In addition, he is an executive with Lulejian & Associates, analytical systems planners. Since joining the firm in July 1970, Mr. Polmar has directed and participated in a number of studies, primarily related to maritime activities, advanced weapons and technologies, and the development of military strategy.

Previously he was Technical Support Advisor with the Northrup Corporation's deep submergence program, being directly involved with Navy long-range planning for undersea activity, submarine rescue, underwater search, advanced diving systems, and the SEALAB III seafloor living experiment. Mr. Polmar was with the Northrup Corporation from January 1967 to July 1970.

Mr. Polmar was Assistant Editor of the Naval Institute Proceedings from September 1963 to January 1967. He was responsible for approximately one-half of the editorial content of that monthly journal. While with the Proceedings, Mr. Polmar lectured at the Naval Academy on the subject of World War II naval weapons. During this period he also was a consultant and regular contributor to the U.S. Air Force Association's magazines Air Force/Space Digest and Acro-Space International, and from 1964 until 1970 he wrote a monthly column for the British magazine Navy.

From December 1960 to September 1963, Mr. Polmar was Associate Editor of the privately published, weekly newspaper Navy Times, writing primarily on the subjects of ships, weapons, and organization.

FOREIGN TRAVEL

Mr. Polmar has travelled extensively in Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East. During the summer of 1973 he visited the Soviet Union as a guest of the Soviet Institute of US Studies and the Soviet Navy.

EDUCATION

Mr. Polmar is a graduate of The American University with a BA in journalism and history.

PUBLICATIONS

Mr. Polmar has authored several books on naval-maritime subjects. In addition, his articles have appeared in The New York Times, Washington Post, Evening Star, and Miami Herald newspapers, the Encyclopedia Britannica, Air Force/Space Digest, Aerospace International, Flying Review International, Brassey's Annual, Naval Institute Proceedings, Sea Power magazine, Navy magazine (London).

Mr. Polmar's books include:

Atomic Submarines (Van Nostrand, 1963); also published in Russian and Japanese language editions.

Death of the Thresher (Chilton, 1964).

Aircraft Carriers: A History of Carrier Aviation and Its Influence on World Events (Doubleday, 1969); this book was named the most notable naval book of 1970 by the Naval Institute.

Soviet Naval Power (a monograph published by the National Strategy Information Center, 1972).

Mr. CLARK. Thank you very much, Norman.

I am very happy that you could appear today, because you have an excellent statement, and I hope that everybody who is interested in this bill one way or the other has a chance to read it.

The Department of Defense apparently thinks we can rely on flags-of-convenience vessels in a crisis.

Please tell us why you do not think we can.

Mr. POLMAR. The answer to that, sir, is both complex and simple. It is complex because I am holding in my hand a study participated in at the request of the Department of Commerce, the Maritime Administration earlier this year entitled Analysis of Availability and Suitability of the Effective United States Controlled Fleet.

This was an analytical study, a historical study, and a legal study. Very basically, it boils down to the fact that the historic, legal, and practical hold that this country has on the ships is virtually nil.

To quote a couple of the conclusions in this respect, "indisputable control of U.S.-owned shipping during a national emergency can only be insured when the ships are under U.S. registry, and manned by U.S. crews."

From there it goes down to the fact that this concept has never been tested.

It goes into historical examples of when crises came up, or wars came up, who actually got the ships, regardless of their flags.

As you all know, during World War I and World War II, a large number of German ships flew the American flag because in some cases they were in American ports at the time we decided to take them over.

But by the same token, Admiral George Miller, who is with us. today, has made the interesting comment that we are talking about a ship manned by, say, a Norwegian crew, or a Philippine crew, or a Chinese crew, and I will not qualify which China in this case, commanded by a Norwegian, or a British captain, or a Spanish captain, flying the flag of Panama, which is a little perturbed with us right now because of the canal situation, carrying oil owned by a foreign company, bringing it to Jamaica, and how in anyone's imagination we can consider this to be effective control because of the piece of paper signed by the shipowner in the United States, which a shipowner can apparently tear up when he pleases, this to me, sir, is ludicrous.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. Pritchard.

Mr. PRITCHARD. If we pass this act, how difficult would it be for oil companies to move flag-of-convenience ships back into American registry, and put American crews on, and let them fall under the act so they would qualify for the 20 or 25 percent?

Mr. POLMAR. I am obviously, sir, not the one to ask this question. My understanding, though, from what reading I have done, and the people I have talked to who use the terms, some of these ships, it is my understanding, this could be done in a very relatively short period of time; a few weeks or a month.

Mr. PRITCHARD. Well, we will probably get a chance to talk to some of the oil companies and find out what the cost is.

It might be a lot cheaper to move the flag-of-convenience back under the American flag-after they've gone through all the other processes.

Mr. POLMAR. That might be a good cause to sail.

Mr. PRITCHARD. I have no further questions.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. Sarbanes?

Mr. SARBANES. No questions.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. Anderson?

Mr. ANDERSON. No questions. I want to commend them for a very fine presentation.

Mr. CLARK. I have some questions that I am going to give you, and you may respond to them later for the record.

[The questions of Mr. Clark follow:]

POLMAR ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD

Q. Would you tell us more about the use of our merchant vessels in a combat auxiliary role?

1. During both World Wars navies modified hundreds of merchant ships for the combat auxiliary role, enabling these ships to serve as amphibious cargo and transport ships, escort aircraft carriers, anti-aircraft ships, and even auxiliary cruisers. Looking at modern merchant ships and potential combat situations, one can envision rapid modification of a large tanker to serve as a combination underway replenishment ship and helicopter carrier. A prefabricated helicopter landing deck could be installed on the tanker's broad deck and modular helicopter hangars and repair shops could be fitted. In this configuration the tanker could operate anti-submarine helicopters and possibly VSTOL aircraft for task force or convoy defense. Obviously, a container ship or LASH ship could be similarly modified . . . if we had realistic control of the ship.

