lency that, so far from nothing having occurred to disturb the good feeling upon which is based the friendly relations between the United States and Brazil, the whole course of your predecessor in relation to the visit of the pirate Sumter to Maranham, and the present attitude of Brazil towards the piratical vessels belonging to the rebel States and to our national vessels, is considered by the Government of Washington untenable, unjust, and "intolerable.”

It is quite unnecessary for the undersigned to repeat his ardent desire to draw closer and render more permanent the relations between the United States and Brazil, and the establishment by them of an "American policy," in contradistinction to what is the recognized policy of Europe, as is being developed by interference with the internal affairs of Mexico; and he is pained to see all his efforts in this regard, and all the wishes of his Government, set at naught by the perseverance of Brazil in a course declared by the Government of Washington to be more unfriendly than that of any other foreign power; and by ignoring every fact, sentiment, and position taken in the Washington dispatches of the 18th March and 3d of April, and utterly refusing to perceive or admit that the United States feels aggrieved by the conduct of Brazil, and confidently expects that she will not persevere in maintaining a position more unfriendly than that of any other maritime power. Adherence by Brazil to her present unfriendly attitude is deprecated by the undersigned, not because he believes such a course calenlated to cause a disruption of the peaceful relations existing between the two conntries; there exists no such danger. The Government of the United States has demonstrated to the world that while struggling for its national existence against a gigantic rebellion, it can submit with grace and a not unbecoming humility to the irritating assaults made upon it in the hour of adversity, whether they emanate from ancient enemies or professed friends. But nations, like individuals, while they frequently for give injuries, do not always forget them. And it is because perseverance in her present course by Brazil may induce the people of the United States to forget the friendly feelings upon which the existing peaceful relations between the two countries are based that the policy of your predecessor is deprecated.1

The discussion on this subject was revived in the ensuing year by the arrival of the Alabama, and shortly afterward the Florida and Georgia, in Brazilian ports. The first-named ship took two American vessels within Brazilian waters and burned them there. Notwithstanding which her commander was allowed to go on shore at the island of Fernando Noronha, and there to obtain supplies for the vessel and to land the prisoners. For this the officer commanding at Fernando de Noronha was displaced. The Florida was allowed to enter the port of Pernambuco, and there to refit and coal, in despite of the protest of the United States consul that the Florida was a pirate and the consort of the Alabama, which had just before violated the neutrality of Brazilian waters. "Neyertheless," says Mr. Webb, in writing to the Marquis d'Abrantes on the 21st of May, 1863

Because her commander represented that the ship required repairs to her engine which could not be done within the twenty-four hours, the governor, in a communication to the pirate, now before the undersigned, dated the 9th of May, informed the ap-. plicant that, inasmuch as he represented to him that a compliance with his order to leave in twenty-four hours will compel him to do so in a distressed condition, because the repairs to his engine, necessary to his safety, cannot be completed in that time, and would be illiberal and inhuman, and expose him to danger, and Brazil to the conse quences; and inasmuch as he, the governor, does not wish to be inhuman or illiberal, or endanger the safety of the pirate, or to lessen his means of defense, or to expose him to imminent risks, therefore, believing the representation to have been made in good faith, and that he cannot in safety continue his cruise, (against American commerce bound to Brazil,) unless given time to repair his engine, the said governor, represent ing the sovereignty of Brazil, and recognizing the traitors in rebellion against the United States as belligerents, does accord to the commander of the pirate bearing their flag all the time he asks for repairs, and privileges of taking in such coals and provisious as may place him in a condition to continue his depredations upon the commerce of a friendly power. A grosser breach of neutrality has never come to the knowledge of the undersigned.2

He adds:

At this moment the ports of Brazil are made harbors of refuge and places of resort and departure for three piratical vessels, avowedly designed to prey upon the commerce

