rebellion against the United States Government to practice upon the presumed indifference, the expected favor, or the fancied weakness of the Dutch Government. During a period of forty-six days, during which we have heard of this piratical vessel in the West Indies, it would appear that she had been twice entertained and supplied at Dutch ports, and spent eighteen days under their shelter.

This can be no accidental circumstance.

In the multitude of harbors with which the West India seas abound, the Sumter has had no occasion to confine her visits so entirely to the ports of one nation, especially one so scantily supplied with them as Holland. And the fact that she does so is, in my judgment, not fairly susceptible of any other interpretation than the one I have given. I feel convinced that the government of the Netherlands will see in this repeated visit of the Sumter (this time, it appears, without any pretext) a distinct violation of its neutrality according to its own views, as laid down in your excellency's communication to me of the 17th of September last, and a case which will call for the energetic assertion of its purpose, expressed in the paper referred to, namely, not to allow its ports to be made the base of hostile operations against the United States. For that the Sumter is clearly making such use of the Dutch ports would seem to admit of no controversy.'

In reply, Baron Van Zuylen repeats the refusal of the royal government to treat the Sumter as other than a ship of war. He observes that the commission of the officer in command of her had been duly exhibited to the governor. At the same time he informs Mr. Pike

However, the government of the Netherlands, wishing to give a fresh proof of its desire [to avoid] all that could give the slightest subject for complaint to the United States, has just sent instructions to the colonial authorities, enjoining them not to admit, except in case of shelter from stress, (relâche forcée,) the vessels of war and privateers of the two belligerent parties, unless for twice twenty-four hours, and not to permit them, when they are steamers, to provide themselves with a quantity of coal more than sufficient for a run of twenty-four hours.

The offensive tone of Mr. Pike's previous letter does not pass unnoticed :

The feeling of distrust which seems to have dictated your last dispatch of the 8th of this month, and which shows itself especially in some entirely erroneous appreciations of the conduct of the government of the Netherlands, gives to the last, strong in its good faith and in its friendly intentions, just cause for astonishment, So, then, the cabinet of which I have the honor to form part, deems that it may dispense with undertaking a justification useless to all who examine impartially, and without passion, the events which have taken place.3

In the mean time, Mr. Seward had written a dispatch to Mr. Pike, of the 17th October, in which he states, in explicit terms, "for the information of the government of the Netherlands, just what the United States claim and expect in regard to the matter in debate."

They have asked for an explanation of the case, presented by the admission of the Sumter by the Governor of Curaçoa, if one can be satisfactorily given; and if not, then for a disavowal of that officer's proceedings, attended by a justly-deserved rebuke.

These demands have been made, not from any irritation or any sensibility of national pride, but to make it sure that henceforth any piratical vessel fitted out by or under the agency of disloyal American citizens, and cruising in pursuit of merchant-vessels of the United States, shall not be admitted into either the continental or the colonial ports of the Netherlands under any pretext whatever. If that assurance cannot be obtained in some way, we must provide for the protection of our rights in some other way. Thus the subject is one of a purely practical character; it neither requires nor admits of debate or argument on the part of the United States. If what is thus desired shall be obtained by the United States in any way, they will be satisfied; if it fails to be obtained through the disinclination of the government of the Netherlands, its proceedings in this respect will be deemed unfriendly and injurious to the United States. The United States being thus disposed to treat the subject in a practical way, they are not tenacious about the manner or form in which the due respect to their rights is manifested by the government of the Netherlands, and still less about the considerations or arguments upon which that government regulates its own conduct in the matter. They regard the whole insurrection in this country as ephemeral; indeed,

British Appendix, vol. vi, p. 82.

2 Ibid., p. 84.

3 Ibid., p. 85.

they believe that the attempt at piracy, under the name of privateering, made by the insurgents, has already well nigh failed. While, therefore, they insist that shelter shall not be afforded to the pirates by nations in friendship with the United States, they, at the same time, are not unwilling to avoid grave debates concerning their rights that might survive the existing controversy. It remains only to say, in this connection, that the course which the United States are pursuing in their complaints to the government of the Netherlands is not peculiar to, but it is the same which has been and which will be pursued toward any other maritime power on the occurrence of similar grievances.

With these remarks I proceed to notice Baron Van Zuylen's communication. You will reply to him that the United States unreservedly claim to determine for themselves absolutely the character of the Sumter, she being a vessel fitted out, owned, armed, sailed, and directed by American citizens who owe allegiance to the United States, and. who neither have nor can, in their piratical purposes and pursuits, have or claim any political authority from any lawful source whatever.

