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in the Army, and similar levels in the other services. This material also indicates that there are 58,000 men in these lower level headquarters, in addition to the 121,000 that I mentioned, for total of 179,000 men in headquarters and headquarters support of all kinds.

We have enough men, it seems, in these headquarters to man more than 11 full infantry divisions.

Is it your position that this number of people is actually required for these military headquarters? Do you have a personal knowledge of that and is that your position here? STATEMENT OF HON. ROGER T. KELLEY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY

OF DEFENSE FOR MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS, ACCOMPANIED BY GEORGE A. DAOUST, JR., DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR MANPOWER RESEARCH AND UTILIZATION, OASD (M. & R.A.); MAJ. GEN. LEO A. BENADE, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR MILITARY PERSONNEL POLICY, OASD (M. & R.A.); FRANCIS J. SULLIVAN, DIRECTOR, MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS, OASD (SA); CARL DETWYLER, DIRECTOR FOR MILITARY PERSONNEL, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER); CHARLES BREWER, DIRECTOR FOR ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER), JONAS M. PLATT, DIRECTOR, MANPOWER UTILIZATION, OASD (M. & R.A.); MAJ. GEN. W. D. CRITTENBERGER, DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR PLANS AND POLICY, J-5 (INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS), OJCS; ROBERT E. MORRISON, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE; LT. GEN. WILLIAM E. DE PUY, ASSISTANT VICE CHIEF OF STAFF, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY; REAR ADM. JOHN G. FINNERAN, ASSISTANT CHIEF OF NAVAL PERSONNEL FOR PLANS AND PROGRAMS, USN; MAJ. GEN. E. B. WHEELER, ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF-G-1, U.S. MARINE CORPS; AND MAJ. GEN. WILLIAM W. BERG, DIRECTOR, MANPOWER AND ORGANIZATION, DCS/P. & R., U.S. AIR FORCE-Resumed

EXPLANATION OF DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONNEL

Mr. KELLEY. Mr. Chairman, I would not represent the viewpoint that we cannot effect efficiencies in our headquarters as well as other units. But it seems to me the most logical way to address your question is to have each of the services explain how their total people are distributed, in the case of the Army, for example, starting with a 13division active force requirement and the various headquarters and staff deployments, how we account for the 869,000 people projected for the Army in fiscal 1973.

I think we should do that service by service and in the backdrop of that explanation I think you and we will be better able to judge whether there are excesses in the headquarters structure.

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The CHAIRMAN. We are going to hear that, I assume, from them. I assume you have already heard?

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir; I have.

The CHAIRMAN. We cannot get to but one witness at a time. We need the opinion here of a civilian official in a position of high responsibility, and you are the manMr. KELLEY. All right, sir. The CHAIRMAN (continuing). That we look to primarily. Mr. KELLEY. All right.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you represent to this committee that your hard belief and recommendation is that that number is required in these positions for our military departments ?

OVERSTAFFING NOT UNIQUE

Mr. KELLEY. I think it is consistent with the way organizations are manned, but it is my opinion that the military services as well as the civilian components of defense as well as administration organizations outside of defense tend to be overmanned in the command and headquarters structure. So I cannot say to you that, in my opinion, the armed forces cannot do with fewer people in the headquarters and command structure. I think they can, but I think the disability from which they suffer is a typical disability and not one that is unique to the Armed Forces.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you mean not unique to the armed forces?

Mr. KELLEY. I mean, there is a general tendency in organization life to overstaff on the side of headquarters and command and management structure. I think the Armed Forces reflect that just as other organizations do.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean, in civilian life?
Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. If it is done there, it seems to me it is an error, and there is no use for the military to follow that example.

Mr. KELLEY. I am not condoning it, Mr. Chairman. I am just answering your question as frankly as I can.

FEWER MEN NEEDED ?

The CHAIRMAN. If that is the situation, it is up to us to try to turn it around some, because, as I have said before, we are taxing little people barely making a living to pay this enormous bill every year for Federal expenditure. We do not feel like saying to them that we allowed more than was actually needed. I just do not know, as I said this morning, how much work you get out of civilian employees. I am not picking on any individual. You may have men above the average. But we have got to get down into this thing and get somebody digging on it. So, your answer is, and I certainly do not want to misunderstand you, you personally think they can do with fewer men in these positions?

