The CHAIRMAN. Then, when there is 90 days or whatever days it is, before the contract is let, you will give us a summary of the whole situation?

Secretary LAIRD. Yes, sir; we will do it according to the agreed-on procedures.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be quite helpful.

Let me make this comment now before we get too far on the record. Back to what Senator McIntyre asked you about Russia being afraid of us. I did not get the idea that he was accusing you of saber rattling or anything like that.

Secretary LAIRD. I am sure the question was not his but the wording of the question was the thing that bothered me a little bit and I do think I overreacted to that.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not trying to judge you. We are reaching the point, I hope, the Russians do have a fear of us. I think there is plenty of cause for it.

Admiral MoORER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The way we are armed and the way we are over there at their doorsteps and the way we are in the Mediterranean and I hope it continues to have a very wholesome effect on them.

ADDITIONAL CARRIER

About this carrier, when it was requested, there was no unconditional request for a carrier. Admiral Moorer was Chief of Naval Operations at that time and as a supporter of the carrier I told him you could not get hard money on a soft request; he would have to make that thing firm and I told

Secretary LAIRD. We have got it hardened up.

The CHAIRMAN. Let us go back and not talk about the Congress having failed to do things. That was the reason and I waited, we waited and waited for you gentlemen to firm that up at the White House. You did not get it firmed up into an unquestionable request and, therefore

Secretary LAIRD. But I did testify, Mr. Chairman, that if you put the money in there I would see that it is was spent.

The CHAIRMAN. I know. Last year I remember telling Mr. Packard. called him up from Mississippi, when I understood the decision was near, that I wanted to make clear that because of my position the year before that I was not opposed to the carrier in the 1972 budget. but now in 1973, with all of this other, I am not making any promises on that.

We have to ask you to come back. Do you want to make it 3 o'clock? Secretary LAIRD. Fine.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, 3 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 1:15 p.m., the committee was recessed, to reconvene at 3 p.m., of the same day.)

MILITARY PROCUREMENT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1973

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 16, 1972

U.S. SENATE,

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,

Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to recess, at 3:05 p.m., in room 212, Old Senate Office Building, Hon. John C. Stennis (chairman).

Present: Senators Stennis (presiding), and Byrd, Jr., of Virginia. Also present: T. Edward Braswell, Jr., chief counsel and staff director; John T. Ticer, chief clerk; R. James Woolsey, general counsel; L. R. Garcia, Don C. Lynch, C. J. Conneely, George Foster, and John A. Goldsmith, professional staff members; Nancy Bearg, research assistant, and Fran Funk, staff aide.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

The CHAIRMAN. All right, gentlemen, if you are ready, let us close the doors, please.

Off the record just a minute.

(Discussion off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. I have some questions here, some of which have been answered in part, some touched on in part, and some fully enough so I will omit.

Admiral Moorer, there has been so much in the paper about the alleged weakness of our Navy, and the alleged strength of the Russian Navy, that people ask me, write me and stop me in the hallways here, sometimes my colleagues, asking if we are on the brink of disaster because of lack of naavl strength. [Deleted.]

I would like a flat statement from you based on your knowledge as a naval officer and reflecting your responsibility as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Under present conditions and for the reasonable. future the next couple of years at least-what is your idea as to whether or not our Navy would be overcome or in serious contest should a conflict come out?

STATEMENT OF HON. MELVIN R. LAIRD, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, ACCOMPANIED BY ADM. THOMAS H. MOORER, USN, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF; COL. ROBERT M. LUCY, USMC, LEGAL ADVISER AND LEGISLATIVE ASSISTANT TO THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF; M. SGT. CHARLES A. GASTON; T.SGT. CURTIS L. MARCUM; SP4 LLOYD A. THIESFELD; YEOMAN SEAMAN ERVIN J. PANEK; AND PERSONNELMAN SEAMAN WILLIAM F. SHUGHART II-Resumed

LIST OF COMBAT SURFACE SHIPS

Admiral MOORER. Yes sir.

First, to follow up on some of the questions you asked yesterday, Mr. Chairman, I do have here now a list of combat surface ships showing

the average of the Soviet ships by type and average of the U.S. Navy ships by type which, with your permission, I will put in the record. In general, it will show the Soviet's ships certainly have been built more recently. In addition to that, you queried me about the escorts, if they were included in the total number.

The CHAIRMAN. The small ones.

MORE MODERN ESCORTS

Admiral MOORER. Yes, sir. What is happening here, so far as the escorts are concerned is that the Soviets are phasing out those older, smaller escorts and replacing them with some more modern escorts now and in the out years. Currently, where ours run about 1,400 to 3,000, theirs run about a thousand to 1,500. So you were correct in saying that they are somewhat smaller than ours.

Before I answer your specific question, I would like to point out that the two navies, so far, have been tailored for really different missions. As I said yesterday, the U.S. Navy has two major functions.

PROJECTION OF SEA POWER

One function is to be able to project sea power across the oceans through the use of aircraft carriers and amphibious forces. In this particular area, there is no question about the fact that we are far superior to the Soviets. The Soviets cannot operate their surface ships with reasonable risk unless they retain them under the umbrella of their land-based air forces or the land-based air forces of their allies. On the other hand, the Soviets have built their Navy not only for surface action, but, in particular, for interdiction of our lines of supply. This is why they have such a very large number of submarines. It is true that they have moved out very vigorously in this field. They have many more prototypes than we have. I listed them yesterday. Of course they have the largest submarine fleet in the world measured by any standard.

