OPENING STATEMENT

The CHAIRMAN. We are glad to have you with us this morning. With us is Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Hon. Roger T. Kelley, to testify on the manpower portion of this year's authorization bill. Mr. Kelley is accompanied by Lt. Gen. William E. DePuy of the Army, Rear Adm. John G. Finneran of the Navy, Maj. Gen. William W. Berg of the Air Force, and Maj. Gen. E. B. Wheeler of the U.S. Marine Corps.

I want to say at the outset that we also appreciate the backup and support materials which have been prepared and assembled from a number of sources by Mr. Sullivan and his staff in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. We received most of this material in a timely fashion. More will be required on specific issues which we will get into later.

I will take just a moment to say that generally my feelings on military manpower are that we must maintain a very high quality of men in our Armed Forces because of the requirements of complex weapon systems and for many other reasons. I do not know of any time in history when we have had a greater demand for dedication than this period we are going through.

I do feel, however, that it will be necessary for us to continue the reductions in the quantity of military manpower. The pressures which are produced by the cost of modern weaponry and by climbing manpower costs due to pay increases mean that we really have no other choice.

In this coming budget year, fiscal year 1973, the Department of Defense has requested authorization for 2,358,000 men as the fiscal year 1973 end strength. This is only 33,000 men below the end strength for fiscal year 1972: 2,391,000.

During the course of these hearings we expect to receive a detailed justification for the military manpower requested by the Department of Defense. It is not enough to state the threat and then a requirement for a certain number of divisions, air wings, or ships. The costs of defense are so high it is essential that the structure be justified in detail the link must be shown between the threat and the forces which are requested. Military manpower costs are edging toward 60 percent of the defense budget; manpower is not a free resource, it is our most expensive commodity.

We also expect during these hearings to receive detailed material on the manpower policies of our NATO allies, the force improvements which they may have made, and the contributions which they are making to help defray the large costs which we incur in helping to defend them.

I think we will have a rather lively, but very difficult debate on this subject on the Senate floor where amendments are filed. These amendments come very close to passing. We must have all the justifications we can to back up whatever the committee does with reference to manpower.

It is important that, in making reductions, we do not reduce our combat capability unnecessarily. I was extremely interested to see that considerably over 1 million men in uniform-1,116,000 to be exactare involved in general support. It is not that the tasks performed by

these men are unimportant-far from it--but we must be particularly sure that the large support structure which we have built up for Vietnam does not continue to drift on and on because of inertia. The question of the numbers of men devoted to support, intelligence, and similar missions, has not been dealt with as thoroughly as it might have been in many cases. Our analysis and our attention, both within the executive and legislative branches, is often focused on the big weapon system issues and on questions having great political importance, such as the number of troops in Europe. But the vast numbers of men involved in these supporting missions absolutely requires the careful attention of the Congress. We will carefully analyze other manpower issues as well this year, of course.

I hope that in our discussions here today and in later testimony during the hearings we can establish a tradition of frankness and candor about these matters. We, in the Congress, fully realize that some of the military manpower problems facing the Department of Defense are not of your making. In part, some of them can be attributed to implicit and explicit policy decisions made by the administration, the Congress, and ultimately by the people themselves. We look forward to exploring these issues with you today, and in following days.

I do not want any tone of complaint about what I say, Mr. Secretary, but I have been on this committee a long time and I have been on the Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense, and I do not remember ever having heard or considered a real in-depth analysis of the actual manpower needs. I do not know who is to blame for that any more than I am. So, I will put myself first. We just have not been into this in depth to my knowledge, but now manpower is getting such a large part of the money each year, billions of dollars, which I do not think is going to be easy to get this year, or next year either.

I think the military itself wants more of a quality product than they have in many ways, not only the uniformed personnel but the civilian employees. Frankly, I do not know what is being done these days to see that civilian employees actually do a day's work. I know I come in contact with the letdown, the slowdown all over this country, for even a minor repair on your automobile. So, I hope all your civilian employees are exceptions to that general trend.

That is really not before us today, but it is a part of the manpower-I mean, the money part of the bill.

As I understand, plans have been worked out for Secretary Kelley, to take 40 minutes to read a portion of his statement, after which the Army will take 30 minutes to talk from the charts in the books, the Navy 20 minutes, the Marine Corps 10 to 15 minutes, and the Air Force 20 minutes. The services have no prepared statements but will speak to the charts in the backup books.

All right. We have these 2 days now; we are not going to rush anyone, but at the same time, we want to get right down to the questions. We have already had a briefing on the threat from the CIA. We are going to have another one from Mr. Laird and then we are going to have the Secretaries of the services in and the Chiefs of Staff. So, we do not have to go to the threat and matters of that kind.

Mr. Secretary, you are recognized. I am not going to limit you the 40 minutes.

