of April having been forwarded by Mr. Secretary Seward to Mr. Dallas, the United States minister in England, it was officially communicated by Mr. Dallas to Lord Russell on the 11th of May. Her Majesty's proclamation of neutrality was not issued till the 14th of May. Thus it was not till three days after the official communication last referred to, and nine days after a copy had been received from the British consul at New York, that Her Majesty's proclamation of neutrality was is sued. But it is said that the expected arrival of Mr. Adams should have been awaited. What difference could it have made? No explanations af forded by that gentleman could have altered the facts-facts which made it the duty of the government to advise Her Majesty to recognize the validity of the blockade, and, in order so to do, to recognize also the belligerent status of the de-facto confederate government. But the not waiting for Mr. Adams is put forward as a breach of faith on the part of Earl Russell, his lordship having, it is said, pledged himself to Mr. Dallas, the predecessor of Mr. Adams, to await the arri val of the latter. Here again we have an entire misconception. No such pledge was given, or intended to be given. What passed between Lord Russell and Mr. Dallas appears from a letter of the latter to Mr. Seward of the 2d of May: The solicitude felt by Lord John Russell as to the effect of certain measures represented as likely to be adopted by the President, induced him to request me to call at his private residence yesterday. I did so. He told me that the three representatives of the Southern Confederacy were here; that he had not seen them, but was not unwilling to do so, unofficially; that there existed an understanding between the government and that of France, which would lead both to take the same course as to recognition, whatever that course might be; and he then referred to the rumor of a meditated blockade of southern ports and their discontinuance as ports of entrytopics on which I had heard nothing, and could therefore say nothing. But as I informed him that Mr. Adams had apprised me of his intention to be on his way hither, in the steamship Niagara, which left Boston on the 1st May, and that he would prob ably arrive in less than two week, by the 12th or 15th instant, his lordship acquiesced in the expediency of disregarding mere rumor, and waiting the full knowledge to be brought by my successor.2 It is plain that the motive for waiting the arrival of Mr. Adams was to obtain positive knowledge in the place of "mere rumor "—that is, "rumor of a meditated blockade;" not that there was any intention of discussing with Mr. Adams the question of the proclamation of neu trality, if the rumor proved correct. When authentic information came in the copies of the President's proclamation officially furnished to the foreign office, full knowledge took the place of rumor, and the latter became converted into certainty. All motive for delay then ceased and the time for action had arrived. Yet this has been magnified into a breach of faith, and that by perby the sons who had this letter before them. fligerency. The example of Great Britain in acknowledging the Confederate Recognition of bel States as belligerents was followed by the Emperor of the French in a proclamation of the 10th of June; by the King of the Netherlands on the 16th; by the Queen of Spain on the 17th; Emperor of Brazil on the 1st of August. oreign powers. The Government of the United States, however, refused to concede Course pursued by to other nations the right of acknowledging the belligerent status of the seceding States. In these they saw only what Mr. Seward termed "a discontented domestic faction." Writing to Mr. Dayton on the 30th of May, 1861, Mr. Seward says: The United States cannot for a moment allow the French government to rest under Appendix to British Case, vol. iii, page 7. the delusive belief that they will be content to have the Confederate States recognized as a belligerent power by states with which this nation is in amity. No concert of action among foreign states so recognizing the insurgents can reconcile the United States to such a proceeding, whatever may be the consequences of resistance.1 In a dispatch from Mr. Seward to Mr. Dayton, of the 17th of June, 1861, the former writes: The United States, rightly jealous, as we think, of their sovereignty, cannot suffer themselves to debate any abridgment of that sovereignty with France or with any ⚫ other nation. Much less can it consent that France shall announce to it a conclusion of her own against that sovereignty, which conclusion France has adopted without any previous conference with the United States on the subject. This Government insists that the United States are one whole undivided nation, especially so far as foreign nations are concerned, and that France is, by the law of nations and by treaties, not a neutral power between two imaginary parties here, but a friend of the United States. It is erroneous, so far as foreign nations are concerned, to suppose that any war exists in the United States. Certainly there cannot be two belligerent powers where there is no war. There is here, as there has always been, one political power, namely, the United States of America, competent to make war and peace, and conduct commerce and alliances with all foreign nations. There is none other either in fact or recognized by foreign nations. There is, indeed, an armed sedition seeking to overthrow the Government, and the Government is employing military and naval forces to repress it. But these facts do not constitute a war presenting two belligerent powers, and modifying the national character, rights, and responsibilities, or the characters, rights, and responsibilities of foreign nations. It is true that insurrection may ripen into revolution, and that revolution thus ripened may extinguish a previously existing state, or divide it into one or more independent states, and that if such states continue their strife after such division, then there exists a state of war affecting the characters, rights, and duties of all the parties concerned. But this only happens when the revolution has thus run its successful