1 British Appendix, vol. vi, pp. 40, 41.

2 Ibid., vol. vi, p. 49.

The

of the United States. The waters of Brazil are violated with impunity in this piratical work, and after the imperial government had admitted and declared its indignation at such violation of sovereignty, the guilty party is received with hospitality and friendship by the governor of Bahia, and instead of being captured and imprisoned, and his vessel detained, he is féted, and supplied with the necessary provisions and coal, to enable him to continue his depredations upon American commerce. wharves and streets of Bahia and Pernambuco have been, for weeks past, swarmed with American sailors and passengers from merchantmen trading with Brazil which have been captured, and the persons on board robbed, by the pirates of the Alabama, Florida, and Georgia, and they have been compelled, in the ports of a friendly nation, to witness their clothing and jewelry, and even family relics, sold on the wharves and in the streets of Bahia and Pernambuco, by their piratical captors, at a tenth of their value; while the piratical vessels and all on board were received and treated as friends, and supplied with the necessary materials to continue their nefarious practices. The scenes which history informs us were rife in the seventeenth century, in the islands of the West Indies, are now being enacted in this nineteenth century in the ports of Brazil, and that through no fault of the imperial government-which has already done its whole duty as rapidly as circumstances have permitted-but because the governors of Pernambuco and Bahia, in their sympathy with piracy and pirates, have neglected their duty to Brazil, and brought discredit upon the civilization of the age.1

As regards the Alabama, which at this time had come into the port of Bahia, Mr. Webb insists that she should have been seized by the governor for her violation of Brazilian neutrality:

Your excellency will not for a moment deny that, having by your official acts, and those of the governor of Pernambuco, recognized the fact that this pirate has violated the waters and outraged the sovereignty of Brazil, it is your duty, when opportunity offers, to vindicate your violated sovereignty, and by his capture, if possible, remunerate the injury done to American commerce within your waters. And should the pirate come into this port when the ability of Brazil to capture and detain him admits of no question, beyond all doubt the neglect to do so would be not only an unfriendly act toward the United States, but would render Brazil responsible for all and every aggression which he might commit on American commerce after leaving this port.

At this moment, the ports of Brazil are made harbors of refuge and places of resort and departure for three piratical vessels, avowedly designed to prey upon the commerce of the United States. The waters of Brazil are violated with impunity in this piratical work, and after the Imperial Government had admitted and declared its indignation at such violation of sovereignty, the guilty party is received with hospitality and friendship by the governor of Bahia, and instead of being captured and imprisoned, and his vessel detained, he is fêted, and supplied with the necessary provisions and coal, to enable him to continue his depredations upon American commerce.1 The Marquis d'Abrantes answers, as to the non-seizure of the Alabama, that the governor of Bahia had not sufficient information to warrant him in taking such a measure; as to the Florida and Georgia, by going over the same topics as his predecessor had done and with equal ability.

The government of Brazil did not seize the Alabama; but it did exclude that vessel from its ports for the future, for having made prizes in Brazilian waters, and applied the same rule to the Tuscaloosa as being a tender of the delinquent vessel.

It was immediately after this troublesome correspondence that the Imperial Government promulgated the rules contained in the circular of June 23, 1863, (set out in the 7th volume of American Documents, p. 110,) which, in point of stringency, far exceed what any other nation had ever thought it necessary to enact. The United States had never adopted any such rules, nor can it for a moment be said that Great Britain ought to be bound by them.

This is the country of which, in the argument of the United States it is stated, I presume in compliment to our distinguished Brazillian col.league:

In the American Case, and the documents to which it refers, there is sufficient indica

tion of the loyalty and efficiency with which the Brazilian government maintained its sovereignty against the aggressive efforts of the confederates.1

with Spain.

A similar question arose with the Spanish government on the entry of Correspondence the Sumter into Cadiz, with a requisition to have repairs done and to coal. After difficulties raised by the United States Representatives, permission was given, though the repairs were limited to what was absolutely necessary.

2

The same question arose with the French government when the Sumter put into St. Pierre, in the Island of Martinque, in November, 1861, and was permitted by the governor to coal which permission was afterward approved of by the French

Correspondence with French govern

ment.

government.3

It arose in a still more striking form when the Florida put into Brest to repair and coal; as we shall see more fully hereafter when I come to the case of that vessel. Mr. Dayton, the United States minister at the court of France, objected to her being received or being allowed to have repairs done to her machinery, but his protest is in the more moderate tone of a statesman and a man of the world; we hear no more about "pirates;" his objection is that, being possessed of sailing power, the vessel did not require the aid of steam-an argument which was, however, overruled by the imperial council.*

Correspondence

ment.

This question was raised between the United States and with British govern Her Majesty's government on the arrival of the Sumter, on the 30th July, 1861, at Trinidad, where she was allowed to coal and to remain six days in port. This was, in due course, complained of to Her Majesty's government. Mr. Seward declaring that "the armament, the insurgent flag, and the spurious commission should have told the governor, as they sufficiently prove to Her Majesty's government, that the Sumter is and can be nothing else than a piratical vessel.” Of course this argument did not prevail with Her Majesty's government any more than it did with those of the Netherlands, France, or Brazil. It was obvious that the confederates having once been acknowledged as belligerents, the admission of their ships of war to the neutral ports and harbors followed as the necessary consequence.

