petition of Miguel Capella, a citizen or subject of Spain, making claim for compensation from the United States for losses sustained during the war of the rebellion, in Alabama, begs leave to report the same back to the Senate and asks to be relieved from further consideration thereof, and recommends that the said petition and accompanying papers be taken from the files of the Senate and returned to the petitioner.

The reason for the action of the committee herein is to be found in the second clause of the fourth subdivision of Rule No. 7 of the Rules of the Senate, which is as follows:

But no petition or memorial or other paper signed by citizens or subjects of a foreign power shall be received, unless the same be transmitted to the Senate by the President.

This petition not having been transmitted to the Senate by the President of the United States, the petitioner being, as the petition states, a subject of Spain, the committee is of opinion that it has not jurisdiction of the matter.

May 14, 1884.

[Senate Report No. 548.]

Mr. Miller, of California, from the Committee on Foreign Relations, submitted the following report:

The Committee on Foreign Relations, to whom was referred the petition of Philip Schatzle, of Germany, have had the same under consideration and beg leave to report that there is nothing in the petition which, if truly stated, places the United States under any obligation to appropriate money for the support of the petitioner.

The committee therefore ask to be discharged from the further consideration of the subject.

[See p. 513.]

July 5, 1884.

[Senate Report No. 893.]

Mr. Morgan, from the Committee on Foreign Relations, submitted the following report:

The Committee on Foreign Relations, to whom was referred Senate resolution Mis. Doc. No. 70, have considered the same, and report that the resolution should not pass, and ask that the committee be discharged from its further consideration.

In the ninth article of the treaty of 1819 with Spain the United States engaged "to cause satisfaction to be made for injuries, if any, which by process of law shall be established to have been suffered by the Spanish officers and individual Spanish inhabitants by the late operations of the American army in Florida."

This was not an engagement to satisfy admitted claims, but such claims, if any, as could be established by process of law. When established, the claims were to be satisfied to the persons injured by the late operations of the American army in Florida, and not to Spain. The United States did not consent to be sued by the claimants in

its own courts, as constituted for the ordinary administration of justice, and according to their usual procedure, nor did they engage to create judicial tribunals to hear and determine these claims, with jurisdiction and process adequate to conduct a litigation between the United States and the claimants. The extent of the engagement was that the claimants should have the right of access to a tribunal constituted by law, having the power to hear and determine the fact that the claimants were entitled to satisfaction for injuries sustained, etc., before which they could establish their claims and the right to process of law, if any was needed, in aid of such proceeding.

The nature of the tribunal to be organized by law was left undefined by the treaty, and was a matter that was therefore left to the discretion of the United States.

The tribunal organized to hear and determine these claims by the act of 1823, to carry into effect the ninth article, is a full execution of the treaty by the United States. Process of law is supplied by that act through which the claims have been heard and determined.

In the case of Ferreiava v. The United States the Supreme Court of the United States examined this whole subject. In their opinion the court say: "The treaty certainly created no tribunal by which these damages were to be adjusted, and gives no authority to any court of justice to inquire into or adjust the amount which the United States were to pay to the respective parties who had suffered damage from the causes mentioned in the treaty. It rested with Congress to provide one according to treaty stipulations."

This was done by the act of March 3, 1823, directing the judges of certain courts to "receive and adjust all claims" of the description mentioned in the ninth article of the treaty, and giving the Secretary of the Treasury the power to revise and settle the claims reported to him by the judges, "on being satisfied that the same were just and equitable, within the provisions of said treaty."

In the case of Ferreiava this law was construed and settled by the Supreme Court as being in accordance with the treaty, and as creating a lawful commission with full power to settle the claims provided for in the ninth article. Congress has therefore done its full duty in providing by law for the execution of the treaty.

