Senator BYRD. Incidentally, do you happen to have the other years handy? General BENADE. I can give you figures for 1967, which I happen to have. For 1967, $1.831 billion, and the estimated cost for 1973 is $4.358 billion, and the balance is accounted for Senator BYRD. What is the total? That is what I want. General BENADE. It is $4.9 billion, but I think it is important to recognize, Senator, that that $4.9 billion includes two other factors. One is the proposed recomputation of retired pay that Secretary Kelley referred to. The other is an anticipated cost-of-living increase. Senator BYRD. I think it is fine to have the details of that but what I want to try to understand is the figure. Now, the figure for military pay retirement, military retirement, is $4.9 billion. General BENADE. In total, Senator. Senator BYRD. That is what I am saying. I am interested in total figures. General BENADE. Yes, sir. Senator BYRD. The total is $4.9 billion. General BENADE. Yes, sir. Senator BYRD. What was it in 1967? General BENADE. $1.8 billion. Senator BYRD. $1.8 billion. General BENADE. Yes, sir. Senator BYRD. You might as well give me 1968. General BENADE. $2.093 billion. 1969 is $2.443 billion. 1970, $2.859 billion. 1971, $3.389 billion. Senator BYRD. So, it has gone up $2 billion in 2 years. What have you got for 1972? General BENADE. $3.931 billion. Senator BYRD. What was 1971? General BENADE. 1971 is $3.389 billion. Senator BYRD. $3.389 billion. Thank you. "GRADE CREEP" On page 39, I do not understand the term "grade creep." Mr. KELLEY. The term "grade creep" is concerned with the average grade of those people who are employed on the civilian side of manpower in either DOD or Government-wide, as the case may be. "Grade creep" is a term indicating that, over a period of period of years, we are classifying people higher to do the work which in an earlier period of time was classified lower. Senator BYRD. I note on page 39 under Government-wide employment for 1971, 1972, and 1973, you state it is not available, the figures are not available. Would not those figures be available? Mr. KELLEY. I am sorry, Senator. I cannot comment on their nonavailability, and I should be able to, but I will Senator BYRD. 1971 is already through. Somebody must have known how many people were employed in 1971. 1972 is almost through. Somebody must know how many persons you were employing. On 1973, there must be some estimate yours must be an estimate because we have not gotten to 1973 yet. Mr. KELLEY. We will provide that information. (The information follows:) Grade Trends (General Schedule Positions) Government-wide employment (thousands): Senator BYRD. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I will hold my other questions and yield to Senator Thurmond. Mr. Secretary, if you feel you should let someone answer this for the record, just say so. Are there not significant shortages of properly trained personnel in the U.S. Army, Europe? Mr. KELLEY. There are shortages, and they are in the process of being corrected and will be corrected by later this year. Correcting those shortages will also correct the problem of severe turbulence and instability which has plagued the Army for several years. Senator THURMOND. The information I have, for instance, was that in September 1971 [deleted] and so forth. Is it not a fact, Mr. Secretary, while the Army may have physically present the men authorized in Europe, that there is a severe shortage of personnel with the necessary military skills required to carry out the Army's assigned combat missions? Mr. KELLEY. I do not think it is a fact that there is a severe shortage of the skills required to carry out the Army's mission. But on examining the facts further, we will provide additional information for the record Senator THURMOND. Thank you. Mr. KELLEY (Continuing). If my answer is not entirely correct. (Information classified and retained in committee files.) Senator THURMOND. How would you overcome these shortages if war started tomorrow? Mr. KELLEY. Well, the immediate answer to the question is by augmenting the forces in Europe with strategic reserve forces from the States and by augmenting the active forces by the use of Army Reserve and Army National Guard units. If further information is appropriate, we will furnish it for the record. Senator THURMOND. Do you not believe that, in looking at the 22 NATO headquarters, the vast number of senior officers and personnel at the European Command Headquarters, plus the array of senior officers and total people at the U.S. headquarters, U.S. Air Force headquarters, and U.S. Navy headquarters, that reasonable people could properly conclude that there are, first, too many headquarters, and second, too many military personnel, particularly senior officers, involved in staff work? Mr. KELLEY. I think I should respond in the record to that question, Senator. (The information follows:) We do not believe that the number of headquarters or the number of senior officers exceeds the need, considering the functions that must be performed. The headquarters and their manning are discussed in detail below. ALLIED COMMAND HEADQUARTERS During the formation years of NATO, various subheadquarters were established for the Allied Command Europe as tasks were identified and responsibilities assigned. The structure has