What we tried to do in the budget document is to do the best we can while taking into account the strategic, manpower, fiscal and political realities. Now, to satisfy the requirements you are talking about, and to meet all contingencies would not take [deleted] divisions in the U.S. forces, it would take much more. We only have 13 Army divisions in this particular budget. You cannot satisfy all of those requirements and face up to the realities that we have to face up to in the 1970's. So, I believe that we are providing a sufficient conventional deterrent so that we will prevent that war you are talking about in Europe, and that is what this budget document is all about.

REDUCTION IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES

Senator CANNON. We have reduced our conventional forces in Europe 138,000 since 1962.

Secretary LAIRD. Actually the reduction is closer to 100,000.

Senator CANNON. And we have a pretty strong military organization there today. I just personally do not see that there is any magic in the numbers unless

Secretary LAIRD. I am not trying to get into any magic. The Germans have done a very capable job. They have increased during the same period of time and they have a much greater capability than they had at that time. The Germans are going ahead with a large increase in their defense budget this year, some 10 to 14 percent.

Our NATO allies all over are increasing their defense budget by dollar terms in the neighborhood of about 6 percent. I do not want to get back to constant dollars, but in real dollar purchasing value it is not quite that much-probably in the area of about a 3-percent increase. But I do feel that we can maintain a realistic conventional deterrent force in Europe.

I do feel, however, that we also have a realistic deterrent as far as theater and strategic weapons are concerned at this time. I am concerned about that in the out years, but I do think that we have that realistic deterrent now and that is what we are trying to maintain in this budget.

This document, this budget, is really based upon the goal of peaceto acquire and maintain peace.

Now if you want to get into all of these war-fighting contingencies. it is very difficult to satisfy every war-fighting contingency that we must face up to every place in the world. You just cannot do that and maintain any semblance of reality in your defense planning or your defense budgets.

PREPARED QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR CANNON

Senator CANNON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

(Questions submitted by Senator Cannon. Answers supplied by Department of Defense.)

Question. Mr. Secretary, I understand there were 305,000 military personnel assigned to Europe as of September 1971. The Army had 195,000, the Air Force had 64,100, the Navy had 38,400, plus 8,800 in NATO activities and miscellaneous units.

Do you believe it is imperative to maintan 305,000 personnel in Europe today and for the indefinite future?

Answer. Under existing circumstances, I believe we must maintain our force levels in Europe and make improvements in our forces if we are to continue to have a sufficient NATO conventional deterrent and defense and an effective NATO strategy. However, along with our NATO Allies, who are taking a similar approach, we stand ready to enter into talks on mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) with Warsaw Pact countries at any time.

As you know, we have a military strategy of flexible response in Europe today. The ability to deter and contain aggression at the conventional level is in our national interest. With a reduction of US forces in Europe, the conventional option would be reduced. The so-called nuclear threshold would most certainly be lowered with the concomitant dangers of escalation to a strategic exchange. The danger of narrowing our options by unilateral force reductions bothers many Europeans as well as Americans who have studied this problem.

Question. Who specifically determines that this is the correct level of U.S. forces? Is it determined annually and by whom?

Answer. This determination takes place in a comprehensive review process involving both the NATO Defense Planning Review machinery and our own total force planning, programming and budgeting system which leads to our five-year defense program. It includes an intensive annual review of our own and NATO defense needs, existing military deficiencies and our national policies toward Europe. From an agreed NATO strategy we work closely with NATO preparing comprehensive assessments and conduct continuing consultation with our Allies. The National Security Council, Department of State and major Pentagon agencies are involved, including of course the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Annually, during the December NATO Defense Planning Committee in Ministerial Session, the Secretary of Defense affirms the United States commitment for the ensuing calendar year in terms of major units, ships and airplanes. Other NATO Ministers of Defense make similiar commitments.

As the President in his 1971 Foreign Policy Report to the Congress stated, our basic judgment concerning the U.S. contribution to European defense was developed in a comprehensive study here and within NATO to determine what levels of forces are required in Europe over the long term in order to achieve and maintain realistic deterrence.

Question. In your judgment, what reduction in forces could be made in U.S. forces in Europe without significantly impairing the NATO alliance?

Answer. At this point in time, I do not believe that we can reduce our forces in Europe without significantly impairing the NATO Alliance. This is true in both military and political terms. [Deleted.]

