it for a good purpose and to emphasize a truth in Christian doctrine very much needed in our day. To his mind there is a clear distinction between "person" as "the subject of a personal mode of being and acting" and "person" as meaning "the mode of being and acting of a personal subject" (p. 145); and it may be there are many who will be helped to a surer hold on the Incarnation by this distinction. All that the writer of this review means to say is that, to his mind, the more he ponders it, the advantage of emphasis upon the Humanity gained by the use of this doubtful phrase is much overweighed by the difficulties inevitably suggested and by the evident pain given to many devout minds by the departure from the Church's historical terminology.

With the chapters on the "human nature of Christ" we have great sympathy. There is not the slightest foundation for the charge that the book teaches that our Lord was guilty of original sin. We feel like apologizing for even referring to such a ridiculous suggestion. It is asserted by Dr. DuBose that our Lord took human nature in its fallen condition -i. e., as affected by weaknesses inherited from fallen Adam. Rightly it is stated that sin pertains to a person; that there is no sin, properly speaking, except in the sinful will; that the phrase "original sin" is only the result of poverty of language, for there can be no such thing as a sinful nature. There may be a condition of the nature induced by sin in the person, but that condition of nature cannot properly be called sin. The whole argument about the existence of the devil turns upon this recognition of the personal meaning of sin, as against the impersonal evil of the Manichæans.

That our Lord assumed a fallen nature, to put it boldly, is no new idea or speculation. It is as old as Athanasius, who says (Cont Ar. D. I. C. II.): "The Saviour humbled himself in taking our body of humiliation, and took a servant's form, putting on that flesh which was enslaved to sin." Newman's note on this passage, in the Oxford Library of the Fathers, emphasizes the fact that sin properly relates to will, and calls attention to the characteristic Apollinarian denial of the inher

ited weaknesses of our Lord's human nature.

It may be that Newman changed his view after he became a Roman Catholic, for the denial of the fallibility of Christ's human nature is curiously associated in history with the development of modern Roman doctrine; and it is easy to discern the close relation between the almost morbid increase of emphasis on "original sin" and the dogmas of transubstantiation and the immaculate conception of the Virgin Mary. So we find that modern Roman Catholic theologians (cf. Oxenham, "Doctrine of the Atonement") incline to the ancient Catholic assertion of the natural corruptibility of the human body of our Lord, but are forced into an extreme view of creationism in order to preserve the immaculate conception of the Virgin. With Dr. DuBose we feel instinctively that a theory which exempts the human psychic nature of Christ absolutely from all inherited and natural propensities derived from the actual motherhood of a mortal woman is Eutychian in its tendency, and injures the fullness of hope and help in the Incarnation. Dr. Kedney expresses this forcibly and at length in his "Christian Doctrine." (Page 376.) As Athanasius says: "Had not sinlessness appeared in the nature which had sinned, how was sin condemned in the flesh?" (In Apoll. II., 6.) Or, as Dr. DuBose puts it: "He took our nature with all those consequences in it of the Fall which make us sinners. He was sinless in it, not by the fact of its being sinless, but by the act of his condemning and destroying sin in it. By taking upon him our sin and abolishing it, he became our righteousness, and enables us to become the righteousness of God in him." (Page 255.)

There are many other luminous and helpful expositions of Christian truth in this book to which we should be glad to call the attention of Christian people, but we have already more than filled the space allotted to us. We cannot conclude, however, without saying that the American Church, and its university at Sewanee, are to be congratulated upon having produced a work of such abiding value.

THOMAS F. GAILOR.

MONOPOLIES AND TRUSTS.

MONOPOLIES AND TRUSTS. By Richard T. Ely, Ph.D., LL.D., Professor of Political Economy and Director of the School of Economics, Political Science, and History in the University of Wisconsin. Macmillan. New York.

1900.

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DR. ELY has already contributed much to the scientific study of the subjects discussed in the present volume. In his well-known work entitled " Problems of To-Day," published originally in a Southern newspaper some dozen years ago, he furnished the public with many original views and did much to popularize the study of political economy throughout the United States. Indeed it is scarcely an exaggeration to say that no one has done more than Dr. Ely to awaken general interest in economics on the part of Americans. And in the field of monopoly Dr. Ely may well claim priority for more than one theory that now finds pretty general acceptance, whilst he has already published much valuable material regarding corporate development. The present volume is part of a comprehensive treatise on "The Distribution of Wealth," which he has been engaged upon for the past seven years, and while the manual before us is the first number in a citizens' library of economics, politics, and sociology, it in nowise sacrifices the interests of science to popularity.

