CHAPTER XXIX.

INTRODUCTORY.

§ 775. Of the sovereign right of eminent domain Delegation thereof to

§ 778.

An effort to purchase a condition precedent to condemnation.

§ 785.

§ 7.6.

§ 787.

The rights acquired are present and permanent.
Of the quantity of land which may be condemned.
The same subject, continued-Statutory regulations

788. Of the company's power to use the lands condemned.

759. Whether the company's possession is exclusive.

790.

The location of its route is in the discretion of the company. § 791. Change of location.

§ 702. Abandonment and non-user of right of way.

₫ 775. Of the sovereign right of eminent domain-Delegation thereof to individuals and corporations.-The right of the State to take private property for public use, or to authorize its taking, without the consent of the owner, upon just compensation being made therefor, exists in her sovereign right of eminent domain.1 This power is not derived from the federal constitution, but is inherent in the State, and a natural and necessary incident of sovereignty. The constitu

tion is merely a limitation upon the right, and except for such limitation, compensation would be discretionary with the legislature. The State may exercise the power of eminent domain directly and in her own name, or may place works of public utility in the charge of private corporations or persons, and authorize them to i stitute and carry to their consummation proceedings seeking the condemnation of property for the use of such works.3 A corporation to which the power of eminent domain has been delegated, is considered to be an agent of the State.1 This delegation of authority may be either by special grant, or by general laws authorizing the taking of private property for the public use. And the legislature may confer upon a railway company a general rigat to condemn lands necessary for the construction of its road, or it may specifically designate what lands shall be condemned, and what estate therein shall be taken." But special gr1nts, with respect to the acquisition of a right of way, are subject to control by subsequently enacted general statutes."

5

1 Lance's Appeal, 5 Pa. St. 16; 93 Am. Dec. 722; Varick v. Smith, 5 Paige, 137; 28 Am. Dec. 417; Harris v. Thompson, 9 Barb. 350; Cooper v. WI iams, 7 Me. 273; Spring v. Russell, 3 Watts (Pa.), 291; Henry v Underwood, 1 Dana, 2.7; O'Hara v. Lexington etc. R. R. Co. 1 Dana, 232: Perry v. Wilson, 7 Mass. 395; De Varaigne v. Fox, 2 Biatchf. 95; Pham v. Decatur County, 9 Ga 341; Donaher v. State, 10 Miss. 649; Brown v. Beatty, 34 Miss. 227; 6) Ain. Dec. 339; Coster v. Tidewater Co. 15 N. J. 51; Bailey v. Miltenberger, 31 Pa. St. 37; Harding v. Gondlet, 3 Yerg. (Tenn.) 41; 24 Am. Dec. 5.6; Stark v. McGowen, 1 Nott & M C. (S. C.) 387; Lindsav v. Commissioners, 2 ay (S. C.), 33; Ford v. Chicago etc. R. R. Co. 14 Wis. 609; 80 Am. Dec. 7:1.

2 Central Branch etc. R. R. Co. v. Atchison etc. R. R. Cɔ. 28 Kan. 453; Wood's Railway Law, 633. "This co stitutional provision is not of American origin. It existed in the Roman empire, and in the Engli h constitution, and in most, if not all, the modern European States. In the Co e Napoleon, book ii, title ii, 545, it is thus expressed: No one can be copelled to give up his property, except for the pub.ic good, and for a just and previous indemnity.' This subject isiscussel much at length by the civil-law writers referred to in Chancellor Kent's elaborate note

upon the subject, 2 Kent's Commentaries, (7th ed.) 393": Hatch v. Vermont Central R. R. Co. 25 Vt. 43.

3 Bloodpod v. Mohawk etc. R. R. Co. 13 Wend. 9; 31 Am. Dec. 313 (annotated); Clarke v. City of Rochester, 24 Barb. 481; In re Kerr, 42 Barb. 121; Bloomfiell etc. Co. v. Richardson. C3 Barb. 47; In re Townsend. 3) N. Y. 174; San Francisco et. R. R. C. v. Crandall, 31 Cal. 372. A de facto corporation may exercise the right of eminent domain delegated to it by the State as well as though legally incorporated, for its legal existence cannot be questioned save by the State, in direct proceedings instituted for that purpose: Reisner v. Strong, 24 Kan. 410; 10 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 335.

4 Alexandria etc. R. R. Co. v. Alexandria etc. R. R. Co. 75 Va. 780; 40 Am. Rep. 743.

5 Central Branch Union Pacific R'y Co. v. Atchison etc. R. R. Co. 26 Kan. 669; Wisconsin Central R. R Co. v. Cornell University, 52 Wis. 557. A company created un ler a special charter may condem lands under a general law: Central Branch Union Pacific R'y Co. v. Atchison etc. R. R. Co. 26 Kan. 6 9.

