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Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, 137, 2 L. ed. 60; Mississippi v. Johnson, 4 Wall. 475, 18 L. ed. 437.

Injunction does not lie against the making of a rate, or against a commission before the rate is made.

Stone v. Farmers' Loan & T. Co. 116 U. S. 307, 29 L. ed. 636, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 334, 388, 1191; Spring Valley Waterworks v. Schottler, 110 U. S. 347, 28 L. ed. 173, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 48; Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Smith, 173 U. S. 684, 43 L. ed. 858, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 565; Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & T. Co. 154 U. S. 367, 38 L. ed. 1016, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 560, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1047; Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 42 L. ed. 819, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 418, 171 U. S. 361, 43 L. ed. 197, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 888, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 835, 64 Fed. 165; Higginson v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. 100 Fed. 235, 102 Fed. 1973; Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418, 33 L. ed. 970, 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 209, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 462, 702; San Diego Land & Town Co. v. National City, 174 U. S. 739, 43 L. ed. 1154, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 804; Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U. S. 213, 42 L. ed. 1012, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 583; Trammell v. Dinsmore, 42 C. C. A. 623, 102 Fed. 800; Southern P. Co. v. Railroad Comrs. 78 Fed. 236, 87 Fed. 21; Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Myatt, 98 Fed. 335; State ex rel. Godard v. Johnson, 61 Kan. 803, 49 L. R. A. 662, 60 Pac. 1068; Tilley v. Savannah, F. & W. R. Co. 4 Woods, 446, 5 Fed. 658; Storrs v. Pensacola & A. R. Co. 29 Fla. 617, 11 So. 227; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Jones, 149 III. 378, 24 L. R. A. 141, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 683, 37 N. E. 247; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 19 Fed. 679.

C. A. 625, 92 Fed. 735; Southern P. Co. v. Railroad Comrs. 78 Fed. 236; Ryan v. Williams, 100 Fed. 172; Erie R. Co. v. Erie & W. Valley R. Co. 100 Fed. 808.

After the Kentucky commission shall have made a rate, the question of the reasonableness of that rate or its constitutionality will become a pure question of law.

South Ottawa v. Perkins, 94 U. S. 260, 24 L. ed. 154; Post v. Kendall County, 105 U. S. 667, 26 L. ed. 1204; Gardner v. The Collector, 6 Wall. 499, sub nom. Gardner v. Barney, 18 L. ed. 890; Wilkes County v. Coler, 180 U. S. 506, 45 L. ed. 642, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 458; 1 Thompson, Trials, § 1053; Cooley, Const. Lim. 6th ed. 162, 163; 19 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, pp. 634, 639, 645; Lyons v. Woods, 153 U. S. 663, 38 L. ed. 859, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 959; Nesbit v. People, 19 Colo. 450, 36 Pac. 224; State v. Searcy, 39 Mo. App. 393; Comstock v. Tracey, 46 Fed. 170; Creager v. Hooper, 83 Md. 504, 35 Atl. 161; Jones v. United States, 137 U. S. 216, 34 L. ed. 697, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 80; State v. Wagner, 61 Me. 178; Gard v. Callard, 6 Maule & S. 69; Illinois C. R. Co. v. Whittemore, 43 Ill. 420, 92 Am. Dec. 138; South Florida R. Co. v. Rhodes, 25 Fla. 40, 3 L. R. A. 733, 5 So. 633; 1 Elliott, Railroads, § 202; 2 Wood, Railroads, § 297, p. 1198.

Messrs. Walker D. Hines, James P. Helm, and Alexander Pope Humphrey argued the cause, and, with Messrs. Edward Colston, W. H. Wadsworth, and A. M. J. Cochran, filed a brief for appellees:

A court of equity has jurisdiction of these actions.

Union P. R. Co. v. Cheyenne, 113 U. S. 516, sub nom. Union P. R. Co. v. Ryan, 28 Messrs. David W. Baird and Lewis L. ed. 1098, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 601; Smyth v. McQuown also argued the cause on rear- Ames, 169 U. S. 516, 42 L. ed. 838, 18 Sup. gument, and, with Messrs. Robert J. Breck- Ct. Rep. 418; Watson v. Sutherland, 5 560, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1047; Smyth v. Ames, provisions of a certain statute therein men

inridge and Aaron Kohn, filed an additional brief for appellants:

The rate fixed by the commission is not a judgment establishing establishing guilt and inflicting penalties, but is simply a law establishing rates, made after full and satisfactory investigation.

