7 The Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1854, 17 & 18 Vict. ch. 31; The Regulation of Railways Act, 1868, 31 & 32 Vict. ch. 119; The Regulation of Railways Act, 1873, 33 & 37 Vict. ch. 48. See Little Rock & M. R. R. Co. v. East Tenn. Va. & Ga. R. R. Co. 3 Inter. Com. C. 1. 8 McDonald v. Hovey, 110 U. S. 619; Cathcart v. Robinson, 5 Pet. 24; Pennock v. Dialogue, 2 Pet. 1; McCool v. Emith, 1 Black, 459; The Ab botsford, 98 U. S. 440. But English decisions rendered subsequently to the adoption of the statute in this country, have not the same weight: Cathcart v. Robinson, 5 Pet. 264. 9 Caledonian R'y Co. v. N. B. R'y Co. 3 Nev. & Mac. R'y Cas. 403; Belfast etc. R'y Co. v. G. N. R'y Co. 3 Nev. & Mac. R'y Cas. 413; Huddersfieid v. R'y Co. 4 R'y & Can. Traf. Cas. 44; Central Wales etc. R'y Co. v. Gt.West. R'y Co. 4 R'y & Can. Traf. Cas. 110; Belfast etc. R'y Co. v. G. N. R'y Co. R'y & Can. Traf Cas. 159. 10 24 U. S. Stat. at Large, 379. The act amending it was approved and went into effect March 2, 1839: 25 U. S. Stat. at Large, 855. § 1021. Its constitutionality.-The constitutionality of the act, as a whole, has not, as yet, been directly passed upon by the courts. It may, however, be inferred, from their reasoning in discussing the extent of the power of Congress under the commerce clause, and from their judg ments as to the validity of other acts affecting interstate commerce,' that Congress had ample power to pass the act, and that its provisions are proper to effect its object. The decisions holding that similar State statutes are unconstitutional, because the power to prescribe rules on the subject is vested solely in Congress, may be regarded as direct authorities for the constitutionality of the act.2 As to the effect of the act upon contracts existing at the time it went into effect, there may be some discussion; but it is hardly to be doubted that the courts will, in this case, adopt the rule prescribed in similar cases, and hold that, if otherwise valid, such contracts will not be adversely affected.3 The question involves the right of Congress to pass laws impairing the obligation of contracts, a right which is expressly denied to the tates by the constitution. The framers of that astrument seem to have regarded such a power as nconsistent with natural right and justice, and o have believed that an express denial of the power to Congress was unnecessary. In so far as the Supreme Court has discussed the question, the result appears to be, that, while a law of Congress, the direct effect of which would be to impair the obligation of contracts, is unconstitutional and void, yet a law will not be held to be unconsti tutional merely because it may indirectly and necessarily have that effect, especially if its purpose and object be the general good of the whole people.5 The act was not intended to invade or impair private contracts between common carriers, which were valid when made and not in conflict with its provisions. Nor was it designed to advance the interest of carriers, but for the benefit and advantage of the commerce they may transport." The law should be liberally construed in favor of commerce between the States.8 1 See cases cited in the preceding section. 2 Wabash etc. R'y Co. v. Illinois, 118 U. S. 557; Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 196; Pickard v. Pullman etc. Car Co. 117 U. S. 31; Railroad Comm'rs v. Railroad Co. 22 S. C. 220; Mobile & Ohio R. R. Co. v. Sessions, 28 Fed. Rep. 592; Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. Stone, 20 Fed. Rep. 468; Louisville & N. R. R. Co. v. Railroad Comm'rs of Tennessee, 19 Fed. Rep. 679; Pacific Coast Steamship Co. v. Railroad Comm'rs of California, 9 Sawy. 253; S. C. 18 Fed. Rep. 10; Kaeiser v. Illinois Central R. R. Co. 18 Fed. Rep. 151. 3 Railroad Co. v. Richmond, 19 Wall. 584; Chicago & Alton R. R. Co. v. Chicago etc. Coal Co. 79 Ill. 127. 4 Federalist, Nos. VII and XLIV. 5 Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 338; Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 303; Hepburn v. Griswold, 8 Wall. 604; Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457; Railroad Co. v. Richmond, 19 Wall. 584; Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U. S. 737. And see a valuable article by Mr. C. H. Phelps, 1 R'y & Corp. Law J. 362. 6 Kentucky & I. Bridge Co. v. Louisville & N. R. R. Co. 37 Fed. Rep. 567. 