6 In re Gilbert Elevated R. R. Co. 70 N. Y. 361; In re New York Elevated R. R. Co. 7) N. Y. 327; In re New York Central R. R. Co. 66 N. Y. 407; Rexford v. Knight, 11 N. Y. 308; Heywood v. New York, 7 N. Y. 314; Stockton etc R. R. Co. v. Browa, 9 H. L. Cas. 246; Iron R. R. Co. v. Ironton, 19 Ohio St. 299; Chicag etc. R. R. Co. v. Lake, 71 I! 3.3; Cleveland etc. R. R. Co. v. Speer, 53 Pa. St. 325; 91 Am. Dec. 81; Parke's Appeal, 64 Pa. St. 137, Commonwealth v. Franklin Canal Co. 21 Pa. St. 117; New York etc. R. R. Co. v. Young, 33 Pa. St. 175.

7 Wisconsin Central R. R. Co. v. Cornell University, 52 Wis. 537.

776. Of the discretion of the legislature.The power of eminent domain is to be exercised by the legislative branch of the government.' It is the sole judge of the age: cies it will employ in carrying its will into effect. And when the legislature has delegated the right of eminent domain to a company for a pu lic use, the courts cannot review the expediency of its action.3 But while the legislature is the sole judge of the expediency of a grant of the power of eminent domain, where the use is certainly a public one, yet a legislative grant is not conclusive that the objects sanctioned by it do constitute a "public use.' And whether any particular use is public in its nature, is always subject to consideration by the courts."

1 Central Branch Union Pacific R'y Co. v. Atchison etc. R. R. Co. 28 Kan 453.

2 Water Works Co. v. Burkhardt, 41 Ind. 364; Holt v. Somerville, 127

Mass. 408; Brayton v. Fall River, 124 Mass. 95; Haverhill Bridge v. County Comm'rs, 1.3 Mass. 120; 4 Am. Rep. 513; Eastern R. R. Co. v. Boston etc. R. R. Co. 111 Mass. 125; 15 Am. Rev. 13; In re Mt. Washington Road, 35 N. H. 134; Johnson v. Joliet etc. R. R. Co. 23 Ill. 202; Bankheal v. Brown, 25 Iowa, 510; People v. Smith, 21 N. Y. 595; Brooklyn Park Comm'rs v. Armstrong, 45 N. Y. 244; 6 Am. Rep. 70; Bloomfield etc. Co. v. Richardson, 63 Barb. 437.

3 Baltimore etc. R. R. Co. v. Pittsburg etc. R. R. Co. 17 W. Va. 812. 4 Varaigne v. Fox, 2 Blatchf. 95; People v. Smith, 21 N. Y. 595; Lehmicke v. St. Paul etc. R. R. Co 19 Minn. 464; Weir v. St. Paul etc. R. R. Co. 18 Minn. 155; Wilkin v. St. Paul etc. R. R. Co. 16 Minn. 271; Kramer v. Cleveland etc. R. R. Co. 5 Olio St. 143; Charleston etc. R. R. Co. v. Blake, 6 Rich. (S. C.) 634; Raleigh etc. R. R. Co. v. Davis, 2 Dev. & B. (N. C.) 451; Malone v. Toledo, 34 Ohio St. 451; Hingham etc. Co. v. Norfolk Co. 6 Allen, 353; Philadelphia etc. R. R. Co. v. Williams, 54 Pa. St. 103; Toledo etc. R. R. Co. v. Daniels, 16 Ohio St. 390.

5 In re Deansvi le Cemetery Association, 66 N. Y. 572; 23 Am. Rep. 86; Bloodgood v. Mohawk etc. R. R. Co. 18 Wend. 9; 31 Am. Dec. 313, and note. Vide infra, §781.

6 Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U. S. 40; Buffalo etc. R. R. Co. v. Brainard, 9 N. Y. 100; People v. Smith, 21 N. Y. 5.5; Brooklyn Park Comnirs v. Armstrong, 45 N. Y. 234; 6 Am. Rep. 70; In re Deansville Cemetery Association, 65 N. Y. 59; 23 Am. Rep. 6; Whitman v. Wilmington etc. R. R. Co. 2 Hur. (Del.) 514; Central R. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co. 31 N. J. Eq. 475; S. C. 32 N. J. E 755; Coster v. Tide Water Co. 18 N. J. Eq. 54; Ford v. Chicago etc. R. R. Co. 14 Wis. 609; 80 Am. Dec. 791; New Central Coal Co. v. George's Creek Coal e.c. Co. 37 Md. 537; Tyler v. Beacher, 44 Vt. 648; 8 Am. Rep. 398.

§ 777. Of foreign corporations. To enable a foreign corporation to take lands for the construction of its railway, a special legislative grant is requisite. It cannot condemn lands under a general railroad act of the State.1 And a power to take land which has been granted by the legislature to a domestic corporation, will not pass to a foreign corporation which succeeds to its rights and powers, without the assent of the legislature." This assent, however, need not be expressly given. It may be gathered by implication from a series of legislative • acts.3

1 Holbert v. St. Louis etc. R. R. Co. 45 Iowa, 23.

2 Abbott v. New York etc. R. R. Co. 145 Mass. 450.

3 Abbott v. New York etc. R. R. Co. 145 Mass. 450.

§ 778. An effort to purchase, a condition precedent to condemnation.—It is frequently pro