course. The French government says, in the instruction which has been tendered to us, that certain facts which it assumes confer upon the insurgents of this country, in the eyes of foreign powers, all the appearances of a government de facto; wherefore, whatever may be its regrets, the French government must consider the two contending parties as employing the forces at their disposal in conformity with the laws of war. This statement assumes not only that the law of nations entitles any insurrectionary faction, when it establishes a de-facto government, to be treated as belligerent, but also that the fact of the attainment of this status is to be determined by the appearance of it in the eyes of foreign nations. If we should concede both of these positions, we should still insist that the existence of a de-facto government, entitled to belligerent rights, is not established in the present case. In a dispatch of June 19 he writes: What is now seen in this country is the occurrence, by no means peculiar, but frequent in all countries, more frequent even in Great Britain than here, of an armed insurrection engaged in attempting to overthrow the regularly. constituted and established government. There is, of course, the employment of force by the Government to suppress the insurrection, as every other government necessarily employs force in such cases. But these incidents by no means constitute a state of war impairing the sovereignty of the Government, creating belligerent sections, and entitling foreign states to intervene or to act as neutrals between them, or in any other way to cast off their lawful obligations to the nation thus for the moment disturbed. 3 Writing to Mr. Adams on the 21st of July, he says: The United States and Great Britain have assumed incompatible, and thus far irreconcilable, positions on the subject of the existing insurrection. The United States claim and insist that the integrity of the Republic is unbroken, and that their Government is supreme, so far as foreign nations are concerned, as well for war as for peace, over all the States, all sections, and all citizens, the loyal not more than the disloyal, the patriots and the insurgents alike. Consequently, they insist that the British government shall in no way intervene in the insurrection, or hold commercial or other intercourse with the insurgents in derogation of the Federal authority. The position assumed by the United States Government was plainly untenable, being neither more nor less than this-that when a body of United States Appendix, vol. i, p. 192. 3 Ibid., p. 206. 2 Ibid., p. 202. 4 Ibid., p. 214. states secede from a former government and form one of their own, the original government is to be the sole judge as to when the status of belligerency can be conceded-a proposition wholly at variance with all received principles of international law. How Lord Russell viewed the matter appears from a dispatch to Lord Lyons, of June 21: I have to state to your lordship that I have every reason to be satisfied with the language and conduct of Mr. Adams since he has arrived in this country. The only complaint which he has urged here is, that the Queen's proclamation an nouncing her neutrality was hasty and premature. I said, in the first place, that our position was of necessity one of neutrality; that we could not take part either for the North against the South, or for the South against the North. To this he willingly assented, and said that the United States expected no assistance from us to enable their Government to finish the war. I rejoined that if such was the case, as I supposed, it would not have been right either toward our admirals and naval commanders, nor toward our merchants and mercantile marine, to leave them without positive and public orders; that the exercise of belligerent rights of search and capture by a band of adventurers clustered in some small island in the Greek Archipelago or in the Atlantic would subject them to the penalties of piracy; but we could not treat 5,000,000 of men, who had declared their independence, like a band of marauders or filibusters. If we had done so, we should have done more than the United States themselves. Their troops had taken prisoners many of the adherents of the confederacy, but I could not perceive from the newspapers that in any case they had brought these prisoners to trial for high treason, or shot them as rebels. Had we hung the captain of an armed vessel of the southern confederacy as a pirate, we should have done that which a sense of humanity had prohibited on the part of the Government itself. Question аз to The question soon assumed a practical form. When the Government of the Confederate States had armed certain vessels, and Confederate vessels had placed them under the command of officers duly commissioned by it, and those vessels put into ports of the neutral powers, the Government of the United States protested loudly against their being received as vessels of war, on the ground that the insurgent States still formed an integral portion of the Union; that they were to be looked upon as rebels; and that commissions from a government, the independence of which had not been acknowledged, could not give to its ships the character of ships of war. They insisted, therefore, on these vessels being looked upon as pirates, to which all entry into the ports of other nations, and all assistance of every kind, should be denied. The Federal Government even went further, and threatened to hold neutral governments responsible for any assistance or supplies afforded to confederate ships. But the neutral governments were unanimous in refusing to accede to these demands, and persisted in conceding to the confederate ships the same privileges as were afforded to those of the United States. Discussion with The question first arose with the government of the Netherlands, on the occasion of a visit of the confederate vessel, the Sumgovernment of the ter, to the Dutch island of Curaçoa, in August, 1861, and of Netherlands. her being allowed to replenish her stock of coal and obtain supplies there. The fact having come to the knowledge of Mr. Seward, he forthwith instructed Mr. Pike, the United States minister