Opinion of the Court.

absence of our mandate on the affirmance of the final order of the Circuit Court of June 2, 1897. The judgment of this court affirming that order was rendered, as we know from our own records, November 8 (see 168 U. S. 705), and we have decided that if the state court after judgment here proceeds before our mandate issues, its action, though not to be commended, is not void. In re Shibuya Jugiro, 140 U. S. 291.

In this instance the state trial court did so proceed, but, in the due and orderly administration of justice, its judgment was superseded by the Supreme Court of the State, which, it is proper to note, granted the certificate of probable cause on the principal ground that the lower court could not exercise jurisdiction to fix a day for the execution of sentence against defendant, in the absence of authentic and official evidence of the disposal of the appeal to this court. People v. Durrant, 50 Pac. Rep. 1070.

In respect of the alleged abridgment of petitioner's privilege or immunity to sue out writs of error from this court to revise the final judgments of the state Supreme Court on appeals therein pending, and particularly the appeal from the judgment of the Superior Court of December 15, which, it was argued, raised Federal questions, it is sufficient to say that it was for the trial judge or the Supreme Court of California to determine whether or not the judgments complained of should be stayed or superseded, and with such determination it is not our province through this writ to interfere, nor do the statutory provisions in that behalf, in themselves, involve any infraction of the Constitution or laws of the United States. Kohl v. Lehlback, 160 U. S. 293; Bergemann v. Backer, 157 U.S. 655; Andrews v. Swartz, 156 U. S. 272.

All the averments in the papers, as well as a petition for a writ of error, which had been previously presented to some of our number and denied, as was admitted, and the suggestions urged at the bar, have been duly considered, with the result that the court is unanimously of opinion that if the writ should be awarded, it would be its duty on the return thereto to remand the petitioner. The application is, therefore,

Denied. Opinion of the Court.

BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATION OF DAKOTA

v. PRICE.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS.

No. 158. Submitted December 9, 1897. - Decided January 10, 1898.

The court below having dismissed the bill in this case on the ground that it had no jurisdiction, as the matter in dispute was determined not to exceed $2000 exclusive of interest and costs, this court examines the bill at length in its opinion, and holds that upon the face of the pleading the matter in dispute is sufficient to give the court below jurisdiction, and remands the case for further proceedings, without determining any of the other questions on the merits.

The case is stated in the opinion.

Mr. J. H. Hauser and Mr. C. W. Starling for appellant. Mr. W. S. Simkins and Mr. T. E. Conn for appellees.

MR. JUSTICE PECKHAM delivered the opinion of the court.

The appellants herein commenced this action against the defendants in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Texas, the complaint in which was filed on the 3d of October, 1895. The defendants demurred on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction of the several subjects-matter set forth in the complaint, one of the objections being that the matter in dispute did not exceed $2000 exclusive of interest and costs.

The cause was heard in the Circuit Court, the demurrer was sustained, and the bill dismissed with costs and without prejudice, for want of jurisdiction of the subject-matter in controversy. The complainant appealed to this court, which appeal was allowed and granted solely upon the question of the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court, and that question alone

Opinion of the Court.

has been certified. Whether the bill shows facts sufficient to invoke the consideration of a court of equity is not such a question of jurisdiction as is_referred to in the Judiciary Act of March 3, 1891, c. 517, and we have therefore no concern with that question. 26 Stat. 826, § 5; Smith v. McKay, 161 U. S. 355.

The decision of the only question before us depends upon whether the allegations contained in the bill of complaint show the matter in dispute to be of sufficient value to give the Circuit Court jurisdiction.

The appellant was incorporated under the laws of the State of South Dakota, and has its principal place of business in the city of Aberdeen, in that State. The action was brought for the purpose of recovering the amount of an alleged debt, damages and costs against the defendants Price, Rothschild and Miller, and for a decree of foreclosure against the defendants H. M. Price and W. B. Luna, under a certain. mortgage and vendor's lien on the premises described therein.