The objection to the reception of these vessels took a somewhat differ ent and more telling form in the case of the confederate ship the Nashville, which, having left the confederate port of Charleston, had been allowed to coal at Bermuda on her voyage to England.

On that voyage the Nashville committed one of those acts which stained this hateful warfare with eternal opprobrium-that of setting fire to a harmless trading-vessel and making her crew prisoners of war. This proceeding was made a ground by Mr. Adams, on the arrival of the Nashville, for claiming that the vessel should not be received into a British port. In terms of just and honest indignation he writes to Earl Russell:

The act of wilfully burning a private merchant-ship while pursuing its way quietly to its destination in its own country seems in itself little to harmonize with the general sentiment among civilized and commercial nations, even when it is committed under the authority of a recognized belligerent; but when voluntarily undertaken by individuals not vested with the powers generally acknowledged to be necessary to justify aggressive warfare, it approximates too closely within the definition of piracy to receive the smallest countenance from any Christian people. The undersigned cannot perulit Page 67.

1

2 British Appendix, vol. vi, pp. 117-119.

3 See British Case, p. 17, and letter of British Consul Lawless to Earl Russell, British Appendix, vol. i, p. 257.

British Appendix, vol. vi, pp. 132, 133.

5 United States Documents, vol. vi, p. 193.

himself to doubt that Her Majesty's government, which has voluntarily renounced the authority to wage private war at sea, would not fail to visit with its utmost indignation any attempts to seek shelter under its jurisdiction from the consequences of indulging a purely partisan malice in unauthorized acts of violence on the ocean.

Mr. Morse, the United States consul at London, only expressed the public feeling when he wrote to Mr. Seward:

The leading event of the current week has been the appearance of the corsair Nashville, from Charleston, in European waters, and her wanton and malicious destruction of an American ship by burning about seventy-five miles west of Cape Clear, off the southern coast of Ireland, and her bold entrance into a British port for coal and repairs the day following the committal of the barbarous act. It has, as a matter of course, created much comment, and no little excitement here.

So far as I can learn and judge, the public voice here is very strong and outspoken in condemning and denouncing the act as malicious and piratical. It has taken the English people by surprise, and is doing much to enlighten them as to the character of the enemy with whom we are dealing.2

But such an act could not be held to be sufficient ground of exclusion. However revolting such a system of warfare, it was still within the stern principle of international law, relative to war, which justifies both the seizure and the destruction of enemy's ships and goods at sea, on the principle that whatever tends to impoverish the enemy is allowable. The practice had been sanctioned by the conduct of the United States themselves, in their last war with Great Britain.

When the civil war was over, it occurred to the United States Government that, though Captain Semmes had been admitted to parol as a prisoner of war, and could not therefore be proceeded against criminally under the law relating to treason, he might, nevertheless, be made amenable to the penal law for the destruction of ships and cargoes belonging to citizens of the United States. But the idea was abandoned, and Mr. John A. Bolles, Solicitor to the Navy Department of the United States, in an article bearing his name, in the July number of the "Atlantie Monthly,"3 under the title of "Why Semmes, of the Alabama, was not tried," has fully explained the reasons, and among them has made us acquainted with the course pursued by the United States Government in the war with England in 1812 and 1813. The question, whether Semmes should be prosecuted or not, seems to have been referred by the President to Mr. Bolles and the law-officer of the Department, who appear to have entered upon and conducted the inquiry with a discrimination, ability, and sense of justice which do them infinite honor. In the article referred to Mr. Bolles, in the first place, observes that

By establishing a blockade of confederate ports, our Government had recognized the confederates as belligerents, if not as a belligerent State, and had thus confessed that confederate officers and men, military or naval, could not be treated as pirates or guerillas, so long as they obeyed the laws of war; the same recognition was made when cartels for exchange of prisoners were established between the Federal and confederate authorities; and, above all, when the Federal Executive, after the courts had declared confederate privateersmen to be pirates, had deliberately set aside those judgments, and admitted the captured and condemned officers and men of the Savannah and the Jeff Davis, to exchange as prisoners of war.1

1 British Appendix, vol. ii, p. 92.

2 United States Documents, vol. ii, p. 549. 3 Page 89.

"The reluctance with which this recognition was granted does not affect its validity. After having refused, again and again, President Davis's offers of exchange, the Federal Executive, being at last notified that fourteen Union prisoners-six colonels, two lieutenant-colonels, three majors, and three captains-had been shut up in felons' cells, to be hung whenever the confederate privateers were executed, concluded to regard those 'pirates' as lawful belligerents entitled to exchange."