varied with requirements, yet there has been a conscious effort in the last few years to streamline the headquarters and eliminate those which are not absolutely necessary. For example, the land and air forces headquarters for the Center Region were formerly organized under an intermediate headquarters called LANDCENT and AIRCENT. In the interests of efficiency and savings, these intermediate headquarters were disestablished and the four subheadquarters now report directly to the Commander of the Center Region (CINCENT). There are also changing requirements which call for new headquarters. For example, Commander Maritime Air Mediterranean was established to accommodate the changing threat in the Mediterranean. It is important to highlight the basic concepts behind the NATO headquarters structure. It is a pre-planned, pre-organized, and pre-established headquarters structure which is designed to accept and immediately employ the massive forces necessary to defend Europe in an all out attack. The NATO structure has the complex problem of melding the combined forces of 14 nations into a single fighting force. Inescapable political considerations require establishment of certain portions of the necessary headquarters structure. The trend in recent years is to streamline and reduce wherever possible. The U.S. manpower contribution to NATO is reviewed each year. Today there are 37 Headquarters in the Allied Command Europe and the U.S. participates in 24. Congressional discussion has centered on 22 headquarters. These headquarters included SACEUR's major and principal subordinate commands and Signal Support Groups. The 22 headquarters count did not reflect the reorganization in Air Force North (reduction of 1 headquarters) and the Naval Forces, Southern Europe, subordinate commands. The number of U.S. personnel in each headquarters varies with responsibilities. Europe is divided into regions (North, Center, South, and Flanks). There are Land, Naval, and Air organizations for each region. The reasons for the current structure are: a. political accommodations to meld the forces of 14 nations into a cohesive organization result in some minor headquarters duplication; b. to provide the necessary command, control coordination and planning structure for full scale fighting forces; c. the existing organization and plans permit the immediate application of defense forces in wartime. UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND (USEUCOM) The requirements for headquarters and their staffing are established by the Commander of the unified command. These requirements are processed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Any sensitive items or major changes are presented to SECDEF for approval. There is an annual review of manpower requirements and a triennial manpower survey conducted by a JCS team in order to validate workload and mission requirements. Each Service sponsors a unified command under the provisions of DOD instruction 5100.3; the U.S. Army is the EUCOM sponsor and furnishes administrative support to HQ, EUCOM and its subordinate headquarters. Each Service is allowed to comment on a yearly review of the Joint Manpower Program, but the JCS is the decision point for initiating reductions in the joint or combined headquarters. Of course, we must bear in mind that the requirement for headquarters in Europe stems basically from the requirement of command and control of our forces which would be deployed to Europe in the event of war. UNITED STATES ARMY-EUROPE (USAREUR) Headquarters, United States Army, Europe and Seventh Army is the command and control element of a field command of Department of the Army and in the United States Army component of the unified United States European Command (USEUCOM) and provides: a. a combat ready force which, within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization alliance, serves to deter aggression in Western Europe or to repel aggression if such should occur. b. administrative and logistical support to United States ground forces in Western Europe. c. command control over assigned forces and other forces as directed by competent authority. UNITED STATES NAVY-EUROPE (USNAVEUR) Commander in Chief, USNAVEUR, provides Navy support of Commander in Chief, US European Command and SACEUR. CINCUSNAVEUR is also commander, Eastern Atlantic (COMEASTLANT). The mission of USCOMEASTLANT is to: conduct combat and operational tasks as assigned to assist in gaining and maintaining control in the U.S. Atlantic Command area; provide logistic and administrative support to U.S. Atlantic Fleet (LANTFLT) Forces in the USEASTLANT subarea and the NATO IBERLANT (Iberia/Atlantic) area. In order to accomplish the above mission, the following tasks have been assigned to USCOMEASTLANT: 1. Exercise operational control of combatant forces as may be assigned. 2. Conduct anti-submarine warfare operations with forces as may be assigned. 3. Exercise operational control of assigned logistic forces and escorts. 4. Provide logistic support, including nuclear weapon logistic support to U.S. LANTFLT forces in the area. 5. Provide administrative support to USLANTFLT forces in the area. 6. Plan for and, when directed, employ forces to close the Baltic exits by mining. 7. Conduct additional offensive mining operations if directed. 