Southern P. Co. v. Railroad Comrs. 78 Fed. 260; Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418, 33 L. ed. 970, 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 209, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 462,

702.

The action of the commission being, in law, the act of the legislature by deputation merely, an injunction will not be granted to restrain the exercise of the function to make rates, because this would be an interference with the legislative power of the state.

New Orleans Waterworks Co. v. New Orleans, 164 U. S. 471, 41 L. ed. 518, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 161; Alpers v. San Francisco, 12 Sawy. 631, 32 Fed. 503.

The Kentucky commission has the duty to enforce the rate after it has made it.

Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Com. 99 Ky. 132, 33 L. R. A. 209, 35 S. W. 129; Southern P. Co. v. Railroad Comrs. 78 Fed. 236.

Injunction does not lie on the ground of

mere fears.

Lake Erie & W. R. Co. v. Fremont, 34 C.

Wall. 74, 18 L. ed. 580; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 19 Fed. 679; Stone v. Farmers' Loan & T. Co. 116 U. S. 307, 29 L. ed. 636, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 334, 388, 1191; Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & T. Co. 154 U. S. 362, 38 L. ed. 1014, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 560, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1047; Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Dey, 1 L. R. A. 744, 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 325, 35 Fed. 882; Clyde v. Richmond & D. R. Co. 57 Fed. 436; Southern P. Co. v. Railroad Comrs. 78 Fed. 238; Georgia R. & Bkg. Co. v. Smith, 128 U. S. 177, 32 L. ed. 377, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 47; Cotting v. Kansas City Stock-Yards Co. 79 Fed. 680; Bank of Kentucky v. Stone, 88 Fed. 390.

Messrs. W. H. Wadsworth and A. M. J. Cochran filed a separate brief for appellees: A railroad commission may be enjoined from fixing rates where it has no power to make such rates.

Stone v. Farmers' Loan & T. Co. 116 U. S. 307, 29 L. ed. 636, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 334, 388, 1191.

A suit against a railroad commission to prevent an enforcement of rates fixed because unreasonable is not a suit against the state.

Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & T. Co. 154 U. S. 362, 38 L. ed. 1014, 4 Inters. Com. Rep.

169 U. S. 466, 42 L. ed. 819, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 418.

Messrs. James P. Helm, Helm Bruce, Thomas Kennedy Helm, H. W. Bruce, and Walker D. Hines, also filed a brief for appellee, the Louisville & N. R. Co.

[494] *Mr. Chief Justice Fuller delivered the opinion of the court:

By By the decrees the railroad commission of the commonwealth of Kentucky was permanently restrained from proceeding under the act of March 10, 1900, which was alleged and held to be unconstitutional.

Conceding that the mere fact that a duly enacted law is unconstitutional does not entitle a party to relief by injunction against proceedings in compliance therewith, it is contended that ground of equity jurisdiction existed here in the want of ade[495]quate *remedy by the ordinary processes of law for the threatened consequences of the exercise of the power to fix rates in multiplicity of suits and irreparable injury.

It is insisted that according to the terms of the act the order of the commission fixing the rate, toll, or compensation which the railroad companies may charge is self-executing, and that no duty to enforce it is imposed on the commission; that the companies are shut up by the act to the final de

tioned against a railroad company, but the question of jurisdiction does not seem to have been raised. The case was considered on its merits, and the bill directed to be dis-[496] missed. Mr. Chief Justice Waite, speaking for the court, among other things, said: "As yet the commissioners have done nothing. There is, certainly, much they may do in regulating charges within the state, which will not be in conflict with the Constitution of the United States. It is to be presumed they will always act within the limits of their constitutional authority. It will be time enough to consider what may be done to prevent it when they attempt to go beyond."

