Syllabus. 317 U.S. MANGUS ET AL. v. MILLER. CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT. No. 74. Argued November 17, 1942.-Decided December 7, 1942. 1. The interest of one of two joint tenants in a contract to purchase land payable in installments, where under state law it is an interest which may be alienated and subjected to execution and separate sale, is property which may be administered in farmer-debtor proceedings under § 75 of the Bankruptcy Act, as amended, although subsequent to the filing of the petition the interest of his co-tenant has been forfeited by default in payment of the installments of the purchase price. P. 183. 2. The farmer-debtor in this case, who was a joint tenant of a landpurchase contract, his wife being the other joint tenant, but, so far as appears, not a farmer-debtor, was authorized to file his petition under § 75 of the Bankruptcy Act, and thus to subject his interest to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court; and he thereupon became entitled to the benefit of the moratorium afforded by § 75 (0) for the purpose of enabling him to effect a composition with his creditors, failing which he was entitled to proceed under § 75 (s). P. 184. In advance of an authoritative determination by the state courts of the rights of purchasers of land as joint tenants when the interest of one of them has been forfeited for non-payment of purchase money, this Court can not say that the difficulties of administering the interests of the parties under § 75 (s) of the Bankruptcy Act are insurmountable. P. 185. 3. The court of bankruptcy, having control under § 75 (e) of the Bankruptcy Act of the farmer's property, is free to permit and to facilitate proceedings in the state courts to adjudicate the interests of the parties to the contract, subject to the stay directed by § 75 (o) of any cancellation of the contract or foreclosure of the farmer-debtor's interest in it. P. 185. 4. In the event that no composition is effected, the farmer-debtor may ask to be adjudicated a bankrupt and as such to be placed in possession of the property under the provisions of § 75 (s) upon terms which will enable him, by paying a suitable rental, to redeem the property unless he is sooner able to finance himself. If his interest is found to be such that it is impracticable to place him in possession or otherwise to administer the property as provided by § 7 (s), he is entitled to petition the court for leave to redeem the property, and if he is unable to redeem it, a sale of his interest may be ordered as directed by § 75 (s) (3). P. 186. 5. In proceedings for a stay under § 75 (s) (2) of the Bankruptcy Act as an incident to which petitioners made a deposit of rental, they withdrew the deposit when the court rendered a judgment, denying its jurisdiction to review; for review of which they obtained a writ of certiorari. Held: (1) That whether the withdrawal of the amount deposited is so inconsistent with further proceedings for the three-year stay authorized by § 75 (s) upon payment of a prescribed rental, could not be determined on the record brought to this Court, and should, in any case, be determined in the first instance by the bankruptcy court having jurisdiction of the cause. P. 187. (2) The withdrawal is not inconsistent with other remedies which the bankruptcy court has jurisdiction to give under § 75, or with recourse to measures which the court may take to permit an adjudication of the rights of the parties in the property involved. P. 187. (3) Since deposit of rental is not prerequisite to jurisdiction, recall and receipt of the money, whatever effect it may have had on the right to the three-year stay authorized by § 75 (s), involved no inconsistency with the assertion in this case of the court's jurisdiction to make an adjudication of the rights of the parties as a basis for composition and afford other relief. P. 187. 125 F.2d 507, reversed. CERTIORARI, 316 U. S. 657, to review a judgment of the court below which reversed orders of the court of bankruptcy denying motions by the present respondent to strike from the debtor's schedules of property certain land which respondent had contracted to sell to the farmerdebtor and another in joint tenancy. Mr. Edwin J. Skeen, with whom Mr. J. D. Skeen was on the brief, for petitioners. Mr. Hadlond P. Thomas for respondent. Opinion of the Court. 317 U.S. