be deemed thereby to assume an obligation for its safe carriage to
such point of destination, unless, at the time of such acceptance,
such carrier be released or exempted from such liability by contract
in writing signed by the owner or his agent; and, although there
be such contract in writing, if such thing be lost or injured, such
common carrier shall himself be liable therefor, unless, within a
reasonable time after demand made, he shall give satisfactory proof
to the consignor that the loss or injury did not occur while the thing
was in his charge" does not attempt to substantially regulate or
control contracts as to interstate shipments, but simply establishes
a rule of evidence, ordaining the character of proof by which a
carrier may show that, although it received goods for transportation
beyond its own line, nevertheless, by agreement, its liability was
limited to its own line; and it does not conflict with the provisions
of the Constitution of the United States, touching interstate com-
merce. Richmond & Alleghany Railroad Co. v. R. A. Patterson To-
bacco Co., 311.
See DISEASED CATTLE, INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF.
manded with directions to take an account for the purpose of ascer-
taining for how much payment should be directed. A writ of error,
sued out from this court to review that judgment was dismissed here
on the ground that the judgment was not final. It does not appear
that any right or title had been specially set up or claimed under
any statute of, or authority exercised under, the United States in the
courts below, or in the Supreme Court of Illinois, prior to such judg-
ment of that court. It appeared on the second hearing that prior
to September 10, 1884, the United States had seized the property for
revenue taxes due from a firm then occupying it as a distillery, the
defendant in error being in no way connected with the firm, that
the property was sold, the Government bidding it in and taking a
deed for it, and that the Government conveyed to the plaintiff in
error. In the account stated the defendant in error was required to
repay the amount so paid with interest. It also appeared that the
plaintiff in error, after the case went back, moved to amend its
answer by setting up that title, as a right and title acquired and
claimed under the Constitution, statutes and authority of the United
States, which motion was refused, and the trial court disposed of
the case on other grounds. In the Appellate Court and in the
Supreme Court the plaintiff in error contended that there was error
in refusing its motion; but the Appellate Court held, and its decision
was sustained by the Supreme Court, that it was bound by the first
decision, and that error could not be assigned, on the second appeal,
for any cause existing at the time of the prior judgment. In this
court it was contended that, at the second trial it appeared that
plaintiff in error claimed to hold an absolute title to the lots in
question by virtue of the foreclosure proceedings and of the master's
deed obtained thereunder, and hence that the title was claimed
under an authority exercised under the United States; that a Federal
question was thereby raised on the record; that the decision of the
case necessarily involved passing on the claim of title; that the
opinion of the Supreme Court of Illinois showed that it was passed
upon; and that the necessary effect of the decree and judgment of
the state court was against the right and title of defendant suffi-
ciently claimed under Federal authority. Held, that the point thus
raised was certainly embraced by the first judgment, and that this
court cannot revise the second judgment on the ground that the
plaintiff in error was thereby denied any right, properly claimed, in
apt time, in accordance with Rev. Stat. § 709. Union Mutual Life
Insurance Co. v. Kirchoff, 103.
3. Oxley Stave Company v. Butler County, 166 U. S. 648, cited, quoted from
and approved to the point that the words "specially set up or
claimed," in Rev. Stat. § 709, imply that if a party in a suit in a state
court intends to invoke for the protection of his rights the Constitu-
tion of the United States, or some treaty, statute, commission or
authority of the United States, he must so declare; and unless he does
so declare "specially." that is, unmistakably, this court is without
authority to reexamine the final judgment of the state court. Ib.
7. After the answers of this court to the questions of the Circuit Court of
Appeals in this case, reported in New Orleans v. Benjamin, 153 U. S.
411, Benjamin amended his bill in the Circuit Court by inserting
an averment that "each of said persons in whose favor said claims
accrued and to whom said certificates were issued, are now, and were
on the 9th day of February, 1891, citizens respectively of States other
than the State of Louisiana, and competent as such citizens to maintain
suit in this honorable court against the defendants for the recovery of
said indebtedness, represented by said certificates, if no assignment or
transfer thereof had been made." The city demurred on the ground
that the case was not one of equitable cognizance, and that the amend-
ment was insufficient to show jurisdiction. This demurrer was sus-
tained in the Circuit Court, and the Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
its decree because the necessary diversity of citizenship was not affirm-
atively shown. Held, that this judgment of the Circuit Court of
Appeals was final, and could not be appealed from. Benjamin v.
New Orleans, 161.
8. An appeal does not lie to this court from the decision of a Circuit
Court in which, after overruling, on the facts, a plea by the defend-
ant that the action was not in truth a controversy between citizens of
different States, but solely between citizens of one State, to whom
other parties were collusively added for the purpose of giving the
Circuit Court jurisdiction, the court then rendered a final judgment
in favor of the plaintiffs on the merits. While such an issue involves
the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court, it does not involve or require,
within the meaning of the act of March 3, 1891, c. 517, either the con-
struction or application of the Constitution. Merritt v. Bowdoin
College, 551.
9. As the respondents, both at the trial in the Circuit Court of the State,
and in the subsequent proceedings on the certiorari in the Supreme
Court of the State, specifically set up and claimed rights under the
Federal Constitution which were denied, the jurisdiction of this court
is not open to doubt. Backus v. Fort Street Union Depot Co., 557.
