17th, Beyroot was first summoned to surrender, and then bombarded by the English squadron, while Turkish troops, or those in the service of Turkey, landed in Syria. The treaty of July 15th was executed in all its consequences, whilst at London and Paris efforts were still making to prevent these results. The situation was critical in France. Preparations for war, already for some time in progress, were every day hastened more and more. The nation felt herself offended, and believed herself menaced. In the treaty of the 15th of July she saw an attack upon her dignity; and the alliance of the four Powers to settle the Egyptian question without her, seemed in her eyes the presage of a new coalition against her, perhaps to come into existence in the near future. The enemies of the government of 1830 fomented this twofold sentiment, promising themselves an opportunity for the gratification of their passions and the success of their designs. The French Cabinet felt all the pressure of the public anger and alarm, and took measures as serious as they would have done if the perils which seemed to threaten had in reality burst upon them. An augmentation of sea and land forces was ordered; it was decided to fortify Paris. On the 8th of October the French Cabinet declared its determination not to consent to the overthrow of Mohammed Ali as Pasha of Egypt, and the Chambers were convoked for the 28th of the same month.

M. Guizot did not believe that the war was necessary. On the 23d of September he wrote to the Duke de Broglie: “Ought France to make war for the sake of preserving Syria to the Pasha of Egypt? Plainly that is not an interest of sufficient importance to become a casus belli. France, who did not make war to save Poland from Russia, or Italy from Austria, cannot reasonably do it in order that Syria may belong to the pasha rather than to the sultan. The war would be either in the East and maritime, or continental and general. If maritime,

the inequality of forces is incontestable; if continental and general, France could sustain the war only by becoming once more revolutionary, that is to say, abandoning the honest, wise, and useful policy which she has followed since 1830, and by her own act transforming the present alliance of the four Powers into a hostile coalition. It is, therefore, not for the interest of France to make the Syrian question a ground for war. The policy hitherto declared and maintained by France towards the East does not permit her to do it. We have constantly and loudly asserted that the distribution of territory between the sultan and the pasha concerned us but little; that if the pasha wished to restore Syria to the sultan, we should offer no opposition whatever; that the anticipation of his refusal, of his resistance, and of the perils which would arise thence for the Ottoman empire and for the peace of Europe, was the sole motive of our opposition to the exercise of coercion towards him. In making war for the sake of preserving Syria to the pasha, we should give ourselves the lie in a most conspicuous and disastrous manner. Is this equivalent to saying that France has nothing to do but to be an armed spectator at the execution of the agreement of the 15th of July, and that her language, her attitude, her preparations must be, whatever happens, a demonstration, and nothing more? Certainly not.

"If the pasha resists, if the measures of coercion employed by the four Powers become complicated and prolonged, then, what France has announced may be realized. The Syrian question may bring up other questions. War, may arise spontaneously, necessarily, in consequence of some unforeseen incident, the situation being perilous and critical. If war arise in this way, not by the will and the act of France, but in consequence of a situation for which France is not at all responsible, France must needs accept the war. From the present moment she is bound to hold herself ready to accept it."

Patriotic anger had been the first impulse in France, upon the news of the convention of July 15th, and revolutionary passions worked upon this patriotic anger, seeking to stimulate it to the most dangerous excesses. The conservative and prudent instinct awakened in presence of the wild extravagances of the newspapers and popular meetings. The necessity for the government to resist this popular excitement by resting upon the wisdom of the Chambers, was every day more keenly felt. The Cabinet of M. Thiers, hotly engaged in the struggle, was not adapted to rally the resisting force of France, nor to treat with England. "Send us away, Sire, send us away," M. Cousin, at that time Minister of Public Instruction, said to the king, "we shall lead you into war." Louis Philippe followed M. Cousin's advice: he recalled M. Guizot from London, and entrusted him with the duty of forming a new Cabinet.

The peace policy prevailed, dignified, reserved, always ready to give proof of boldness and strength, in an isolation which might at any moment become an imminent danger,

the policy of peace, however, openly announced, and courageously supported. The English Cabinet greeted it with mingled satisfaction and embarrassment; and events, justifying Lord Palmerston's policy,― the insurrection in Syria, the retreat of Ibrahim Pasha and his army, and the taking of St. Jean d'Acre, destroyed the illusions of France in respect to Mohammed Ali's energetic resistance, and threatened to complicate the situation of Europe, by making the triumph of the four Powers too complete. Sir Robert Peel acknowledged this in a letter to M. de Bourgueney, French chargéd'affaires.

In this perilous situation Mohammed Ali resolved to follow the advice given him by Sir Charles Napier, then in command of the English squadron; he offered, as soon as the heredi