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution.

Such an unconstitutional discrimination is made by a provision of a state statute which prohibits peddling without a license, and fixes the punishment therefor, but excepts persons who sell commodities manufactured or raised by themselves in the state. Ames v. People, 25 Colo. 508, 55 Pac. 725.

So, an exemption of manufacturers who have paid taxes on capital employed, from the provisions of a state statute imposing a license tax upon peddlers, renders the statute unconstitutional as a regulation of commerce when applied to a nonresident acting as an agent or employee in the sale of goods owned and manufactured by a nonresident corporation. Com. v. Myer, 92 Va. 809, 31 L. R. A. 379, 23 S. E. 915.

And a municipal ordinance rendering a nonresident of the state engaged in selling the prod uce of his farm within the municipality without purchasing a license liable to fine and imprisonment, while no such liability is imposed on farmers residing in the state, violates the implied prohibition of the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution against local legislation tending to impair the uniformity which the grant to Congress was designed to promote. Com. v. Simons, 3 Pa. Dist. R. 792.

And a state statute requiring every person selling foreign-grown nursery stock to file an affidavit and bond with the secretary of state, and exhibit to every purchaser a certificate that he has complied with his requirements, imposes an unconstitutional obstruction to com

ment of an occupation tax. Camp v. State merce in such articles. Re Schechter, 63 Fed. (Tex. Crim. App.) 61 S. W. 401.

695.

caine meaning to the state statute that was given to it by the supreme court of the state, and the question which remains for us to decide is whether, as so construed, the statute violates any provision of the Federal Constitution.

We think it violates the interstate commerce clause of the Constitution of the United States, and that this court has in several cases decided the principle which invalidates the statute so far as it affects the business of the complainants. The principle is contained in the cases of Brown v. [31] Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, 6 L. ed. 678, *and Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275, 23 L. ed. 347. Subsequently the case of Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist. 120 U. S. 489, 30 L. ed. 694, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 45, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 592, was decided, which is one of the leading cases upon the subject now in hand, and we think that it is decisive of the case before us. That case was tried upon an agreed statement of facts as follows:

$

"Sabine Robbins is a citizen and resident of Cincinnati, Ohio, and on the day of -, 1884, was engaged in the business of • drumming in the taxing district of Shelby county, Tennessee, i. e., soliciting trade by the use of samples for the house or firm for which he worked as a drummer, said firm being the firm of 'Rose, Robbins, & Co.,' doing business in Cincinnati, and all the members of said firm being citizens and residents of Cincinnati, Ohio. While engaged in the act of drumming for said firm, and for the claimed offense of not having taken out the required license for doing said business, the defendant, Sabine Robbins, was arrested by one of the Memphis or taxing district police force, and carried before the Hon. D. P. Hadden, president of the taxing district, and fined for the offense of drumming with out a license. It is admitted the firm of 'Rose, Robbins, & Co.'are engaged in the selling of paper, writing materials, and such articles as are used in the book stores of the taxing district of Shelby county, and that it was a line of such articles for the sale of which the said defendant herein was drumming at the time of his arrest."

The court held upon these facts that the statute of Tennessee of 1881, enacting that "all drummers and all persons not having a regular licensed house of business in the taxing district of Shelby county, offering for sale, or selling goods, wares, or merchandise therein by sample, shall be required to pay to the county trustee the sum of $10 per week. or $25 per month, for such privilege," was void as against Robbins.

The opinion of the court was delivered by Mr. Justice Bradley, in the course of which he said (p. 494, L. ed. p. 696, Inters. Com. Rep. p. 47, Sup. Ct. Rep. p. 594):

"In a word, it may be said that in the matter of interstate commerce the United States are but one country, and are and must be subject to one system of regulations, and not to a multitude of systems. The doctrine [32] of the freedom of that commerce, *except as regulated by Congress, is so firmly established that it is unnecessary to enlarge fur ther upon the subject. In view of these

fundamental principles, which are to govern our decision, we may approach the question submitted to us in the present case, and inquire whether it is competent for a state to levy a tax or impose any other restriction upon the citizens or inhabitants of other states, for selling or seeking to sell their goods in such state before they are introduced therein. Do not such restrictions affect the very foundation of interstate trade? How is a manufacturer, or a merchant, of one state to sell his goods in another state, without in some way obtaining orders therefor? Must he be compelled to send them at a venture, without knowing whether there is any demand for them? This may, undoubtedly, be safely done with regard to some products for which there is always a market and a demand, or where the course of trade has established a general and unlimited demand. A raiser of farm produce in New Jersey or Connecticut, or a manufacturer of leather or wooden ware, may. perhaps, safely take his goods to the city of New York and be sure of finding a stable and reliable market for them. But there are hundreds, perhaps thousands, of articles which no person would think of exporting to another state without first procuring an order for them. It is true, a merchant or manufacturer in one state may erect or hire a warehouse or store in another state, in which to place his goods, and await the chances of being able to sell them. But this would require a warehouse or store in every state with which he might desire to trade. Surely, he cannot be compelled to take this inconvenient and expensive course. In certain branches of business it may adopt it with advantage. Many manufacturers do open houses or places of business in other states than those in which they reside, and send their goods there to be kept on sale. But this is a matter of convenience, and not of compulsion, and would neither suit the convenience nor be within the ability of many others engaged in the same kind of business, and would be entirely unsuited to many branches of business. In these cases, then, what shall the merchant or manufacturer do who wishes to sell his goods in other states? Must he sit still in his factory or warehouse, and *wait for the people of [33] those states to come to him? This would be a silly and ruinous proceeding. The only other way, and the one, perhaps, which most extensively prevails, is to obtain orders from persons residing or doing business in those other states. But how is the merchant or manufacturer to secure such orders? If he may be taxed by such states for doing so, who shall limit the tax? It may amount to prohibition. To say that such a tax is not a burden upon interstate commerce is to speak at least unadvisedly and without due attention to the truth of things."

