personnel turbulence caused by large-scale strength reductions and troop redeployments resulting from our reduced Vietnam role.

In fiscal year 1972, as you can see where the line levels out on chart No. 1, fiscal 1972 is one of more stabilization and 1973, we hope, will be a year of increased readiness in our force.

Now, as you can see, at the very top left of chart No. 1, the peak strength of the Marine Corps was achieved in March of 1969 with a strength of

The CHAIRMAN. Pardon me. These charts are not numbered that I can find. You have a figure down here, but you punched holes for your looseleaf books and cut some of these numbers out. You do have chart 2 here on the next page.

General WHEELER. Yes, sir, the charts should be numbered. I would hope they are.

The CHAIRMAN. You are talking about the first one now? General WHEELER. Yes, sir, which has the big curve on it, which is organized to show on the vertical scale thousands of Marines and on the horizontal scale, the fiscal years 1969 through 1973.

Entering that chart at the left top, as I pointed out, we reached our peak strength, 317,000, in fiscal year 1969. The remainder of the chart is organized to show strength changes, as you can see, across the top middle in terms of officer and enlisted and the totals, and the cumulative total as we ran through the years, 1971 and planned to through

1973.

At the bottom of the chart, sir, are the end strengths for fiscal years 1969-71. Those are actual strengths, and the projected strength for

1972 and 1973.

You notice that at the end of fiscal 1971, addressing this period of 1971, we reduced some 97,000 officers and men in a space of about 2 years from the end of fiscal 1969. Interestingly enough, that cumula

tive total of 97,000 is almost equal to one-half of the total strength that we request in fiscal 1973, which is 198,000 as indicated at the bottom right of this chart.

Addressing the period 1972–73, you can see that during fiscal 1972, we plan to reduce another 14,000 for a cumulative total reduction of 111,000. And in fiscal 1973, the last column at the right top, we have a minor reduction, actually the strength is almost level; the numerical reduction is 55 marines.

But I would like to point out to the committee there that we do continue to reduce our officers some 700, as you can see, although we raise the total of enlisted about 600. So, we are continuing the officer reduction in fiscal 1973.

Relatively dramatic or drastic management actions were taken to achieve these manpower reductions by over 97,000 in fiscal year 1970 and 1971. If you will address chart No. 2, gentlemen.

CHART 2

FISCAL YEAR 1970 AND 1971 ACTIONS TO REDUCE STRENGTH

Early release.

Reversion of temporary officers.

Forced retirement and severence of reserve officers.

Easing of administrative bars to retirement.

Sharply reduced accessions.

FISCAL YEAR 1972 AND 1973 ACTIONS TO REDUCE STRENGTH

Early release.

Reduced accessions.

Restricting augmentation into regular force.

SAVINGS

Strength reduction during fiscal year 1972.

Application of pay raises-Increase time in grade between promotions.
Better manpower utilization.

General WHEELER. Chart No. 2 is a summary at the top of the actions that we took in 1970 and 1971 to achieve these reductions. First, large-scale early release; almost 92,000 officers and men were released early during that period of time. We reverted almost all of our temporary officers who were elevated from enlisted ranks to fulfill wartime requirements. They were reverted back to their enlisted ranks.

We reluctantly implemented forced retirement and severence of Reserve officers up to and including the grade of colonel. We eased the administrative bars to retirement for the more senior regular officers, and we effected sharply reduced accessions, promotions, and augmentation into the regular Marine Corps. These actions. Mr. Chairman, continue in 1972 and are planned to continue in 1973, including further early release of a relatively small number of officers reduced accessions well below losses for our officers; and we are going to continue to restrict augmentation of Reserve officers into the regular Marine Corps.

Addressing at the bottom of the chart under savings, I would like to point out

The CHAIRMAN. Which chart is that now?

General WHEELER. Chart 2, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

General WHEELER. Early in this fiscal year 1972, management actions were taken to more nearly aline fiscal 1972 end strength with

1973, thereby permitting an orderly phase down from 1972 into the 1973 level strength and minimizing turbulence. This action reduced the pay raise supplemental request by some $17 million.

Public Law 92-129 provided a much-needed raise in pay for junior servicemen. But consistent with our long-standing intent to reestablish a more deliberate promotion flow and to regain our more pyramidal grade structure of pre-Vitenam years, we plan to lengthen the time between promotions somewhat.

These actions will not denigrate the valuable effect of these raises, but it will space them out a bit. The cost savings attributable to this action was in excess of a million dollars for 1972 and will be about $5 million for fiscal 1973.