This premised, Mr. Bolles writes:

Without consulting publicist or jurisconsult, it was easily possible to see and show that we, as a Government, could not afford to prosecute and punish as a criminal any naval officer for capturing and destroying the enemy's trading-vessels, as fast as possible, not only without any attempt to send them in for adjudication, but with a determined purpose and policy not to do so.

This conclusion was the result of a careful study of our own naval history, and of a thoughtful examination of future possibilities in the event of war between the United States and some great commercial nation.

I will not dwell upon this last division of the topic, but content myself with a reference to that past theory and practice of our naval warfare which rendered it impossible to punish Semmes for having learned and practiced so successfully the lesson taught by our own instruction and example in the Revolutionary War, when we were rebels, and in the last war (1812) with Great Britain.

The earlier records are imperfect; but enough can be gathered from our naval historian, Cooper, to show that many of the vessels captured in the war of the revolution were destroyed at sea.

Of the history and policy of the later period we have abundant proofs. Not less than seventy-four British merchantmen were captured, and destroyed as soon as captured, under express instructions from the Navy Department, and in pursuance of a deliberate purpose and plan, without any attempt or intent to send or bring them in as prizes for adjudication. The orders of the Department upon this subject are numer ous, emphatic, and carefully prepared. They deserve to be studied and remembered: and they effectually silence all American right or disposition to complain of Semmes for having imitated our example in obedience to similar orders from the secretary of the confederate navy.

The instructions to which I refer were addressed to Captains David Porter and O. H. Perry, each in command of a squadron; to Captain Charles Stewart, of the Constitution, twice; to Captain Charles Morris, of the Congress; Commandant Lewis Warrington, of the Peacock; Commandant Johnstone Blakely, of the Wasp; Master Commandant Joseph Bainbridge, of the Frolic; Master Commandant George Parker, of the Siren; Master Commandant John O. Creighton, of the Rattlesnake; Lieutenant William H. Allen, of the Argus; Lieutenant James Renshaw, of the Enterprise; and Master Ridgely, of the Erie.

Extracts from the instructions of the Department, which led to these immediate burnings of captured vessels, will best show the precise purpose and deliberate policy of the Government. I will, therefore, quote brief passages from some five or six different orders as samples of all:

"The great object," says one of them, "is the destruction of the commerce of the enemy, and the bringing into port the prisoners, in order to exchange against our unfortunate countrymen who may fall into his hands." "You will, therefore, man no prize unless the value, place of capture, and other favorable circumstances, shall render safe arrival morally certain." "You will not agree to the ransoming of any prize." "Grant no cartel nor liberate any prisoners except under circumstances of extreme and unavoidable necessity."

In another it is said: "You will, therefore, unless in some extraordinary cases that shall clearly warrant an exception, destroy all you capture, and, by thus retaining your crew and continuing your cruise, your services may be enhanced tenfold."

"I have it in command from the President strictly to prohibit the giving or accepting, directly or indirectly, a challenge to combat ship to ship."

Again: "Your own sound judgment and observation will sufficiently demonstrate to you how extremely precarious and injurious is the attempt to send in a prize, unless taken very near a friendly port and under the most favorable circumstances. Policy, interest, and duty combine to dictate the destruction of all captures, with the above exceptions."

Another: "The commerce of the enemy is the most vulnerable point of the enemy we can attack, and its destruction the main object; and to this end all your efforts should be directed. Therefore, unless your prizes should be very valuable and near a friendly port it will be imprudent and worse than useless to attempt to send them in: the chances of recapture are excessively great; the crew, the safety of the ship under your command, would be diminished and endangered, as well as your own fame and the national honor, by hazarding a battle after the reduction of your officers and crew by manning prizes. In every point of view, then, it will be proper to destroy what you capture, except valuable and compact articles, that may be transshipped. This system gives to one ship the force of many."

Another order says that "a single cruiser, if ever so successful, can man but a few prizes, and every prize is a serious diminution of her force; but a single cruiser destroying every captured vessel has the capacity of continuing, in full vigor, her destructive power, so long as her provisions and stores can be replenished either from friendly