Ct. Rep. 775; Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41, 44 L. ed. 969, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 747; United States v. Perkins, 163 U. S. 625, 41 L. ed. 287, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1073; Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Sav. Bank, 170 U. S. 283, 42 L. ed. 1037, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 594. The 14th Amendment does not give this court power to review an act simply because the appellants regard it as harsh.

Mobile County v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 703, 26 L. ed. 238; King v. Mullins, 171 U. S. 436, 43 L. ed. 226, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 925; Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Sav. Bank, 170 U. S. 293, 42 L. ed. 1042, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 594; Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U. S. 700, sub nom. Union P. R. Co. v. United States, 25 L. ed. 436.

In taxation "due process of law" is not violated, if the act provides for notice and an opportunity to object.

ed. 998, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 774, Affirming 161
N. Y. 631, 57 Ñ. E. 1122; Murdock v. Ward,
178 U. S. 139, 44 L. ed. 1009, 20 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 775; Re Sherman, 153 N. Y. 1, 46 N.
E. 1032; Re Knoedler, 140 N. Y. 380, 35 N.
E. 601.

*Mr. Justice Shiras delivered the opinion [281] of the court:

This is the case of a so-called transfer tax imposed under the laws of the state of New York. The various contentions of the plaintiffs in error, attacking the validity of the tax, were overruled by the courts of the state, and the cause is now before us on the general proposition that by the proceedings the plaintiffs in error, or those whom they represent as trustees and guardians, have been deprived of the equal protection of the laws of the state of New York, their privileges and immunities as citizens of the United States have been abridged, and their property taken without due process of law, in violation of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and like

Winona & St. P. Land Co. v. Minnesota, 159 U. S. 537, 40 L. ed. 251, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 83; Palmer v. McMahon, 133 U. S. 669, 33 L. ed. 776, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 324; Simon v. Craft, 182 U. S. 427, 45 L. ed. 1165, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 836; Davidson v. New Or-wise, as to a portion of the property afleans, 96 U. S. 97, 24 L. ed. 616.

Th act does not abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States. This provision of the 14th Amendment has no relation to taxation, but relates only to rights conferred by the national government. Giozza v. Tiernan, 148 U. S. 657, 37 L. ed. 599, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 721; Bartemeyer | v. Iowa, 18 Wall. 129, 21 L. ed. 929.

"Equal protection of the laws" does not prohibit classification for taxation, provided the classification is reasonable, and all within the same class are treated the same under like circumstances.

Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Sav. Bank, 170 U. S. 283, 42 L. ed. 1037, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 594; Giozza v. Tiernan, 148 U. S. 657, 37 L. ed. 599, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 721.

A person has no vested right in a rule of the common law, and it can be changed without violating the 14th Amendment.

Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, 24 L. ed. 77; Cooley, Const. Lim. 5th ed. p. 440; State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U. S. 607, 23 L. ed.

671.

A fiction can be abrogated without violating the 14th Amendment; for example, that the "situs of a debt follows the domicil of the owner."

Bristol v. Washington County, 177 U. S. 133, 44 L. ed. 701, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 585; Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U. S. 27, 35 L. ed. 618, 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 595, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 876.

fected, in violation of § 10 of article 1 of
the Constitution of the United States.

The first question presented arises out of
subdivision 5 of § 220 of the tax law of the
state of New York, which reads as follows:

"5. Whenever any person or corporation shall exercise a power of appointment derived from any disposition of property, made either before or after the passage of this act, such appointment, when made, shall be deemed a transfer taxable, under the provisions of this act, in the same manner as though the property to which such appointment relates belonged absolutely to the donee of such power, and had been bequeathed or devised by such donee by will; and whenever any person or corporation possessing such a power of appointment so derived shall omit or fail to exercise the same within the time provided therefor, in whole or in part, a transfer taxable under the provisions of this act shall be deemed to take place to the extent of such omissions or failure, in the same manner as though [282] the persons or corporations thereby becoming entitled to the possession or enjoyment of the property to which such power related had succeeded thereto by a will of the donee of the power failing to exercise such power, taking effect at the time of such omission or failure." [Laws of 1897, chap. 284.]

This enactment became a law on April 16, 1897. David Dows, Sr., died March 30, 1890, leaving a will containing a power of The succession law can be made retroac-appointment to his son, David Dows, Jr., tive, if the law clearly shows that it was intended to apply to past successions.

Carpenter v. Pennsylvania, 17 How. 456, 15 L. ed. 127. See also Wright v. Blakeslee, 101 U. S. 174, 25 L. ed. 1048; Wilcox v. Smith, 26 L. J. Ch. N. S. 596; Atty. Gen. v. Middleton, 3 Hurlst. & N. 125.

Nontaxable securities can be appraised in determining the value of the succession created by the exercise of the power.