STATEMENT OF HON. ROGER T. KELLEY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS; ACCOMPANIED BY GEORGE A. DAOUST, JR., DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR MANPOWER RESEARCH AND UTILIZATION, OASD (M. & R.A.); MAJ. GEN. LEO A. BENADE, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR MILITARY PERSONNEL POLICY, OASD (M. & R.A.); FRANCIS J. SULLIVAN, DIRECTOR, MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS, OASD (SA); CARL DETWYLER, DIRECTOR FOR MILITARY PERSONNEL, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER); CHARLES BREWER, DIRECTOR FOR ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER); JONAS M. PLATT, DIRECTOR, MANPOWER UTILIZATION, OASD (M. & R.A.); MAJ. GEN. W. D. CRITTENBERGER, DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR PLANS AND POLICY, J-5 (INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS), OJCS; ROBERT E. MORRISON, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE; LT. GEN. WILLIAM E. DE PUY, ASSISTANT VICE CHIEF OF STAFF, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY; REAR ADM. JOHN G. FINNERAN, ASSISTANT CHIEF OF NAVAL PERSONNEL FOR PLANS AND PROGRAMS, USN; MAJ. GEN. E. B. WHEELER, ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-1, USMC; AND MAJ. GEN. WILLIAM W. BERG, DIRECTOR, MANPOWER AND ORGANIZATION, DCS/P. & R., USAF

Mr. KELLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to read a portion of my statement, that portion that deals with the size and the composition of our forces, because I think I would not do justice to the subject if I gave you a capsule statement on that subject. The greater length of my statement I would reduce to a capsule summary, the portions dealing with the elements of the manpower cost and some of the major manpower issues we face.

Mr. Chairman, we propose for fiscal 1973 an average military manpower strength of 2,396,500, down 139,500 from the average strength of fiscal year 1972. This marks the fifth consecutive year in which Defense has requested fewer men than the previous year-a net 5-year reduction of 1.1 million men.

The President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Congress have all determined that past reductions could and should be made. We have not recommended, and we will not recommend, reductions which jeopardize national security. I am advised that the increased capabilities of several of our allies, improvements in our weapons systems, and changes in the threat in some parts of the world, have enabled us to make the manpower reductions of recent years without endangering security.

Today, I want to present not only the reasons why we are recommending a further reduction to the level of 2.4 million men in the Armed Services, but also an overview of the major manpower issues confronting us, including significant cost and other trends.

Despite substantial reductions in the size of our military forces, total manpower costs have risen sharply in recent years and now account for more than 50 cents of every Defense dollar spent. There are many reasons for this trend-including pay raises, higher retired pay costs, more technically trained and higher rated people, and high personnel turnover. These cost trends deserve further analysis as they relate to our most expensive and important asset-people.

Our basic national security objective is to preserve the United States as a free and independent Nation, to safeguard its fundamental institutions and values, and to protect its people. In addition, we have vital interests in other parts of the world, interests which relate intimately to our own security as well as that of our allies. Our military power, in partnership with other nations, helps to protect their interests and our mutual security.

The President of the United States, as Chief Executive and Commander in Chief, establishes basic policy on broad requirements necessary to fulfill our national security objectives. This broad guidance is, in turn, expanded by the Secretary of Defense and provided to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the military services for use in force and manpower planning, including the development of recommended force structure and manpower requirements necessary to carry out the guid

ance.

In our force planning, under the total force concept, we take into account the forces of our allies for the purpose of meeting many of the threats with which we and our partners must be prepared to cope. As you know, Mr. Chairman, Secretary Laird has, for 3 years, laid special emphasis upon the concept of total force, giving effect to President Nixon's principle of partnership. Within our own military forces, the total force concept has meant strengthening our Guard and Reserve units so that they will constitute an effective augmenting force for our active forces.

Once given an approved force goal of, for example, "X" aircraft wings and "Y" divisions, the services are charged with meeting that goal through a combination of equipment, manpower, and training. They must answer such questions as: How many crews are needed to properly man the aircraft; how many men are needed to keep a comserviced and flying; how much support does it take to keep a combat division in the field; what headquarters are needed to direct the combat elements; and what sort of training establishment must be maintained? We must insure that the necessary manpower is distributed into forward deployed units, active CONUS units, and reserve units in order to preserve at minimum cost the capability to deter aggression.

It is my job to see that personnel policies serve the best interests of national security and that they are fair to people. Achieving that goal has not been easy during a period which has been one of the most turbulent in our military history. As we emerge from that turbulence we should jointly examine policies and practices to be sure that they will deliver the best manpower performance at the lowest possible cost. Tough issues must be addressed, and we need your help. This report should provide a basis for further review and discussion of personnel policies and the key manpower issues of defense.

We are moving toward an All-Volunteer Force. This fact requires restudy of basic personnel policies which govern such things as length of enlistments, nature and length of training, and services to be pro

vided (medical care for dependents, commissaries, et cetera). Personnel policies often have substantial impact on the rate of flow of personnel through the defense system and, consequently, affect the cost of training people, the number of people needed to maintain the required manpower levels in the forces, and the cost of maintaining them.

DOD MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS FOR FORCE LEVELS

Manpower requirements, Mr. Chairman, derive from analysis of the threat and what is needed to meet it. Table 1 shows our estimate of military manpower needed for fiscal year 1973, as well as the level maintained in the previous 3 years-broken out by major mission areas: Strategic, general purpose, other mission, and general support.

Note: Numbers in parentheses are additive to major area tota.s; numbers may not add to DOD totals due to rounding.

Mr. KELLEY. Table 2 shows general support apportioned by major mission area.

TABLE 2.-ACTIVE MILITARY MANPOWER SUMMARY WITH GENERAL SUPPORT MANPOWER ALLOCATED TO MAJOR MISSIONS

Note: Numbers in parenthesis are additive to major mission totals; numbers may not add to DOD totals due to round

ing.