Politics, Markets, and Grand Strategy: Foreign Economic Policies as Strategic InstrumentsUniversity of Michigan Press, 2000 - 256 lappuses Why do states sometimes discriminate in favor of certain states and at other times choose to pursue nondiscriminatory policies? In answering these questions, Lars S. Skålnes stresses the international political importance of foreign economic policy, arguing that trade, foreign investment, and foreign aid policies are strategic instruments great powers use to manage political and military relations with allies and adversaries. Skålnes explains changes in foreign economic policy in terms of shifting strategic assessments regarding the importance of military support from allies. When states need military support from their allies to meet threats to their security, they will adopt discriminatory foreign economic policies in an attempt to strengthen alliance relations. When states can go it alone without military support, by contrast, they will not pursue foreign economic policies that discriminate in favor of either allies or other countries. Discriminatory policies, Skalnes argues, are important strategic instruments for several reasons. First, they can be used to tie countries to a military alliance. Second, they are useful as signals of intention. Third, discriminatory policies may strengthen an ally militarily by increasing the economic resources available for military purposes. Skålnes provides detailed accounts of the grand strategies of Germany (1879-1914), France (1887-1914), Great Britain (1919-1939), and the United States (1945-1967). Politics, Markets, and Grand Strategy will be important reading for scholars and students in the fields of national security studies, international political economy, and economic history, and to economists working on problems associated with foreign investment and trade generally and customs union theory and discriminatory trade agreements specifically. Lars S. Skålnes is Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Oregon. |
Saturs
Strategic Need and Economic Discrimination | 15 |
German Grand Strategy 18791914 | 39 |
French Grand Strategy 18871914 | 71 |
British Grand Strategy 191939 | 109 |
U S Grand Strategy 194567 | 151 |
Conclusion | 189 |
227 | |
245 | |
Citi izdevumi - Skatīt visu
Politics, Markets, and Grand Strategy: Foreign Economic Policies as ... Lars S. Skålnes Fragmentu skats - 2000 |
Politics, Markets, and Grand Strategy: Foreign Economic Policies as ... Lars S. Skålnes Fragmentu skats - 2000 |
Bieži izmantoti vārdi un frāzes
allies American policymakers argued attack Austria-Hungary Austrian Berlin Berlin Börse Bismarck bonds Bosnian crisis Bourse Britain British Bülow Cabinet Conclusions Caprivi Chamberlain commitment considerations countries discriminate in favor discriminatory foreign economic domestic political Dominions Drummond Dual Dual Alliance economic appeasement economic concessions economic discrimination economic interests empire European exports foreign economic policies foreign policy France France's Franco-Russian alliance French French government FRUS Germany Germany's Geyer Girault government's grand strategy grant hegemonic stability theory important increase industrial issue Japan Japanese Kennan ment militarily military relations million francs Minister motives negotiations nomic officials percent plans Poidevin policies that discriminated political and military possible preferential problem pursue role Russian government Russian loans signal Soviet Union strategic assessments strategic instruments strategic need strategic railroads strategic-need hypothesis strengthen tariff threat tied-hands tion trade policy trade preferences trade treaty Triple Alliance U.S. policymakers United Kingdom Weltpolitik Western Europe Winzen
Atsauces uz šo grāmatu
Economic Interdependence and International Conflict: New Perspectives on an ... Edward Deering Mansfield,Brian M. Pollins Ierobežota priekšskatīšana - 2009 |