Opinion of the Court. and figures as we find them from evidence obtainable, from sworn reports now on file in our office. And we would respectfully recommend that no action be taken that will in any way jeopardize the interests of the producers of Nebraska, but that all interests be protected in the fullest manner possible, as provided by the foregoing findings." To this report of the Secretaries is appended the "Findings of the Board," from which we make this extract: "After a careful and quite thorough investigation of the question of freight rates in Nebraska, which has occupied much time, and has taken a wide range, the state Board of Transportation has arrived at the conclusion that the rates now in force in this State cannot be generally reduced without doing violence to the business interests of the State, and at the same time injuring the shipping and producing classes. We have come to this conclusion, not by taking the cost of construction and equipments, nor the amount of stock and bonds issued per mile, but by making our computations upon the basis of what it would cost to duplicate the property at the present time. It has been our endeavor to deal fairly and justly with the question, and in arriving at a conclusion we have been governed only by the evidence, statements and facts produced for our consideration. A candid examination and comparison of the figures presented to us in the unanimous report of the Board of Secretaries, in the opinion of this Board, fully justifies the conclusion reached : That a general reduction of rates, as now in force over the State, is not practical at this time." So that we have the judgment of the state Board of Transportation, as constituted in 1891, that a general reduction of rates could not then have been made without injury to the business of the State, to say nothing of the interests of those whose means were invested in railroad property. We are unable to find from the record before us that the situation in Nebraska had so changed in 1893 as to justify that being done in that year which it was not safe or just to do in 1891. But it may be added that the conditions of business, so far as railroad corporations are concerned, have probably changed Opinion of the Court. for the better since the decree below, and that the rates prescribed by the statute of 1893 may now afford all the compensation to which the railroad companies in Nebraska are entitled as between them and the public. In anticipation, perhaps, of such a change of circumstances, and the exсерtional character of the litigation, the Circuit Court wisely provided in its final decree that the defendants, members of the Board of Transportation, might, "when the circumstances have changed so that the rates fixed in the said act of 1893 shall yield to the said companies reasonable compensation for the services aforesaid," apply to the court, by bill or otherwise as they might be advised, for a further order in that behalf. Of this provision of the final decree the state Board of Transportation, if so advised, can avail itself. In that event, if the Circuit Court finds that the present condition of business is such as to admit of the application of the statute to the railroad companies in question without depriving them of just compensation, it will be its duty to discharge the injunction heretofore granted, and to make whatever order is necessary to remove any obstruction placed by the decrees in these cases in the way of the enforcement of the statute. Perceiving no error on the record in the light of the facts presented to the Circuit Court, The decree in each case must be affirmed. The CHIEF JUSTICE took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases. MR. JUSTICE MCKENNA was not a member of the court when they were argued and submitted, and took no part in their decision. Statement of the Case. MERRITT v. BOWDOIN COLLEGE. APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA. No. 505. Submitted January 31, 1898. Decided March 14, 1998. An appeal does not lie to this court from the decision of a Circuit Court in which, after overruling, on the facts, a plea by the defendant that the action was not in truth a controversy between citizens of different States, but solely between citizens of one State, to whom other parties were collusively added for the purpose of giving the Circuit Court jurisdiction, the court then rendered a final judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on the merits. While such an issue involves the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court, it does not involve or require, within the meaning of the act of March 3, 1891, c. 517, either the construction or application of the Constitution. THE plaintiffs in this suit, appellees here, are the President and Trustees of Bowdoin College, a corporation of Maine, and a large number of individuals who are citizens of States other than California. They sued on behalf of themselves and of all other beneficiaries under a certain deed of trust made and entered into between Catharine M. Garcelon, of the first part, and John A. Stanly and Stephen W. Purington, trustees, of the second part. The defendants were James P. Merritt and others, including Stanly and Purington. The general object of