papers, have had the same under consideration and ask leave to submit the following report:

This case arises under the report of the mixed commission authorized by the convention of January 12, 1863, between the United States and the Republic of Peru, for the settlement of the pending claims of the citizens of either country against the other. An act of Congress was passed on the 3d of March, 1863, to provide for the appointment of commissioners according to the terms of this convention, and E. George Squier and James S. Mackie were appointed on the part of the United States; Santiago Tavara and Felipe Barriga on the part of Peru. The commission thereafter proceeded to consider the cases brought before them, sitting at Lima, in Peru, and on the 27th of November, 1863, they made their report.

There were various cases before the commission. Of these, 19 were claims of citizens of the United States on Peru and 4 were claims of Peruvian citizens on the United States. By the report of the commissioners it appears that award was made in favor of citizens of the United States in 8 cases for sums amounting in all to $67,197.23, while there were only 2 awards in favor of the Peruvian claimants on the United States. The citizens of the United States have all been paid by the Peruvian Government in coin. Of the 2 Peruvian claims, 1 was that of Carmen Teojel, whose losses were paid by our Government "en moneda de plata de los Estados Unidos o su equivalente," in silver money or its equivalent, amounting, with interest, to $1,170. The other Peruvian was Stephen G. Montano, whose case is still unsettled and whose petition for relief brings the matter before Congress in its present shape.

There is no question as to the main facts of the case, which are substantially as follows, viz: That on and prior to the 3d day of January, 1851, Montano was the owner of the bark Eliza; that on that day his vessel was lost in the bay of San Francisco through the carelessness of a licensed California pilot; that he instituted suit against the Pilot Association of California, to which this pilot belonged, and which was by law responsible for the neglect of its members, in the United States court for the northern district of California, and that some time in 1851 judgment was rendered in his favor for $24,151.29, and that the marshal who was directed to execute the decree made a return of "no property found," although the laws of California required the pilot association to execute good and sufficient bonds for the performance of its duty. The mixed commission were unable to agree on this case, and it was referred to the umpire, Gen. P. A. Herran, according to the rule prescribed in the convention for such cases. The questions propounded to him were two:

Is the claim of Stephen G. Montano against the United States valid? If so, for what amount?

The umpire in his decision discusses at some length the question whether the United States is responsible for the failure of the State of California to execute its laws, and for the insolvency of the private corporation, a question which had been the subject of diplomatic correspondence between our Government and that of Peru. He decides it in the affirmative, and awards Montano the amount of the original judgment which he recovered in the case, with interest from the date of the judgment to the time of the award. His words are:

Therefore I decide that the claim of Stephen G. Montano against the United States is valid for the sum of $24,151.29, with interest at the rate of six per centum per annum from the 2d day of September, 1851, payable all in current money of

The decision of the umpire was pronounced in the Spanish language, as is certified by General Herran himself, by Domingo Rada, secretary of the commission, and by H. R. de La Reintrie, the solicitor of the United States before the commission, and the words fixing the payment were "pagadero todo en monada corriente de los Estados Unidos." A discussion somewhat philological in character has arisen as to the true meaning of these words, Mr. Hunter, the Assistant Secretary of State, giving to them a latitude that would cover greenbacks, while Mr. de La Reintrie would interpret them as meaning coin. It is difficult to say that the word "monada" in Spanish does not mean money in English, although the greater use of coin in Spanish countries may lead the people there to associate with this general term the idea of coin. In six Spanish dictionaries "monada" is defined "pieces of gold, silver, or copper, stamped with the arms of a prince of state,' but we learn from some of the same dictionaries that coin is "monada acuñada," or coined money, thus giving to the term money a more general sense.

The term money in the English language has unquestionably broadened in its application. Dr. Johnson, in his dictionary, defines it to be "metal coined for the purposes of commerce." This definition is as strong and exclusive as any in the Spanish dictionaries. The following example from Locke confirms this definition: "Money differs from uncoined silver in that the quantity of silver in each piece of money is ascertained by the stamp it bears, which is a public voucher." Webster, in his dictionary, begins by recognizing money as the synonym of moneda or monada, and then gives the following definition: Money. 1. Coin: Stamped metal; any piece of metal, usually gold, silver, or copper, stamped by public authority and used as a medium of commerce.

2. Bank notes or bills of credit, issued by authority, and exchangeable for coin or redeemable, are also called money, as such notes in modern times represent money, and are used as a substitute for it.

