as well as public. Upon being appointed by him they had begged to be excused, and it was only upon his insisting and appealing to them, in the name of their country, that they had consented to act.

The negotiation began August 27, 1847, and ended on the 6th of September, with the announcement to the American plenipotentiary of the rejection of the terms proposed by him and the submission of a counter project from Santa Anna. This caused the immediate cessation of the armistice and the resumption of hostilities on the day following. It afterwards became public that the conferences between the plenipotentiaries had borne for their fruit a recommendation from those on the Mexican side to Santa Anna and his cabinet that a treaty should be conducted upon the terms proposed by the Government of the United States.

The resumption of hostilities on the 7th of September was speedily followed by the capture of the City of Mexico and the dissolution of the Mexican Government. In his dispatch of September 27, 1847, Mr. Trist, speaking of the capture of the Mexican capital, says: "From which event dates the total dissolution of the Mexican Government. There has not been since that moment any recognized authority in existence with whom I could communicate." For the time being, therefore, negotiation was simply impossible. The only thing that Mr. Trist could do was to further, by such means as might be in his power, the formation of a government with which to treat.

It so happened that means toward this end were in his power, and they were diligently used by him. They consisted in the sentiments of personal regard and confidence in him with which the Mexican commissioners in the recent abortive negotiation had become inspired, and with an expression of which their final official report had closed in the following words:

"It now only remains for us to say that in all our relations with Mr. Trist we found ample motives to appreciate his noble character; and if at any time the work of peace is consummated, it will be done by negotiators adorned with the same estimable gifts which, in our judgment, distinguish this minister."1

These men became the nucleus of a peace party, which engaged forthwith in exertions that were unweariedly plied. After a most arduous struggle they accom. plished the object of reconstituting the Government, and at the same time establishing the peace party in entire possession of it in all its branches.

So soon as the executive branch had become solidly constituted its first action consisted in the selection of four commissioners to meet Mr. Trist for the conclusion of a treaty upon the basis that had been proposed by him in the first negotiations. At the head of this new list was no longer seen the name of Herrera, but that of his bosom friend, Couto, associated with that of one more of the former four, and two new names, Don Manuel Rincon and Don Luis Gonzaga Cuevas, both men of the highest personal standing throughout the Republic and conspicuous among the leaders of the peace party. In being made acquainted with this selection, Mr. Trist was informed why all four of the commissioners could no longer be the same whom he had formerly met. General Herrera was lying dangerously ill, and General Mora y Villarnil's services were needed in the new cabinet as minister of war.

Thus did the case stand with reference to the certain and early accomplishment of the object for which he had been sent to Mexico, when, on the 16th of November, 1847, Mr. Trist received his letter of recall, under date October 6, the triplicate of which letter was the first to reach him as an inclosure in another dispatch from the Secretary of State, dated the 25th of October, reiterating the recall. The original was delivered to him on the day following by the person specially sent with it from Washington.

In that letter of recall the ground of the President's determination to discontinue the mission is stated in the following words:

66

'They (the Mexican Government) must attribute our liberality to fear, or they must take courage from our supposed political division Some such cause is necessary to account for their strange infatuation. In this state of affairs, the President, believing that your continued presence with the army can be productive of no good, but may do much harm by encouraging the delusive hopes and false impressions of the Mexicans, has directed me to recall you from your mission and instruct you to return to the United States by the first safe opportunity."

The state of affairs" really existing in Mexico, with reference to the object for which the mission intrusted to Mr. Trist had been instituted, was, then, the direct reverse of that supposed by the President and by him assigned as his reason for withdrawing that mission, and for the further determination on his part expressed

1As translated at Washington, by order of the Senate, Thirtieth Congress, first session. (Senate Executive, No. 52, p. 345.)

in the letter of recall "not to make another offer to treat," * * * "they must now sue for peace.' "what terms the President may be willing to grant them will depend upon the future events of the war, and the amount of the precious blood of our fellow-citizens, and the treasure which shall, in the meantime, have been expended."

Thus situated, Mr. Trist did, nevertheless, forthwith enter upon a course of strict conformity with his recall. In his dispatch, acknowledging the simultaneous receipt of the recall, and its reiteration under dates October 6 and 25, he says:

My first thought was immediately to address a note to the Mexican Government, advising them of the inutility of pursuing their intention to appoint commissioners to meet me. On reflection, however, the depressing influence which this would exercise upon the peace party, and the exhilaration which it would produce among the opposition being but too manifest, I determined to postpone making this communication officially, and meanwhile privately to advise the leading men of the party here and at Queretaro of the instructions which I had

received.