In commenting upon the effect of the language of the treaty respecting the words " process of law," the Supreme Court say: "It is said, however, on the part of the claimant, that the treaty requires that the injured parties should have an opportunity of establishing their claims by a process of law; that process of law means a judicial proceeding in a court of justice; and that the right of supervision given to the Secretary over the decision of the district judge is therefore a violation of the treaty. The court think differently, and that the Government of this country is not liable to the reproach of having broken its faith with Spain. The tribunals established are substantially the same with those usually created when one nation agrees by treaty to pay debts or damages which may be found to be due to the citizens of another country. This treaty meant nothing more than the tribunal and mode of proceeding ordinarily established on such occasions, and well known and well understood when treaty obligations of this description are undertaken. But if it were admitted to be otherwise, it is a question between Spain and that department of the Government which is charged with our foreign relations, and with which the judicial branch has no concern. Certainly the tribunal which acts under the law of Congress, and derives all its authority from it, can not

call in question the validity of its provisions, nor claim absolute and final power for its decisions, when the law by virtue of which the decisions are made declares that they shall not be final, but subordinate to that of the Secretary of the Treasury, and subject to his reversal."

The complaints that have been made against the action of the Government relate to the justice of the decisions made by the Secretary of the Treasury in declining to allow interest to be computed on certain of the claims as a part of the measure of damages for the injuries suffered by the claimants.

Congress, if it has the power to make an appropriation to meet the demands thus set up, can not reverse the decision of the Secretary of the Treasury upon these claims.

The committee are not prepared to recommend the opening of these claims, finding no ground for impeaching the justice and equity of the decision of the Secretary of the Treasury in his decision made according to the power confided to him by Congress.

If Spain has any right to intervene in this matter, it can only be upon the ground that the language of the treaty should be re-formed so as to carry into effect the real understanding among the treaty powers.

No such demand has been made by Spain, so far as the committee are advised. The Supreme Court of the United States has conclusively settled the question that the act of March 3, 1823, is a proper execution of the ninth article of the treaty, as it is construed by that high tribunal.

The Committee on Foreign Relations decline to recommend to the Senate that it request or advise the President to institute the negotiations with Spain that are indicated in the resolution referred to them.

[See pp. 518, 528.]

FORTY-NINTH CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION.

February 10, 1886.

[Senate Report No. 98.]

Mr. Frye, from the Committee on Foreign Relations, submitted the following report:

Your committee, to whom was referred Senate bill 1219, for the relief of the heirs of Martin Kenofsky, find that Martin Kenofsky, a Prussian subject, was a resident of Grenada, in the State of Mississippi, in 1864; that he was a man of Union sentiments; that he converted his possessions into gold, amounting to $4,992.50; then started for Memphis, at that time occupied by the Union forces; was seized within the lines, his gold taken from him, and he cast into prison, from which he was discharged without trial, and without any restoration of his property. The gold was converted into currency, realizing $8,861. By authority of military officers in command, this money was used for military purposes, contrary to law and the regulations of the Treasury Department. It should have been covered into the Treasury.

The claimant was industrious in pursuing his remedy, commencing at once, in 1865, by application to the Secretary of War, and continuing without cessation until his death in 1880. Then his widow peti

tioned Congress for relief, but died, pending its hearing, in 1881, leaving seven children in destitute circumstances. The authorities of the Widows and Orphans' Home of New Orleans and friends of the family then petitioned Congress for relief. No laches can be charged against the claimants.

The United States have had the benefit of this money; it was not. justly exposed to confiscation; it should have been in the Treasury to-day, subject to the disposal of Congress, and in the opinion of your committee justice requires that, notwithstanding it was never covered into the Treasury, having been committed to the use of the Army contrary to law, this money should be paid to the legal heirs of Martin Kenofsky, and they accordingly report back the bill referred, with an amendment striking out the words "eight thousand eight hundred and sixty-one dollars," in the sixth and seventh lines, and inserting instead thereof the words "four thousand nine hundred and ninety-two dollars and fifty cents," with the recommendation that as amended it ought to pass.

[See pp. 528, 532.]

May 6, 1886.

[Senate Report No. 942.]

Mr. Frye, from the Committee on Foreign Relations, submitted the following report:

The Committee on Foreign Relations, to whom was referred the bill (S. 2088), for the relief of the owners, officers, and crew of the British bark Chance, respectfully report:

The facts in this case appear to be as follows:

The Chance was a whaling bark hailing from Sydney, New South Wales. Her owners in March, 1871, had fitted her out at Sydney, at an expense of £3,200 (or $16,000), for a voyage in the Arctic Ocean. Besides her captain and chief officer, she carried four mates and a crew of twenty-eight men.