Worcester, after mentioning the following foreign synonyms, Italian moneta, Spanish moneda, French monnaie, thus defines money:

1. Stamped metal, generally gold, silver, or copper, used in traffic or as the measure of price; coin.

2. Cash generally: any current token or representative of value, as bank notes exchangeable for coin; notes of hand, accepted bills on mercantile houses, drafts, etc.

And in a note he says:

Money, originally stamped coin, is now applied to whatever serves as a circulating medium, including bank notes and drafts, as well as metallic coins.

The French equivalent, "monnaie," is defined by the standard authority, the Dictionary of the Academy, to be

Toute sorte de pièces de metal, servant au commerce, frappées par autorite souveraine et marquees au coin d'un prince cu d'un etat souverain.

Papier monnaie, papier crée par le gouvernement pour faire office de monnaie. Monnaie dans au sens plus parti culier se dit des petites especes d'argent ou de billon.

If we trace the derivation of the word from the Latin, we find "Moneta" a surname of Juno, then applied to her temple at Rome, and then, as that temple was used as a mint, to the money coined there; hence the word in ancient times seems to have meant strictly "coin."

The award to the citizens of the United States, eight in number, were made payable-four "in the current money of Peru," one "in the current money of the country," one" in current money," and two in

"pesos fuertes," (hard money). These were all paid by the Peruvian Government in coin. The award now under consideration being made by a Peruvian, his words, "current money of the United States," might mean "current coin of the United States," by a reasonable construction. In the uncertainty which exists as to the true meaning, as used by the umpire, the committee have been disposed to find some other grounds for their decision, and here they have been impressed by several considerations:

In the first place, it seems that the essential equity of the case is with the petitioner. His claim is based on a judgment pronounced in his favor by the district court of the United States, in 1851. Had he recovered what he was justly entitled to at that time, he would have received upwards of $24,000 in coin or its equivalent. This he was prevented from receiving through the the negligence of the State authorities of California, or of an officer of the United States, without fault of his own. This judgment was taken as the basis on which the umpire founded his decision. The correctness of the judgment was acknowledged and Montano was allowed its amount with interest. When he received payment gold was almost at its highest point, and he received the equivalent of $15,000 in gold, or $9,000 less than he was justly entitled to more than twelve years before.

Again, by the terms of the convention, payment was to be made, by each Government, of such claims as the commission allowed within one month after it received notice of the award, or interest was to be paid for the delay. This is construed by the Secretary of State as follows:

It gave the United States, in effect, the option of selecting the time when it would pay, under the condition of a stipulated rate of damages for postponing payment.

In the present case, the notice of the award was received before the 23d of December, 1863, and on that day the report of the commissioners was transmitted to Congress. By that time, and during the ensuing month, gold was ranging from 145 to 150. Had Montano been paid then, he would have received the equivalent of nearly $30,000 in gold. As it was, payment was delayed till the 30th of June following, when he received a draft on the assistant treasurer in New York for $42,909.36. If he had exercised the utmost diligence, he could not have presented it till the next day, the 7th of July, 1864, when, from the operation of special causes, gold stood at 285, the very highest point it reached during the war. It was actually presented and paid on the 11th of July, when gold was 284. In fact, then, the United States, using an irredeemable currency, in the exercise of the option claimed above as to the time of payment, waited till this currency reached the lowest point of depreciation, and seized that opportunity to pay its creditor. According to this construction, our Government might have paid him in currency worth ten cents on a dollar or less, provided, only, that some temporary necessity obliged us to use it as money in this country. It is evident that the allowance of interest is no compensation for the damage inflicted by this delay.

There is an illustrative incident not unworthy of mention. General Herran, the umpire, from the ambiguity of whose language the discussion arose, has declared a willingness to explain his meaning if requested by both Governments. The Peruvian Government signified its disposition to accept this solution of the difficulty, but the United States refused to join the request. Mr. Smith, the exami

ner of claims for the Department of State, in expressing himself against this proposition, remarks:

If, because we had a different kinds of "current money" in the United States, we may be supposed to derive an advantage from the election to pay in ore kind rather than another, it is an advantage which I think there is no motive to surrender.

