The Limits of Leviathan: Contract Theory and the Enforcement of International LawCambridge University Press, 2006. gada 14. aug. Much of international law, like much of contract, is enforced not by independent sanctions but rather through cooperative interaction among the parties, with repeat dealings, reputation, and a preference for reciprocity doing most of the enforcement work. Originally published in 2006, The Limits of Leviathan identifies areas in international law where formal enforcement provides the most promising means of promoting cooperation and where it does not. In particular, it looks at the International Criminal Court, the rules for world trade, efforts to enlist domestic courts to enforce orders of the International Court of Justice, domestic judicial enforcement of the Geneva Convention, the domain of international commercial agreements, and the question of odious debt incurred by sovereigns. This book explains how international law, like contract, depends largely on the willingness of responsible parties to make commitments. |
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2. sadaļa | 24 |
3. sadaļa | 29 |
4. sadaļa | 43 |
5. sadaļa | 52 |
6. sadaļa | 59 |
7. sadaļa | 65 |
8. sadaļa | 70 |
13. sadaļa | 128 |
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9. sadaļa | 84 |
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11. sadaļa | 110 |
12. sadaļa | 111 |
21. sadaļa | 180 |
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The Limits of Leviathan: Contract Theory and the Enforcement of ... Robert E. Scott,Paul B. Stephan Priekšskatījums nav pieejams - 2011 |
The Limits of Leviathan: Contract Theory and the Enforcement of ... Robert E. Scott,Paul B. Stephan Priekšskatījums nav pieejams - 2006 |
Bieži izmantoti vārdi un frāzes
actors agreements Anne-Marie Slaughter arbitration authority award behavior benefits Buyer Chapter choice claim commitments complex compliance Constitution contract theory cooperation costs customary international law decision dispute resolution domestic courts Econ economic effect enforcement mechanisms enforcement of international Ernst Fehr European Community ex ante ex post example exists federal formal enforcement future GATT human rights ICANN implementation impose incentives inequity aversion informal enforcement Intl interactions International Criminal Court international law enforcement international relations investment issue judicial jurisdiction lawmaking legal enforcement litigation ment moral hazard NAFTA norms obligations observe odious debt optimal enforcement particular political Posner preference for reciprocity produce proxies question reciprocal fairness regime renegotiation reputation response retaliation risk Robert Robert E rules sanctions scholars Scott Self-Enforcing Seller standards states Stephan supra third party tion trade Treaty tribunal U.S. courts United verifiable Vienna Convention violation welfare WTO DSB
Populāri fragmenti
6. lappuse - ... international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations ; d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.
1. lappuse - ... private appetite is the measure of good and evil : and consequently all men agree on this, that peace is good, and therefore also the way or means of peace, which, as I have shewed before, are justice, gratitude, modesty, equity, mercy...
Atsauces uz šo grāmatu
How International Law Works: A Rational Choice Theory Andrew T. Guzman Ierobežota priekšskatīšana - 2008 |