money in plays, and help to make great artists. Four out of five plays are failures because of dramatic criticism, and it has been proven in our records, four out of five plays produced in New York City are failures, people read the newspaper accounts the next day and newspapers have destroyed them. I think the owners of our great newspapers, men of fine calibre, of the type of William Randolph Hearst, should come out and do justice to the producer by not allowing these critics to destroy plays without giving the author and the producer his viewpoint.

A NEWSPAPER REPORTER. His viewpoint might be biased too.

The CHAIRMAN. You then have both sides. Why should the newspaper destroy the author's viewpoint? When the newspaper man brings in his article to the newspaper, your city editor cuts whatever you send in, he doesn't take your article as you send it. And you men are not infallible. Even judges have their cases reversed by the Supreme Court of the United States. What court of appeals do you give an author or a dramatist? You give him no recourse, he is at the mercy of one man, and no man is infallible, and we are entitled to give this man some protection.

When you produce the drama and the star works up to $2,000 a week, along comes the motion-picture industry and pays him $5,000 a week: How can you have the motion-picture competing with the spoken drama? They take all the great actors after they have been developed. The producer can not get anybody; talk to a producer to-day: "The motion pictures take away our stars, we can not pay them.'

I wrote a play a few months ago, in which the theatrical producer offered George Bancroft $4,500 and 50 per of the profit. How can you run a play when the play can only take in $20,000 a week? Something has to be done to protect the drama, and all we are asking as members of this committee, if I sense the sentiment, is a fair deal to the young author, to give him a chance in life. If he works two or three years on a play and it is killed off in one night, he will not write any more plays; we give him no protection.

This committee does not intend to muzzle free speech, but we want something in a constructive way.

We will let you know when we invite the dramatic critics to be here. We invite them here with malice toward none.

Mr. Solberg, the committee may have lost the trend of your thought. You stated copyright begins from the time of publication with notice, and it runs for a period of 28 years, with a privilege of renewal for another 28 years that is, under the existing law. That is where you left off.

Mr. RICH: What do you mean by notice?

Mr. SOLBERG. Notice under the law means the inscribed notice of copyright in the thing, in the book.

Mr. DIES. The author puts it on there himself; he does not have any connection with the Copyright Office?

Mr. SOLBERG. He claims copyright under that express condition of law. Publication with notice gives him the right of registration as a subsequent action.

Mr. DIES. What part does registration play?

Mr. SOLBERG. Well, it is supposed to play a useful part in relation to the defense of the copyright, but I think I better not enlarge on

that now because it would carry me altogether too far from my particular point. I would be glad to answer any question at any time after I get through.

STATEMENT BY THORVALD SOLBERG, FORMER REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, COSMOS CLUB, WASHINGTON, D. C.

THE TERM OF COPYRIGHT

Mr. SOLBERG. There is undoubtedly a widespread feeling that the period of copyright protection should be increased in order to do justice in the case of especially valuable works to their authors or to the families of such authors.

But there is no unanimity either as to what the new term of copyright should be, the measure of its equitable increase, nor how such extension of the term of protection should be secured.

The copyright bill which passed the House of Representatives on January 13, 1931, proposed the so-called union term, the period of protection adopted by the International Copyright Union, namely, during the life of the author after the creation or publication of his work and for 50 years thereafter. There is much to be said for this union term. Its adoption goes to increase the uniformity of the term of protection throughout the world. It is the term now in force in the larger number of countries. It has the advantage that an author's copyright continues during his life in all cases, and for all his works terminates at the same time, 50 years after the date of his death; thus avoiding the difficulties which arise because the end of an author's copyright differs with everyone of his works. The supposed difficulty of ascertaining the date of death of any author is exaggerated. In this age of newspapers and bibliographies and the widespread habit of obituary notices, it is not likely that such date of any author's death would be difficult of ascertainment, and, as already pointed out, it is only a single date required to be learned with regard to each author, whereas by any other method of computation a date must be ascertained for any work of any one author, which may be some times a large number. It should not be overlooked, however, that although it might be held desirable, in case the United States should become a member of the InternationalCopyright Union, that the union term of copyright should be adopted-it is not necessary to do so. Our present provisions for the period of copyright protection may be left in force unchanged, or they may be modified as Congress may see fit to determine.

The alternative proposed has been a single fixed term of years. In the Senate bill this was last year 70 years-now in S. 176 it is 60 years.