And again at p. 496, L. ed. p. 697, Inters. Com. Rep. p. 47, Sup. Ct. Rep. p. 595:

"But it will be said that a denial of this power of taxation will interfere with the right of the state to tax business pursuits and callings carried on within its limits,

and its rights to require licenses for carry-material distinctions of fact which render ing on those which are declared to be privi- it unlike the one now before us. The opinleges. This may be true to a certain extent; ion of the court was delivered by the pres

ent chief justice, who, while recognizing and approving the Robbins and other similar cases, distinguished them from the one then under review. In the course of his opinion he said (p. 20, L. ed. p. 606, Inters. Com. Rep. p. 84, Sup. Ct. Rep. p. 811):

but only in those cases in which the states themselves, as well as individual citizens, are subject to the restraints of the higher law of the Constitution. And this interference will be very limited in its operation. It will only prevent the levy of a tax, or the requirement of a license, for making negotiations in the conduct of interstate commerce; and it may well be asked where the state gets authority for imposing burdens on that branch of business any more than for imposing a tax on the business of importing from foreign countries, or even on that of postmaster or United States marshal. The mere calling the business of a drummer a privilege cannot make it so. Can the state legislature make it a Tennessce privilege to carry on the business of throughout the entire year held, a general

importing goods from foreign countries? If not, has it any better right to make it a state privilege to carry on interstate commerce? It seems to be forgotten, in argument, that the people of this country are citizens of the United States, as well as of the individual states, and that they have some rights under the Constitution and laws of the former independent of the latter, and free from any interference or restraint from

them."

Other cases followed the Robbins Case, among them, Philadelphia & S. Mail S. S. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U. S. 326, 30 L. ed. 1200, [34]7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1118; *Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U. S, 640, 32 L. ed. 311, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1380; Asher v. Texas, 128 U. Š. 129, 32 L. ed. 368, 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 241, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1; Stoutenburgh v. Hennick, 129 U. S. 141, 32 L. ed. 637, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 256; McCall v. C'alifornia, 136 U. S. 104, 34 L. ed. 391, 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 181, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 881; Norfolk & W. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 136 U. S. 114, 34 L. ed. 394, 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 178, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 958; Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U. S. 47, 35 L. ed. 649, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 851. These cases exhibit different phases of the same general principle, but all follow that principle as announced in the Robbins Case, and deny the right of the state to tax people representing the owners of property outside of the state, for the privilege of soliciting orders within it as agents of such owners for property to be shipped to persons with in the state. We think they cover the facts of the case at bar, and render the statute as construed by the state court invalid so far as it affects the business of the complainants described in the agreed statement of facts above set forth.

The defendants in error, admitting the finality of the decisions above referred to in regard to the questions therein decided, claim that they do not in truth cover the case before us, and they urge that it is controlled by Ficklen v. Shelby County Taxing Dist. 145 U. S. 1, 36 L. ed. 601, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 79, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 810. A reference to that case shows important and 185 U. S. U. S., BooK 46.

50

"In the case at bar the complainants were established and did business in the taxing district as general merchandise brokers, and were taxed as such under § 9 of chapter 96 of the Tennessee Laws of 1881, which embraced a different subject-matter from § 16 of that chapter. For the year 1887 they paid the $50. tax charged, gave bond to report their gross commissions at the end of the year, and thereupon received, and

and unrestricted license to do business as such brokers. They were thereby authorized to do any and all kinds of commission business, and became liable to pay the privilege tax in question, which was fixed in part, and in part graduated according to the amount of capital invested in the business, or if no capital were invested, by the [35] amount of commissions received. Although their principals happened during 1887, as to the one party, to be wholly nonresident, and, as to the other, largely such, this fact might have been otherwise then and afterwards, as their business was not confined to transactions for nonresidents. In the case of Robbins the tax was held, in effect, not to be a tax on Robbins, but on his principals; while here the tax was clearly levied upon complainants in respect of the general commission business they conducted, and their property engaged therein, or their profits realized therefrom."

