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United States refused to include in the treaty of peace a provision presented by the Spanish plenipotentiaries by which the United States was to assume "all charges and obligations of every kind in existence at the time of the ratification of the treaty of peace which the crown of Spain may have contracted lawfully in the exercise of the sovereignty hereby relinquished and transferred, and which as such constitute an integral part thereof."'60 It also rejected a provision requiring that "grants and contracts for public works and services" in Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippines be "maintained in force until their expiration, in accordance with the terms thereof, the new government assuming all the rights and obligations thereby attaching up to the present time to the Spanish government.' It, however, disavowed, any purpose "to disregard the obligations of international law in respect to such contracts."61 A number of claims based on Spanish concessions were presented to the government and were variously settled in accordance with opinions of attorneys general and law officers of the War Department, which was then administering the Islands.62 As an example may be mentioned the case of the Manila Railway Co., a corporation subsidized by the Spanish government which

releases of all claims against the United States." As few of the Texan bonds were specifically pledged upon imports, the act gave rise to question, but was held to require payment of all bonds. (See Cushing Att. Gen. 6 op. 130, (1853), Corwin, Sec. of Treas., Sen. Ex. Doc., 103, (34th Cong. Ist Sess, p. 406-7). In the British claims arbitration of 1853, claims for Texan bonds were presented and the commission held that the United States was not liable, hence these claims were not within the competence of the arbitral court. The matter was concluded by an act of Feb. 28, 1855, 10 stat. 617, by which the United States agreed to pay Texan debts for which the revenues of the state were pledged to the the amount of $7,750,000, to be apportioned pro rata among the creditors. See Moore's Digest, 1;343-347. In the Joint Resolution of July 7, 1898, annexing Hawaii. "the public debt of the Republic of Hawaii" was assumed by the United States to an amount not to exceed $4,000,000. See Moore's Digest, 1;351.

60This applied to Cuba and Porto Rico. See Moore's Digest, 1;352. The United States delegation held that these obligations were incurred in a fruitless effort to pacify the Islands extending over a long period of years. The expenditure did not benefit the Islands and should be considered liabilities of the Spanish nation, not of the Islands. See Moore's Digest, 1;351-385.

61 Moore's Digest, 1;389-390.

62 Griggs. Att. Gen., 22 op. 310, 408, 514, 520, 546; 23 op. 181; Knox, Att. Gen. 23 op. 451.

claimed a continuance of the periodic subsidies by the new government. The law officer of the Division of Insular affairs of the War Department advised the non-allowance of the claim, holding it to be a personal obligation of the Spanish sovereign, but the attorney general took a contrary view, and in an official opinion held that the United States was liable for this obligation under international law.

To summarize, the United States has generally acknowledged its obligation to pay debts pledged on the revenue, and contracts for the improvement of territory to which it has succeeded. It however, denied such an obligation with reference to the general public debt of the dismembered state, in cases of partial succession.

(3) Certain rights of the inhabitants have generally been specified in treaties ceding territory to the United States. Freedom to leave the country and retain their former allegiance without loss of property, and in case of election to remain in the territory, guarantees of civil rights, religious liberty and sometimes admission to American citizenship have generally been so stipulated.65 Similar provisions have been contained in resolutions, statutes and executive orders relating to the annexation, government and administration of new territory.66 By enforcing these provisions the courts have enforced the government's obligations under international law.

The enforcement of constitutional guarantees also acts to protect the rights of inhabitants of such territory, but the courts have drawn distinctions as to the applicability of these guarantees to different kinds of acquisitions. All of the constitutional

63 Magoon's Reports, 177.

64 Griggs Att. Gen., 23 op. 181; Knox Att. Gen., 23 op. 1,451. See Moore's Digest, 1;389-410.

65 Treaties with Great Britain, 1783, art. 4, 5, 6, Malloy, p. 586; 1840, art. 3, p. 656; France, 1803, art. 3, 6, p. 508; Mexico, 1848, art. 8, 9, 11, p. IIII; 1853, art. 2, 5, p. 1121; Russia, 1867, art. 3, p. 1523; Spain, 1819, art. 5, 6, 8, p. 1653; 1898, art. 9,-12, p. 1690.

