RECRUIT TRAINING

The rate at which recruits must be trained is a function of projected trained strength requirements versus projected trained strength inventories. If the inventory of trained men is not forecast to be as large as the need, new men must be trained. The inventory of trained men in a given year is determined by the inventory in the previous year minus the losses to that inventory.

The number of personnel required to support a given trainee load in each phase of recruit training is established through military staffing guides which result from work measurement studies and historical experience. In general terms, however, the number of instructors and overhead staff in recruit training is related to the trainee load which is the number of recruit trainees in training per week.

In recruit training in FY73 the number of active military men at end year is programed to increase by 2.2 thousand men, or 1.5%, over the FY72 level. The basic reason for this is the 6.5 thousand increase in Navy recruit training and the 2.2 thousand increase in Air Force recruit training.

In the Navy the increased trainee load and consequent increased requirement for instructors and staff is the result of a higher demand for new accessions. These are required to replace expected losses from an unusually large group of four year enlistees that entered the Navy in FY69.

Similarly, in the Air Force, the increased trainee load is due to increased accessions necessary to replace losses from an unusually large group of men procured in FY 69. For example, 117,874 enlisted men were procured in FY 69. This compares to an average procurement of about 90,000 per year.

SPECIALIZED TRAINING

Specialized training provides individuals with new or higher degrees of skills to match specific job requirements. Each year a certain percentage of those who graduate from recruit training receive immediate additional specialized training. Therefore, the number of men in the specialized training establishment in a given year is, in general, a function both of the number of new accessions in that year and the number of men already in the Service who require additional training. As in recruit training, the number of instructors and staff is related generally to the average student load; however, the actual programing of instructors and staff is done at a much more detailed level.

The increase in manpower in specialized training from FY72 to FY73 totals only about 1,300 men. The increase in student loads for the Air Force and the Navy are accountable to the same reasons applicable to recruit training.

The increases discussed take into account the reductions between FY72 and FY73 in total average enlisted strength programed for Navy and Air Force reductions which total 5,500 manyears for Navy and 20,400 manyears for Air Force.

TRAINING REQUIREMENTS

The CHAIRMAN. You are going to train more men in fiscal 1973 than you did in 1972?

Mr. KELLEY. Basic training; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What about fiscal 1971?

Mr. KELLEY. My recollection is that in fiscal 1971, new accessions were higher than 1972 and about the same as projected for 1973. The CHAIRMAN. I would think it would be a little less. The draw down was at a faster rate in 1972.

Mr. KELLEY. The gains from civilian life for fiscal 1971 were 649,000, 508,000 in 1972, and projected 570,000 in fiscal 1973. So 1973 is higher than 1972 but lower than 1971.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you going to take in more men now to require this training during fiscal 1973 than fiscal 1972?

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir. Because of the very rapid drawdown of forces in 1972, for one reason.

The CHAIRMAN. What planning assumptions are in each of those services for the number of men at the end of 1973? What was the number when you made these training requirements calculations? Mr. KELLEY. For the end strength?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. KELLEY. Two million three-are you speaking of the end strength in Vietnam?

The CHAIRMAN. Men in Vietnam. Talking about the drawdown in Vietnam.

Mr. KELLEY. I would have to check the record for that, Mr. Chairman; I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. We checked out the number that you were calculating on, and I do not think it has been gone into in previous years, certainly not enough. We gave you money based on your estimates, and the estimates turned out to be a lot more money than was needed. This year we want to know more about what you definitely are going to need and come near hitting it, so that the President has all of this emergency power and everything else.

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Concerning Vietnam, the rest of the drawdown after May is not going to make very much difference anyway if you get it down to what is that figure?

Mr. KELLEY. Sixty, I think.

The CHAIRMAN. 60,000.

Mr. KELLEY. 69,000.

The CHAIRMAN. That is by May of this year.
Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir; by May of this year.

