that act were not discretionary, and were limited to the clerical func-
tion of making payment as directed by the act. United States v.
Louisville, 249.
2. By the act of February 25, 1893, c. 165, making provision for the pay-
ment of further and other claims of the same character, Congress did
not intend to in anywise open the transactions which had been closed
by the payment of the moneys directed in the act of 1891. Ib.
3. Article 420 of the Treasury Regulations, providing that night watchmen
shall be divided into two watches as nearly as possible, both watches
to perform duty every night, and empowering the surveyor of the port
to make such changes in the division of the watches as he may deem
expedient, and to appoint the hours of duty for different watches; and
that when it is necessary to assign a night watchman to a vessel, or to
any other all night charge, the night watchman so assigned must
remain on the vessel or on his charge until relieved, and will be
excused from performing duty the following night, does not authorize
the payment of an extra day's work to a night watchman so employed
during the whole night, and again put upon duty in the following
night. United States v. Garlinger, 316.
4. It is not possible for the Secretary of the Treasury, by passing regula-
tions, to divide a day's service into parts, and to attach to each part
the pay for a full day's work. Ib.
5. Where payments for work done in Government employ are made fre-
quently and through a considerable period of time, and are received
without objection or protest, and where there is no pretence of fraud or
of circumstances constituting duress, it is legitimate to infer that such
payments were made and received on the understanding of both parties
that they were made in full; and such a presumption is much strength-
ened if the employé waits two years after the expiration of his service
before making any demand for further compensation. Ib.
1. A statute of a State, providing that no contract shall exempt any rail-
road corporation from the liability of a common carrier, or carrier of
passengers, which would have existed if no contract had been made,
does not, as applied to a claim for an injury happening within the
State under a contract for interstate transportation, contravene the
provision of the Constitution of the United States empowering Con-
gress to regulate interstate commerce. Chicago, Milwaukee & St.
Paul Railway Co. v. Solan, 133.
2. It is the rule of courts, both state and Federal, not to decide consti-
tutional questions until the necessity for such decision arises in the
record before the court. Baker v. Grice, 284.
3. The provisions in the act of March 30, 1896, c. 72, of Utah, providing
that "The period of employment of workingmen in all underground
mines or workings shall be eight hours per day, except in cases of
emergency where life or property is in imminent danger;" that "The
period of employment of workingmen in smelters and all other insti-
tutions for the reduction or refining of ores or metals shall be eight
hours per day, except in cases of emergency where life or property is
in imminent danger;" and that "Any person, body corporate, agent,
manager or employer who shall violate any of the provisions of sec-
tions one and two of this act shall be deemed guilty of a misde-
meanor," are a valid exercise of the police power of the State, and do
not violate the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Con-
stitution of the United States by abridging the privileges or immuni-
ties of its citizens, or by depriving them of their property, or by
denying to them the equal protection of the laws. Holden v. Hardy,
4. The cases arising under the Fourteenth Amendment are examined in
detail, and are held to demonstrate that, in passing upon the validity
of state legislation under it, this court has not failed to recognize the
fact that the law is, to a certain extent, a progressive science; that in
some States methods of procedure which, at the time the Constitution
was adopted, were deemed essential to the protection and safety of the
people, or to the liberty of the citizen, have been found to be no longer
necessary; that restrictions which had formerly been laid upon the
conduct of individuals or classes had proved detrimental to their inter-
ests; and other classes of persons, particularly those engaged in dan-
gerous or unhealthy employments, have been found to be in need of
additional protection: but this power of change is limited by the fun-
damental principles laid down in the Constitution, to which each mem-
ber of the Union is bound to accede as a condition of its admission as
a State.
5. The statute of Oregon of October 26, 1882, taxing mortgages of lands
in that State to the mortgagees in the county where the land lies,
does not, as applied to mortgages owned by citizens of other States
and in their possession outside of the State of Oregon, contravene
the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.
Savings & Loan Society v. Multnomah County, 421.
6. A suit against individuals for the purpose of preventing them as officers
of a State from enforcing an unconstitutional enactment to the injury
of the rights of the plaintiff, is not a suit against the State within the
meaning of the Eleventh Amendment. Smyth v. Ames, 466.
7. It is settled that: (1) A railroad corporation is a person within the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment declaring that no State shall
deprive any person of property without due process of law, nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws;
(2) A state enactment, or regulations made under the authority of
a state enactment, establishing rates for the transportation of per-
sons or property by railroad that will not admit of the carrier earn-
ing such compensation as under all the circumstances is just to it
and to the public, would deprive such carrier of its property without
due process of law, and deny to it the equal protection of the laws,
and would therefore be repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment to
the Constitution of the United States; (3) While rates for the trans-
portation of persons and property within the limits of a State are
primarily for its determination, the question whether they are so
unreasonably low as to deprive the carrier of its property without
such compensation as the Constitution secures, and, therefore, with-
out due process of law, cannot be so conclusively determined by the
legislature of the State or by regulations adopted under its authority,
that the matter may not become the subject of judicial inquiry. Ib.
8. The grant to the legislature in the constitution of Nebraska of the
power to establish maximum rates for the transportation of passen-
gers and freight on railroads in that State has reference to "reason-
able" maximum rates, as the words strongly imply that it was not
intended to give a power to fix maximum rates without regard to
their reasonableness; and as it cannot be admitted that the power
granted may be exerted in derogation of rights secured by the Con-
stitution of the United States, and that the judiciary may not, when
its jurisdiction is properly invoked, protect those rights. 16.