This action seems to place the United States in the position of taking advantage of an accidental ambiguity in the language of the award to deny the petitioner the money to which he is justly entitled, and if "we have different kinds of current money' in the United States," comity to a friendly nation would seem to require that its subjects should be paid in that kind which is most convenient to them.

All the other awards made by the commission were paid in coin, though, as has been seen, the language of the various decrees was different. Our countrymen have all been paid in coin. Shall this Peruvian be compelled to receive payment in greenbacks, and that, too, when they were worth only about a third of their nominal value? If he is thus compelled, he is the only claimant under the commission who does not receive a full compensation. The justice done to our own citizens seems to establish a rule for this single Peruvian. It may be observed also, as has been stated above, that the commission sat in Lima, and that the award in the case of Montano was made in Spanish. Though not expressly required to be paid in Peru, yet it is not unreasonable to suppose that it was to be paid in money which would have a value there. Our ministers abroad are not subject to the losses of a depreciated currency. They receive their salaries in coin. The reason for this rule, in their case, seems applicable to the present petitioner.

The committee report a bill, in which they give him the difference between the amount which he received and that to which he was entitled, with interest from the 11th of July, 1864, to the date of payment, both principal and interest payable in coin.

FORTY-FIRST CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION.

February 22, 1870.

[Senate Report No. 49.]

Mr. Sumner made the following report:

The Committee on Foreign Affairs, to whom was referred the memorial of E. Dickelman, a Prussian subject, asking that he might receive indemnity, or that his claim against the Government of the United States for damages suffered by the action of the military authorities at New Orleans in the year 1862 might be referred to the Court of Claims for adjudication, beg leave to report:

That from the memorial and accompanying papers it appears that after the taking of New Orleans from the rebels in 1862, the President of the United States, on the 12th day of May of that year, by proclamation, declared that that port was open to commerce, and the Secretary of the Treasury issued rules and regulations in relation to the trade, prohibiting only articles contraband of war.

That on the 29th day of August the Prussian ship Essex, owned by the memorialist, arrived at the port of New Orleans, discharged her cargo, and on the 2d day of September commenced taking in a cargo

of outward-bound freight; that her cargo was fully completed on the 16th of September; that among her cargo were ten packages of bullion, silver plate, coin, etc.; that on that day the captain applied for a clearance, which was refused, unless the captain would land the ten packages above referred to. The captain said he could not do so, as his bills of lading had been issued after the packages had been taken on board, under the supervision of a custom-house official, and that without a surrender of the receipts he could not be discharged from liability. That on the 29th of September a custom-house officer came on board and produced to the captain the receipts and bills of lading for two of said packages, which were surrendered to him. That on the 1st of October a sergeant and two soldiers, accompanied by a custom-house officer, came on board and presented an order from the shipper for two other cases. That the captain refused to deliver up the cases without surrender of the bill of lading. That the keys of the hatches were in possession of a custom-house officer, who opened the same, and the packages were taken out. That on the 6th day of October a custom-house officer came on board and informed the captain that the ship would be cleared, and, in accordance with such notification, on the 7th of October a clearance was issued. That these proceedings were under the direction and control of the military authorities of the United States, then in possession of New Orleans. That the general in command believed, and acted upon such belief, that the property contained in said packages was the property of persons, citizens of the United States, in open rebellion against the Government; that the articles were contraband of war or liable to confiscation.

The ship was detained for nineteen days in the manner above stated, and subjected, as alleged, to very great losses. No claim is made for the cases so taken, only for the detention of the ship.

Your committee has made this brief synopsis of the main facts alleged, without any desire or intention to express any opinion upon the merits of the controversy or the justice of the claim. It has been rejected at the State Department.

The Government of Prussia has requested that the claim of the memorialist shall receive a judicial investigation, claiming that treaty obligations between the two countries require such a reference.

Your committee, believing that the United States are bound in fulfillment of its obligations to give the memorialist a hearing before our own tribunals, have unanimously directed me to present the accompanying bill and recommend its passage.

April 22, 1870.

[Senate Report No. 116.]

Mr. Sumner made the following report:

The Committee on Foreign Relations, to whom was referred Senate bill No. 535, for the relief of Kenneth Mackenzie, have had the same under consideration and now report.

Mr. Mackenzie is a Queen's counsel of Toronto in Canada, and was retained by the United States as counsel for the defense of certain Fenians, indicted for treason in Canada, in the latter part of October, 1866. For this service he has already received $5,000. A demand for