Q. Why do you say on page 8 that this is a period of increasing dependence upon the sea?

2. I believe that our dependence on the sea is increasing because of our need for foreign resources and foreign markets to enable our economy to remain viable and grow. At the same time, emerging nations want to trade, selling their wares at markets and importing machinery and other products of more technologically advanced nations. Other factors are the need for food from the oceans to feed the world's growing populations and the exploitation of ocean resources, especially seafloor petroleum reserves. Taken together, the trends in these areas all indicate that man is today using the sea more than ever before.

Q. Not only the Soviets have demonstrated the feasibility of employing merchant ships for naval logistic support. Are you aware of the current program using United States-flag commercial tankers as Navy oilers, and the success of the ERNA ELIZABETH and TALUGA in this regard?

3. I am familiar with the recent U.S. considerations for employing merchant ships in naval logistic support role. First, the Soviet merchant fleet on a day-today basis provides logistic support to the Soviet Navy; this massive effort in no meaningful way can be compared to the few post-World War II experiments conducted by the United States. Second, the TALUGA is not a merchant ship; she has been a Navy oiler since her completion 30 years ago. Recently her Navy crew was replaced by a civilian crew in an effort related to Navy personnel limitations. She remains a Navy ship, owned, controlled, and operated by the government. Thus, the TALUGA in no way demonstrates the feasibility of employing merchant ships for naval support.

The ERNA ELIZABETH was a valid example of supporting Navy ships with a merchant tanker. The ERNA ELIZABETH demonstrated that support from merchant ships is feasible if American-flag merchant ships are available. The question is how many modern, high-speed merchant ships are today under U.S. control flying the American flag?

Q. On page 3 you say industrial nations maintain merchant fleets because merchant ships are vital to a major maritime trading nation. Is this necessarily true for the United States where our standard of living makes it extremely difficult to compete with foreign-flag vessels? Do you feel that we get our moneys worth from subsidy spent for this purpose?

4. Agreed, our standard of living makes it difficult for American-flag merchant ships to compete with foreign-flag ships. But for this very reason H.R. 8193 will help to bring more ships to the American flag. Also, if we look at the merchant fleet in the broad view as a political and military as well as economic factor, I believe the nation will more than receive its money's worth for subsidies spent for this purpose.

Q. On page 5 you say that "At considerable 'cost', Great Britain. Japan, and other major trading nations operate their own large, national-flag merchant fleets". If these nations have determined that there are economic benefits to be derived from such operations, then there really isn't a cost is there? What are some of the benefits that would override this so-called "cost"?

5. Great Britain, Japan, and other major trading nations have all made the decision to invest resources to develop a national-flag merchant marines. Each nation invested large sums in the ships, crews, ports, and other components of a modern merchant fleet. Probably there were alternative uses for those funds

within the nations concerned. But the decision was made and, subsequently, certain economic, political, and even military benefits have accrued to those nations.

Specific benefits include transportation costs for their raw materials and manufactured produces being paid to national firms and to their own citizensailors, and not to foreigners; their shipyards generally have more work than if they built ships only for foreign fleets; merchant ships are available to the national governments in periods of emergency; they have a peaceful political presence force that they can project into overseas areas of interest; and they have a cadre of trained seamen to supplement their navies.

Mr. CLARK. Again, I want to thank both of you very much for coming this morning to give your views. You have added a great deal to our record.

The subcommittee is adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair. [Whereupon, at 11:55 a.m., the subcommittee adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.]

ENERGY TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ACT OF 1974

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 21, 1974

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON MERCHANT MARINE OF THE

COMMITTEE ON MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES,

Washington, D.C. The subcommittee met at 10:05 a.m., in room 1334, Longworth Office Building with Hon. Frank M. Clark (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. CLARK. Good morning.

The Subcommittee on Merchant Marine will please come to order. We continue hearings on H.R. 8193 and similar bills that we reserve a percentage of U.S. oil imports to be carried on U.S.-flag vessels.

This morning the subcommittee looks forward to receiving the views of the American Petroleum Institute on the proposed legislation.

I understand that Mr. James W. Kinnear, senior vice president of Texaco, will appear on behalf of Texaco accompanied by other members of the American Petroleum Institute.

Will you come forward, please, gentlemen, and identify them for the record so we may proceed. We are glad to have you with us this morning.

STATEMENT OF JAMES W. KINNEAR, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT OF TEXACO, INC.; ACCOMPANIED BY CHRISTOPHER J. CARVEN, TRANSPORTATION OF OPERATIONS DIVISION MANAGER OF EXXON CORP., AND THOMAS S. WYMAN, MANAGER, MARITIME RELATIONS, CHEVRON SHIPPING CO.

Mr. KINNEAR. My name is James W. Kinnear, I am a senior vice president of Texaco, Inc., and am appearing here today on behalf of the American Petroleum Institute, or as it is commonly known, API. With me today is Mr. Christopher J. Carven, transportation operations division manager of Exxon Corp., to my right, and Mr. Thomas S. Wyman, manager-maritime relations, Chevron Shipping Co., to my left.

At this time, Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit for the record the "Analysis of Proposed Cargo Preference Legislation-Fall 1973" which has been prepared by API.

[The document may be found on p. 490.]

API member companies, including some independent U.S.-flag