The bill alleges, among other things, that on the first of January, 1890, one Jacob Rothschild applied for membership in the complainant's association and subscribed for forty shares of its capital stock, which application was accepted, and on that day a certificate for forty shares of the capital stock was issued and delivered to him, and he paid the application or subscription fee due thereon, and the stock was accepted and received by him upon the terms and conditions therein set forth, and he thereupon became a member of the association and the holder and owner of forty shares of its capital stock.

The bill then proceeds as follows:

"3d. Your orator further shows that on or about the said first day of January, 1890, the said Jacob Rothschild, being then and there a stockholder in your orator and entitled under the rules, regulations and by-laws to make application for an advancement on his said stock, made his application to your orator for an advancement of two thousand dollars in anticipation of the maturity value of his said forty shares of stock, and in competition with other bidders for the funds of your

Opinion of the Court.

orator bid as a premium for the privilege of obtaining such advancement the sum of fifty dollars per share and offered as security for the continued payment for the monthly dues on said forty shares of stock and the interest on said advancement the real estate hereinafter described; and your orator further shows that said application and bid were made in accordance with the rules, regulations and by-laws of said association, and were duly accepted and approved by your orator's board of directors, and the advancement applied for was duly made, and the amount due thereon was duly paid to the said Jacob Rothschild; that said advancement was made by your orator on the faith and in the expectation that the said Rothschild would, according to his agreement, continue the monthly payment on his said forty shares of stock until such stock should have become fully matured and of the value of one hundred dollars per share.

"4th. Your orator further shows that on or about the first day of February, 1890, the said Jacob Rothschild and the defendant, Bertha Rothschild, for and in consideration of the advancement so made and for the purpose of securing the continued payment of the monthly dues on said stock, made, executed and delivered to your orator, and thereby promised and agreed to comply with the terms of a bond, of which the following is substantially a copy:

""Know all men by these presents, that Jacob Rothschild and Bertha Rothschild, his wife, of the county of Dallas, and State of Texas, are held and firmly bound unto the Building and Loan Association of Dakota, of the city of Aberdeen, and State of South Dakota, in the sum of four thousand ($4000) dollars, lawful money of the United States of America, to be paid to the said association, its certain attorney, successors or assigns, at its home office in Aberdeen, South Dakota, to which payment, well and truly to be made, we bind ourselves and our heirs, executors and administrators, jointly and severally, firmly by these presents.

""Sealed with our seals, and dated at Aberdeen, South Dakota, this first day of February, one thousand eight hundred and ninety.

Opinion of the Court.

""The condition of this obligation is such that, whereas, said Jacob Rothschild has bid, in accordance with the by-laws of said association, the sum of two thousand ($2000) dollars, as and for a premium for the advancement to him by said association of two thousand dollars, by way of anticipation of the value, at their maturity, of forty shares of the capital stock of said association, now owned by said Jacob Rothschild and, whereas, said association has this day advanced to said Jacob Rothschild the sum of two thousand dollars, in consideration of said premium, and by way of said anticipation:

""Now, therefore, if the above bounden Jacob Rothschild and Bertha Rothschild, their heirs, executors and administrators, or any of them, shall well and truly pay or cause to be paid unto the said association, its certain attorney, successors or assigns, at its home office, on or before nine years from date hereof, the just sum of four thousand dollars as aforesaid, together with interest on two thousand dollars, at the rate of six per cent per annum, from the first day of February, A.D. 1890, until paid, payable monthly in advance; or shall well and truly pay, or cause to be paid, unto said association, its certain attorney, successor or assigns, at its said home office, the sum of twenty-four and dollars on the first day of each and every month hereafter, as and for the monthly dues on said forty shares of capital stock of said. association now owned by the said Jacob Rothschild, and by him hereby sold, assigned, transferred and set over to said association as security for the faithful performance of this bond, and shall also well and truly pay, or cause to be paid, all instalments of interest aforesaid, and all fines which become due on the said stock, without any fraud or further delay, until said stock becomes fully paid in and of the value of one hundred dollars per share, and shall then surrender said stock to said association; then, and in either of such cases, the above obligation to be void, otherwise of full force and virtue.

""Provided, however, and it is hereby expressly agreed, that `if, at any time, default shall be made in the payment of said interest, or the said monthly dues on said stock, for the space