66 See Northwest Ordinance, July 13, 1787; Act. Aug. 7, 1789; in reference to Louisiana, Act. Oct. 2, 1803, 2 Stat. 245; Mch. 19, 1804, 2 Stat. 272; in reference to Texas, Joint Resolution, Mch. 1, 1845, 5 Stat. 797; Act Sept. 9, 1850, 9 Stat. 446, Feb. 28, 1855, 10 Stat. 617; In reference to New Mexico, Act. Mch. 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 854; in reference to Hawaii, Joint Resolution, July 7, 1898, Act. Apr. 30, 1900; in refernce to Porto Rico, Act Apr. 12, 1900, May 1, 1900; in reference to Philippines, Act July 1, 1902, Mch. 9, 1902; in reference to Guano Islands, Act 1856, Rev. Stat. 5570-5578.

guarantees apply to incorporated territory such as Alaska,67 and territory contiguous to the original colonies, but those conferring privileges not "natural rights," but of a technical nature relating peculiarly to the common law, such as trial by jury, or of a political nature such as citizenship, do not apply to inhabitants of unincorporated territory, such as the Philippines, Hawaii, and Porto Rico.8 None of the constitutional guarantees appear to apply to territory temporarily occupied and under military government,69 or to consular jurisdiction. It appears, however, that the confiscation of property or the deprivation of life or liberty of persons without "due process of law" in actually acquired territory, would be prevented by constitutional guarantees.

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The United States courts have held that all public law relating to forms of government, revenue systems, and administration is abrogated by change of sovereignty," but in a number of cases the executive has by order continued the former administrative authorities, in which case their acts are valid."2 The

67 Rasmussen vs. U. S., 197 U. S. 510.

68 For this distinction and reference to "natural rights" see Justice Brown, in Downes vs. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 244, 282. For its application to Hawaii, Hawaii vs. Mankichi, 190 U. S. 197; to the Philippines, Dorr vs. U. S., 195 U. S. 138; and to Porto Rico, Gonzales vs. Williams, 192, U. S. 1. 69 Neeley vs. Henkel, 180 U. S. 109, 122.

70In re Ross, 140 U. S. 453, 464.

71 Harcourt vs. Gaillard, 12 Wheat. 523; New Orleans vs. U. S., 10 Pet. 602; Davis vs. Concordia, 9 How. 280; U. S. vs. Vaca, 18 How. 556; Am. Ins. Co., vs. Canter, I Pet. 542; Pollard vs. Hagan, 3 How. 212-225; U. S. vs. Reynes, 9 How. 127; U. S. vs. D'Auterine, 10 How. 609; Montoult vs. U. S., 12 How. 47; U. S. vs. Yorba, 1 Wall. 412; Stearnes vs. U. S., 6 Wall. 589; U. S. vs. Pico, 23 How. 321; Moore vs. Steinbach, 127 U. S. 70; Alexander vs. Roulet, 13 Wall. 386; Mumford vs. Wardwell, 6 Wall. 423. See Moore's Digest, 1;304-311. For effect of succession on Revenue Laws, see Flemming vs. Page, 9 How. 603; Wirt, Att. Gen., I op. 483, (1821); Cross vs. Harrison, 16 How. 164; President's Proclamation, July 25, 1901, and Insular Cases, DeLima vs. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 1; Downes vs. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 244; Dooley vs. U. S. 182 U. S. 222; Armstrong vs. U. S. 182 U. S. 243; Huus vs. N. Y. & Porto Rico, Steamship Co. 182 U. S. 392; Goetz vs. U. S. 182 U. S. 221; Crossman vs. U. S. 182 U. S. 221; Fourteen Diamond Rings, 103 U. S. 176; Dooley vs. U. S. 183 U. S. 151. See Moore's Digest, 1;311-332.

72 Joint Resolution, July 7, 1898, in reference to Hawaii; War Dept. Circular, Feb. 1899, in reference to territory under military government; act May 1, 1900, in reference to Porto Rico. See Ely's Adm. vs. U. S. 171 U. S. 220, 230, (1898). Moore's Digest, 1;306-308.

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system of private law in force. has, however, been held to continue until specifically altered by statute. It is upon this principle that the courts of all of the states, originally British colonies or settled from them, have continued to apply the common law,' while those of Louisiana and Texas have applied the French and Spanish systems of law respectively. The application of the English law of admiralty in federal courts has been based on a like principle. The courts have applied the same principle to other acquisitions of territory such as Florida, New Mexico, and the Spanish cessions of 1898.75

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The inviolability of existing contracts and property rights of inhabitants of acquired territory has been generally upheld. in reference to obligations owed by the former state itself to such inhabitants. Inhabitants as well as persons of foreign states benefit by the acquiescence of the new sovereign in its duty to assume the public burdens attached to the territory. If a