The CHAIRMAN. The fiscal year will not start until July 1, of

course.

Anyway, we would like to know what your planning assumptions were for each service.

Mr. KELLEY. All right, sir.

(The information follows:)

Our answer is in the context of the chairman's earlier question regarding increases in recruit and specialized training in fiscal year 1973 "at a time when we are reducing our manpower in Vietnam."

An explanation of the reasons for increases in recruit and specialized training in fiscal year 1973 is given on page 128. The increases in these training categories, as the explanation indicates are required to replace unusually large enlisted losses of men who entered Navy and Air Force Service in fiscal year 1969 and takes into account the projected decline in average total enlisted strength for these Services between fiscal year 1972 and fiscal year 1973 of 5,500 and 20,400 manyears respectively.

PAY INCREASE

The CHAIRMAN. I have heard rumors about another pay increase this year. As you know, there has been no recommendation made yet but do you personally favor an additional increase now? We need some counsel and advice on the matter.

Mr. KELLEY. Mr. Chairman, in my judgment, military pay has reached competitive levels with civilian pay. That is all I care to say about it.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it has, too. I know it has reached what I consider enormous levels in certain categories. In conferences on the bill, I felt that more money should go to the benefit of the sergeants rather than to put so much on raw recruits.

Mr. KELLEY. We recognize that arguments can be made that inasmuch as military jobs are not to be compared with civilian jobs, a different level of pay is justifiable on behalf of the military, but I remain with my position that military pay is competitive with civilian

pay.

The CHAIRMAN. I think we have to stop a while and let you evaluate all of this and see what you can do on the volunteer army concept. Mr. KELLEY. Of course, as I noted this morning, we have not had an opportunity to measure the impact of the recent pay raises on military retention or accessions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Thurmond?
Senator THURMOND. Thank you.

DELINEATION OF RESPONSIBILITIES

Mr. Secretary, I would like to clear up, if I can, the responsibilities of your office compared with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I am not completely sure this is clear for the record and I have some questions here. If there are any questions that you feel the Joint Chiefs should answer you can state so. I would like to have them answered for the record.

Mr. KELLEY. All right, sir.

Senator THURMOND. I asked a number of manpower questions this morning that you indicated you prefer to reply by way of inserts for the record.

I understand in talking with the staff that it may be helpful to clear up your responsibilities, which I understand might not be identical with your job title.

Is it correct, Mr. Secretary, that prior to preparation for these hearings, that even though your title here is Assistant Secretary of Defense, Manpower and Reserve Affairs, that in fact, you did not have responsibilities for "manpower" in the Department of Defense? Mr. KELLEY. That I did not or do not?

Senator THURMOND. That you do not have or did not.

Mr. KELLEY. Well, no, sir; I do not believe that is a correct statement.

Senator THURMOND. Do you have responsibility for manpower? Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir; I do. But let me attempt to explain what my responsibility is.

I included in my statement a section on what my responsibility is. It is to provide a personnel policy structure which serves the best interests of our national security and whose policies are fair to people. It is not possible, in my opinion, to separate personnel policy on the one hand from manpower and force size considerations on the other. My responsibilities are certainly more heavily weighted on the side of personnel policy than they are on the side of force manning considerations, but I have a responsibility which encompasses manpower and which is even broader in terms of Reserve affairs.

Senator THURMOND. You would set out the policies for individuals in the services? In other words, so-called personnel policies, I guess? Who would determine how many divisions an Army is to have, how many of those divisions will be located in NATO in Europe or other places, and be able to justify or validate that number?

Mr. KELLEY. That would be the determination made on the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and approved by the Secretary of Defense.

Senator THURMOND. So, you would not make that determination? Mr. KELLEY. No, sir.

Senator THURMOND. Is that made by the Secretary of Defense then in his collaboration with the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or do you make the recommendation to the Secretary of Defense after you confer with the Joint Chiefs of Staff? Does that go through you at all?