Their spirits had, for the last few days, been very much raised by the course of events at Queretaro; and one of them (the second of the two heads mentioned in a late dispatch) had called on me the very day after your two dispatches came to hand, for the purpose of communicating the good news' and making known the brightening prospects.' Upon my saying that it was all too late, and telling what instructions I had received, his countenance fell, and flat despair succeeded to the cheeriness with which he had accosted me. The same dejection has been evinced by every one of them that I have conversed with, while joy has been the effect upon those of the opposite party who have come to inquire into the truth of the newspaper statement from the Washington Union. By both parties the peace men were considered floored; this was the coup de grâce for them.

"Mr. Thornton was to set out (as he did) next morning for Queretaro, and I availed myself of this privately to apprise the members of the Government of the state of things with reference to which their exertions in favor of peace must now be directed, and to exhort them not to give up. as those here had at first seemed strongly inclined to do, and as it was believed that those at Queretaro would at once do. Fortunately, however, when the news reached there they had just taken in a strong dose of confidence-the result of the meeting of the governors-which served to brace them against its stunning effect. * The peace men did not cease for several days to implore me to remain in the country; at least until Mr. Parrott shall have arrived with the dispatches, of which report makes him the bearer. To these entreaties, however, I have turned a deaf ear, stating the absolute impossibility that those dispatches should bring anything to change my position in the slightest degree.

* *

"I recommended to the peace men to send immediately, through General Scott, whatever propositions they may have to make; or to dispatch one or more commissioners with me. After full conversations on the subject, however, I became thoroughly satisfied of the impracticability of either plau; it would, to a certainty, have the effect of breaking them down. The only possible way in which a treaty can be made is to have the work done on the spot-negotiation and ratification to take place at one dash. The complexion of the new Congress, which is to meet at Queretaro on the 8th of January, is highly favorable. This will be the last chance for a treaty. I would recommend, therefore, the immediate appointment of a commission on our part."

In a letter to his wife, accompanying that dispatch, he sent a message to Mr. Buchanan, (the Secretary of State,) beseeching him, as he valued our Union, to lose not an instant in seizing the last chance for peace; and suggesting that, to gain time, authority to conclude a treaty should be forthwith dispatched to General Scott, or to Gen. W. O. Butler, of Kentucky, or to both conjointly, the lastnamed officer being a member of the Democratic party, who had been sent to take command of our Army as General Scott's successor.'

The position in which Mr. Trist was placed, by his recall, toward the peace party could not but be a most painful one, At his instigation it was, as our country's representative, and on the strength of the assurances given by him of the sincerity and earnestness of her and her government's desire for peace, that this party had built itself up; and, after a most arduous struggle, had accomplished what was universally regarded as an impossibility. In this struggle its leaders, and every prominent man whom they had succeeded in enlisting in the same cause, had staked everything which can be staked in a political contest by the

This not in my official dispatches, but I have the letter.

This nowhere stated in my dispatches; but any historian would infer all this from what is there stated.

citizens of a republic, torn, as Mexico has proverbially been, by convulsions of the most violent kind. From the assurances which he had given them, they regarded it as impossible that the President of the United States, upon receiving the dispatches acquainting him with the true "state of affairs" in Mexico and of the progress which had been made toward the consummation of the object which the bearer of those assurances had been sent there to give, could fail to revoke the recall which placed them in a position so perilous; hence the confident belief on their part that the revocation of that recall must be on its way, and hence their entreaties to Mr. Trist to delay his departure.

To the strength of the appeal so made to him, to its strength on the mere ground of simple good faith between man and man toward the patriotic men whom he had been instrumental in entrapping into that cruel position, he could not be otherwise than fully sensible. To find himself under the necessity of turning a deaf ear to it must have been most trying to his feelings.

But he was ordered "to return by the first safe opportunity;" and the possibility of his being shaken in his determination to obey this order by any such expectation as that of his recall being revoked was precluded by the whole tenor and spirit of the letter recalling him, and most especially its closing paragraph, which said:

*

*

"Should you, upon its arrival, be actually engaged in negotiations with Mexican commissioners, these must be immediately suspended. * You are not to delay your departure, however, awaiting the communication of any terms from these commissioners for the purpose of bringing them to the United States." So that, had his recall found him pen in hand to affix his signature to a perfected treaty of peace, this treaty word for word identical with the project given him for his guidance, our commissioner would, upon reading those instructions, have become bereft of all authority to write his name to that treaty. Had the "state of affairs," at the moment when those instructions reached the City of Mexico, proved to be such as to render this expenditure of one single drop of ink the sole remaining requisite for preventing all further effusion of what, in those same instructions, is called the precious blood of our fellow-citizens;" even if this had proved to be the "state of affairs" which that dispatch found to exist there, yet, so very guardedly and effectually had it provided against the expenditure of this one drop of ink, "the precious blood" must have continued to flow. It must have continued to be "expended;" to be expended to such amounts,' whatever this amount might turn out to be, as might be determined by the protraction of the war for an indefinite period. For this is the term which, less than five months after that recall left the city of Washington, was in the President's message to the Senate, February 29, 1848, assigned by him to the probable duration of the war, in case the Senate should fail to comply with his express "recommendation" to adopt and ratify as a national act the work done by the ex-commissioner in direct contravention of the above-quoted, most carefully devised, and most skilfully framed orders for securing against even the signing of a treaty, should this prove to be the sole remaining requisite for the consummation of the object for which the mission had been instituted.