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73In Mortimer vs. N. Y. Elevated R. R. Co., 6 N. Y. S. 89, (1889), Scott, III, a claim that Dutch law rather than English should apply in reference to the portion of New York City originally occupied by the Dutch was denied. The British claim based on Cabot's discovery prior to Dutch occupancy established, in the view of the court, the common law. The court admitted that modern publicists hold that discovery not followed by occupation is insufficient to give title to new territory, but thought that, by the international law of that time, Cabot's claim was valid. As an additional reason for its opinion the court seemed to cast some doubt on the principle that succession does not alter the private law. Thus it held that even if Cabot's claim were not sufficient to establish a prior British title, the Dutch law would have been abrogated by the British conquest and acquisition in 1664. The court, however, suggested that the charter of Charles II, of 1664, specifically established the common law. The intervention of such an act of state would clearly bind municipal courts, even if contrary to international law. It would seem that prescription might have furnished sufficient basis for maintaining the predominance of English law in this case, but it does not seem to have been relied upon. 74 Thirty Hogshead of Sugar vs. Boyle, 9 Cranch 191, (1815). 75Louisiana, see Keene vs. McDonough, 8 Pet. 308; U. S. vs. Turner, II How. 663; Florida, see Am. Ins. Co. vs. Canter, 1 Pet. 542; New Mexico, U. S. vs. Power's Heirs, II How. 570, U. S. vs. Heirs of Rillieux, 14 How. 189; Leitsendorfer vs. Webb, 20 How. 176. In Chicago Pac. R. R. Co. vs. McGlenn, 114 U. S. 542, the state law was held to apply in territory donated by the state of Kansas to the Federal Government for a penitentiary. See Mortimer vs. N. Y. Elevated R. R. Co. 6 N. Y. S. 89, (1889), Scott, III, note 73 above. See also U. S. vs. Chaves, 159 U. S. 452, (1895); Strother vs. Lucas, 12 Pet. 410.

76Supra, p. 57.

definite act of the political department of government repudiates such liability, there is no recourse for the inhabitants," although foreigners entitled to similar credits can still resort to diplomatic protest.

Where the obligation is one between private parties, treaties generally have required inviolability, and the courts have emphatically maintained that the same doctrine holds in the absence of treaty.78 Thus Chief Justice Marshall, in upholding a real estate right in Florida based on a grant by Spain, said, "It is very unusual even in cases of conquest for the conqueror to do more than to displace the sovereign and assume domain over the country. The modern usage of nations, which has become law, would be violated, that sense of justice and of right which is acknowledged and felt by the whole civilized world would be outraged if private property should be generally confiscated and private rights annulled. The people change allegiance, their relations to their ancient sovereign are dissolved, but their relations to each other and their right of property remain undisturbed.''79

77 West Rand Central Gold Mining Co. vs. Rex. L. R. 2 K. B. 301, 4012, (1905), and article by J. Westlake, Law Quar. Rev., 22;14-26. In this case it was held that an “act of state” barred the right of an inhabitant of the Boer Republic to recover debts owed him by that republic, from Great Britain, after succession.

78 Wilcox. vs. Henry, I Dall. 69, (Pa., 1782); U. S. vs. Soulard, 4 Pet. 511, (1830); U. S. vs. Percheman, 7 Pet. 51, (1833); U. S. vs. Arredondo, 6 Pet. 691; U. S. vs. Clarke, 8 Pet. 436; U. S. vs. Clarke, 16 Pet. 231; U. S. vs. Repentigny, 5 Wall. 212, (1866); U. S. vs. Hansen, 16 Pet. 196, Delassus vs. U. S. 6 Pet. 117, 133, (1835); Mitchell vs. U. S. 9 Pet. 711, (1835); U. S. vs. Yorba, 1 Wall. 412; Townsend vs. Greeley, 5 Wall. 326; U. S. vs. Anguisola, 1 Wall. 352; Airhart vs. Massieu, 98 U. S. 491; Coffee vs. Grover, 123 U. S. 1, 9, (1887); Ely's Adm. vs. U. S. 171 U. S. 220, 223, (1898); See Moore's Digest 1; 414-427. For citation of further cases see Scott, cases, 97 note. By statute of 1860 congress authorized the courts to settle land claims near the Sault Ste. Marie based on a grant of the King of France in 1750, according to international law, the law of the country from which the claim was derived, principles of justice and stipulations of treaties. Under this act the court held that a grant of land on certain conditions of occupancy was lost upon the grantee's failure to fulfill these conditions after leaving the country because of Great Britain's succession in 1760. The opinion of both the original grantee and his son that the claim was lost, and the failure to advance a claim until seventyfive years after the grant, confirmed the court's opinion that the claim was without merit. See U. S. vs. Repentigny, 3 Wall. 211, (1866), Scott. 98.

79U. S. vs. Percheman, 7 Pet. 51, 86, (1833).

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