And again, at p. 24, L. ed. p. 607, Intera. Com. Rep. p. 86, Sup. Ct. Rep. p. 813, it was said:

"We agree with the supreme court of the state that the complainants having taken out licenses under the law in question to do a general commission business, and having given bond to report their commissions during the year, and to pay the required percentage thereon, could not, when they applied for similar licenses for the ensuing year, resort to the courts because the municipal authorities refused to issue such licenses without the payment of the stipulated tax. What position they would have occupied if they had not undertaken to do a general commission business, and had taken out no licenses therefor, but had simply transacted business for nonresident princi pals, is an entirely different question, which does not arise upon this record."

From these extracts from the opinion it is seen that a material fact in the case was that Ficklen had taken out a general and unrestricted license to do business as a broker, and he was thereby authorized to do any and all kinds of commission business, and therefore became liable to pay the 793

privilege tax exacted. Although Ficklen's | v. Titusville, said, at p. 307, L. ed. p. 725,

principals happened in the year 1887 to be wholly nonresidents, the fact might have been otherwise, as was stated by the Chief Justice, because his business was not confined to transactions for nonresidents.

In this case the complainants did not represent or assume to represent any residents of the state of Tennessee, and each of the complainants represented only certain specific parties, firms, or corporations, all of whom were nonresidents of Tennessee. They did no business for a general public. We attach no importance to the fact that in [36]the Robbins Case the individual *taxed resided outside of the state. He was taxed by reason of his business or occupation while within it, and the tax was held to be a tax upon interstate commerce. Nor does the fact that the complainants acted for more than one person residing outside of the state affect the question. If while so act ing and soliciting orders within the state for the sale of property for one nonresident of the state, the person so soliciting was exempt from taxation on account of that busi

ness, because the tax would be upon inter

state commerce, we do not see how he could become liable for such tax because he did

Inters. Com. Rep. p. 664, Sup. Ct. Rep. p. 834: "In other words, the *tax imposed was for [37] the privilege of doing a general commission business within the state, and whatever were the results pecuniarily to the licensees, or the manner in which they carried on business, the fact remained unchanged that the state had, for a stipulated price, granted them this privilege. It was thought by a majority of the court that to release them from the obligations of their bonds on account of the accidental results of the year's business was refining too much, and that the plaintiffs who had sought the privilege of engaging in a general business should be bound by the contracts which they had made with the state therefor."

Although it is said in the opinion of the state court herein that the thing taxed is the occupation of merchandise brokerage, and not the business of those employing the brokers, yet we have seen from the cases already cited that when the tax is applied to an individual within the state selling the goods of his principal who is a nonresident of the state, it is in effect a tax upon interstate commerce, and that fact is not in anywise altered by calling the tax one upon the occupation of the individual residing within the state while acting as the agent of a nonresident principal. The tax remains one upon interstate commerce, under whatever name it may be designated.

business for more than one individual, firm, or corporation, all being nonresidents of the state of Tennessee. The fact that the state or the court may call the business of an individual, when employed by more than one person outside of the state, to sell their merchandise upon commission, a "brokerage business," gives no authority to the state to tax such a business as complainants'. The name does not alter the character of the Montgomery, 110 Ala. 619, 20 So. 127, in a

transaction, nor prevent the tax thus laid from being a tax upon interstate commerce. As was said by Mr. Justice Bradley, in the Robbins Case, 120 U. S. 489, 30 L. ed. 694, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 45, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 592: "The mere calling the business of a drummer a privilege cannot make it so. Can the state legislature make it a Tennessee privilege to carry on the business of importing goods from foreign countries? If not, has it any better right to make it a state privilege to carry on interstate commerce?" It is still a carrying on of interstate commerce, whether the party is acting for one or more principals residing outside of the state and selling their goods through his procurement, acting for them as their agent.

We cannot see that the Ficklen Case rules the one before us. Although it is plain from the opinion of the Chief Justice that there was not the slightest intention of casting any doubt upon the correctness of the decisions in the Robbins and other cases above cited, it is subsequently stated in Brennan v. Titusville, 153 U. S. 289, 38 L. ed. 719, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 658, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 829, that the Case of Ficklen "is no departure from the rule of decision so firmly established by the prior cases." In speaking of the distinguishing features of the Ficklen Case, Mr. Justice Brewer, in delivering the opinion of the court in Brennan

That such a tax amounts to an invasion of the commerce clause of the Constitution of the United States is held in Stratford v.

most satisfacto opinion by Chief Justice Brickell. In speaking of the tax under the Alabama statute, he said (p. 628, So. p. 129): "While, as we have shown, the business of the defendant was general, so as to constitute him a broker, it by no means follows that it required he should also take local business. He might, as he did, confine himself to interstate business and still be a 'broker,' without becoming liable to the tax." The statute of Alabama is similar to the one in Tennessee, and the facts in the above case are almost identical with those agreed upon herein.

Although the state has general power to tax individuals and property within its jurisdiction, yet it has no power to tax interstate commerce, even in the person of a resident of the state.

*We regard this case as within the Rob-[38] bins and other similar cases above referred to, and it follows that the judgment of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, holding the complainants liable to pay the tax demanded, was erroneous. The judgment of that court is therefore reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with the opinion of this court. It is so ordered.

Mr. Justice Gray took no part in the decision of this case.

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