In New Orleans Waterworks Co. v. New Orleans, 164 U. S. 471, 482, 41 L. ed. 518 524, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 161, 165, the general rule was stated and applied, and Mr. Justice Harlan, who delivered the opinion of the court, said: "We repeat that when the city council shall pass an ordinance that infringes the rights of the plaintiff, and is unconstitutional and void as impairing the obligation of its contract with the state, it will be time enough for equity to interfere, and by injunction prevent the execution of such ordinance. If the ordinances already passed are in derogation of the plaintiff's contract rights, their enforcement can be prevented

termination of the commission that they by appropriate proceedings instituted directhave charged more than a just and reasona- ly against the parties who seek to have the

ble rate; and that on the trial of indictments for failure to observe the rates made by the commission the courts cannot entertain any inquiry as to the reasonableness of the rates so fixed, because such inquiry is unwarranted by the statute, and because such an investigation would be illusory and worthless; and that, even if the question of constitutionality could be raised in defense, yet that if such order be permitted to be entered of record and notified as provided, the companies, if they do not comply, will be at once exposed to innumerable prosecutions, and to financial ruin by the accumulation of penalties before a judicial decision as to the validity of the statute could be had, if it should then happen that the statute is up held.

However all this may be, we think it is not to be doubted that these bills cannot be maintained if it appear that the commission is charged with the duty of enforcing the orders it may enter fixing rates. The objection that before this is done the com mission is required to exercise judicial func tions in determining that the companies have charged or received more than a just and reasonable rate goes to the validity of the act. The fixing of rates is essentially legislative in its character, and the general rule is that legislative action cannot be interfered with by injunction.

It is true that in Railroad Commission Cases, 116 U. S. 307, sub nom. Stone v. Farmers' Loan & T. Co. 29 L. ed. 636, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 334, 388, 1191, the suit was brought to enjoin the railroad commission of Mississippi from proceeding under the

benefit of them. This may involve the plaintiff in a multiplicity of actions. But that circumstance cannot justify any such decree as it asks."

The rule was also applied by Mr. Justice Field in Alpers v. San Francisco, 32 Fed. 503, where complainant sought an injunction to restrain the passage of an ordinance which he alleged would impair the obligation of a contract he had with the city. Mr. Justice Field said: "This no one will question as applied to the power of the legislature of the state. The suggestion of any such jurisdiction of the court over that body would not be entertained for a moment. The same exemption from judicial interference applies to all legislative bodies, so far as their legislative discretion extends. The courts cannot in the one case forbid the passage of a law nor in the other the passage of a resolution, order, or ordinance. If by either body, the legislature or the board of supervisors, an unconstitutional act be passed, its enforcement may be arrested. The parties seeking to execute the invalid act can be reached by the courts, while the legislative body of the state or of the municipality, *in the exercise of its legislative discretion, is beyond their jurisdic tion. The fact that in either case the legis lative action threatened may be in disregar of constitutional restraints, and impair the obligation of a contract, as alleged in this case, does not affect the question. It is legislative discretion which is exercised, and that discretion, whether rightfully or wrongfully exercised, is not subject to interfere лсе by the judiciary."

In Southern Pac. Co. v. California Rail-might fix, it was its duty so to do, and in

road Comrs. 78 Fed. 236, the law of California provided that the commissioners might "enforce their decisions, and correct abuses through the medium of the courts;" and, in substance, that after the rate was made by the commission, a copy of the order should be served on the corporation af fected thereby, and that twenty days thereafter the rate should take effect. A bill was filed before the twenty days had expired; and Mr. Justice McKenna, then Circuit Judge, held that it was the duty of the commissioners to enforce the rate, and that an injunction would lie. The railroad commission had made an order reducing the grain rates of the company 8 per cent, and had passed a resolution declaring that its general charges were 25 per cent too high, and that "this board proceed at once to adopt a revised schedule of rates in accordance herewith, in order that the same may be in force before January 1, 1896." The court enjoined the enforcement of the 8 per cent reduction, which had already been made, but declined to restrain the 25 per cent reduction, because no decisive action had been

taken.

Reading the various sections of the General Statutes of Kentucky, set forth in the statement preceding this opinion, as in pari materia with the act of March 10, 1900, which should be done, since they are parts of one system, having the same general objects in view, we think it apparent that the duty devolves on the commission to enforce the rates it may fix under the latter act. By § 816 extortion was defined to be charging more than a just and reasonable rate. Section 817 defined unjust discrimination, and § 818 forbade undue or unreasonable pref

erence.