That first safe opportunity," by which Mr. Trist was thus ordered to return, did not occur until the 10th day of December. When the order reached him, (November 16, 1847,) it was expected that an army train for Vera Cruz would leave the City of Mexico about the end of that month. Owing, however, to the unexpected detention at that port of a train which had been sent there for supplies, the departure of the one with which Mr. Trist had prepared to leave was postponed, first, to the 4th of December, and then to the 10th. On this day the train started. Mr. Trist, however, did not go with it. Had it been delayed no later than the 4th, in such case his return journey would have begun on the morning of that day. Then must "the precious blood of our fellow citizens" have continued to be "expended," and our country have been made to believe this expenditure, so religiously abhorrent to our Executive and so piously deprecated by him, attributable solely to that strange infatuation" on the part of the Mexicans, which was so deplored by the President and the Secretary of State, and which they found themselves utterly at a loss to account for, except on the supposition that Mexico fancied our country to be afraid of her.

The postponement of the departure of that train to a day later than the 4th was big with consequences of vast moment. That day-the 4th of December in the year of our Lord 1847-proved to be the appointed time in the course of human events for an incident which, though in itself of the most casual, and trivial, and commonplace kind, had for its effect to reverse the gloomy aspect which things had worn at the rising of the sun, and had continued to wear till near his setting, boding the indefinite protraction of the war.

From this incident arose a determination on the part of Mr. Trist, which, in

itself, in the circumstances under which it was taken, and in the results attending it, constitutes an event that stands alone in history, and is not likely ever to have a parallel.

This determination, with the motives which impelled to it, are found stated in a confidential letter immediately written by him, and a copy of which was transmitted as promptly as possible to the Secretary of State at Washington, was among the papers subsequently communicated to the Senate, and by their order printed. The dispatch transmitting it to the Secretary of State begins as follows: "HEADQUARTERS OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY,

"Hon. JAMES BUCHANAN,

"Secretary of State, Washington:

66 Mexico, December 6, 1847.

"SIR: Referring to my previous dispatches in regard to the political state of this country, and to the inclosed copy of a confidential letter, under date the 4th instant, to a friend at Queretaro, to whose able and indefatigable cooperation in the discharge of the trust committed to me, I have, from the very outset, been greatly indebted, I will here enter at greater length into the considerations by which I have been brought to a resolve so fraught with responsibility to myself; whilst, on the other hand, the circumstances under which it is taken are such as to leave the Government at perfect liberty to disavow my proceeding, should it be deemed disadvantageous to our country."

The friend at Queretaro, "to whose able and indefatigable cooperation" Mr. Trist so acknowledged his deep obligations, was Mr. Edward Thornton, at that time, owing to the retirement of the British minister from ill-health, left in charge of the British legation in Mexico. The same gentleman is now the representative of his sovereign to our Government.

The resolve so formed by the ex-commissioner of the United States was to this effect: Should the Mexican Government be willing, he would take upon himself to engage with its plenipotentiaries in the work which had been so unexpectedly prevented by his recall. All such action on his part would, of course, be devoid of validity and of all binding force upon our Government. Nevertheless, should the negotiation result in their agreeing upon the terms of a treaty, such treaty would secure to the cause of peace the chance of its adoption by the Government of the United States, upon its being presented with the option so to put an end to the war.

The attempt so ventured upon was crowned with success. His proposal was accepted by the Mexican Government. The plenipotentiaries, who, just before his recall arrived, had been selected to meet him, were commissioned. They at once went to work, and the work was plied so diligently that in about six weeks' time from their first regular conference their task was brought to its desired end by the signing at Guadalupe Hidalgo on the 2d of February, 1848, of the document, in the form of a treaty, which was immediately sent to the Secretary of State at Washington.

Every possible provision having been made for its speedy conveyance, it reached its destination in sixteen or seventeen days after signature-the quickest time ever made by man between the capitals of the two Republics-the bearer being James L. Freaner, a native of the State of Maryland, and the only man who had been in any way instrumental in determining Mr. Trist to make the attempt of which that document was the result.