Mr. KELLEY. I personally think also that the relative efficiency of the Armed Forces as reflected in the number of people who are in command and headquarters positions compares favorably with other organizations.

The CHAIRMAN. I was not suggesting it was not. They are supposed to be better. I like to think of it as being far better. That is not the question at all. The question is what is the need. We have to get down to it. As long as we run from it we are not doing our duty, as I see it. In order to get what is actually needed, I think we are going to have to convince the general voting Senator that what is asked for is needed, otherwise we are going to lose some votes on this bill. Illustrating why I believe this, on reducing the troops in NATO and Europe, the amendment that the Appropriations Committee put on the appropriations bill has a limitation. I believe it reduced by onethird, at least. That was the committee's recommendation and that amendment by the Appropriations Committee was defeated on the floor only after a real battle in which the President of the United States had to give a letter to be read on the floor and sent to the Senators. It was an excellent letter, and gave specifically the reasons why he wanted this kept like it was as a matter of foreign policy.

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I think the military can help the President's position a lot, if they go into the command structure. If you did not reduce it but 2,000 that would show a good faith effort on the part of the military to get things a little more in order and help meet these arguments that are made.

Does that impress you any? I do not want to embarrass you; I have a great deal of respect for you as a responsible official.

HEADQUARTERS REQUIREMENTS NOT ABOVE NEED

Mr. KELLEY. It does not embarrass me at all, Mr. Chairman, but I regard 2,000 as a sky hook figure which needs to be measured against what each of the four services is doing with its command and headquarters structure and how they relate to the total size and configuration of the organization otherwise.

It is not difficult for any of us who work inside the Pentagon to say that we could be more efficient in terms of headquarters and in terms of other manning specifications. But looking at the overall picture, service by service, I cannot be unduly critical of the headquarters manning requirements of the services.

Mr. CHAIRMAN. I am not a man of great experience but I have looked at life a good while and had a good deal of down to earth experience. You get more confusion and conflict when you have too many people than you do anything else.

Do you have any specific recommendations to make to the committee that would help us get to this problem?

Mr. KELLEY. If by the problem you mean headquarters and command structure?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. KELLEY. No, sir; none other than those reflected in our recommendations to you.

STREAMLINING COMBAT COMMAND

Going on then to the President's Blue Ribbon Defense Panel. There were some very strong recommendations there for streamlining the combatant command which the panel states, "should result in a substantial reduction of the total number of personnel required to staff the structure.”

What is the view of the Office of the Secretary of Defense that you represent on this subject on the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel position that this command structure is not only large and cumbersome but “unwieldy and unworkable in crisis and too fragmentary to provide the best potential for a coordinated response to a general war situation."

You have been through all of that, I know. I do not want to take you by surprise. What is your view as representing the Office of the Secretary of Defense on that?

Mr. KELLEY. Mr. Chairman, that portion of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel is one in which the Secretary and the Joint Chiefs, more so than I, concerned themselves. I think it would be appropriate for me to pass that question and suggest that you direct it to the Secretary and Admiral Moorer when they are here.

RECOMMENDATIONS OF BLUE RIBBON DEFENSE PANEL

The CHAIRMAN. All right, let us pass that question over then, members of the staff, and bring it back to my attention.

While we are on the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, we would like to have a specific response to each of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel's recommendations in this area, specifically the recommendations in section (I) (5) of the panel report on pages 56 and 57.

(The information follows:) This provides a response to the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel recommendation 1-5 which recommended in part:

The establishment of an operations staff, separate from all other military staffs, to provide staff support on military operations, and channel of communications from the President and the Secretary of Defense to the Unified Commands;

The responsibilities now delegated to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the Secretary of Defense to serve as military staff in the chain of operational command with respect to the Unified Commands be rescinded;

The Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff be limited to include only the Joint Chiefs of Staff and a reconstituted Joint Staff consisting of not more than 250 officers augmented by professional civilian analysts as required;

Unified Commanders be given unfragmented command authority for their Commands, and the Commanders of component commands redesignated as Deputies to the commander of the appropriate Unified Command;

Major realignment of Unified Commands;

Redelegate responsibilities related to civil disturbance to the Tactical Command which are currently delegated to the Army; and

Unified Commanders be given express responsibility and capability for makrecommendations for operational capabilities objectives and allocations of force structures needed for the effective accomplishment of their missions.