Sailing in the spring of 1871, with a complete outfit to take whales, she arrived on the whaling grounds early in September. The season is short, extending from about the 1st of September to the middle of October; and it appears that the season of 1871 was unusually promising. Whales were plenty, and there was every prospect of the Chance obtaining a full cargo of oil and bone.

The American whaling fleet of some thirty vessels had been caught by the ice about 60 miles north of where the Chance then was, and four of the vessels wrecked. Twelve hundred men were imprisoned, with no hope of escape, except by the aid of such ships as were in the neighborhood to the south.

The captain of the Chance received a letter from the masters of these American vessels addressed to "any shipmaster south of Icy Cape." This letter in eloquent terms set forth the calamity that had overtaken the American fleet, and the danger that threatened their officers and crews. It appealed for instant aid, and closed as follows:

We realize your peculiar situation as to duty, and the bright prospects you have for a good catch in oil and bone before the season expires; and now call on you, in the voice of humanity, to abandon your whaling, sacrifice your personal interest, as well as that of your owners, and put yourselves in condition to receive on board ourselves and crews for transit to some civilized port, feeling assured that our Government, so jealous of its philanthropy, will make ample compensation for all your losses.

The master of the Chance gave up his voyage and got ready to take all of these unfortunate men on board that they had room for. They were brought to the Chance, and she sailed on the 15th of September, crowded with men, for Honolulu, at which port she arrived safely October 29. By this timely act the Chance rescued from almost certain death ninety-six American seamen.

It happened that Mr. J. C. Pfluger, of the firm of Hackfeld & Co., of Honolulu, held a general power of attorney from the owners of the Chance. Upon her arrival under these extraordinary circumstances Mr. Pfluger took the responsibility of drawing up an account, charging the United States at the rate of $35 a man for the passage of the officers and crews thus brought to port. The United States consul at Honolulu approved the account and certified to the facts. This account Mr. Pfluger transmitted to Frederic Probst & Co., at New York, who sent it to Secretary Fish by letter of December 9, 1871.

The claim for $3,360 aggregate thus instituted was forwarded without the knowledge or sanction of the owners themselves.

On February 13, 1872, the owners applied at Sydney, through our consul, Mr. Hall, for compensation for breaking up the voyage.

In May, 1872, however, the owners ratified Mr. Pfluger's action by executing a new power of attorney to Hackfeld & Co. The claim for $3,360 passage money was allowed by the First Comptroller July 27, 1872, and the money paid to Probst & Co.

The Treasury Department evidently made this payment under authority conferred by the first section of the act of February 28, 1811, for the relief of destitute seamen. (2 Stat., 651.)

The section reads as follows:

In all cases where distressed mariners and seamen of the United States have been transported from foreign ports where there was no consul, vice-consul, commercial agent, or vice-commercial agent of the United States, to ports of the United States, and in all cases where they shall hereafter be so transported, there shall be allowed to the masters or owner of each vessel in which they shall or may have been transported such reasonable compensation, in addition to the allowance fixed by law, as shall be deemed equitable by the Comptroller of the Treasury.

The claim was for transportation and maintenance of mariners. It had no reference to the breaking up of the voyage. The money went to the owners to pay for the use of the vessel and for provisions. It did not represent proceeds of the voyage to be divided amongst officers and crew, as well as the owners, proportionately in the same manner as "lay. The payment of $35 a man appears to have been reasonable compensation as passage money.

When the bark abandoned her whaling voyage, she had taken on board, as an affidavit by one of the owners declares, 20 tons of black oil and 1 ton of bone, the fair value of which was $6,500. A fair catch for that season was worth from $20,000 to $30,000.

In presenting our claims at Geneva for losses sustained by the destruction of the whaling fleet in the Arctic by the Shenandoah, our Government said of the "catch:"

The business when undisturbed by violence is sure of a return. As certain as the harvest to the farmer is the catch of oil to the whaleman. The average catch of whales is well known and understood by the merchant and seaman. Upon this knowledge of probable average catch the sailor readily procures an advance before sailing, and his family obtain necessaries and a support during his absence. (III Gen. Arb., 254.)

The Court of Commissioners of Alabama Claims, in the cases of four whalers impressed by the Shenandoah to take to Honolulu the officers and crews of vessels she had burned in the Arctic, decided that there