the suit was to quiet the title of the plaintiffs to the real estate conveyed by the above deed to Stanly and Purington, and to secure an injunction restraining the other defendants from violating certain alleged covenants, promises and agreements made with the grantor, and also the specific performance of such covenants, promises and agreements. The bill contained these allegations as explanatory of the reasons why the suit was not instituted by the trustees Stanly and Purington: "Your orators and oratrices allege and aver that they have requested the said Stephen W. Purington and John A. Stanly, as trustees as aforesaid, to institute such action, suit or proceedings against the defendants, the said James P. Merritt Statement of the Case. and Frederick A. Merritt, and their confederates, as would be necessary to quiet their title to the real estate so conveyed to them in trust as aforesaid, or to secure a perpetual injunction restraining the said James P. Merritt and Frederick A. Merritt and each of them from violating their repeated covenants, promises and agreements made with the said Catharine M. Garcelon, as is hereinbefore stated, and to secure a specific performance of said covenants, promises and agreements, and the said Purington and Stanly have declined to accede to this request of your orators and oratrices; that by reason of such refusal your orators and oratrices are compelled to institute this suit, which your orators and oratrices do, not only in their own behalf, but on behalf of all other beneficiaries of said trust who may elect to join your orators and oratrices herein." The defendants James P. Merritt and Frederick A. Merritt demurred to the bill of complaint, assigning as grounds.of demurrer that it appeared from the bill that the plaintiffs were not entitled to the relief prayed against them; had not by the bill made out any title to the relief prayed; that the subject of the suit was not within the jurisdiction of a court of equity; that the court below had no jurisdiction of the suit; that it appeared from the bill that the same was exhibited against the defendants for several distinct and independent matters having no relation to each other or to one another, and in which or in the greater part of which the defendants demurring were not in any way interested or concerned; that the bill was multifarious; that it appeared from the bill that certain persons were not brought before the court who were necessary and proper parties; and that the bill did not show any matter of equity entitling the plaintiffs to the relief asked against the defendants who demurred. The demurrer was overruled, and the opinion of the court thereon will be found in 54 Fed. Rep. 55. The case was next heard on the application of the plaintiffs to file a supplemental bill making Harry P. Merritt a party defendant, and for an injunction to restrain the prosecution of an action commenced by him in the Superior Court of Alameda Statement of the Case. County, California. Leave to file such a bill was given, and a preliminary injunction was granted. 59 Fed. Rep. 6. Subsequently the defendant James P. Merritt filed a plea, in which it was stated that all the defendants to the bill (including the defendant Purington who had then recently died) were at the time of the commencement of the action and ever since had been citizens of California; that Stanly and Purington "could not at any time bring or maintain in this court this action nor any cause of action alleged in the said bill of complaint; that said last-named defendants for the purpose of bringing and maintaining this action in this court, and to evade the provisions of the Constitution of the United States and the -laws giving jurisdiction to this court, brought and maintained this action in the names of the persons named in said bill of complaint as complainants therein, and without any authority thereto by or from said named complainants or any of them; that said named complainants are only nominal parties to said bill of complaint and in this action, and that said last-named defendants John A. Stanly and Stephen W. Purington, claiming to be trustees as aforesaid, have always been in truth and in fact the only real parties conplainant in said bill of complaint and in this action, and that they are only nominally. and colorably defendants in said bill and in this action; " that "the said John A. Stanly and Stephen W. Purington, claiming to be trustees as aforesaid, never were, nor was either of them at any time, nor is the said John A. Stanly, as trustee or otherwise, now in truth or in fact, real or genuine parties defendant or a real or genuine party defendant to said bill of complaint; and that said John A. Stanly and Stephen W. Purington, claiming to be trustees as aforesaid, were, and each of them is named in said bill of complaint as a party defendant thereto only colorably and by false pretense, for the purpose of making it falsely to appear that he is a party defendant thereto and in truth the real and genuine party complainant therein; that none of the parties named in said bill as complainants therein ever was or is in truth or in fact complainants or a party complainant to said bill of complaint or in this action." The plea further averred |