Mr. KELLEY. On force size and composition?

Senator THURMOND. Yes; number of divisions in NATO and anywhere else. Do you make any recommendations on that after conferring with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or does the Secretary reach a decision from direct conference with them?

Mr. KELLEY. The principal staff assistance provided the Secretary on a subject like that is provided by Systems Analysis and not by Manpower and Reserve Affairs.

However, to the extent that the configuration of forces impacts on individual members of the Armed Forces in a way that does not make them productive and does not make them effective as members of a unit, then I become involved.

Senator THURMOND. I was coming to that. In other words, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis then is a civilian in the Defense Department who, after conferring with the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, would give the Secretary of Defense a recommendation concerning the number of units the Army should have and where they should be stationed?

Mr. KELLEY. I think it might be more accurate to say, Senator, that he would coordinate with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on any recommendation made to the Secretary about the number of divisions constituting the Army or the relationship between the Army structure and the structure of the other services.

Senator THURMOND. So, do you have anything to do with making recommnedations as to where divisions or units are located?

Mr. KELLEY. No, sir.

Senator THURMOND. That is entirely up to the Asistant Secretary for Systems Analysis?

Mr. KELLEY. It is not entirely up to him.

Senator THURMOND. And the Joint Chiefs?

Mr. KELLEY. It is a primary responsibility of the Joint Chiefs but is coordinated within OSD with the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Systems Analysis.

Senator THURMOND. Then, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis would not make the recommendation himself after he confers with the members of the Joint Chiefs, but he would join them in making a recommendation or may differ with them? Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir.

Senator THURMOND. They both then make a recommendation to the Secretary of Defense?

Mr. KELLEY. That is correct, or one may make a recommendation and coordinate it with the other.

Senator THURMOND. This is a function for which the Secretary of Defense does not have a direct recommendation from any one civilian under him?

Mr. KELLEY. He would in the case of a disagreement between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Assistant Secretary for Systems Analysis. If those two concurred in a recommendation then there would be, of course, only a single recommendation given to the Secretary. If they disagreed, then their disagreements would be in the form of separate recommendations to the Secretary.

Senator THURMOND. Since the military is always considered subordinate to civilians, I was not sure whether there was a civilian who would make a recommendation to his chief, the Secretary of Defense, directly after conference and conferring with the military. From what I understand, if the Joint Chiefs and the Assistant Secretary for Systems Analysis agree, then they join in a recommendation; if they disagree they both submit their own recommendations.

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir; and I think that is the standard procedure that we follow in the management system of the Pentagon today, not only with regard to relationships between the Joint Chiefs and, in this case, Systems Analysis, but in the relationship between any of the senior military officers who have a direct reporting relationship to the Secretary and those of us assistant secretaries who also do. Senator THURMOND. Who would make recommendations to the Secretary of Defense on the size and number of units, is it the same Joint Chiefs and Assistant Secretary for System Analysis? Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir; it is.

Senator THURMOND. What role does the National Security Council staff play in this process, if any?

Mr. KELLEY. The National Security Council-and I may need help in answering this question-the National Security Council fulfills mainly the role of evaluating the threat and making judgments as to how we respond to the threat in terms of total force capability. Once that judgment is made, the further determination of how to break down total force capability into units and people becomes a responsibility which largely resides within the Pentagon. In other words, the Service Chiefs, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Assistant Secretary for Systems Analysis recommend to the Secretary of Defense the force structure decision to be taken.

Sentor THURMOND. So, as I understand, then, if I get it clear for the record, the size and number of units in all of the services would be determined by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir; to insure committee understanding of this subject I would like to extend my remarks for the record. (The information follows:)

The National Security Council advises the President on broad policy questions, such as the allocation of resources between Defense and non-Defense programs. The NSC provides the President's policy guidance to the Department of Defense. Decisions on how to translate the President's broad policy guidance into substan