The United States regard the vessel as piratical, and the persons by whom she is manned and navigated as pirates.

The United States, therefore, cannot admit that the Sumter is a ship of war or a privateer, and so entitled to any privileges whatever, in either of those characters, in the port of Curaçoa; nor can they debate any such subject with the government of the Netherlands.'

Mr. Pike expresses his satisfaction at the restrictions placed by the government of the Netherlands on the confederate vessels, but at the same time regrets that the same treatment should have been adopted toward the vessels of the United States; to which M. Van Zuylen replies that the United States Government having desired that measures should be taken to prevent the prolonged stay in Dutch ports of the Sumter or other vessels in the seceding States, the King's government had admitted the justice of the claim, but that the measures taken could not reach one of the two parties exclusively; they must be gen eral.

The new regulations led to a singular result. On the 8th of Novem ber the United States steamer Iroquois arrived off the port of Curaçoa; the governor informed Lieutenant Palmer, who was in command of the vessel, that her stay must be limited to forty-eight hours, and her supply of coal to twenty-four hours' consumption, although at the time the United States had more than 1,300 tons of coal at Curaçoa, which, by the way, shows that they had established a depot there. Lieutenant Palmer declined to enter the port on these terms, and his conduct in so doing was approved by Mr. Seward. Mr. Pike' is directed to ask for explanations, with this remark from Mr. Seward:

If His Majesty's government shall approve of the proceedings of the governor of Curaçoa, it will become an important question what measure of hospitalities will be due by us to the naval vessels and authorities of the Netherlands in similar cases."

Thus, while the regulation was received with satisfaction by the United States Government, as a restriction on Confederate vessels, an attempt to enforce it against one of their own was looked upon as matter of grave offense. It so happened, however, that the Dutch govern ment had, shortly before, on the suggestion of the governor of Curaçoa, revoked the order.

No sooner had this been done than the Government of the United States desired its restoration. Mr. Pike is instructed to lose no time in "calling the attention of Mr. Stratenus to the subject of the intrusion of insurgent piratical American vessels seeking shelter in the ports of the Netherlands and their colonies. If you cannot obtain a decree excluding them altogether, it is thought that the government will have no hesitation in restoring the restrictive policy which was adopted by it under the representatives of its foreign affairs by Baron Van Zuylen." 1 British Appendix, vol. vi, pp. 86, 87. 2 Ibid., p. 91.

3 Ibid., p. 95.

Mr. Pike was at the same time instructed to call upon the King's gov ernment to reconsider the subject of according to the Confederate States the character of belligerents, and, in the then state of affairs, to revoke the recognition.

Both proposals were declined by the King's government. The inconsistency of the demand for the restoration of the restrictive order is pointed out by M. de Sombreff, the new minister of foreign affairs:

In this regard I permit myself to observe to you that I could not understand how your government could desire the re-establishment of measures which actually were, and would again be, applicable to both parties, aud which were, at the time, the cause why the Union ship Iroquois would not enter the port of Curaçoa under the rule of said restrictive measures.

It was on that occasion that the last were modified, which was brought to your notice the 30th of December, 1861.

It follows, from advices which have since reached the government, that the new commander of the Iroquois has expressed himself well satisfied to find the precedent restrictive measures withdrawn, and thus to have the privilege of taking as much coal as he might wish. These measures are also favorable to Netherlands commerce with ⚫ the United States, so that the interests of the two countries are in perfect accord.

If the instructions given before the month of December, 1861, were now returned to, the government of the Netherlands might not only be taxed, with good reason, with trifling, but would hurt its own interests, as well as those of the Union, considering that the consequence of said instructions would be, as has been remarked in the communication of Baron de Zuylen, dated October 29, 1861, that the vessels of war of the United States, also, could no longer be able to sojourn in the Netherlands East Indian ports more than twice twenty-four hours, nor supply themselves with coal for a run of more than twenty-four hours.'

A similar correspondence had, in the mean time, been going on between the United States, Government and that of Brazil, in

Correspondence

consequence of the Sumter having, on the 7th of September, with Brazil. 1861, been allowed to enter the Brazilian port of Maranham, and to take in a supply of coal there, notwithstanding the protest of the United States consul. Mr. Webb, the United States minister at the court of the Emperor, is instructed to "lose no time in calling the attention of the Emperor's government to the affair."