10. While this court may examine proceedings had in a state court, under
state authority, for the appropriation of private property to public
purposes, so far as to inquire whether that court prescribed any rule
of law in disregard of the owner's right to just compensation, it may
not inquire into matters which do not necessarily involve, in any sub-
stantial sense, the Federal right alleged to have been denied. Ib.
11. The limit of interference by this court with the judgments of state
courts is reached when it appears that no fundamental rights have
been disregarded by the state tribunals. Ib.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 13;
MOTION TO DISMISS.
B. JURISDICTION OF CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEAL.
The provision in § 16 of the act of February 4, 1897, as amended by the
act of March 2, 1889, c. 382, that appeals from judgments of Circuit
Courts in such cases to this court shall not operate to stay or supersede
the order of the court, or the execution of any writ or process thereon,
does not refer to an appeal from a judgment of a Circuit Court of
Appeals to this court; and such an appeal to this court from such a
judgment of a Circuit Court of Appeals operates as a supersedeas.
Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Behlmer, 644.
C. JURISDICTION OF CIRCUIT COURTS.
1. In an action of ejectment the question whether the land in dispute
is of sufficient value to give a Circuit Court jurisdiction is purely
one of fact, and the statutes regulating jurisdiction leave the mode
of trying such issues to the discretion of the trial judge. Wetmore v.
Rymer, 115.
2. Whether he elects to submit such issue to a jury, or to himself hear and
determine it without the intervention of a jury, in either event the
parties are not concluded by the judgment of the Circuit Court. Ib.
3. In this case the question was passed upon by the court below on affi-
davits, and the judgment dismissing the action for want of jurisdiction
is reviewable here. Ib.
4. A suit cannot properly be dismissed by a Circuit Court as not involving
a controversy of an amount sufficient to come within its jurisdiction,
unless the facts, when made to appear on the record, create a legal cer-
tainty of that conclusion. Ib.
5. While Circuit Courts of the United States have jurisdiction, under
the circumstances set forth in the statement of the case, to issue
a writ of habeas corpus, yet those courts ought not to exercise that
jurisdiction, by the discharge of a prisoner, unless in cases of peculiar
urgency, but should leave the prisoner to be dealt with by the courts
of the State; and even after a final determination of the case by those
courts should ordinarily leave the prisoner to his remedy by writ of
error from this court. Baker v. Grice, 284.
6. Upon the facts appearing in this case no sufficient case was made out
for the exercise of the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court by the issue of
a writ of habeas corpus to take the prisoner out of the custody of the
state court. Ib.
7. The adequacy or inadequacy of a remedy at law for the protection of
the rights of one entitled upon any ground to invoke the powers of a
Federal court, is not to be conclusively determined by the statutes
of the particular State in which suit may be brought. One who is
entitled to sue in the Federal Circuit Court may invoke its jurisdiction
in equity whenever the established principles and rules of equity per-
mit such a suit in that court; and he cannot be deprived of that
right by reason of his being allowed to sue at law in a state court on
the same cause of action. Smyth v. Ames, 466.
See CIRCUIT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES.
D. JURISDICTION OF STATE COURTS.
1. On June 25, 1889, plaintiff in error, Daniel Dull, being the owner of
the tract of land in controversy, conveyed the same by warranty deed
executed by himself and wife to John E. Blackman. Blackman, on
August 2, 1889, made a deed of the same land to George F. Wright as
security for moneys to be advanced by Wright. On the 29th of Feb-
ruary, 1892, Blackman commenced this suit in the District Court of
Pottawattamie County, Iowa, to compel a reconveyance by Wright on
the ground of his failure to advance any money. Prior thereto, and
on January 30, 1892, Blackman had executed a deed of the land to
Edward Phelan, which conveyance was at first conditional but by
agreement signed by the parties on September 15, 1892, was made
absolute. On the 17th of September, 1892, Phelan filed his petition
of intervention, setting forth his rights in the matter under the deed
of January 30 and the agreement of September 15, and also making
plaintiffs in error and others defendants, alleging that they claimed
certain interests in the property, and praying a decree quieting his
title as against all. On January 24, 1893, plaintiff's counsel withdrew
his appearance for Blackman, and, upon his application, was allowed
to prosecute the action in the name of Blackman for and in behalf of
Phelan, the intervenor. On February 2, 1893, the plaintiffs in error
appeared in the suit and filed an answer denying all the allegations in
plaintiff's petition and in the petition of intervention. On the 15th
of that month they filed an amended answer and a cross petition, in
which they set up that Blackman had obtained his deed from them
by certain false representations, and that a suit was pending in the
Supreme Court of the State of New York, in which Daniel Dull was
plaintiff, and Blackman, Wright, Phelan and others were defendants,
in which the same issues were made and the same relief sought as in
the case at bar. On May 29 they filed an amendment to their answer
and cross petition setting forth that the case pending in the Supreme
Court of New York had gone to decree, and attached a copy of that
decree. The suit in the Supreme Court of the State of New York
was commenced on the 3d of November, 1892. Blackman was served
personally within the limits of that State, but the other defendants
therein, Wright, Phelan and Duffie their counsel, were served only by
delivering to them in Omaha, Nebraska, a copy of the complaint and
No appearance was made by them, notwithstanding which
the decree was entered against them as against Blackman, and was
a decree establishing the title of Daniel Dull, setting aside the deed
made by him and his wife to Blackman, and enjoining the several de-
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