This latest work from the pen of Dr. Ely is composed of six chapters, the first of which deals with "The Idea of Monopoly." After briefly reviewing the many and often conflicting conceptions of monopolies to be found in the writings of economists, our author wisely concludes that "a satisfactory discussion of monopoly must be based on a more restricted idea of monopoly." In his opinion, therefore, monopoly, as opposed to competition, sacrifices" unity in management of some kinds of business in some essential particulars. It may be in production, it may be in sales, or it may be in purchases, or it may be in any two or all three of these particulars." This use of the term monopoly has the advantage of clearness, and it will enable one the more readily to understand the following definition given by Dr. Ely: "Monopoly means that substantial unity of action on the part of

one or more persons engaged in some kind of business which gives exclusive control, more particularly, although not solely with respect to price." Our author then sketches briefly the various legal restrictions placed upon monopolies in England and the United States, but we do not think he sufficiently recognizes the reaction against this restrictive policy both in England and America, where monopolies were often allowed when the public interest was unaffected thereby.

The second chapter of this book gives "The Classification and Causes of Monopoly." After having first pointed out the distinction between public and private monopolies, Dr. Ely gives another classification and further divides monopolies into social and natural ones. Under the former are included patents, copyrights, public consumption monopolies, trade-marks, and fiscal monopolies; whilst natural monopolies include such as arise from a limited supply of raw material, those arising from properties inherent in the business, and those arising from secrecy.

While recognizing the large size of the field which by force of circumstances belongs to monopoly, Dr. Ely gives us the hopeful assurance that, outside of this field, we have another in which, under right conditions, competition is a permanent force. Most readers of this volume will probably find Chapters V. and VI. by far the most interesting and suggestive. In the former chapter the concentration of production and the growth of trusts are treated in a conservative, scholarly manner. This tendency is rightly ascribed to the introduction of improved machinery and the steady increase of capital, and while our author appears to admit that the "trust movement" is in the nature of an industrial evolution, he also regards it as a speculative movement. There are two points, however, which he, in our opinion, is disposed to ignore. We refer, in the first place, to the fact that, of all modern machinery, one of the best and most far-reaching kinds in its influence is the trust. Curiously enough, moreover, many of the objections that a century or more ago were urged against labor-saving machinery are now urged against trusts. The same inconoclastic spirit which then

terrorized parts of England now and then lifts up its head in this country. The spirit that last century wanted to destroy the jenny, the mule, and the engine now clamors for the smashing of the trust. Secondly, Dr. Ely lays little stress, we think, on the point so well emphasized by Dr. Sherwoodnamely, the influence exerted on corporate growth by the genius and mercantile foresight of the entrepreneur.

Dr. Ely does not believe there is any trust problem. He carefully diagnoses the situation and draws attention to an evident confusion of thought on the subject. Instead of a trust problem we frequently have (a) a monopoly problem; (b) a problem of industrial concentration, (c) a problem of wealth concentration. He is inclined to think that the cure for the monopoly evil is public ownership if the monopoly be a natural one.

In treating of this branch of the subject he says: "The evidence of the rapid shifting of public opinion manifested at the Chicago Trust Conference was most remarkable, and was to the author a great surprise. When, less than fifteen years ago, he began urging the superior advantages of public ownership and management of these monopolies, he found comparatively little sympathy. During the period that has intervened, however, there has been such a change in sentiment on the part of others-coupled, perhaps, with a slight lessening of ardor on his own part-that at Chicago he found himself standing among those who would be regarded as the conservative element, while those who have figured as opponents of governmental activity were predicting that we would have government ownership of railways sooner than the writer can anticipate." This rapid trend of public sentiment toward collectivism is one of the most remarkable signs of the times.

There are practically but two alternatives: we must have either public control of private property or public property with public management. Perhaps the most conspicuous failure of the first alternative is the Interstate Commerce Commission. It is questionable whether such control is possible under a democratic government, particularly one with a