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Secretary LAIRD. This is the first year we have been operating under it. If those procedures are not satisfactory to you, we are presently carrying on some discussions with your staff to work out better procedures so that we will satisfy the needs of this committee. We certainly want to do that, Mr. Chairman.

TESTING SCHEDULE PROCEDURE

The CHAIRMAN. All right, that is a good start. My recollection is not full about what was the language agreed on finally. It was compromise language, you see, rather hastily done, but I said at that time that I would rather have agreement from you gentlemen to come over here and tell us the broad outlines, and give us a report on how much testing had been done.

Secretary LAIRD. And I have instructed each of the services to be prepared to do that in their presentations and will be

The CHAIRMAN. And then before the contract is signed I will want you to make a summary report of the whole thing because we read in the paper, you know, where you have entered into a contract with XYŽ company and that is about all we know and we do not know how this is going to work out.

Secretary LRD). Every 60 days we will give you a list of the contemplated prime contracts for the succeeding 90 days that fall within this legislation

The CILARMAX. Until we get that going I want a promise from you that you will come here with a broad outline of what I have asked you to do and give us a report before you make any contracts. If you are not prepared to answer that yes or no now, you take it under consideration.

Secretary Lane). We will.
The CHAIRMAN. We have got to do something.

Secretary Lurn. What are the arrangements that you object to now that have been worked out with the staff?

The CHAIRMAN. I have not mentioned it with the staff. Secretary LAIRD. Discussions have been going on, as I understand it, with the staff to work out an arrangement. I thought that those were going along very well. This is the first knowledge I had there had been a breakdown in those discussions.

The CHAIRMAN. Wait a minute. There is nothing about a breakdown. I have not even mentioned this as to the staff, I said when this language was agreed on that we had to have a better understanding just across the table about what was being included in the contract, particularly how far you had gone, and about prototyping and testing. I do not think you can write it into the law that you must have a prototype on every type of weapon. It varies too much. There are too many differences in it. But if we cannot have agreement here about full disclosure and discussion as to the high maintenance points, why we have got to make other arrangements. We have the F-14, we were given every assurance in the world by the Navy, absolutely everything is all right, we can do that, and do that, and so forth, and we gave it the hurry up, you know, it was not even requested in the budget that year.

Secretary LAIRD. I know, I was a member of the conference committee.

The CHAIRMAN. You were in the Congress then.
Secretary LAIRD. We made a mistake.

The CHAIRMAN. I have gotten into this enough to know that there ought to be more liaison with the committees that represent the branches of the Congress before you commit the Government to a billion dollar contract or $2 billion or $7 billion. I am sure it can be done.

Secretary LAIRD. We are working out a means of reporting to the committees so that you are certainly and completely advised in advance. Those discussions were going on with the Comptroller's Office and we were working out such a procedure. We want to keep you completely

The CHAIRMAN. It is not a complaint. My question is just commonsense.

Secretary LAIRD. I recognize the Congress is a coequal branch of this Government along with the executive, as I have said in my Defense report, and we will do everything we can to see that that is recognized fully.

The CHAIRMAN. We will just stand on the cold letter of the law there. This memo says the required reports are about cost schedules and testing. Well, that is fine. That is a part of it.

Secretary LAIRD. And also in advance of contracting.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; in advance of contracting. I want to know how much testing, how much prototype has there been and if you are skipping it, if you think it has to have a lot of concurrency. But not let us find it out later, you know, after the thing has given trouble. We ought to be in on the takeoff, as Senator Vandenberg used to say, in these big contracts.

Well, anyway now, what is the situation? What do you propose to do beyond the requirements of that law?

Secretary LAIRD. We will work out such a reporting procedure so that as far as the testing, the development, and the costs are concerned, you are given complete information.

74-696 0 - 72 - pt. 2 - 24

The CHAIRMAN. Then, when there is 90 days or whatever days it is, before the contract is let, you will give us a summary of the whole situation?

Secretary LAIRD. Yes, sir; we will do it according to the agreed-on procedures.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be quite helpful.

Let me make this comment now before we get too far on the record. Back to what Senator McIntyre asked you about Russia being afraid of us. I did not get the idea that he was accusing you of saber rattling or anything like that.

Secretary LAIRD. I am sure the question was not his but the wording of the question was the thing that bothered me a little bit and I do think I overreacted to that.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not trying to judge you. We are reaching the point, I hope, the Russians do have a fear of us. I think there is plenty of cause for it.

Admiral MOORER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The way we are armed and the way we are over there at their doorsteps and the way we are in the Mediterranean and I hope it continues to have a very wholesome effect on them.

ADDITIONAL CARRIER

About this carrier, when it was requested, there was no unconditional request for a carrier. Admiral Moorer was Chief of Naval Operations at that time and as a supporter of the carrier I told him you could not get hard money on a soft request; he would have to make that thing firm and I told

Secretary Laird. We have got it hardened up.

The CHAIRMAN. Let us go back and not talk about the Congress having failed to do things. That was the reason and I waited, we waited and waited for you gentlemen to firm that up at the White House. You did not get it firmed up into an unquestionable request and, therefore

Secretary Laird. But I did testify, Mr. Chairman, that if you put the money in there I would see that it is was spent.