Section 819 denounced the same penalties 1498]on conviction of the offense of extortion, or of unjust discrimination, or of unreasonable preference, and provided for prosecution by indictment, or by action in the name of the commonwealth, on information filed by the board of railroad commissioners; that the railroad companies should be liable in damages to the party aggrieved; and also that prosecution by indictment should only be had on the recommendation or request of the railroad commission.

By § 829 the commission was empowered to hear and determine complaints under §§ 816, 817, and 818, and to enforce their awards in the courts.

The duty was imposed on the commission to initiate indictments under § 820 for charging greater compensation, in the ag gregate, for a shorter than for a longer

haul.

Section 821 made it the duty of the commission to see that the laws relating to railroads should be faithfully executed, and to exercise a general supervision over the railroads of the state.

So that unless the act of March 10, 1900, operated to repeal the provisions of the prior law, by withdrawing from the commission the duty of enforcing the rates it

dictments were to be found at its instance.

Section 816 read thus: "If any railroad corporation shall charge, collect, or receive more than a just and reasonable rate of toll or compensation for the transportation of passengers or freight in this state, or for the use of any railroad car upon its track or upon any track it has control of or the right to use in this state, it shall be guilty of extortion."

In Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Com. 99 Ky. 132, 33 L. R. A. 209, 35 S. W. 129, this section was considered. The court held that the section could not be enforced as a penal statute for want of certainty, and said:

"That this statute leaves uncertain what shall be deemed a 'just and reasonable rate of toll or compensation' cannot be denied, and that different juries might reach different conclusions, on the same testimony, as to whether or not an offense has been committed, must also be conceded.

*"The criminality of the carrier's act, [499] therefore, depends on the jury's view of the reasonableness of the rate charged; and this latter depends on many uncertain and complicated elements.

"That the corporation has fixed a rate which it considers will bring it only a fair return for its investment does not alter the nature of the act. Under this statute it is still a crime, though it cannot be known to be such until after an investigation by a jury, and then only in that particular case, as another jury may take a different view, and, holding the rate reasonable, find the same act not to constitute an offense. There is no standard whatever fixed by the statute, or attempted to be fixed, by which the carrier may regulate its conduct; and it seems clear to us to be utterly repugnant to our system of laws to punish a person for an act the criminality of which depends, not on any standard erected by the law which may be known in advance, but on one erected by a jury. And especially so as that standard must be as variable and uncertain as the views of different juries may suggest, and as to which nothing can be known until after the commission of the crime."

The court referred to and quoted from Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Jones, 149 III. 361, 24 L. R. A. 141, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 683, 37 Ν. Ε. 247; and Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. People, 77 III. 443, in which it was held under a similar statute that the want of certainty in lack of reference to a standard under its 1st section was obviated by its 8th section providing for the making by the railroad and warehouse commissioners of schedules of reasonable and maximum rates, which, being done, the supreme court of Illinois said: "There will be a standard of what is fair and reasonable, and the statute can be conformed to and obeyed."

Such being the state of the law, the aet of March 10, 1900, was passed.

The mischief to be cured in respect of extortion, as defined by § 816, was the want of certainty, and the remedy provided was

the fixing of the rates by the railroad com- | § 821) it is made the duty of the commismission.

In so providing, the act, while repeating many of the provisions of § 819, did, indeed, omit reference to an action by way of information and to liability in damages, and it [500]also *omitted the provision that indictments should be made only on the recommendation or request of the railroad commission; but it does not therefore follow that it was the legislative intention, without any expression thereof in terms, to repeal so important a provision.

Was the provision repealed by necessary implication? "We say by necessary implication, for it is not sufficient to establish that subsequent laws cover some or even all of the cases provided for by it [the prior law]; for they may be merely affirmative, or cumulative, or auxiliary." Story Story, J., Wood v. United States, 16 Pet. 362, 10 L. ed. 995. Repeals by implication are not favored, and are only allowed to the extent that repugnancy exists, and, in order to give an act not clearly intended as a substitute for an earlier one the effect of repealing it, the implication of the intention to do so must necessarily flow from the language used, bearing in mind the necessity and occasion of the law. And where it is plain that the new law is in aid of the purposes of the old law, the latter will not be held to be abrogated except so far as there is palpable inconsistency.