The factors to be considered in the case of any increase in our present term of copyright are: First, the increased term for all new works, books, music, dramas, works of art, and so forth, created and published after the new law shall have gone into effect; second, the increase in the term of protection of subsisting copyrights. That would mean an increase either of copyrights already secured for our first term of protection of 28 years, or an increase beyond the termination of the second or renewal term of 28 years; third, provisions of law to determine the equitable ownership of any new extension of copyright protection.

This last may become a matter of difficulty. In the present House bill 139, such provisions occupy 63 lines of the text of the bill. In the present Senate bill 176 where the total increase of the copyright term is from a maximum protection of 56 years to 60 years, only an extension of 4 years, the provisions relating to the vesting of the extended copyright fill 34 lines of the bill. These difficulties may be wholly eliminated by reducing the proposed new term from 60 to 56 years, cutting out the proposed extension of 4 years.

It is well known that the severest criticisms of our period of copyright protection are leveled against the results of our double-term, namely 28 years from publication and a renewal term of 28 years more. It has been argued that the present maximum term, twice 28 years or 56 years from date of the first publication of any work would, in the largest number of such works, prove an ample period of protection.

If this proposal for a copyright term of 56 years were enacted it would mean: First, that all new works would be automatically protected against theft and unlawful use from the time of their creation and be accorded as well a continuing statutory copyright for the single term of 56 years from the date of first publication or of first public performance of the work; second, that of subsisting copyrights, such as were for the second or renewal term, under existing law, would finally terminate upon the expiration of that term and such works would then fall into the public domain upon such termination dates. But copyrights subsisting for the first term of protection under existing law for 28 years would be extended for 28 years more to reach the maximum term of protection of 56 years.

If the new copyright act should go into force on July 1, 1932, as proposed, the number of copyrights subsisting for the second, renewal term, registered since July 1, 1909, the date upon which the copyright act of 1909 went into effect, would be 61,732. The act would definitely provide that each of these copyrights should end for good upon the date when the renewal term should fulfill 28 years, and the nearly 62,000 such works would fall into the public domain, each one upon the date of the end of its 28-year renewal term.

Of subsisting copyrights for the first term would be included all copyrights for works registered since July 1, 1904. The works thus registered number up to July 1, 1931, 3,513,224. If there were registered for the fiscal year ending July 1, 1932, a number equal to last fiscal year, namely, 172,792, the grand total of works protected for the first term of 28 years would be 3,686,016, all entitled to an extension of 28 years so that the period of their protection should equal that of the proposed term of 56 years.

The two copyright bills (S. 176; H. R. 139) provide for this extension to be automatic for the period of time to equal the new term of copyright proposed, or automatic extension under S. 176 for 28 years of nearly 4,000,000 works. This seems of doubtful value or necessity. When the copyright act of March 4, 1909, increased the renewal term from 14 to 28 years, it provided:

That the copyright subsisting in any work at the time when this act goes into effect ** may be renewed and extended *for a further period such that the entire term shall be equal to that secured by this act, including the renewal period.

But it was not enacted that this extension should take place automatically. It was secured only in cases where application for such renewal and extension was made to the Copyright Office and duly registered therein within the last year of the subsisting term. So far as figures are available less than 62,000 registrations for such extensions or renewals as the act of 1909 permitted were actually made. It is supposed that such renewals numbered about 5 per cent of the actually subsisting copyrights. If, therefore, it is now similarly proposed to permit the extension of the copyright to equal the new term of 56 years only when renewal applications are actually recorded during the last year of the original term of copyright, such increase of protection would extend to less than 200,000 works instead of to nearly 4,000,000 works.

It should be stated that making such extension of the term of protection contingent upon the requirement of renewal registration would not affect our entry into the copyright union although entry is contingent upon not making copyright protection depend upon compliance with any formalities. The nationals of the countries of the copyright union would secure the proposed new period of copyright protection from the creation of their works to continue until the end of 56 years from the date of first publication or first public performance of such works-from the time, in other words, when they became available for the benefit of the public.

If such a proposal were adopted it would require comparatively little change from the text of our present law. The provision that copyright was secured "whether the copyright work bears the author's true name or is published anonymously or under an assumed name " should be retained; so also the provisions for renewal of periodicals, cyclopaedic, composite or posthumous works, or works published by an employer for whom such works were made for hire, in the name of the copyright proprietor should be retained. But the present provisions of law that where neither the author, widow, or children are living renewal should then be made "by the author's executors, or in the absence of a will, his next of kin," should be amended in such contingency to provide, as in recent bills, for renewal "by the said author's executors or testamentary trustees, or, if there be no such executors or trustees, then by a duly appointed administrator with the will annexed; or, in the absence of the will, by the administrators, or other legal representatives of the said author's estate," to cure a troublesome defect in the present law.