You will ask explanations thereof, and, unless satisfactory explanations are rendered, you will then inform His Majesty's government that the shelter and supplying of pirates, as the Sumter is sheltered and supplied, in the ports of Brazil, are deemed an unfriendly act by this Government, and will ask that such measures shall be taken in regard to the case as will make the governor of Maranham sensible of His Majesty's displeasure, and will prevent a recurrence of such injuries to the United States hereafter.

I hardly need say that the proceeding at Maranham is an occurrence of great surprise and deep disquiet to the United States. That we have supposed that Brazil and every other state on the American continent have an interest second only to our own in the stability of the American Union, the downfall of which would, in our belief, inevitably be followed, sooner or later, by the decline and fall of every independent nation on this continent, which must in that case become once more a theater for the ambition of European powers.

Such respect for the sovereignty of the United States as one great nation owes to another is an indispensable condition of friendly relations with foreign powers in the present emergency. You will therefore take care not, for one moment, to admit into debate any question of claim on the part of the insurgents to any rights, whether as a sovereign or a belligerent.2

Mr. Webb thereupon addresses to Senhor Taques, the secretary of state for foreign affairs, a dispatch of prodigious length, but which ends with the pertinent inquiry:

Whether it is or is not the intention of the Brazilian government to permit the piratical letters of marque and privateers of the rebels of the United States to enter into the ports of Brazil, and there find succor and material aid-"provisions and coal — to continue their voyages" against the commerce of the United States? 3

Senhor Taques replied, as the Baron van Zuylen had done before him, in a most able paper, in which he reminded Mr. Webb of the numerous instances in which governments de facto had been admitted to the status of belligerents, although their sovereign character had not been ac knowledged, pointing out that the recognition of belligerency carried with it the consequence that the commissioned vessels of the acknowl edged belligerent could not be treated as pirates, but must receive the same treatment as those of the opponent.

The correspondence continued, and, owing to the exceeding fertility of Mr. Webb's pen, assumes very formidable proportions. It led to the regulations which I have already mentioned; which regulations the Presidents of the provinces were ordered to enforce.

Mr. Seward reviews the correspondence with evident dissatisfaction: We cannot admit, and we are not likely to admit, that anything has occurred to relieve Brazil, or any other power holding treaty relations with us, from fulfilling the 'obligations of friendship toward us, which it has heretofore voluntarily assumed; much less can we admit that any such nation has a right, by adopting a character of neutrality, to give hospitality, shelter, and supplies to pirates engaged in destroying our commerce, whether they affect to be public vessels of war, or are content to sail under cover of pretended letters of marque granted by the chief of their treasonable faction.

At the same time we are not looking out for causes of conflict with maritime powers. We state our complaints whenever grievances are committed by them, and we ask the redress due to us from friendly states. Unwilling to drag such powers into our own domestic strife, we are content with a practical respect for our flag, and we engage in no discussions with them about the unjust or unfriendly manifestations with which that practical respect is sometimes attended. Acting on this principle, we have brought to the notice of the Brazilian government the grievance committed against us by the governor of Maranham. That government, instead of giving us redress, or taking any measures to prevent a repetition of the grievance, has avowed and sanctioned it.

In the position thus assumed, the Brazilian government stands single and alone. We cannot, with self-respect, further remonstrate nor debate. I confess that the attitude assumed by Brazil embarrasses us, because it tends to encourage our internal enemies. We trust, however, that we possess the ability to maintain and preserve our government against all enemies at home, however much aid and encouragement they may receive from abroad.

It is not needful that you state to the Brazilian government any part of the contents of this dispatch except its conclusions, which are these: 1st. We stand upon the posi tion heretofore assumed, that the proceedings of the governor of Maranham are intol erable. 2d. We cannot further debate at Rio, nor can we change the field of the discussion from that capital to Washington. 3d. Conscious of our ability to protect all our national rights, we neither importune nor menace any foreign state which may deem it fit to do us wrong. But so fast as every such case matures we determine, with what prudence and firmness we can, the course which the emergency requires.2

Mr. Webb re-echoes:

We cannot go to war with all the world; and while circumstances compel us to acquiesce in the conduct of England, Spain, and Holland, we cannot insist upon reparation from Brazil for having adopted the same line of policy toward us.3

The Marquis d'Abrantes having succeeded Senhor Taques as minister of foreign affairs, in reference to Mr. Seward's last dispatches writes, on the 16th of June, to Mr. Webb:

In view of the conclusions of the last of the dispatches referred to from the Govern ment of the Union, the government of His Majesty the Emperor judges convenient to regard at an end the discussion of the subject it treats, it being flattering to observe that from it nothing has resulted in the least altering the relations of friendship and good understanding between the two countries which it so much interests both to maintain.