On the political side, US forces in Europe are, in a sense, the glue that holds the defensive alliance together. Not only would substantial force withdrawals renege on the oft-repeated US pledge to maintain and improve our forces in Europe and not reduce them except in the context of mutual reductions with our adversaries, but it would also adversely affect European attitudes and momentum toward maintaining and improving their own forces, and their assuming a greater share of the common defense effort. Furthermore, the NATO approach to Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions would be seriously undermined. We need the pillars of strength and partnership of the Nixon Doctrine as the foundation for our third pillar-a willingness to negotiate.

Question. Is it your judgment that we should maintain this number of troops indefinitely?

Answer. I believe that under present circumstances we should maintain our current force levels in Europe. Future developments in European defense integration; east-west relations and possible MBFR agreements could combine to reduce the size of the U.S. contribution required for effective NATO defense. However, we cannot act now on the presumption that such developments will in fact occur.

Question. Is it not a fact that we have reduced U.S. forces, by 138,000 since

1962?

Answer. At the end of CY 1962, the United States had 416,000 military personnel in the European Command area, including the Sixth Fleet. Authorized US military strength in Western Europe and related areas is currently 319,000. Based on currently authorized troop strength, the reduction is, therefore, slightly less than 100,000.

Question. Is it not a fact that NATO is stronger militarily today than it was in 1962?

Answer. As you recognize, qualitative improvements, strategy and other factors enter into an assessment of whether NATO is stronger today than 10 years ago. Qualitatively, the force is improved from what it was 10 years ago. We have made as many qualitative improvements as possible in our NATO posture within the manpower and fiscal constraints experienced by all of the Allies including ourselves.

Question. How can it be said, therefore, that few if any future reductions in U.S. personnel can be made in Europe in the light of the reductions of nearly 100,000 during the past nine years.

Answer. I believe that we have reached the point where further reductions without similar reductions on the part of the Warsaw Pact would adversely affect the military balance that must be maintained to insure our NATO strategy of deterrence based upon flexible response remains credible.

The United States contribution we now provide is essential to the organized collective force of NATO; and thus to a yiable NATO and in turn to the security of the United States and its NATO Allies. No token presence can serve our purpose in Europe, for our forces there must provide a credible means of defense other than reliance upon the threat of nuclear war. Further reductions will degrade the deterrent that provided the peace that we enjoyed over the past quarter of a decade in Europe. We do, however, keep our forces in Europe under continuing review to insure that marginal functions are eliminated and personnel resources are utilized to attain maximum combat effectiveness.

Question. In addition to military personnel in the European Command, there are 8,852 U.S. civilians and 71,365 local nationals employed. How essential is it to employ nearly 80,000 civilians to support our military personnel? Can reductions be made here in the future?

Answer. In addition to supporting our military personnel, civilians employed by the European Command also provide the bulk of the support for over 200.000 dependents. As an example, the dependent school system in Europe alone employs some 6.000 civilian school teachers. The majority of U.S. civilians employed by EUCOM are in staff or technical supervisory jobs, while the majority of local national employees is engaged in administrative and support-type tasks; ie., clerical, maintenance, transportation, supply, and labor. A reduction in civilian personnel performing these support functions will inevitably lead either to an increase in the number of military personnel to perform them or the requirement for military personnel already in Europe to perform these functions with a resulting degradation of the combat readiness of our military forces.

We have made some progress in reducing the number of civilian employees in Europe. The following data demonstrates our progress over the past four years in Western Europe and related areas.' We will continue to carefully monitor civilian employment in Europe with the objective of maintaining it at the minimum necessary levels.

1 Western Europe and related areas includes the following countries:

Question. How many of the 305,000 U.S. military forces in Europe are essential to wage a conventional war?

Answer. Most of the military forces which the U.S. maintains in Europe are there to conduct a conventional defense of Western Europe if required. [Deleted.] Additionally, there are personnel assigned to peacetime activities such as post exchange or commissary operations and maintenance of facilities. In the event of hostilities, these people are designated to join military related units as individual fillers or replacements.

Question. Is it not possible that we could base additional units in the U.S. with the mission of being assigned to NATO in the event of an emergency under the "dual basing" concept?

Answer. While it is possible to extend the "dual-basing" concept further, we do not feel that it is advisable at this time. As I explained before, we believe that U.S. forces should be reduced only through an agreement with the Warsaw Pact on Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction, negotiated in close cooperation with our allies. Moreover, dual-based forces are more expensive than forward deployed forces for two reasons: first, two complete sets of equipment are required; and second, the dual-based forces need to be maintained in a higher (and costlier) state of readiness to be capable of rapid deployment in a crisis. The effectiveness of the dual-based concept also depends a great deal on having a period of crisis measured in weeks or months. An increased dependence on dual-based forces increases the risk of a crisis rapidly deteriorating into armed conflict.