We do not think that it was intended to repeal the provision of § 819 requiring indictments to be found only on the recommendation or request of the commission, and still less that it was intended to circumscribe in this particular the general duty of the commission to see that the laws relating to railroads should be faithfully executed. Dealing as we are with the statutes of Kentucky, we are gratified to find these views confirmed by the court of appeals of that commonwealth, in Illinois C. R. Co. v. Com. decided October 25, 1901, its opinion having been furnished us at the close of the argument, and since reported in 23 Ky. L. Rep. 1159, 64 S. W. 975.

In that case the railroad company was indicted under $ 820, and fined for charging more for a shorter than a longer haul. The indictment was returned before the railroad commission had determined whether the company should be exonerated as provided by that section. The judgment was reversed, and Hobson, J., speaking for the court,

said:

[501]*"In the construction of statutes the cardinal aim of the court is to arrive at the intention of the legislature. The court will presume that the legislature meant something by all the provisions of the statute, and will endeavor to give them all a fair effect. If the legislature ure had intended indictments to be found for each offense, regardless of action by the railroad commission, we see no reason why the section might not have stopped with the first sentence defining the offense and providing for its punishment, for by the next section (Ky. Stat.

sion 'to see that the laws relating to all rail-
roads, except street, are faithfully execut-
ed;" and under this provision it would be
the duty of the commission to see to viola-
tions of the preceding section.
From the section as a whole it is clear that
the legislature had in mind providing for
the exoneration of the railroad from its pro-
visions in proper cases, and exempting the
carrier from criminal liability to this ex-
tent. It therefore provided for an investi-
gation by the railroad commission, a de-
termination by it whether it deemed it prop-
er to exonerate the railroad, and for the en-
forcement of its decision by indictment by
the grand jury in case the railroad was not
exonerated. To allow the carrier to be in-
dicted in advance of any action by the rail-
road commission under this section would
be to deprive it of all opportunity for ex-
oneration. The legislature had no such re-
sult in mind, but clearly aimed to secure to
the carrier a hearing on this question.

"The long and short haul matter is only another form of undue discrimination and preference, which are provided for by § 819, and indictments under this section can only be had upon the recommendation of the railroad commission. This has been a settled legislative policy, as shown by the act of April 6, 1882 (see Gen. Stat. 1021), which was in force at the time of the adoption of the Constitution and the present statutes. In other words, the legislature has always acted upon the idea that the interests of the entire people of the state should be looked to in these matters, and that the railroad commission must first determine them before the grand juries of the state should find indictments."

The 4th section of the act of the general assembly of Kentucky of April 6, 1882[502) (Acts 1881, p. 66, chap. 790), entitled "An Act to Prevent Extortion and Discrimination in the Transportation of Freight and Passengers by Railroad Corporations, and in Aid of That Purpose to Establish a Board of Railroad Commissioners, and Define its Powers and Duties," set forth in the edition of the Kentucky Statutes of 1887, p. 1021, and referred to by the court, provided for the infliction of penalties on railroad companies convicted of extortion or unlawful discrimination, and that the offender should be "prosecuted by indictment or by action in the name of the commonwealth, upon information filed by the board of railroad commissioners;" and also that the companies should be liable in damages to the parties aggrieved. The act of March 10, 1900, does not appear to have been intended to change the settled legislative policy that indictments should be found on the recommendation of the commission.

The result of these considerations is that the duty of enforcing its rates rests on the commission, and that none of the consequences alleged to be threatened can be set up as the basis of equity interposition, before the rates are fixed at all. Whether after they are determined their enforcement can.

be restrained is a question not arising for 5. Any interference with interstate commerce decision on this record, and we are not called on to dispose of other contentions of grave importance which were pressed in argument as if now requiring adjudication.

Decrees reversed and cases remanded to the Circuit Court, with a direction to sustain the demurrers and dismiss the bills.

[503]*LOUISVILLE & NASHVILLE RAILROAD COMPANY, Plff. in Err.,

v.

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY.

(See S. C. Reporter's ed. 503-519.)

Constitutional law-due process of lawequal protection of the laws-charging more for shorter than for longer haulinterference with interstate commerce.

1. The construction put by the Kentucky court of appeals upon the provisions of Ky. Const. $218, by which a different effect is given to it than to similar language in the interstate commerce law, is binding upon the Supreme Court of the United States in a case governed by the state Constitution.