7 Kentucky & I. Bridge Co. v. Louisville & N. R. R. Co. 37 Fed. Rep. 567. 8 Kentucky & I. Bridge Co. v. Louisville & N. R. R. Co. 37 Fed. Rep. 567. § 1025. § 1026. Elements to be considered in determining reasonableness of rates. § 1032. Proceedings to test reasonableness of rates. "Devices"-Rebates-Like kind of traffic. § 1033. Differences in rates on different parts of railway. § 1036. § 1037. The same subject, continued-Quantity of freight shipped. § 1038. Regulation of passenger traffic. § 1039. The same subject, continued-Free passes-Equal accommoda tions. § 1040. Obligation of railway company to supply suitable and sufficient cars. § 1022. Carriers subject to the act. "SEC. 1. "PAR. 1. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of "Representatives of the United States of America in "Congress assembled, That the provisions of this act "shall apply to any common carrier or carriers en"gaged in the transportation of passengers or property "wholly by railroad, or partly by railroad and part"ly by water, when both are used, under a common "control, management, or arrangement, for a con 86 66 'tinuous carriage or shipment, from one State or territory of the United States, or the District of "Columbia, to any other State or territory of the "United States, or the District of Columbia, or from any place in the United States to an adjacent foreign country, or from any place in the United "States through a foreign country to any other place "in the United States, and also to the transportation "in like manner of property shipped from any place "in the United States to a foreign country and "carried from such place to a port of transhipment, or shipped from a foreign country to any place in "the United States and carried to such place from a "port of entry either in the United States or an adjacent foreign country; provided, however, that "the provisions of this act shall not apply to the transportation of passengers or property, or to the "receiving, delivering, storage, or handling of property, wholly within one State, and not shipped to or from a foreign country from or to any State or "territory as aforesaid." 66 66 66 66 66 The first section of the act not only expressly includes railroads as carriers to be subjected to its provisions, but confines the operation of the act to such carriers of interstate commerce as are engaged in transporting passengers or property by means of railroads, either wholly or partly. Nearly all the railroads in the country are or may be used to a greater or less extent as links in through transportation. Other carriers subject to the act are transportation companies, despatch companies, fast freight lines, and express companies. Such companies are common carriers, though they do not own the cars used in their business. Where a rail way company, by contract, acquires the right to use a bridge, the railway company is regarded as the owner or operator of the bridge, as to its freight transported over the bridge, and as to that traffic, it, and not the bridge company, is the common carrier within the meaning of the act.5 A short railroad, wholly within a State, used and operated only by companies owning connecting interstate roads for interstate business, is one of the "instrumentalities of shipment or carriage" included in the term “transportation," and the carriers using it are subject to the provisions of the act. In respect to such traffic, the duties of such carriers to the public are the same, without respect to ownership, corporate control, the authority or means of its construction. The fact that the owner of merchandise which is offered to a carrier for transportation from one point to another in the same State, intends to have it further transported by a second carrier into another State, does not make such first transportation interstate commerce, even though the first carrier may be informed of the ultimate destination of the merchandise." Where traffic originating in a State was destined to an adjoining State, from which it was separated by a river, but was delivered by the railroad to the consignee at a point on the river opposite its destination, the rates of the railroad being made to such point and not to the place of destination, it was held that such traffic was not interstate, in so far as the railroad conducted it. The provisions of the act to regulate commerce apply to foreign as well as domestic common carriers engaged in the transportation of |