The CHAIRMAN. I know. Last year I remember telling Mr. Packard, called him up from Mississippi, when I understood the decision was near, that I wanted to make clear that because of my position the year before that I was not opposed to the carrier in the 1972 budget. but now in 1973, with all of this other, I am not making any promises on that.

We have to ask you to come back. Do you want to make it 3 o'clock?
Secretary LAIRD. Fine.
The CHAIRMAN. All right, 3 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 1:15 p.m., the committee was recessed, to reconvene at 3 p.m., of the same day.)

MILITARY PROCUREMENT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1973

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 16, 1972

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,

Washington, D.C. The committee met, pursuant to recess, at 3:05 p.m., in room 212, Old Senate Office Building, Hon. John C. Stennis (chairman).

Present: Senators Stennis (presiding), and Byrd, Jr., of Virginia.

Also present: T. Edward Braswell, Jr., chief counsel and staff director; John T. Ticer, chief clerk; R. James Woolsey, general counsel; L. R. Garcia, Don C. Lynch, C. J. Conneely, George Foster, and John A. Goldsmith, professional staff members; Nancy Bearg, research assistant, and Fran Funk, staff aide.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

The CHAIRMAN. All right, gentlemen, if you are ready, let us close the doors, please.

Off the record just a minute. (Discussion off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. I have some questions here, some of which have been answered in part, some touched on in part, and some fully enough so I will omit.

Admiral Moorer, there has been so much in the paper about the alleged weakness of our Navy, and the alleged strength of the Russian Navy, that people ask me, write me and stop me in the hallways here, sometimes my colleagues, asking if we are on the brink of disaster because of lack of naavl strength. [Deleted.]

I would like a flat statement from you based on your knowledge as a naval officer and reflecting your responsibility as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Under present conditions and for the reasonable future—the next couple of years at least—what is your idea as to whether or not our Navy would be overcome or in serious contest should a conflict come out?

STATEMENT OF HON. MELVIN R. LAIRD, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, ACCOMPANIED BY ADM. THOMAS H. MOORER, USN, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF; COL. ROBERT M. LUCY, USMC, LEGAL ADVISER AND LEGISLATIVE ASSISTANT TO THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF; M. SGT. CHARLES A. GASTON; T.SGT. CURTIS L. MARCUM; SP4 LLOYD A. THIESFELD; YEOMAN SEAMAN ERVIN J. PANEK; AND PERSONNELMAN SEAMAN WILLIAM F. SHUGHART II—Resumed

LIST OF COMBAT SURFACE SHIPS

Admiral MOORER. Yes sir.

First, to follow up on some of the questions you asked yesterday, Mr. Chairman, I do have here now a list of combat surface ships showing the average of the Soviet ships by type and average of the U.S. Nary ships by type which, with your permission, I will put in the record.

In general, it will show the Soviet's ships certainly have been built more recently. In addition to that, you queried me about the escorts, if they were included in the total number.

The CHAIRMAN. The small ones.

MORE MODERN ESCORTS

Admiral MOORER. Yes, sir. What is happening here, so far as the escorts are concerned is that the Soviets are phasing out those older, smaller escorts and replacing them with some more modern escorts now and in the out years. Currently, where ours run about 1,400 to 3,000, theirs run about a thousand to 1,500. So you were correct in saying that they are somewhat smaller than ours.

Before I answer your specific question, I would like to point out that the two navies, so far, have been tailored for really different missions. As I said yesterday, the U.S. Navy has two major functions.

a

PROJECTION OF SEA POWER

One function is to be able to project sea power across the oceans through the use of aircraft carriers and amphibious forces. In this particular area, there is no question about the fact that we are far superior to the Soviets. The Soviets cannot operate their surface ships with reasonable risk unless they retain them under the umbrella of their land-based air forces or the land-based air forces of their allies.

On the other hand, the Soviets have built their Navy not only for surface action, but, in particular, for interdiction of our lines of supply. This is why they have such a very large number of submarines. It is true that they have moved out very vigorously in this field. They have many more prototypes than we have. I listed them yesterday. Of course they have the largest submarine fleet in the world measured by any standard.

ATTRITION AGAINST SHIPS AND CONVOYS

So, to answer your question specifically, I would say that in the present situation, we could expect heavy attrition against our merchant ships and convoys that were engaged in carrying supplies overseas. In that particular area, it boils down to whether or not the attrition can be compensated for by rapid mobilization and by building up our industrial base in this country, as we did in World War II.

In this context, I am talking in terms of a nonnuclear war. To measure the two forces, I would simply say that so far as the control of the air over the sea and the projection of our sea power from the sea to the shore, including the land forces in this case the Marinesare concerned there is no question about the fact that the l'.S. Navy is significantly superior.

In terms of the threat to the lines of communication of the United States in the oceans of the world, I do think it is true that with the number of submarines that the Soviets are now able to deploy, we would have to be more selective concerning the areas in which we

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