measures in the Security Council. Although the draft resolution easily received a two-thirds majority within the Security Council, the Soviet veto effectively ended any chance for the United Nations to back its words with actions and be more than an impotent onlooker to the unfolding of the crisis. 202 Concurrently, the United States filed an action in the International Court of Justice. Both the interim measures endorsed in December, 1979, and the later decision on the merits were repudiated by Iran. These avenues having been exhausted, the United States then instituted a number of economic sanctions intended to be coercive.203 The focus of American response shifted from words to deeds. E. American Objectives. The United States seemed unable to determine what objectives it wished to pursue and also relucant to admit that economic sanctions seldom prove successful against a post-revolutionary regime.204 An editorial in the British Manchester Guardian Weekly asked: "But where is the strategy? Is the release of the hostages all we are trying to achieve or are we concerned also with the future stability of Iran and the region?" 205 Although public attention was focused on the fate of the hostages, more significant—although less dramatic-goals seemed to be the preservation of American influence and reputation as a supporter of world order. 206 If release of the hostages had been the United States' only goal, the Shah could have been seized and used as a bargaining chip. America's problem lay in translating its multiple policy interests into clear, convincing terms-credible to our allies and clearly discernible to the Iranians. The difficulty was exacerbated by the Carter Administration's inability to separate the various crises demanding responses. The situations in Iran and Afghanistan seemed to merge into one in the President's mind, whereas effective conflict management required that they be kept on related, but separate, tracks. In the case of Iran, President Carter's inability to decide on a course of action made it difficult for America's European allies to be certain just 202. There has been speculation that the Soviet Union vetoed the January 13, 1980, draft resolution in the Security Council in retaliation for U.S. sponsorship of the earlier General Assembly resolution condemning the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The General Assembly resolution was passed under the "Uniting for Peace" rationale (G.A. Res. 377 V. U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950)) following a Soviet veto in the Security Council. 203. See Section IF4 of the text. 204. The economic sanctions imposed against post-revolutionary regimes in the Soviet Union, China and Cuba were a total failure. Similarly, League of Nations' sanctions against Mussolini's Italy and United Nations' sanctions against Rhodesia, far from punishing those countries, actually led to greater unity, harder work, and years of increased productivity. 205. Manchester Guardian Weekly, May 13, 1980, at 14. 206. Fisher, Sanctions Won't Work, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 14, 1980, at 21. where it was the United States was headed. For five months after the hostage seizure, President Carter seemed ready to rely on a medley of political, judicial, and economic initiatives in the belief that rational leadership in Iran would eventually prevail on the student militants. When, on 24 April 1980, he abandoned this policy without consulting any allies, he was stunned to find questioning amazement among friends abroad. Months earlier Carter had committed a similar political gaffe by imposing a series of unilateral sanctions against both Iran and the Soviet Union without first adequately preparing the Western alliance. These turns and twists of policy, often adopted after only minimal consultation with allies, suggest that President Carter did not believe that he could successfully mobilize a community response. In part, this vacillation between unilateral and group initiatives echoes the dual nature of the hostage crisis as both an American and a global problem. Although the situation affected the United States most acutely, all signatories of the 1961 and 1963 Vienna Conventions had a direct interest in the safe return of diplomatic hostages and premises. The attempt at forcible rescue in April 1980, if successful, would have solved the American part of the problem without resolving the larger issues of diplomatic rights and international order. The unsuccessful rescue operation followed an Administration posture towards Iran which had first been severe, then lenient, then harsh once again. While the Carter Administration could argue persuasively that these changes were justified in light of the constantly changing situation, the frequent reversals mystified Europeans. Had our allies followed President Carter's initial call for strong measures, noted one European ambassador, the allies would have been caught short by the change to leniency. "We would have been out on a limb and he could have sawed it off. That's why we're a little wary now of being told we have to be tough."207 As former Under Secretary of State George Ball urged, the European allies did have an important, although narrower, interest in the Iranian crisis, and "[w]e should [have] welcome [d] their counsel and not resent [ed] it."208 He stated further that the United States should have listened carefully to the urging of its allies for a unified effort to isolate Iran politically so that the community of states could show the Iranian people "that the government which violates the sanctity of an embassy becomes an international pariah.' "209 Although the various American responses were basically justified, their timing and methodology do not appear to have been optimal. The failure of the United States to secure early release of the hostages was in part a 207. Time, April 28, 1980, at 15. 208. Time, May 12, 1980, at 29. 209. Id. function of President Carter's inability to devise and execute a coherent strategy and, more importantly, a result of the world community's understandable unwillingness to give his actions the respect and credibility needed to impress the Iranians. F. American Grisis Diplomacy in the Future. In theory, a government's response to unlawful coercion is governed by principles of international law applied to the context of a particular situation. A government should be prepared to meet unexpected and intolerable situations with legal contingency plans which are suited for quick response, whether the responses be political and /or military. Responses based on legal analysis rather than on political expedience would, in the Iranian situation, likely have promoted an earlier end to the crisis and a less traumatic restoration of world order. The Iranian seizure of the American Embassy was unlawful both in terms of diplomatic law and in terms of general principles governing the legitimate use of force. The American retaliation to Iran's violations, however, raises troubling questions. Not only was the overall pattern of responses tactically ineffective, it seemed at times as though American attempts to secure release of the hostages were in. collision with broader goals of the international community. On one hand, diplomatic efforts of the United States to mobilize community action through the Security Council and through the International