9. The idea that any legislature, state or Federal, can conclusively deter-
mine for the people and for the courts that what it enacts in the form
of law, or what it authorizes its agents to do, is consistent with the
fundamental law, is in opposition to the theory of our institutions; as
the duty rests upon all courts, Federal and state, when their jurisdic-
tion is properly invoked, to see to it that no right secured by the su-
preme law of the land is impaired or destroyed by legislation. Ib.
10. The effect of the Nebraska statute of 1893, entitled "An act to regu-
late railroads, to classify freights, to fix reasonable maximum rates
to be charged for the transportation of freights upon each of the
railroads in the State of Nebraska, and to provide penalties for the
violation of this act," is to deprive each of the companies involved
in these suits of the just compensation secured to them by the Con-
stitution of the United States, and therefore the decree below re-
straining its enforcement was correct. Ib.
11. If the Circuit Court finds that the present condition of business is
such as to admit of the application of the statute to the railroad
companies in question without depriving them of just compensation,
it will be its duty to discharge the injunction heretofore granted,
and to make whatever order is necessary to remove any obstruction
placed by the decrees in these cases in the way of the enforcement
of the statute. Ib.
12. Chapter 320 of the Laws of North Carolina of 1891 was a valid law,
and the action of the Governor of the State under it in suspending
the plaintiff in error as railroad commissioner, appointed under it,
was, as construed by the Supreme Court of that State, a valid exer-
cise of the power conferred upon the Governor by that act, and was
due process of law, within the meaning of the Constitution. Wilson
v. North Carolina, 586.
13. The Federal question which is attempted to be raised in this case
is unfounded in substance, and does not really exist. Ib.
14. The judgment of the state court in this case operated of itself to
remove the plaintiff in error from the office of railroad commissioner,
and there is no foundation in the evidence for the allegation that
his successor knew of the filing of the supersedeas bond when he
took possession of the office, or was guilty of contempt in doing
So. Ib.
15. A child born in the United States, of parents of Chinese descent,
who, at the time of his birth, are subjects of the Emperor of China,
but have a permanent domicil and residence in the United States,
and are there carrying on business, and are not employed in any
diplomatic or official capacity under the Emperor of China, becomes
at the time of his birth a citizen of the United States, by virtue of
the first clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution,
"All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of
the State wherein they reside." United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 649.
See DISEASED CATTLE, INTERSTATE
EMINENT DOMAIN;
INTERSTATE COMMERCE.
CONSULS AND VICE-CONSULS.
1. Congress has power, under the Constitution, to vest in the President
authority to appoint a subordinate officer, called a vice-consul, to be
temporarily charged with the duty of performing the functions of the
consular office. United States v. Eaton, 331.
2. The Revised Statutes confer upon the President full power, in his dis-
cretion, to appoint vice-consuls, and fix their compensation, to be paid
out of the allowance made by law for the principal consular officer in
whose place such appointment shall be made. Ib.
3. The facts that the minister resident and consul-general at Siam-had
obtained a leave of absence from the President, and was ill and unable
to discharge his duties, and that the vice-consul previously appointed
had not qualified, and was absent from Siam, created a temporary
vacancy and justified an emergency appointment to fill it. Ib.
4. The accounting officers of the Government did not err in treating the
salary fixed by law for the joint service of minister resident and con-
sul-general at Siam as indivisible. Ib.
5. There was no error in allowing Eaton compensation for a period during
which he performed the duties of the office before his official bond
was received and approved. Ib.
6. A consular officer must account to the Government for fees received by
him for administering upon the estates of citizens of the United
States, dying within the limits of his jurisdiction. Ib.
CONTRACT.
See MARRIED WOMAN;
TAX AND TAXATION.
1. In proceedings brought before the board of general appraisers by pro-
tests under § 14 of the Customs Administrative Act of June 10, 1890,
c. 407, 26 Stat. 131, to review decisions of a collector of customs upon
entries, the board has jurisdiction to inquire into and impeach the
dutiable valuation reported to the collector by the appraiser upon
which the collector assessed the rate of duty to which the merchandise
was subject. United States v. Passavant, 16.
2. The "German duty," which is a tax imposed by the German Govern-
ment on merchandise when sold by manufacturers for consumption or
sale in the markets of Germany, but is remitted by that Government
when the goods are purchased in bond or consigned while in bond for
exportation to a foreign country, was lawfully included by the
appraiser in his estimate of the dutiable value of the importation in
question in this case. Ib.
3. In paragraph 297 of the tariff act of August 27, 1894, c. 349, 28 Stat.
509, providing that "the reduction of the rates of duty herein pro-
vided for manufactures of wool shall take effect January first, eighteen
hundred and ninety-five," the words "manufactures of wool" had rela-
tion to the raw material out of which the articles were made, and, as
the material of worsted dress goods was wool, such goods fell within
the paragraph. United States v. Klumpp, 209.
This was an action to recover damages for injury done to certain land in
the city of Washington by reason of the illegal occupation by a rail-
road company of the street on which the land abutted. The land
constituted original lot one in square 630, and long prior to the action
it had been subdivided between the owners, and a plat thereof recorded.
In the partition it was provided that the alleys marked on the plat were
exclusively for the sole benefit and use of the sub-lots, should be pri-
vate and under the control of all owners of property thereon, and that,
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