Question. How many dependents of military and civilian personnel are in Europe?

Answer. 222,000 military and civilian dependents.

Question. Is it a fact that U.S. military forces have never gone to war previously with their dependents being located almost “across the street"?

Answer. I do not believe that history furnishes a direct analogy to our current position in Europe with respect to dependents. Of course, some dependents were on our western frontiers during the Indian Wars, and others were in Korea in 1950. It is also true that one never knows where or when or under what circumstances a nation will go to war. We had many dependents in Hawaii and the Philippines before Pearl Harbor.

My point is that NATO is purely a defensive alliance, and is not itself "going to war." U.S. military forces are in Europe primarily to preserve the peace that is epitomized, among other things, by the very presence of American dependents. I am firmly convinced that our dependents help preserve the morale and discipline of our troops on extended overseas tours. Furthermore, we have current operative plans for their speedy evacuation in the unfortunate event that war breaks out or becomes imminent.

Question. How long do you believe it will be before our NATO allies could independently achieve a realistic conventional capability?

Answer. The force improvements that are being undertaken in connection with the Study on Alliance Defense for the 1970's will provide a much enhanced Allied conventional capability in the next five years. Toward this end, the 1972 defense budgets of our Allies have increased some 3% in real terms over 1971. This force improvement program is based on the principal of Alliance solidarity, as expressed in President Nixon's pledge that given a similar approach by the other Allies, the United States would maintain and improve its own forces in Europe and not reduce them except in the context of a reciprocal East/West action. The security of NATO is indivisible and the special military and political role of American forces present in Europe that I have described earlier is considered an irreplaceable contribution to the common defense. This is not to say that we are completely satisfied with the current sharing of the common defense burden; we are not, and the Allies have recognized their responsibility to shoulder more.

Question. Do you believe the allies would "pick up the slack" if the U.S. reduced its conventional forces?

Answer. I do not believe that the Allies would "pick up the slack" generated by a U.S. unilateral reduction. On the other hand, if you regard the "slack" as

Question. Is it not a fact that NATO is stronger militarily today than it was in 1962?

Answer. As you recognize, qualitative improvements, strategy and other factors enter into an assessment of whether NATO is stronger today than 10 years ago. Qualitatively, the force is improved from what it was 10 years ago. We have made as many qualitative improvements as possible in our NATO posture withit the manpower and fiscal constraints experienced by all of the Allies including ourselves.

Question. How can it be said, therefore, that few if any future reductions U.S. personnel can be made in Europe in the light of the reductions of nearls 100,000 during the past nine years.

Answer. I believe that we have reached the point where further reductions without similar reductions on the part of the Warsaw Pact would adversely affect the military balance that must be maintained to insure our NATO strategy of deterrence based upon flexible response remains credible.

The United States contribution we now provide is essential to the organized collective force of NATO; and thus to a yiable NATO and in turn to the security of the United States and its NATO Allies. No token presence can serve our par pose in Europe, for our forces there must provide a credible means of defense other than reliance upon the threat of nuclear war. Further reductions will de grade the deterrent that provided the peace that we enjoyed over the past quarter of a decade in Europe. We do, however, keep our forces in Europe under cD tinuing review to insure that marginal functions are eliminated and personnel resources are utilized to attain maximum combat effectiveness.

Question. In addition to military personnel in the European Command, there are 8,852 U.S. civilians and 71,365 local nationals employed. How essential is it to employ nearly 80,000 civilians to support our military personnel? C'an reduc tions be made here in the future?

Answer. In addition to supporting our military personnel, civilians employed by the European Command also provide the bulk of the support for over 200.000 dependents. As an example, the dependent school system in Europe alone employs some 6.000 civilian school teachers. The majority of U.S. civilians employed by EUCOM are in staff or technical supervisory jobs, while the majority of local national employees is engaged in administrative and support-type tasks: Le. clerical, maintenance, transportation, supply, and labor. A reduction in civilian personnel performing these support functions will inevitably lead either to st increase in the number of military personnel to perform them or the requirement for military personnel already in Europe to perform these functions with a resulting degradation of the combat readiness of our military forces.

We have made some progress in reducing the number of civilian employees in Europe. The following data demonstrates our progress over the past for years in Western Europe and related areas.1 We will continue to carefully monitor civilian employment in Europe with the objective of maintaining it at the minimum necessary levels.

1 Western Europe and related areas includes the following countries:

Sweden
Switzerland