DRAFT FOR SECTIONS OF A BILL PROVIDING FOR THE TERM OF COPYRIGHT

[NOTE. All words in italics are taken from present law]

Sec. -. Copyright throughout the United States and its dependencies is hereby granted and secured to all authors entitled thereto for all their writings from and after the date of the creation of the work without compliance with any conditions or formalities for the limited time hereinafter prescribed, whether such work is unpublished or is published in any form or by any method through which the thought of the author may be expressed.

Sec. —. Such copyright shall extend to all works of authors who are citizens of the United States which are not in the public domain on the date when this act takes effect and to all works by such citizens thereafter created, as well as to the works of alien authors who shall be domiciled within the United States at the time of the first publication of their works, or who are citizens of any foreign state or nation which grants, either by treaty, convention, agreement, or law, to citizens of the United States the benefit of copyright on substantially the

same basis as to its own citizens, or copyright substantially equal to the protection secured to such foreign authors under this act or by treaty; or when such foreign state or nation is party to an international agreement which provides for reciprocity in the granting of copyright, by the terms of which agreement the United States may, at its pleasure, become a party thereto. The existence or the cessation of such reciprocal conditions aforesaid shall be determined by the President of the United States by proclamation made from time to time as the purposes of this act may require.

SEC.. Copyright throughout the United States and its dependencies shall also subsist in the work of alien authors not domiciled in the United States who are nationals of any country which is a member of the International Copyright Union by virtue of the adherence of the United States to the convention of Berne for the portection of literary and artistic works of September 9, 1886, as revised at Berlin on November 13, 1908, and at Rome on June 2, 1928.

SEC.. From and after the date upon which the adherence of the United States to the said convention of 1928 becomes effective, copyright protection shall be accorded without formality for the works of such alien authors thereafter created, as well as for all their works, which on such date are protected by copyright in any country which is a member of the International Copyright Union: Provided, That the duration of such copyright in the United States and its dependencies shall not in the case of the work of any alien author extend beyond the date upon which such work has fallen into the public domain in the country of its origin as defined in said convention of 1928: And provided further, That as to copyright in works not previously copyrighted in the United States, no right or remedy given pursuant to this act shall prejudice lawful acts done or rights in or in connection with copies lawfully made or the continuance of business undertakings or enterprises lawfully undertaken within the United States or any of its dependencies prior to the date on which the adherence of the United States to the said convention of 1928 became effective; and the author or other owner of such copyright or person claiming under him Ishall not be entitled to bring action against any person who has prior to such date taken any action in connection with the exploitation, production, reproduction, circulation, or performance (in a manner which at the time was not unlawful) of any such work whereby he has incurred any substantial expenditures or liability.

SEC.. The copyright protection secured by this act, whether the copyrighted work bears the author's true name or is published anonymously or under an assumed name, shall endure until the expiration of 56 years from the date of the first publication or first public performance of the author's said work, which ever is the earlier date.

SEC. The copyright subsisting in any work on the date upon which this act goes into effect for the first term of copyright of 28 years secured under previous laws of the United States, may be renewed and extended for a further term of protection of 28 years when an application for such renewal shall have been made to the Copyright Office and duly registered therein within one year prior to the expiration of the original term of copyright by the author of any copyrighted work including a contribution by an individual author to a periodical or to a cyclopaedic or other composite work when such contribution has been separately registered, if such author is still living, or by the widow, widower, child or children of such author, if the author be not living, or if such author, widow, widower, child or children be not living, by the said author's executors or testementary trustees, or, if there be no such executors or trustees, by a duly appointed administrator with the will annexed; or, in the absence of a will, by the administrators or other legal representatives of the said author's estate: Provided, That in the case of any posthumous work or of any periodical, cyclopaedic, or other composite work upon which the copyright was originally secured by the proprietor thereof, or of any work copyrighted by a corporate body (otherwise than as assignee or licensee of the individual author), or by an employer for whom such work was made for hire, the proprietor of such copyright shall be entitled to the renewal of the copyright of such work for the further term of 28 years, upon the registration of the renewal application above provided for: Provided further, That in default of the registration of such application for renewal within the prescribed year as hereinabove provided, the copyright in any work shall determine at the expiration of 28 years from first publication. SEC. The copyright subsisting in any work on the date upon which this act goes into effect for the renewal term of 28 years secured prior to such date