2. The equal protection of the laws is not denied to a railroad company by Ky. Const.

218, and Ky. Gen. Stat. 1894, § 820, which prohibit the companies from charging more for a shorter than for a longer haul, except by permission of the railroad commission in special

cases after investigation.

3. The guaranty of due process of law by the Federal Constitution is not violated by Kу.

Const. § 218, and Ky. Gen. Stat. 1894, § 820, giving a railroad commission power to make exceptions in particular cases, after investigation, from the general prohibition of greater rates for shorter than for longer hauls.

Such commission is not to be deemed a mere administrative body, but it is a constitutional tribunal, the decisions of which are made conclusive, and not reviewable by the courts. 4. A railroad company accepting its charter subject to the provisions of Ky. Const. 218, prohibiting greater charges for shorter than for longer hauls, except when permitted by the railroad commission, is as much subject to the provisions for exoneration from that prohibition as to the prohibition itself, and cannct claim that it has any implied contract

exemption from these provisions by virtue of its charter and the consequent right to charge reasonable rates for its service.

by the enforcement of state laws prohibiting a greater charge for shorter than for longer hauls is too remote and indirect to be regarded as an unconstitutional interference with interstate commerce.

[No. 7.]

Argued November 9, 1900. Ordered for Reargument March 25, 1901. Reargued November 8, 11, 1901. Decided January 6, 1902..

1

N ERROR to the Court of Appeals of the State of Kentucky to review a decision affirming a judgment of conviction on an indictment against a railroad company for charging unlawful rates. Affirmed.

See same case below, 21 Ky. L. Rep. 232, 51 S. W. 164, 1012.

Statement by Mr. Justice Shiras:

At the January term, 1895, of the Marion county circuit court of the state of Kentucky, an indictment was found against the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company, a corporation of the state of Kentucky, for an alleged violation of § 218 of the Constitution of the state, and § 820 of the Kentucky Statutes, in charging more for the transportation of coal from Altamont, Kentucky, to Lebanon, Kentucky, than to Louisville and Elizabethtown, Kentucky, over railroads which the company were operating under its charter. The indictment alleged that it was filed upon the recommendation of the state railroad commission. The trial resulted in a judgment of conviction and a fine of $300, which, on appeal, was, on May 20, 1899, affirmed by the court of appeals. [21 Ky. L. Rep. 232, 51 S. W. 164, 1012.] From that judgment of the court of appeals a writ of error was allowed by the chief justice of that court on June 28, 1899, and the case was brought to this court.

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NOTE. On the construction and effect of state laws and Constitutions and state decisions in regard to the same-see note to Elmendorf v. Taylor, 6 I. ed. U. S. 290.

As to constitutional equality of privileges, Immunities, and protection-see Louisville Safety Vault & T. Co. v. Louisville & N. R. Co. (Ky.) 14 I. R. A. 579, and note.

As to what constitutes due process of lawsec Kuntz v. Sumption (Ind.) 2 L. R. A. 755, and note; Re Gannon (R. I.) 5 L. R. A. 359, and note; Ulman v. Baltimore (Md.) 11 L. R. A. 224, and note; Gilman v. Tucker (N. Y.) 13 .L. R. A. 304, and note. And see notes to People v. O'Brien (N. Y.) 2 L. R. A. 258; Pearson v. Yewdall, 24 L. ed. U. S. 436, and Wilson v. North Carolina ex rel. Caldwell, 42 L. ed. U. S. 865.

As to state regulation of commerce-see notes

to Ratterman v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 32 L. ed. U. S. 229; Harmon v. Chicago, 37 L. ed. U. S. 216; Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Backus, 38 L. ed. U. S. 1041, and Postal Teleg. Cable Co. v. Adams, 39 L. ed. U. S. 311.

That state laws cannot regulate interstate commcrce-see Norfolk & W. R. Co. v. Com. (Va.) 13 L. R. A. 107, and note.

On what constitutes a regulation or restraint upon interstate commerce-see note to Postal Teleg. Cable Co. v. Adams, 39 L. ed. U. S. 311.

As to state laws interfering with interstate or foreign commerce-see note to McCanna & F. Co. v. Citizens' Trust & Surety Co. 24 C. C. A. 13.

On legislative power to flæ tolls, rates, or prices-see note to Winchester & L. Turnp. Road Co. v. Croxton (Ky.) 33 L. R. A. 177.

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