Total implementation of this recommendation is partly dependent on establishing three Deputy Secretaries, which the Secretary of Defense has rejected in favor of two deputies. However, certain related actions taken by the Department have been consistent with the thrust of certain aspects of the recommendation. Prior to the issuance of the Blue Ribbon Panel Report, the Department had initiated a study to examine some elements of the Unified and Specified Command structure. We concluded that the Unified Commands, as they were then structured, together with the distribution of responsibilities among the various commands, did not represent the most effective organization of U.S. combatant forces in support of national policies, nor the most effective arrangement for the deployment of U.S. forces to meet likely contingencies.

In view of this conclusion, changes have been made that have resulted in the realignment of the headquarters arrangements for command and control

of the Armed Forces world-wide. These changes are in keeping with the Nixon Doctrine and are consistent with our on-going efforts to revitalize the organizational structure in support of our policy of Realistic Deterrence, The Unified Command Plan, which had not been changed since 1963, represents, as revised, the best judgment of the President, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense. This Unified Command structure will be reviewed periodically to assure that, as changes occur in U.S. policies, interests, and other considerations, the command structure will be modified to support them.

Specifically, the changes are:

U.S. Strike Command.-US Strike Command was disestablished, along with the title Commander in Chief, Middle East, Africa, and South Asia (USCINC MEAFSA). In its place, a new command, US Readiness Command, was established at MacDill Air Force Base. The new command is manned austerely to control US-based major combatant general purpose forces not assigned to other unified commands. It has the responsibility to provide a general reserve of combat ready forces to reinforce other U.S. commands, perform deployment planning, and assist the Joint Chiefs of Staff in developing doctrines and techniques for the joint employment of forces. (Deleted.)

U.S. European Command.-USCINCEUR's area of responsibility was expanded to include the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, and the Middle East to the eastern border of Iran. We think that the growing Soviet presence in the Mediterranean and Middle East represents an increased threat to the southern flank of NATO; that all U.S. military planning and operations in this area and Europe should be coordinated and controlled by one military commander.

Pacific Command.-PACOM area responsibility was expanded to include the Indian Ocean to 62° East Longitude, those South Asian countries formerly assigned to USCINCMEAFSA, the Aleutian Islands, and a portion of the Arctic Ocean. This change is more compatible with the forces likely to be deployed for contingencies in these areas.

Atlantic Command.LANTCOM area responsibility was expanded to include the water areas around the continents of Africa and South America. It also includes a portion of the Arctic Ocean. This arrangement is more compatible with the existing and likely deployment of U.S. naval forces.

The Alaskan Command retained its mission in the state of Alaska and responsibility for Alaskan coastal islands.

The Strategic Air Command and the Continental Air Defense Command also retained their present missions.

The US Southern Command is unchanged.

The Department is in full accord with the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel concerning the streamlining of the combatant commands thereby reducing the personnel required to staff the structure. The changes in the Unified Command Plan which became effective January 1, 1972, provided for an improved command structure as well as effecting an overall reduction in the headquarters manning of the commands. For example, the disestablishment of US Strike Command and the establishment of the US Readiness Command resulted in the reduction of 306 personnel spaces. As a separate action, all major headquarters staff elements are being examined with a view toward reducing their size. Approximately a 20 percent reduction in the major staff elements is planned for FY 73 from the FY 69 level.

The decision has been deferred regarding that portion of the recommendation concerning (1) the reorganization of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and (2) the establishment of an operations staff, separate from all other military staffs, to provide staff support on military operations, and a channel of communications from the President and the Secretary of Defense to the Unified Commands. This aspect of the recommendation has been examined very closely. While it has not been implemented as suggested, we have taken action to improve the present system to provide a more effective, efficient, and economical command and control system to support the President and Secretary of Defense (DoD Directive 5100.30).

Certain limited advantages may perhaps be realized by separating the Joint Chiefs of Staff from the operational chain of command and other responsibilities related to operational matters as recommended by the Panel ; however, the total impact of this action must also be considered. This includes, among other things :

The creation of another high level military staff organization and an asso ciated layer of responsibility and authority which would accompany it.

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