Mr. CASSEDY. I have another table which gives the number of cases on appeal from the Commission's orders; that is, petitions for review of Federal Trade Commission orders by circuit courts of appeals throughout the years from 1939 to date; petitions for writs of certiorari in Federal Trade Commission cases in the Supreme Court from 1939 to date; appeals in cases, where orders to cease and desist were affirmed by the circuit courts of appeals, and the Supreme Court, given by years from 1939 to date; appeals in cases where orders to cease and desist were affirmed as modified by the circuit courts of appeals, and the Supreme Court, from 1939 to date; appeals withdrawn or dismissed in circuit courts of appeals leaving orders to cease and desist in effect, from 1939 to date; with a total of those cases, as compared with appeals in cases where orders to cease and desist were reversed, remanded, or set aside by the circuit courts of appeals and the Supreme Court, from 1939 to date.

The CHAIRMAN. The table will be placed in the record.

Mr. ELLSWORTH. What is the difference between a complaint and application for complaint?

Mr. CASSEDY. If there was a matter which you, yourself, Congressman, reported to the Commission that you knew of and thought constituted a violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act, that would would be received by the Bureau of Legal Investigations in the Commission and would be docketed by that Bureau as an application for complaint, and in the terminology of the Commission you would be termed the "applicant" by reason of your having reported the matter to the Commission.

I have one other table that may be helpful to the committee, with respect to the personnel in the Federal Trade Commission as of March 31, 1948, showing the number of people and who and what they are in the various bureaus and divisions of the Commission.

The CHAIRMAN. The table will be made a part of the record.

(The table is as follows:)

Personnel in Federal Trade Commission as of Mar. 31, 1948

Mr. CASSEDY. Mr. Chairman, I would like to file with the committee several copies of the Federal Trade Commission Act compared with the amendments proposed by the O'Hara bill. And I would like to call attention to the fact that several days ago when the hearings were first begun on this bill, I furnished to the clerk and he to the members who were present, some copies of the Federal Trade Commission's Rules of Practice, as amended, to conform with the Administrative Procedure Act, which I would like to file for the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be made a part of the record at this point. (The two documents mentioned above have been placed in the committee files.)

Mr. CASSEDY. I have some printed copies of the Rules, Policy, Organization, and Acts of the Federal Trade Commission that are presently in force, dated November 20, 1947, which show the rules and organization of the Commission, which have been conformed to the Administrative Procedure Act. I will file these with the clerk. Reference was made in these hearings to trade-practice rules of the Federal Trade Commission. With the permission of the chairman, I am filing with the clerk, a copy of all of the Trade Practice Rules that have been issued by the Commission up to date.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be filed for the committee's use.

Mr. CASSEDY. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make a statement with respect to the testimony of Mr. Casper W. Ooms and Mr. James F. Hoge.

One of the cases mentioned by Mr. Ooms was that of the Scotch

Woolen Mills.

I am personally familiar with that case, having studied it and had some connection with it, since it was appealed and while pending in the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit at Chicago.

Mr. Ooms, I understand, was connected with this case during the trial. I was not connected with it at that time, but only after the order was issued during the period it was pending in the circuit court of appeals.

I do not have any records in my possession at the present time, but that case began approximately in 1920, and after a period of trial, including the taking of testimony, it was briefed, argued, and submitted to the Commission. The Commission entered an order of dismissal in 1922.

Subsequent to that date, specifically in 1938, the Federal Trade Commission Act was amended. Prior to that amendment, section 5 prohibited only unfair methods of competition in commerce.

After the Wheeler-Lea amendment was enacted, as I am sure those of you on the committee at that time will remember, that amendment added the provision that unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce are declared to be unlawful.

By reason of the change in the law, the Chief Counsel filed a motion before the Commission to reopen that case which had been dismissed in 1922. The proceedings to reopen, I believe, were in 1942.

I could be mistaken as to the dates, but they are approximately

correct.

The case was reopened by the Commission, and in that connection, I refer you to subsection b of section 5. You will find the point I refer to on page 6 of the document comparing the Federal Trade

Commission Act with the O'Hara bill, at the top of the page on the left-hand side of the page:

After the expiration of the time allowed for filing a petition for review, if no such petition has been duly filed within such time, the Commission may at any time, after notice and opportunity for hearing, reopen and alter, modify, or set aside, in whole or in part, any report or order made or issued by it under this section, whenever in the opinion of the Commission, conditions of fact or of law have so changed as to require such action or if the public interest shall so require.

The point I make is the statute gives the Commission the authority to reopen any of its proceedings.

In the Scotch Woolen Mills case, after the change in law provided by the Wheeler-Lea Act, the order of dismissal was set aside and the case was reopened. An amended complaint was filed, making charges that this respondent had violated provisions of the WheelerLea Act, and not the act as originally constituted.

In other words, the first complaint charged respondent with unfair methods of competition, whereas under the second complaint, it was charged with unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce. No competitor was involved in the second proceedings and the second proceedings was an entirely different one from the first.

The CHAIRMAN. The second was instituted about 20 years after the first one?

Mr. CASSEDY. Approximately; yes, sir. But there were no proceedings intervening from the dismissal until the motion was made to

reopen.

The case was reopened, and it was again reheard; that is, by the taking of testimony, and reargued, briefed, and orally argued before the Commission.

The Commission then issued an order prohibiting this respondent from using the word "Scotch" to designate any material that had no origin in the country of Scotland, or to use the term "Woolen Mills" unless they were engaged in the manufacture of woolen cloth, which the proof showed they were not.

They operated no mills whatsoever. They merely made clothes out of the cloth they purchased from others.

While the case was pending in the circuit court of appeals, the application of the doctrine of res judicata was raised. This defense had been denied by the Commission. That question was presented in the brief of the Scotch Woolen Mills, and the Commission, of course, was then required to file its brief. It became my duty to study the case and to prepare the Commission's brief.

I did study the case, and while I personally doubted that the doctrine of res judicata had any application in the case, I did not know how the court might decide it. At any rate I recommended to the Commission that if the case could be settled on a basis satisfactory to the respondent, that it should be settled by a modification of the order.

In fact, the respondent's attorney, Mr. Rothchild, who was associated with Mr. Ooms, and who is a very excellent attorney from Chicago, discussed this matter with me freely, and he, too, was somewhat in doubt about the legal problem.

To make the statement of this matter in short, we did negotiate a stipulation, notwithstanding Mr. Ooms' statement this morning that