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Opinion of the Court.

That was an action by assignees in bankruptcy to secure the amount due on a policy of insurance stipulating for the payment of a certain sum, upon the death of Fauntleroy, to his executors, administrators or assigns. The assured was convicted of forgery, and for that offence was executed. The Lord Chancellor, after observing that the question was whether the parties representing and claiming under one who effects insurance upon his life, and afterwards commits a capital felony, for which he was tried and executed, could recover the amount named in the policy, said: "It appears to me that this resolves itself into a very plain and simple consideration. Suppose that in the policy itself this risk had been insured against: that is, that the party insuring had agreed to pay a sum of money year by year, upon condition, that in the event of his committing a capital felony, and being tried, convicted and executed for that felony, his assignees shall receive a certain sum of money - is it possible that such a contract could be sustained? Is it not void upon the plainest principles of public policy? Would not such a contract (if available) take away one of those restraints operating on the minds of men against the commission of crimes? namely, the interest we have in the welfare and prosperity of our connections? Now, if a policy of that description, with such a form of condition inserted in it in express terms, cannot, on grounds of public policy, be sustained, how is it to be contended that in a policy expressed in such terms as the present, and after the events which have happened, that we can sustain such a claim? Can we, in considering this policy, give to it the effect of that insertion, which if expressed in terms would have rendered the policy, as far as that condition went at least, altogether void?"

Referring to that case, Bunyon in his work on Life Insurance says: "It would render those natural affections which make every man desirous of providing for his family, an inducement to crime; for the case may be well supposed of a person insuring his life for that purpose, with the intention of committing suicide. For a policy, moreover, to remain in force when death arose from any such cause would be a fraud

Opinion of the Court.

upon the insurers, for a man's estate would thereby benefit by his own felonious act. Hence the rule of law when there is no condition whatever, but in that case, if the suicide or selfdestruction takes place when the assured is insane and not accountable for his acts, the rule arising from public policy does not apply, and his representatives are entitled to the policy money." 3d ed. p. 96; 2d ed. p. 72.

In Moore v. Woolsey, 4 Ell. & Bl. 243, 254, in which the question was as to the rights of an assignee under a policy providing that if the assured should die by duelling or by his. own hand, or the hand of justice, it should be void as to the personal representative of the assured, Lord Campbell, C. J., said that, "if a man insures his life for a year, and commits suicide within the year, his executors cannot recover on the policy, as the owner of a ship who insures her for a year cannot recover upon the policy if within the year he causes her to be sunk: a stipulation that, in either case, upon such an event the policy should give a right of action, would be void."

For the reasons we have stated, it must be held that the death of the assured, William M. Runk, if directly and intentionally caused by himself, when in sound mind, was not a risk intended to be covered, or which could legally have been covered, by the policies in suit.

The case presents other questions, but they are of minor importance, and do not affect the substantial rights of the parties.

We perceive no error of law in the record, and the judgment is

Affirmed.

MR. JUSTICE PECKHAM did not take part in the consideration or decision of this case.

Opinion of the Court.

BENJAMIN 0. NEW ORLEANS.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH

CIRCUIT.

No. 188. Argued January 10, 1898, Decided January 31, 1898.

After the answers of this court to the questions of the Circuit Court of Appeals in this case, reported in New Orleans v. Benjamin, 153 U. S. 411, Benjamin amended his bill in the Circuit Court by inserting an averment that "each of said persons in whose favor said claims accrued and to whom said certificates were issued, are now, and were on the 9th day of February, 1891, citizens respectively of States other than the State of Louisiana, and competent as such citizens to maintain suit in this honorable court against the defendants for the recovery of said indebtedness, represented by said certificates, if no assignment or transfer thereof had been made." The city demurred on the ground that the case was not one of equitable cognizance, and that the amendment was insufficient to show jurisdiction. This demurrer was sustained in the Circuit Court, and the Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed its decree because the necessary diversity of citizenship was not affirmatively shown. Held, that this judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals was final, and could not be appealed from.