Hereupon Mr. Webb breaks out. After repeating verbatim the complaints set out in his letter of the 18th of March, he continues:

Here, as your excellency will perceive, is not only grave cause for complaint set forth, but a mode is pointed out in which the friendly relations heretofore existing between the two countries can be restored, viz, by a simple act of justice, reversing the decision which Brazil has hastily made. If Brazil cannot meet the reasonable expectation of the Government of the United States, then the Secretary of State, speaking in the name of the President and the Government, claims, at least, as a concession to the past friendly relations of the two countries, that Brazil will no longer occupy toward the United States a more unfriendly position than any other power; but, by following the example of other nations, place herself "on the same ground in relation to the United States which is occupied by other maritime powers, and thus mitigate the discontent" which it is made my duty to report to this Government.

But this is not all. In a dispatch from Washington, dated the 3d April, the undersigned is instructed to say to the government of His Imperial Majesty that the Government of the United States, standing "upon the position heretofore assumed," declare "that the proceedings of the governor of Maranham are intolerable; and we cannot further debate at Rio, nor can we change the field of the discussion from that capital to Washington."

And how are these complaints, remonstrances, and friendly intimations to Brazil, from the Government of the United States, received by the imperial government? Why, the undersigned is called upon to apprise his Government that Brazil has "put an end to this discussion upon the aforesaid subject," and is happy to perceive that not "the least alteration will result from it in the relations of friendship and good understanding between the countries."

Most assuredly these are not the results which the Government of the United States promised itself when it ordered the undersigned to place before the government of Brazil the dispatches of the 18th of March, and the very significant extract from that of the 3d of April; and while it is the duty of the undersigned to convey to his Government an answer so very different from what he anticipated, self-respect demands that he should not act as a mere automaton in the matter; and an earnest desire to restore and perpetuate the friendly relations which formerly existed between the two countries compels him to remind your excellency that so desirable a result cannot be obtained by utterly ignoring our complaints, by treating them as alike groundless and unmeaning, and by assuming that nothing has occurred to interrupt the good feelings or disturb the friendly relations between the two countries. The undersigned is grateful to a kind Providence that in what has occurred the existing friendly relations between the two governments have not been disturbed; but he is not unmindful that the good feelings upon which those friendly relations were based, and which is ever the best safeguard for their continuance, have been trifled with by the conduct of the governor of Maranham, and which conduct has been defended, sustained, and approved by your immediate predecessor, speaking in the name of the Imperial Government of Brazil. The Government of the United States, for more than a year, has been actively engaged in putting down the greatest rebellion recorded in the history of the world. A civil war, which has called into the field more than a million of soldiers, and which imposed upon the Government of the United States the raising and equipping of an army of seven hundred thousand men, and a fleet of nearly five hundred vessels to do battle for our national existence, has called forth the energies and exhibited the resources of a mighty people; and yet, in the hour of greatest peril, our Government has not hesitated to tell the nations of the world which have done her wrong, when resistance to such wrong was impossible, that "the United States will not debate with other states a question vital to its own existence," but content herself with pointing out the wrong done her, leaving for the present the expiation of such wrong and injury solely to the sense of justice and magnanimity of those who once styled themselves friends. Hence, as our Secretary of State justly says, "acting on this principle, we have brought to the notice of the Brazilian government the grievance committed against us by the President of Maranham." That Government, instead of giving us redress, or taking measures to prevent a repetition of the grievance, has avowed and sustained it.

Hence the undersigned is instructed to say to the Brazilian government" that while the United States cannot ask Brazil for less than the absolute exclusion of pirates from her harbors, yet, standing as she does alone among nations, in the extent of her unfriendly attitude, if she would but place herself upon the same ground in relation to the United States which is occupied by other maritime powers, it would mitigate the discontent which you are authorized to express;" and, as if foreseeing the failure of this appeal to the friendship and justice of Brazil, the undersigned is ordered to say, in conclusion, that, "conscious of our ability to protect all our national rights, we neither importune nor menace any foreign state which may deem it fit to do us wrong; but so fast as every such case matures we determine, with what prudence and firmness we can, the course which the emergency requires."

Inasmuch as the Government of the United States has definitively closed all further discussion of the affair of the pirate Sumter, either here or at Washington, nothing of the kind is intended in this dispatch; its sole object being to point out to your Excel