Plummer v. Coler, 178 U. S. 115, 44 L.

which will was duly admitted to probate
by the surrogate's court on April 14, 1890.
David Dows, Jr., died on January 13, 1899,
leaving a will in which he exercised the pow-
er of appointment given him in the will of
his father, and apportioned the property
which was the subject of the power among
his three sons, who are represented in this
litigation by the plaintiff in error.

It is claimed that under the law of the
state of New York as it stood at the time of

may remain whether the statute, as so construed, imports a violation of any of the rights secured by applicable provisions of the Constitution of the United States. And such is the contention here.

This court has no authority to revise the statutes of New York upon any grounds of justice, policy, or consistency to its own Constitution. Such questions are concluded by the decision of the legislative and judicial authorities of the state.

his death, in 1890, David Dows, Sr., had a legal right to transfer, by will, his property, or any interest therein, to his grandchildren, without any diminution or impairment then imposed by the law of the state upon the exercise of that right; that his said grandchildren acquired vested rights in the property so transferred; and that the subsequent law, whose terms have been above transcribed, operates to diminish and impair those vested rights. In other words, it is claimed that it is not competent for In Carpenter v. Pennsylvania, 17 How. the state, by a subsequent enactment, to ex- 456, 15 L. ed. 127, the question arose as to act a price or charge for a privilege lawful- the validity, in its Federal aspect, of a law ly exercised in 1890, and to thus take from of the state of Pennsylvania" imposing an the grandchildren a portion of the very prop-inheritance tax on personal *property which [284] erty the full right to which had vested in had passed into the possession of an executor them many years before. before the passage of the act, and which was held by him for the purpose of distribution among the legatees, who were collateral relatives to the decedent. The act was held valid by the supreme court of the state, and was brought up to this court by a writ of error, where it was contended that such an act was in its nature an ex post facto law, which took the property of an individual to the use of the state, because of a fact which had occurred prior to the passage of the law; and also that the law, in its retroactive effect, impaired the obligation of a contract, in that it was alleged to absolve the executor from his contract, implied in law, to pay over the legacies to those entitled to them, just to the extent that the law required him to pay to the state. The opinion of the court, delivered by Mr. Justice Campbell, was in part as follows:

We here meet, in the first place, the question of the construction of the will of David Dows, Sr. Under and by virtue of that will did the property whose transfer is taxed pass to and become vested in the grandchildren, or did the property not become vested in them until and by virtue of the will of David Dows, Jr., exercising the power of appointment? The answer to be given to this question must, of course, be that furnished us by the court of appeals in this case (Re Dows, 167 N. Y. 227, 52 L. R. A. 433, 60 N. E. 439):

"Whatever be the technical source of title [283] of a grantee under a *power of appointment, it cannot be denied that, in reality and substance, it is the execution of the power that gives to the grantee the property passing under it. The will of Dows, Sr., gave his son a power of appointment to be exercised only in a particular manner, to wit, by last will and testament. If, as said by the Supreme Court of the United States, the right to take property by devise is not an inherent or natural right, but a privilege accorded by the state, which it may tax or charge for, it follows that the rights of a testator to make a will or testamentary instrument is equally a privilege, and equally subject to the taxing power of the state. When David Dows, Sr., devised this property to the appointees under the will of his son, he necessarily subjected it to the charge that the state might impose on the privilege accorded to the son of making a will. That charge is the same in character as if it had been laid on the inheritance of the estate of the son himself; that is, for the privilege of succeeding to property under a will."

It will be perceived that in putting this construction upon the will of David Dows, Sr., the court of appeals not merely construed the words of the will, but, by implication, applied to the case the provisions of the subdivision 5 of § 220 under which the transfer tax in question was imposed, and thus construed that tax law, and affirmed its validity.

While it is settled law that this court will follow the construction put by the state courts upon wills devising property situated within the state, and while it is also true that we adopt the construction of its own statutes by the state courts, a question

"The validity of the act as affecting successions to open after its enactment is not contested; nor is the authority of the state to levy taxes upon personal property belonging to its citizens, but situated beyond its limits, denied. But the complaint is that the application of the act of 1826 by that of 1850 to a succession already in the course of settlement, and which had been appropriated by the last will of decedent, involved an arbitrary change of the existing laws of inheritance to the extent of this tax, in the sequestration of that amount for the uses of the state; that the rights of the residuary legatees were vested at the death of the testator, and from that time those persons were nonresidents, and the property taxed was also beyond the state; and that the state has employed its power over the executor and the property within its borders to accomplish a measure of wrong and injustice; that the act contains the imposition of a forfeiture or penalty, and is ex post facto.