Also, we are trying to make savings in other ways, especially those that are realized through better manpower utilization. We initiated a program called Task Analysis almost 2 years ago and it is well underway at the present time. In this program, we examine exactly what the marine is doing, why he does it, how he does it, and what skills he actually needs to carry out his job. We go to the field and talk to the marine on the job to get these answers. The net effect is definitely improving utilization of our personnel.

Furthermore, Mr. Chairman, in addition to the Task Analysis, we have deliberately downgraded colonels' billets within our Marine divisions and Marine air wings and certain of our Marine barracks. This has had a chain reaction effect by also downgrading some lieutenant colonels and majors. Now, we have done this for two reasons: (1) to give more challenge and responsibility to the junior officers as well as to better utilize our personnel.

tive total of 97,000 is almost equal to one-half of the total strength that we request in fiscal 1973, which is 198,000 as indicated at the bottom right of this chart.

Addressing the period 1972-73, you can see that during fiscal 1972, we plan to reduce another 14,000 for a cumulative total reduction of 111,000. And in fiscal 1973, the last column at the right top, we have a minor reduction, actually the strength is almost level; the numerical reduction is 55 marines.

But I would like to point out to the committee there that we do continue to reduce our officers some 700, as you can see, although we raise the total of enlisted about 600. So, we are continuing the officer reduction in fiscal 1973.

Relatively dramatic or drastic management actions were taken to achieve these manpower reductions by over 97,000 in fiscal year 1970 and 1971. If you will address chart No. 2, gentlemen.

CHART 2

FISCAL YEAR 1970 AND 1971 ACTIONS TO REDUCE STRENGTH

Early release.

Reversion of temporary officers.

Forced retirement and severence of reserve officers.

Easing of administrative bars to retirement.

Sharply reduced accessions.

FISCAL YEAR 1972 AND 1973 ACTIONS TO REDUCE STRENGTH

Early release.

Reduced accessions.

Restricting augmentation into regular force.

SAVINGS

Strength reduction during fiscal year 1972.

Application of pay raises-Increase time in grade between promotions.
Better manpower utilization.

General WHEELER. Chart No. 2 is a summary at the top of the actions that we took in 1970 and 1971 to achieve these reductions. First, large-scale early release; almost 92,000 officers and men were released early during that period of time. We reverted almost all of our temporary officers who were elevated from enlisted ranks to fulfill wartime requirements. They were reverted back to their enlisted ranks.

We reluctantly implemented forced retirement and severence of Reserve officers up to and including the grade of colonel. We eased the administrative bars to retirement for the more senior regular officers, and we effected sharply reduced accessions, promotions, and augmentation into the regular Marine Corps. These actions. Mr. Chairman, continue in 1972 and are planned to continue in 1973, including further early release of a relatively small number of officers reduced accessions well below losses for our officers; and we are going to continue to restrict augmentation of Reserve officers into the regular Marine Corps.

Addressing at the bottom of the chart under savings, I would like to point out

The CHAIRMAN. Which chart is that now?

General WHEELER. Chart 2, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

General WHEELER. Early in this fiscal year 1972, management actions were taken to more nearly aline fiscal 1972 end strength with

1973, thereby permitting an orderly phase down from 1972 into the 1973 level strength and minimizing turbulence. This action reduced the pay raise supplemental request by some $17 million.

Public Law 92-129 provided a much-needed raise in pay for junior servicemen. But consistent with our long-standing intent to reestablish a more deliberate promotion flow and to regain our more pyramidal grade structure of pre-Vitenam years, we plan to lengthen the time between promotions somewhat.

These actions will not denigrate the valuable effect of these raises, but it will space them out a bit. The cost savings attributable to this action was in excess of a million dollars for 1972 and will be about $5 million for fiscal 1973.

Also, we are trying to make savings in other ways, especially those that are realized through better manpower utilization. We initiated a program called Task Analysis almost 2 years ago and it is well underway at the present time. In this program, we examine exactly what the marine is doing, why he does it, how he does it, and what skills he actually needs to carry out his job. We go to the field and talk to the marine on the job to get these answers. The net effect is definitely improving utilization of our personnel.

Furthermore, Mr. Chairman, in addition to the Task Analysis, we have deliberately downgraded colonels' billets within our Marine divisions and Marine air wings and certain of our Marine barracks. This has had a chain reaction effect by also downgrading some lieutenant colonels and majors. Now, we have done this for two reasons: (1) to give more challenge and responsibility to the junior officers as well as to better utilize our personnel.