The Court found, in essence, that reference to the agreement between the parties and supporting documents was permissible to ascertain the meaning of an ambiguous word in the consent decree. Numerous circuits have followed this case in stating that the intent of the parties is an element for inquiry in connection with the determination of whether a voluntary dismissal with prejudice based upon a settlement agreement should have a claim preclusive effect. However, it should be noted that the holding of the Court was based squarely upon the contractual nature of the consent decree, and the cases that have followed this holding have made similar observations. However, in this case Complainant's contention that "[t]here was no settlement or compromise of the District Court case," and that "there was no value and no consideration for the dismissal...," argues against considering the intent of the parties, since it eliminates any contractual element in the voluntary dismissal. There is another consideration that bears upon this question. Were we to say, in spite of the above reasoning, that there is a substantial contractual element to the voluntary dismissal so as to open the possibility of an inquiry into the intent of the parties, the cases which allow such an inquiry presuppose an ambiguity in the stipulation such as would make an inquiry as to the intent of the parties appropriate in the same manner in which it would be in a purely contractual context. Here there was no ambiguity in the stipulation or order, and it must be deemed a final adjudication on the merits for res judicata purposes of the claims "See, for example, Ronald F. Keith v. Edward C. Aldridge, Jr., 900 F.2d 736 (Fourth Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 900, 111 S.Ct. 257, 112 L.Ed.2d 215 (1990), where the court stated: "When a consent judgment entered upon settlement by the parties of an earlier suit is invoked by a defendant as preclusive of a later action, the preclusive effect of the earlier judgment is determined by the intent of the parties. . . . This approach, following from the contractual nature of consent judgments, dictates application of contract interpretation principles to determine the intent of the parties." The court then looked to the "mutually manifested... intentions" of the parties, noting that "the settlement agreement and the dismissal order entered pursuant to it do not expressly reserve to Keith the right to raise due process or other substantive claims in subsequent litigation." 'Israel v. Carpenter, 120 F.3d 361(2nd Cir. 1997) (applying Massachusetts law that "in order to utilize extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent, a court need not invariably find facial ambiguity."); Coakley & Williams Construction, Incorporated v. Structural Concrete Equipment, Incorporated, 973 F.2d 349 (4th Cir. 1992); Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Simon, No. 00 CIV. 1393(RCC), 2002 WL 313865 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2002); WILJ International Limited v. Biochem Immonusystems, Inc., 4 F.Supp.2d 1(D. Mass. 1998). 62 Agric. Dec. 358 asserted, or which could have been asserted, in the District Court trust action.8 Furthermore, a misunderstanding by the parties as to the legal effect of an agreed upon dismissal with prejudice does not warrant voiding the agreement," and, where "a genuine misunderstanding had occurred concerning the stipulation's scope" it was held that counsel's misunderstanding could not void the agreement, even though "the consequences of entering into [the] agreement were not fully weighed" and "the choice was poor."10 Complainant, in resisting Respondent's motion for dismissal, asserts that a 1913 Oklahoma case requires that for a dismissal of a suit to have a preclusive effect it must be "based upon an agreement between the parties by which a settlement and adjustment of the subject matter is made." Complainant argues that since there was no settlement or adjustment between the parties to the District Court action, preclusive effect should not be given to the voluntary dismissal with prejudice. However, we are here dealing with an order of a federal district court in a federal trust case, not a diversity case, and it is clear that federal law must determine the interpretation of the order. 12 Under federal law: where there is no settlement agreement at all, there is nothing for the court to consider other than the voluntary dismissal with prejudice, which... is sufficient by itself to invoke the preclusive effect of res 8 Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Simon, No. 00 CIV. 1393(RCC), 2002 WL 313865 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2002). 'TCBY Systems, Inc. v. EGB Associates, Inc., 2 F.3d 288 (8th Cir. 1993); and Citibank, N.A. v. Data Lease Financial Corporation, 904 F.2d 1498 (1990) “... misunderstanding as to the legal effect of a dismissal with prejudice does not warrant a hearing." 10 Nemaizer v. Baker, 793 F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1986). 11Turner v. Fleming, 130 P. 551(OK 1913). 12 Semtek International Incorporated v. Lockheed Martin Corporation, 531 U.S. 497 (2001); Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, at 488 n. 9 (1994) “It is clear that where the federal court decided a federal question, federal res judicata rules govern," quoting P. Bator, D. Meltzer, P. Mishkin, & D. Shapiro, Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System 1604 (3d ed. 1988); Deposit Bank v. Frankfort, 191 U.S. 499 (1903). See also Hallco Manufacturing Co., Inc. v. Raymond Keith Foster, 256 F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d 469 (Fed. Cir.1991); PRC Harris, Inc. v. the Boeing Company, 700 F.2d 894 at n. 1(2nd Cir.1983). judicata.13 We conclude that Complainant's claim in this reparation proceeding is precluded by the dismissal with prejudice of the trust action in the District Court. The complaint should be, and hereby is, dismissed. Copies of this order shall be served upon the parties. 13 Edward T. Hanley v. Cafe Des Artistes, Inc., No. 97 Civ. 9360(DC), 1999 WL 688426 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 1999) (mem.) 62 Agric. Dec. 365 PERISHABLE AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES ACT MISCELLANEOUS ORDERS In re: ZEMA FOODS, L.L.C. PACA Docket No. D-01-0027. Order Dismissing the Complaint. Filed February 7, 2003. Charles E. Spicknall, for Complainant. Respondent, Pro se. Order issued by James W. Hunt, Chief Administrative Law Judge. Complainant's motion to dismiss the disciplinary complaint filed on August 21, 2001 against Zema Foods, L.L.C., alleging willful violations of Section 2(4) of the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act, 1930, as amended, (7 U.S.C. § 499a et seq.) is granted. The complaint in the above-captioned matter is dismissed without prejudice. PERISHABLE AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES ACT DEFAULT DECISIONS In re: C.T. PRODUCE, INC. PACA Docket No. D-02-0011. Decision Without Hearing by Reason of Default. PACA - Default - Payment, failure to make prompt. David A. Richman, for Complainant. Respondent, Pro se. Decision issued by Jill S. Clifton, Administrative Law Judge. Preliminary Statement This is a disciplinary proceeding under the Perishable Agriculture Commodities Act, 1930, as amended (7 U.S.C. § 499a et seq.) (hereinafter referred to as the "Act"), instituted by a complaint filed on March 14, 2002, by the Associate Deputy Administrator, Fruit and Vegetable Programs, Agricultural Marketing Service, United States Department of Agriculture. The complaint alleges that during the period May 2000 through July 2000, Respondent C.T. Produce, Inc. (hereinafter "Respondent") failed to make full payment promptly to 2 sellers of the agreed purchase prices in the total amount of $523,917.39 for 186 lots of perishable agricultural commodities which it purchased, received and accepted in foreign commerce. As described in Complainant's Motion for Decision Without Hearing by Reason of Default, service was effected upon Respondent on April 11, 2002. The time for filing an answer expired on May 1, 2002, and upon motion of the Complainant for the issuance of a Default Order, the following Decision and Order shall be issued without further procedure pursuant to Section 1.139 of the Rules of Practice (7 C.F.R. § 1.139). Findings of Fact 1. C. T. Produce, Inc., is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of California. Its business mailing address is 2225 Avenida Costa Este, Suite 1100, San Diego, California 92173. 2. At all times material herein, Respondent was licensed under the provisions of the PACA. License number 940841 was issued to Respondent on |