THE case is stated in the opinion.

Mr. J. D. Rouse for appellant. Mr. William Grant was on his brief.

Mr. Branch K. Miller for appellees.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER delivered the opinion of the court.

This was a bill filed by Henry W. Benjamin, "an alien and a subject of the Kingdom of Great Britain," on February 9, 1891, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Louisiana, "against the city of New Orleans, a municipal corporation, created by the laws of the State of Louisiana and a citizen of said State; the city of Kenner, also a municipal corporation created by the laws of and a citizen of said State; the Police Jury of the Parish of Jefferson and

VOL. CLXIX-11

Opinion of the Court.

the Police Jury of the Parish of St. Bernard, political corporations created by the laws of and citizens of said State," seeking to collect, in the manner and on the grounds therein set forth, certain Metropolitan Police warrants or certificates. The defendants other than the city of New Orleans seem to have dropped out in the course of the proceedings.

The jurisdiction of the Circuit Court was attacked by defendant but was maintained, and a decree entered in favor of complainant, from which defendant appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, whereupon that court certified certain questions to this court, by the answers to which it was determined that no such dispute or controversy arose in the case as gave jurisdiction to the Circuit Court without regard to the diverse citizenship of the parties, and that as the suit was, under the pleadings, a suit to recover the contents of choses in action within the meaning of the judiciary acts of 1887 and 1888, by the assignee thereof, and it did not appear that it could have been brought in that court by the assignors, the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court could not be maintained on the ground of diverse citizenship. New Orleans v. Benjamin, 153 U. S. 411.

On receipt of the answers certified from this court, the Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decree of the Circuit Court and ordered that court to dismiss the bill, unless by amendment its jurisdiction could be made affirmatively to appear. Thereupon complainant amended the bill by inserting the following: "And your orator avers that each of said persons in whose favor said claims accrued and to whom said certificates were issued, are now, and were on the 9th day of February, 1891, citizens respectively of States other than the State of Louisiana, and competent as such citizens to maintain suit in this honorable court against the defendants for the recovery of said indebtedness, represented by said certificates, if no assignment or transfer thereof had been made."

The city of New Orleans demurred for the reasons that the case was not one of equitable cognizance, and that the amendment was insufficient to show jurisdiction. The Circuit Court sustained the demurrer on both grounds and dismissed the

Opinion of the Court.

bill, (71 Fed. Rep. 758,) whereupon the cause was taken to the Circuit Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decree because the necessary diversity of citizenship was not affirmatively shown. 41 U. S. App. 178.

The case was not brought here directly from the Circuit Court of the United States on the question of the jurisdiction of that court as such, nor did the Circuit Court of Appeals, when the case came before it for the second time, certify any question on which it desired our instruction.

On the contrary, this is an appeal from a judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals affirming the decree of the Circuit Court, and the inquiry at once presents itself as to our jurisdiction to entertain such appeal.

By the sixth section of the judiciary act of March 3, 1891, the judgments or decrees of the Circuit Courts of Appeals are made final in certain classes of cases, and, among others, " in all cases in which the jurisdiction is dependent entirely upon the opposite parties to the suit or controversy, being aliens and citizens of the United States, or citizens of different States." This case confessedly did not belong to either of the other classes, and if it fell within the class just mentioned, this appeal will not lie.

The judicial power extends to controversies between citizens of different States; and between citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of foreign States; but from the judiciary act of 1789 to the act of August 13, 1888, it has been provided in substance, (the differences being immaterial here,) that no Circuit Court shall "have cognizance of any suit, except upon foreign bills of exchange, to recover the contents of any promissory note or other chose in action in favor of any assignee, or of any subsequent holder if such instrument be payable to bearer and be not made by any corporation, unless such suit might have been prosecuted in such court to recover the said contents if no assignment or transfer had been made." And, to avoid the operation of this limitation, it is necessary in such cases that the record should show that the suit could have been maintained in the Circuit Court in the name of the assignor. Parker v. Ormsby, 141 U. S. 81.

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