ATTRITION AGAINST SHIPS AND CONVOYS

So, to answer your question specifically, I would say that in the present situation, we could expect heavy attrition against our merchant ships and convoys that were engaged in carrying supplies overseas. In that particular area, it boils down to whether or not the attrition can be compensated for by rapid mobilization and by building up our industrial base in this country, as we did in World War II.

In this context, I am talking in terms of a nonnuclear war. To measure the two forces, I would simply say that so far as the control of the air over the sea and the projection of our sea power from the sea to the shore, including the land forces-in this case the Marinesare concerned there is no question about the fact that the U.S. Navy is significantly superior.

In terms of the threat to the lines of communication of the United States in the oceans of the world, I do think it is true that with the number of submarines that the Soviets are now able to deploy, we would have to be more selective concerning the areas in which we

operate. We are no longer the unchallenged masters of the sea. This is a direct result of the Soviet submarine-building program.

As one measure of comparison, I think it is fair to say that we would lose more ships today from submarine attack than we would have lost perhaps a few years ago.

On the other hand, we are building now a new ASW weapon; we are improving our ASW capability. The Congress has now approved the program for the 688 submarines, which will be useful in defending against a worldwide submarine campaign on the part of the Soviets. I think that with the programs we have in the budget, it is clear that our capabilities are going to increase.

So, in a nutshell, what I am really saying is that one cannot make a flat statement that the Soviets have supremacy; in terms of the total Navy you must look at it in terms of the various tasks that they would like to perform in carrying out their national objectives, and it is in the attack submarine area that they present us with a significant problem.

QUESTIONABLE ANSWER

I am afraid I have not given you a yes or no answer, but I do not think there is a flat yes or no answer as to who has the biggest and best Navy. They are moving out with new helicopter ships and new missile cruisers-they have emphasized the surface-to-surface missile, as you know. Consequently, their surface ship threat is greater than it has been in the past and they have used this to advantage primarily in the Mediterranean.

In addition to that, they are making frequent visits to the Caribbean-to Cuba for instance-with their newer ships. We have observed them in the Indian Ocean and in the Pacific. Also, the Secretary of Defense has mentioned another aspect related to their strategic capability; namely, their very rapid build-up of the Yankee class missilefiring submarine.

MODERN FLEET SHIPBUILDING PROGRAM

I discussed with you yesterday their large scale production capacity. This program is moving out with a momentum which I do not think will be arrested in the near future. [Deleted.]

As you know, sir, there was a period in the midsixties when the shipbuilding program for the U.S. Navy was very low, and it is only in the last 2 or 3 years that we have been able to get approved a shipbuilding program which will serve to reduce the average age and to modernize the fleet. If you look at the record, you will see what has happened during the last 10 years. I think that the action that has been taken in the last 2 or 3 years is going to significantly enhance the strength of the Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much for such a complete answer. The Soviets show a growing capacity to produce?

Admiral MOORER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In these fields particularly that you mentioned. And they are far more of a threat than heretofore and there is every evidence that that threat will increase.

Admiral MOORER. That is a correct statement.

The CHAIRMAN. To intercept us. But now with our carriers, if they are what they are supposed to be, and I put great value on them, and the Soviets not having any carriers you certainly would be far superior in controlling the air in any spot you chose to go.

SOVIET RESTRICTIONS OF OPERATION

Admiral MOORER. Yes, sir; that is why I made the statement that the Soviets are restricted to operating from surface ships in those areas which can provide them air support from the shore and certainly a Soviet surface ship without any air defense would be subject to destruction by the carrier aircraft.

The CHAIRMAN. We have that capacity as far as the number operating, and are far superior to anything not only the Soviets have but anyone else in the world?

Admiral MOORER. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Any combined group that would likely be against us?

Admiral MOORER. However, I should point out that the Soviets have considerably increased the areas in which their naval forces can operate with shore-based air cover. This has occurred as a result of their gaining access to ports and airfields in several strategic areas, such as the eastern Mediterranean and the Red Sea. There is another aspect I believe mentioned in the Secretary of Defense statement and that is. the Soviets still have considerable to learn in the area of what I would call staying power and replenishment at sea. They tend to do a large part of their replenishment by anchoring in sheltered areas. We note them in this evolution all the time in the Mediterranean.

I think, for instance, one of the reasons that they have trailed our forces from time to time is in order to observe these techniques and attempt to learn just how we do this kind of thing. Operating a fleet a distance from its bases is a somewhat new experience for the Soviets. They have always looked on their Navy as purely a coastal defense organization. Despite the fact that during World War I they had a tremendous Navy, they never deployed it away from their shores. Now they are learning day-by-day how not only to operate at a distance from home waters, but to operate in coordination. They have conducted exercises [deleted] involving operations by their various commands in the different oceans of the world, which indicates their increasing capability to operate naval forces worldwide.

COMBAT FORCES BUILDUP

Associated with the buildup of their combat forces-I always come back to the fact that they are making a very significant buildup of their merchant marine. This has a definite purpose other than economic in my view, because from the economic point of view they do not need the availability of so much sealift.

They are going to use this sealift to establish a presence worldwide. This will permit them to set up offices in various ports. Then they can compete with the other shipbuilders or ship operators, such as the Norwegians, undercutting them in terms of rates for political purposes, and through this means, simply extend their influence.