On the 23d of February, 1848, some days after its arrival at Washington, the document received from Mr. Trist was communicated by the President to the Senate, with a message bearing date the day previous (February 22), beginning thus:

"I lay before the Senate, for their consideration and advice as to its ratification, a treaty of peace, friendship, limits, and settlement, signed at the city of Guadalupe Hidalgo on the 2d day of February, 1848, by N. P. Trist, on the part of the United States, and by plenipotentiaries appointed for that purpose on the part of the Mexican Government.'

By the Executive action so taken upon the document the invalidity of that in which it originated was cured, and it became transmuted into a genuine treaty so far as the President's sole authority was competent to impart this character to it.

A week later, on the 29th of the same month, in another message to the Senate the President took occasion to explain that his first message was intended to be understood as positively recommending the treaty for adoption; the words upon this point in the second message being:

"I considered it to be my solemn duty to the country, uninfluenced by the exceptionable conduct of Mr. Trist. to submit the treaty to the Senate with a recommendation that it be ratified with the modifications suggested."

NICHOLAS P. TRIST.

Incorporated with this express recommendation are the President's reasons for considering it his solemn duty to make it; among which assigned reasons is his belief that if the present treaty be rejected, the war will probably be continued, at a great expense of life and treasure, for an indefinite period."

After thorough discussion by the Senate, extending from February 23 to March 10, in which it underwent various modifications, its ratification was advised and consented to by a vote of 38 yeas to 14 nays.

This action of the Senate was immediately followed by the formal ratification of the treaty on the part of the United States; whereupon a joint commission was forthwith dispatched to Mexico for the purpose of there procuring its ratification as amended by the Senate.

The rank of this commission and the strictly limited purpose for which it was sent are both explained with great particularity in two letters of the Secretary of State of the United States, under date of March 18, 1848, one of which letters, a very long and elaborate production, manifesting the great importance attached to the object in view, was immediately dispatched to Mexico as a forerunner of the commission. From it the following extracts are made:

[The Secretary of State of the United States to the minister of foreign relations of the Mexican Republic.]

*

"SIR: Two years have nearly passed away since our Republics have been engaged in war. Causes which it would now be vain, if not hurtful, to recapitulate have produced this calamity. Under the blessing of a kind Providence this war, I * I most cordially congratulate you on the trust, is about to terminate. cheering prospect. This will become a reality as soon as the Mexican Government shall approve the treaty of peace between the two nations concluded at Guadalupe Hidalgo on the 2d of February last, with the amendments thereto which have been adopted by the Senate of the United States.

* *營

"I have now the honor to transmit you a printed copy of the treaty, with a copy in manuscript of the amendments and final proceedings of the Senate upon it. This is done to hasten, with as little delay as practicable, the blessed consummation of peace, by placing in the possession of the Mexican Government at as early a period as possible all the information which they may require to guide their deliberations.

* * *

Recurring to the amendments adopted by the Senate it affords me sincere pleasure to know that none of the leading features of the treaty have been changed.

* * *

"The President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, has appointed the Hon. Ambrose H. Sevier, of the State of Arkansas, and the Hon. Nathan Clifford, of the State of Maine, commissioners to Mexico, with the rank of envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary. Mr. Sevier has for many years been a distinguished Senator of the United States, and for a considerable period has occupied the highly responsible station of chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations. Mr. Clifford is an eminent citizen of the State of Maine, is AttorneyGeneral of the United States, and a member of the President's Cabinet. They will bear with them to Mexico a copy of the treaty, with the amendments of the Senate, duly ratified by the President of the United States, and have been invested, either jointly or severally, with full powers to exchange ratifications with the proper Mexican authorities.

That this final act may be speedily accomplished, and that the result may be a sincere and lasting peace and friendship between the two Republics, is the ardent desire of the President and people of the United States."

The other letter from the Secretary of State was addressed to the joint commissioners, Messrs. Sevier and Clifford. In it the object of their mission was thus strictly defined:

You are not sent to Mexico for the purpose of negotiating any new treaty, or of changing in any manner the ratified treaty which you will bear with you. None of the amendinents adopted by the Senate can be rejected or modified, except by the authority of that body. Your whole duty, then, will consist in using every honorable effort to obtain from the Mexican Government a ratification of the treaty in the form in which it has been ratified by the Senate; and this with the Your mission is confined to procuring a ratifileast practicable delay. cation from the Mexican Government of the treaty as it came from the Senate." Nevertheless, to provide for a contingency which might occur, the instructions continue thus:

*

"Should you find it impossible, after exhausting every honorable effort for this purpose, to obtain a ratification from the President and Congress of Mexico of the treaty as it has been amended by the Senate, it may then become necessary for