Court of Justice were measures which tended to reflect and preserve community values. Conversely, America's unilateral economic and military steps, especially when taken without prior consultation or consent, undercut the preservation of community values. In limited circumstaces, such as the need for self-defense against aggression, unilateral responses are permitted. The distinction between permissible self-defense and impermissible self-help, however, is often blurry. Solid arguments can be mustered on both sides regarding the issue of the "reasonableness" of American attempts to coerce Iran into releasing the hostages. Certain implications of the 444-day Iranian hostage crisis are clear. The continued vitality of mutual world values depends on much more than a search for national catharsis. The American public's penchant for gestures, such as candlelight vigils and yellow ribbons, was matched by the Carter Administration's tendency to confuse symbol with substance and to palm off poses in the name of policy. Politically, the crisis put Carter in a tight spot. The American public demanded a solution to the problem, yet paradoxically this surge of public pressure to "do something" reduced the President's ability to hang tough. Time was perceived as being on the side of the Iranians. In retrospect, it seems that the predicament controlled Carter rather than vice-versa. His willingness to tack back and forth in dealing with the crisis met the public demand for visible action and also provided moments of cathartic relief. In the long run, however, this at tempt to reconcile Iranian intransigence with the American appetite for action resulted in a settlement favorable to Iran. A country that confuses catharsis with defense of its interests is a nation uncertain of its values, and President Carter's effort to ride both horses at once proved to be counterproductive. President Reagan now finds himself bound by the terms of the Carter Administration's negotiated settlement, terms which the U.S. Supreme Court has generally upheld as legal even if not wise.210 Some of the terms, such as the requirement to return unencumbered Iranian financial assets, do no more than honor a pre-existing obligation. Other commitments which pertain directly to the official relationship between Iran and the United States, such as the formation of a joint American-Iranian Claims Tribunal, should also be honored as a positive contribution to community values. Some parts of the agreement, however, may be legally unenforceable. One such provision is the requirement that The United States will order all persons within U.S. jurisdiction to report to the U.S. Treasury, within 30 days, for transmission to Iran, all information known to them, as of Nov. 3 1979. . . with respect to the property and assets of the former shah. Violation of the requirement will be subject to civil and criminal penalties described by U.S. law.211 No such order has ever been issued, and it is highly improbable that President Reagan will ever do so; if he did, enforcement would be impossible. President Reagan's pledge of "swift and effective retribution" in case of threats to Americans abroad is clearly meant to deter future attacks as well as to reassure a concerned nation. Given the profusion of incidents throughout the world, there seems to be little chance that Reagan's warnings will turn back the tide of disorder. In fact, the probability of direct engagement by the United States could spur some groups to risk more radical outcomes than they would have attempted previously. Hopefully, the painful lessons of the Iranian hostage conflict have spurred the current Administration to review the entire range of alternatives available for protecting limited—but highly visible-national interests such as American diplomatic personnel and property. The mere pledge of quick retribution is not enough. A heightened sensitivity and alertness to the possibility of terrorism-a current phenomenon in less-developed nations-would go far in preparing the United States for the unexpected while at the same time promoting the 210. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981). 211. Washington Star, Jan. 29, 1981, at A-12, col. 3. design of responsive contingency plans. To this end, the United States ought to ensure that its military and /or political responses-responses that should support customary international law while also being firm-reflect America's weight and standing in the international community. CHRONOLOGY 1979 Jan. 16 Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi leaves Iran for "an extended vacation." Oct. 22 The deposed Shah arrives in New York from Mexico for medical treatment. Nov. 6 The Government of Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan resigns. Khomeini turns power over to the Revolutionary Council. Nov. 8 Abdol Hassan Bani-Sadr is appointed Foreign Minister of Iran. Nov. 9 The U.N. Security Council appeals for the immediate release of the hostages. Nov. 12 President Carter announces a halt to U.S. oil imports from Iran. Iran announces suspension of oil sales to the United States. Nov. 14 Iran announces it will withdraw its financial reserves from American banks. President Carter responds by freezing Iranian assets in the United States. Nov. 18 Two black Marines and a woman hostage are released. Nov. 19 Ten more hostages-four women and six blacks-are released. Nov. 20 President Carter orders a naval task force into the Indian Ocean. Nov. 28 Bani-Sadr is dismissed as Foreign Minister and replaced by Sedegh Ghotbzadeh. Nov. 29 Mexico announces it will not renew the Shah's tourist visa. Dec. 2 The Shah is flown from New York to an Air Force hospital near San Antonio. President Carter calls the move temporary, for the Shah's "recuperation." Libyans march on the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli and set it on fire. Dec. 4 The U.N. Security Council approves a resolution calling for the release of the hostages. The Iranian militants refuse to recognize the Security Council. Dec. 10 The State Department reiterates that the United States will discuss "differences" with Iran only after the hostages are freed. Marine Cpl. William Gallegos appears in a televised interview from the Embassy. Dec. 15 The Shah leaves the United States for Panama. The Revolutionary Council continues to hold the United States responsible for alleged crimes committed under the Shah. Iranian militants declare that the hostages will be tried "as soon as possible." The International Court of Justice rules in favor of the United States and orders the release of the hostages. The militants reject the decision. Dec. 18 Ghotbzadeh calls on the United States to launch an inquiry into the regime of the Shah. Dec. 19 U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim asks the United States to delay its appeal to the Security Council for economic sanctions against Iran because of "intensive discussion" with the Iranians. President Carter agrees. Dec. 25 Three U.S. clergymen and an Algerian archbishop conduct Christmas services for the Americans. Dec. 31 Waldheim leaves for Iran to negotiate for the hostages' release. 1980 Jan. 4 Waldheim, denied a meeting with Khomeini, returns to New York and predicts "no quick solution" to the crisis. Jan. 13 The U.N. Security Council vote on U.S.-proposed sanctions against Iran is vetoed by the Soviets. |