"It is in some sense true that the rights of donees under a will are vested at the death of the testator, and that the acts of administration which follow are conservatory means directed by the state to ascertain those rights, and to accomplish an effective translation of the dominion of the decedent to the objects of his bounty; and the legislation adopted with any other aim than this would justify criticism, and per'haps censure. *But, until the period for dis-[285]

laws and the extent of the powers of the
states and of Congress in imposing and regu-
lating them.

In the light of the principles thus estabJished we are unable to see in this legislation of the state of New York, as construed by its highest court, any infringement of the salutary provisions of the 14th Amendment. There are involved no arbitrary or unequal regulations prescribing different rates of taxation on property or persons in the same condition. The provisions of the law extend alike to all estates that descend or devolve upon the death of those who once owned them. The moneys raised by the taxation are applied to the lawful uses of the state, in which the legatees have the same interests with the other citizens. Nor is it claimed that the amount or rate of the taxation is excessive to the extent of confiscation. But it is further urged that the tax law of the state of New York, § 221, expressly exempts from taxation or charge all real estate passing to lineal descendants by descent or devise, and all such descendants so taking title to real estate from ancestors; and it is said that under the interpretation of this law by the courts of the state of New {288] York all property which was real estate at the time of the death of the person owning it continues, as to the lineal descendants, to be real estate, and is therefore exempt from taxation, though such descendants may not enter into possession and enjoyment of the property until years after the death of the ancestor who owned it, and the property in the meantime has been converted into cash or securities.

York exempt by statute from taxation, such exemption formed part of the contract under which said securities were purchased, and the tax imposed and the proceedings to enforce it were in violation of § 10 of article 1 of the Constitution of the United States forbidding the states to pass laws impairing the obligation of contracts.

The court of appeals overruled the proposition that the *transfer tax in question was [289] a tax upon property, and not upon the right of succession, and held that when David Dows, Sr., devised this property to the appointees under the will of his son, he necessarily subjected it to the charge that the state might impose on the privilege accorded to the son of making a will, and that the charge is the same in character as if it had been laid on the inheritance of the estate of the son himself; that is, for the privilege of succeeding to property under a will.

In reaching this conclusion the court of appeals cited, not only various New York cases, but several decisions of this court, the principles of which were thought to be applicable. Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Sav. Bank, 170 U. S. 283, 42 L. ed. 1037, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 594; Plummer v. Coler, 178 U. S. 115, 44 L. ed. 998, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 774; Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41, 44 L. ed. 969, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 747; Murdock v. Ward, 178 U. S. 139, 44 L. ed. 1009, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 775.

We think it unnecessary to enter upon another discussion of a subject so recently considered in the cases just cited, and that it is sufficient to say that, in our opinion, the court of appeals did not err when it held It is true that the property described in that a transfer or succession tax, not being the 6th paragraph of the will of David a direct tax upon property, but a charge upDows, Sr., was real estate, but under the on a privilege exercised or enjoyed under powers conferred in the will of David Dows, the law of the state, does not, when imposed Sr., the trustees had converted the real es- in cases where the property passing consists tate, and held the proceeds as personal prop- of securities exempt by statute, impair the erty, before the death of David Dows, Jr., obligation of a contract within the meanand it was this personal property which being of the Constitution of the United States. came vested in the grandchildren under the A further contention is made that the exercise of the power of appointment. The legatees or devisees of the remainders cre court of appeals held that it was the execu- ated by the will of David Dows, Jr., are not tion of the power of appointment which sub-legally subject to taxation until the precedjected grantees under it to the transfer tax. | ent estates terminate and the remainders This conclusion is binding upon this court vest in possession. in so far as it involves a construction of the will and of the statute. Nor are we able to perceive that thereby the plaintiffs in error were deprived of any rights under the Federal Constitution. The rule of law laid down by the New York courts is applicable to all alike, and even if the view of the court of appeals respecting the question was wrong, it was an error which we have no power to review.

The court of appeals held that the doctrine invoked had no application to the remainders given to the sons of David Dows, Jr.; that they are absolute, and not subject to be devested, or to fail in any contingency whatever; that by statute they are alienable, devisable, descendible, and if the property were real estate, they could be sold on execution against their owners; that by the aid of the table of annuities, upon the faith of which large sums are constantly distributed by the courts, the present value of these remainders is capable of ready *com-[290] putation; and that therefore they are subject to present taxation.

Another objection made to the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the surrogate's order is that the tax imposed upon transfers made under a power of appointment is a tax upon property, and not on the right of succession; and that, as a por- These views of the court of appeals must tion of the fund was invested in incorporated be accepted by us as accurate statements companies liable to taxation on their own of the law of the state; and though it is capital, and in certain bonds of the state of claimed in the brief of counsel for the plainNew York, and in bonds of the city of Newtiffs in error that such a construction of the

JOHN SCHRIMPSCHER et al., Plffs. in Argued November 22, 1901. Decided Jan