8. Be prepared to replenish previously established mine fields. 9. Provide stowage and maintenance of prepositioned mines. 10. Provide protection for underway replenishment group in the area. 11. Conduct NATO meteorological flights. 12. Provide logistic and evacuation support to USCINCEUR, as directed. 13. Maintain custody of U.S. nuclear weapons in the USEASTLANT organization. 14. Control and protect shipping and act as OCA in the USEASTLANT sub area. 15. Act as CINCLANTFLT's alternate Eastern Atlantic representative for amphibious matters. 16. Provide operational intelligence support to USLANTFLT forces. 17. Coordinate, as required, with LANTFLT commands, CINCUSNAVEUR, and European authorities. 18. Represent CINCLANTFLT in base rights and base construction matters in USEUCOM area. UNITED STATES AIR FORCE-EUROPE (USAFE) During the past year HQ USAF, with full participation of the Commander-inChief, United States Air Forces in Europe (CINCUSAFE) and the U.S. Commander-in-Chief, European Command (USCINCEUR), conducted an in depth review encompassed all aspects of the mission responsibilities and functions charged to HQ USAFE, Lindsey Air Station, Germany; HQ Third Air Force at South Ruislip on the outskirts of London, U.K.; HQ 16th Air Force, Torrejon Air Base, Spain: HQ 17th Air Force, Bamstein Air Base, Germany, and those subordinate units providing direct and indirect support, including detachments and operating locations throughout Europe. Primary objectives were to 1) assure that the major command headquarters (HQ USAFE) is composed solely of true headquarters staff functions; 2) streamline the numbered Air Force headquarters to an operational configuration by eliminating or significantly reducing staff management functions (i.e., Personnel, Comptroller, Civil Engineering, etc.), centralizing the latter at major command level where absolutely necessary; 3) realign, consolidate and reduce support functions within subordinate echelons for optimum mission accomplishment and improved management of manpower resources; and 4) sharply reduce aggregate manpower and dollar costs associated with the headquarters management function, and organizationally align those resources to preclude duplicative effort, improve resource management, and assure functional costing and sizing in the future. The review has been most successful. It resulted in a thorough streamlining of the three numbered air forces and a sharp reduction from an aggregate of 616 to a new total of 166 manpower authorizations. The reorganization reduced the numbered air forces to operational configuration and economically centralized at HQ USAFE the staff management of tactical units throughout the command. The manpower authorizations centralized at HQ USAFE have served to enhance staff capabilities in broad management areas, and to enhance the capability to work directly with tactical wings and squadrons. Major command teams such as Inspector General, Security Performance and Aircraft Maintenance and Munitions were expanded on a centralized basis to perform assistance, standardization and evaluation tasks. These comprehensive headquarters streamlining actions produced overall savings of 235 manpower spaces, as shown below: By the summer of 1972, after all reorganization actions have been implemented, the manpower authorizations for the numbered air forces and HQ USAFE proper will represent less than three per cent of the total manpower resources allocated to the United States Air Forces in Europe. In consideration of the enemy threat, the mission, the diversity in weapon systems, the established force levels (In-Theater, Dual Based, Rapid Reactor and follow-on augmentation) and the required command, control and management of tactical units further large headquarters reductions appear unlikely. The review of headquarters functions will continue, however, in the effort to eliminate lower priority requirements, to reorganize and/or consolidate for increased efficiency, and to effect further manpower and dollar reductions wherever possible. By way of example, the planned relocation of Headquarters Third Air Force and several other units in FY 73 from the London area to established USAF bases in Great Britain should produce notable manpower and dollar economies through functional consolidations and reduction of support costs. EUROPEAN HEADQUARTERS STAFFING USEUCOM (and the U.S. elements of the various SHAPE headquarters), USAREUR, USAFE, and CINCUSNAVEUR are responsible for the management of some 300,000 manpower assets and their costly weapons systems (including nuclear weapons) in the European area. This task requires an experience level which is greater than that required in subordinate commands. Therefore, you will find it normal to have more senior officers in these headquarters because the jobs require the varied experience and expertise that can only be acquired through years of service. REDUCTION RECOMMENDATION Senator THURMOND. Thank you. I am calling this to your attention because I think it might be worth looking into. I am interested in helping the Defense Department all I can but we continually have these things thrown up to us and I think it is well for us to have an answer to justify the situation if it can be justified. If it cannot, then I am sure you appreciate having it called to your attention for correction. |