、

dred of our slaves, to elect members to congress. Saving what foreign goods we and our immediate families may consume, we can arrange it so that the coarse clothing that will answer for our slaves can be manufactured in this country, or else have it free of duty, and, by this operation, save ourselves from the onerous necessity of paying taxes, and throw them all off on our northern friends." This, whether they reasoned so or not, they effectually have done. The North then, being driven into the measure against her wish, or at least against the wish of those who made the bargain, and it being said, and at last finding manufactures might be made profitable, if they could have the home trade, and that there was a prospect, if it could be secured to her, she would be able to maintain herself against foreign capital, consented, and a tariff was made, when it was thought by the South it might also be a benefit to her. But, after a series of years, when it was ascertained that the "peculiar institution" there was not congenial to such labor, then threats, bravadoes, and all the arts and contrivances of which their fertile geniuses were capable of devising, were put in requisition to reduce the duties on all goods to such an amount as would just enable the government to get along without affording any protection to manufactures, or having that at all in view. Now, although there may be no objection to having things as they now exist, yet we do say all the consideration for which the North guaranteed slavery to the South (though we do

not admit she ever did) has been forcibly taken from her, and she is no longer under any obligation to fulfil her part of the contract. The value received is gone, and taken, too, without her consent; and therefore she is under no further obligation for any guaranty that may be said to have been given for the continuance of so foul a system, admitting, also, (which is not admitted,) she had a right to make such a compact, or guaranty. But, so far as has been made public, there is no evidence any such was given, or ought, or could have been given. And, besides, we think it would be a very pertinent question to ask, did the colored man agree to be considered but three fifths of a man? did he acknowledge the right of the delegates, assembled to form the Constitution, to legislate for him? or, if he did, did he suppose that those delegates were to take away all his rights? and has he ever yet acknowledged the justice of those proceedings? It can safely be answered, no; not until he has a right to vote, and be heard on the floor of congress, can it be said he has agreed to his debasement.

Neither can the American congress ever usurp the right without involving itself in the most palpable guilt. They therefore did not, they could not admit, and they would have been ashamed to have expressed openly, if they could have admitted, there was a person in the land from whom they were taking away the right of being fully heard before those who were exercising the right of taxing him. Here, however, the influ

ence of the slaveholder was felt, and here it came up in opposition to the free spirit of the land, and endeavored to bend it to its own purposes, and, after long, labored, and vexatious discussion, and an express determination to trig the wheel of united freedom by the more southern States, consent was at last obtained, that, if there were any other persons in the community than free persons, and those bound to service for a term of years, then they should be considered but as three fifths of a man. But, in such a forced consent as that, when so many other rights were thought to be involved, can it now be argued that this consent must be held in the light of a guaranty to maintain forever a system of slavery in our land? We think not; the most that can be made of it is, an evil of such magnitude existed, they felt themselves powerless to root it out; but, if the system is maintained, that community who upholds it shall not have so extensive political privileges as the one that does not, a portion at least of her people are but three fifths of other men. Whether there is not a deep censure of those States that will suffer their population to be so degraded, implied in the use of the language of this section, we think may be made a question.

In the first clause of the 8th section, article 1st, power is given to congress "to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises; to pay the debts, and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States; that all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform

throughout the United States." Now, if it should be denied congress was the representative of the people, but of the States, and, as such, had no power to interfere with the internal policy of the States, yet this clause would show that, as representative of the States, it was vested with the power to provide for the common defence and the general welfare; and, having the power, it is their duty to attend to both these subjects; and, if a discussion should be had on any subject involving either, and, consequently, if any State, or number of States, are pursuing a system of policy detrimental to either, then it is in their power to have the obstruction removed, and to see that the United States, as a whole, are not injured; and if it can be proved and we think it can be that slavery is an obstruction to the common defence, and requires constant care and vigilance of our army, and, consequently, is an expense to the country; and, further, that the general welfare suffers by its continuance, that it injures the morals, the peace, and harmony of the communities in which it exists, and the advancement of civilization, and the general cause of truth, of virtue, of science, &c. &c.— then, we say, this clause places it in the power of congress, whether it is done as "we the people," or as we the States, to put an end to its continuance. It cannot be argued that a State, or any number of States, may institute such practices within their borders as to require the protective oversight of the others, and yet place it out of the power of these others to say aught against

their conduct. If, therefore, congress should open its doors, that its evils may be discussed, and, after mature deliberation, it is found the evils attending it are not so great as has been represented, as a mere political body they can say so; but if, on the contrary, it can be shown its character is bad, that it is an incubus upon the body politic, a violation of the laws of God and of human nature, then it would be their duty, if there is no other way provided, to act in the premises, and do away a system whose evil consequences to the community are apparent, however much any particular section of country may be wedded to it.

The sixteenth paragraph of the same section and article has relation to the "power of congress over any district that might be ceded to the United States, as the seat of government, and the places purchased for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards, and other needful buildings;" and the seventeenth to the making "all laws which shall be necessary for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department thereof." The legislative power over the places mentioned above is "exclusive; "" no one else is to share it with them, and, consequently, it must be as unlimited as any of the State legislatures. We do not see in either of these paragraphs any allusion made that it was necessary for them to conform to the proceedings of other States to determine them in their actions in regard to the territories over