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE STONE delivered the opinion of the Court. The question is whether the interest of one of two joint tenants of a land purchase contract can be administered in farmer-debtor proceedings under § 75 of the Bankruptcy Act as amended, 11 U. S. C. § 203, although subsequent to the filing of his petition the interest of his co-tenant had been forfeited by default in payment of installments of the purchase price. Petitioners, husband and wife, as "joint tenants with full right of survivorship and not as tenants in common," entered into a contract with respondent's assignor for the purchase of a plot of land. They apparently entered into possession under the contract, although the fact does not explicitly appear in the record. The contract stipulated for a down payment of $500 of the purchase price and for payment of the balance in equal monthly installments extending over a period of more than seven years. Nearly two years later, the buyers being in default in payment of installments, respondent gave appropriate notice, in conformity to state law, that the contract would be forfeited unless all payments due were made. Five days before the date on which the forfeiture was to become effective, the husband alone, without reference to his co-tenant, filed his petition as a farmer-debtor under § 75. After the date of forfeiture, respondent moved, on a showing of the facts as stated, to strike the land in question from the schedules of the debtor's property, challenging the jurisdiction of the court to administer it. The wife thereupon filed in the bankruptcy proceeding a "joinder of Rose L. Mangus" in which she asked to be permitted to adopt the petition of her husband for relief under § 75 and his schedules of property, referring to the land in question. It does not appear whether she was an insolvent farmer-debtor within the meaning of § 75 (r), and so entitled to the benefits of the Act. Upon respondent's filing of a supplemental motion to strike the land from the schedules of the debtor's property, with a showing that at the time of the wife's attempted joinder she had forfeited her interest in the property, the court denied both of respondent's motions. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed, 125 F. 2d 507, holding that the right or interest which the wife had acquired in the land by the contract of purchase had been forfeited before her attempted joinder in the bankruptcy proceedings, see Federal Land Bank v. Sorenson, 121 P.2d 398; Leone v. Zuniga, 84 Utah 417, 34 P. 2d 699, and that in consequence she had no remaining interest in the land which she could ask the bankruptcy court to administer. It thought that by the forfeiture respondent became vested as her successor with the interest which she had acquired in the land by virtue of the contract. But it was also of opinion that notwithstanding the forfeiture she remained a joint tenant of the contract with her husband and so was an indispensable party to any judgment or order of the bankruptcy court making disposition of the debtor's interest in the contract and the property. It also pointed out that although the interest of a bankrupt joint tenant may be sold in a regular bankruptcy proceeding, the proceedings under § 75 (a)–(r) do not look in the first instance to a sale of the debtor's property or operate to pass title to a trustee or the court, but contemplate maintenance of the status quo by a moratorium pending an adjustment or composition of his debts, and his ultimate emergence from bankruptcy with all his property. See John Hancock Ins. Co. v. Bartels, 308 U.S. 180, 184; Wright v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 311 U.S. 273. From all this the court concluded that the difficulties of administration of the bankrupt's interest in § 75 proceedings are so insurmountable as to require dismissal of the Opinion of the Court. 317 U.S. proceeding. In the circumstances of this case, it attributed these difficulties to the uncertainty as to the rights of the husband as joint tenant of the contract with his wife and as tenant in common with respondent of the land. The uncertainty arose, it was suggested, from the doubt whether the husband, upon effecting an adjustment and compromise with creditors, would be entitled to acquire all the land upon payment of the balance of the purchase price, or only to demand half of it on payment of onehalf of the purchase money due. We granted certiorari, 316 U. S. 657, on a petition which challenged the rulings of the Circuit Court of Appeals that the wife was an indispensable party to the farmer-debtor proceeding, and that the interest of the husband alone was not susceptible of administration in that proceeding. ... Section 75 (n) directs that the filing of the farmerdebtor's petition "shall immediately subject the farmer and all his property . . . for all the purposes of this section, to the exclusive jurisdiction of the court. . . including any equity or right in any such property, including, among others, contracts for purchase, contracts for deed, or conditional sales contracts." Section 75 (0) provides an effective moratorium, pending further proceedings, against the forfeiture of the debtor's interest in the property over which the court has jurisdiction. This it accomplishes by staying, unless otherwise permitted by the court, proceedings for foreclosure of a mortgage, or for cancellation or rescission of an agreement for the sale of land, or for the recovery of possession of land, or for the seizure or sale of the debtor's property under conditional sales agreement. Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U. S. 433; John Hancock Ins. Co. v. Bartels, 308 U. S. 180. 1 Compare Buss v. Prudential Ins. Co., 126 F. 2d 960; In re Harris, 15 F. Supp. 304. |