at the Hague, to bring the matter immediately to the notice of the Govern ment: You are instructed to bring this matter immediately to the notice of the government of the Netherlands. The subject of damages for so great a violation of the rights of the United States will be considered when we shall have properly verified the facts of the case. In the mean time you will ask the government of the Netherlands for any explanation of the transaction it may be able or see fit to give. You will further say that the United States, if the case thus stated shall prove to be correct, will expect, in view of the treaties existing between the two countries, and the principles of the law of nations, as well as upon the ground of assurances recently received from the government of the Netherlands, that it will disown the action of its authorities at Curaçoa, and will adopt efficient means to prevent a recurrence of such proceedings hereafter.1 Mr. Pike accordingly protests against the idea "that aid and countenance could be afforded by a friendly power to the Sumter, though she did assume the character of a ship of war of the insurgents. I claimed," he says That were she afforded shelter and supplies on this ground by the authorities at Curaçoa, and should the Dutch government approve the act, it would be, substantially, a recognition of the Southern Confederacy, and that, in my judgment, such an act would be regarded by the United States as an unfriendly and even hostile act, which might lead to the gravest consequences. I held that nothing more need be asked by the so-styled Confederate States, as a practical measure of recognition, than that a ship like the Sumter, claiming to be a national vessel of those States, should be permitted to enter the neighboring ports of foreign nations, and there obtain the necessary means to enable her to depredate upon the commerce of the United States. That such a course on the part of any power, aggravated by the fact that she was unable to obtain such supplies at home, so far from being neutral conduct, was really to afford the most efficient aid to the men who were in rebellion against their own government, and plundering and destroying the vessels and property of their fellow-citizens on the high seas. I protested against such a doctrine as tending necessarily to the termination of all friendly relations between our Government and any government that would tolerate such practices, whether that government were France, or England, or Spain, or Holland. I remarked that it was not for me to judge of the purposes of European powers in regard to the existing state of things in the United States; but if there were to be exhibited a disposition anywhere to take advantage of our present situation, I believed it would be found that such a course could not be taken with impunity now, nor without leading to alienation and bitterness in the future. A correspondence ensued between Mr. Pike and Baron Van Zuylen, the Netherlands minister for foreign affairs, in which the former denied the right of other nations to accord to the insurgent States the character of a belligerent power, and insisted that the vessels of the Confederate government were but "piratical craft," or at best could only be looked upon as privateers, in which character they would be excluded, except in case of distress, from ports of the Netherlands. M. Van Zuylen stated the views of his government in a most able paper, from which, however, owing to its length, I must confine myself to a few extracts: It is not sufficient to dispose of the difficulty by the declaration that the Sumter is, as is stated in your dispatches, "a vessel fitted out for, and actually engaged in, pirati cal expeditions," or "a privateer steamer." Such an assertion should be clearly proved, in accordance with the rule of law, "affirmanti incumbit probatio." After having poised, with all the attention which comports with the weightiness of the matter, the facts and circumstances which characterize the dissensions which now are laying desolate the United States, and of which no government more desires the prompt termination than does that of the Netherlands, I think I may express the conviction that the Sumter is not a privateer, but a man-of-war, grounding myself on the following considerations: In the first place, the declaration of the commander of the vessel, given in writing to the governor of Curaçoa, who had made known that he would not allow a privateer to come into the port, and had then demanded explanations as to the character of the vessel. This declaration purported, "the Sumter is a ship of war, duly commissioned by the government of the Confederate States." The Netherlands governor had to be contented with the word of the commander couched in writing. M. Ortolan, ("Diplomatie de la mer," i, p. 217,) in speaking of the evidence of nationality of vessels of war, thus expresses himself: “The flag and the pennant are visible indications; but we are not bound to give faith to them until they are sustained by a cannon-shot." The attestation of the commander may be exigible, but other proofs must be presumed; and, whether on the high seas or elsewhere, no foreign power has the right to obtain the exhibition of them. British Appendix, vol. vi, p. 69. 2 Ibid., p. 70. Therefore the colonial council has unanimously concluded that the word of the commanding officer was sufficient. In the second place, the vessel armed for war by private persons is called "privateer." The character of such vessel is settled precisely, and, like her English name, (privateer,) indicates sufficiently under this circumstance that she is a private armed vessel-name which Mr. Wheaton gives them.-(" Elements of International Law," ii, p. 19.) Privateering is the maritime warfare which privateers are authorized to make, for their own account, against merchant-vessels of the enemy, by virtue of letters of marque, which are issued to them by the state. The Sumter is not a private vessel; is not the private property of unconnected individuals-of private ship-owners. She, therefore, cannot be a privateer; she can only be a ship of war or ship of the state, armed for cruising. Thus the Sumter is desig nated, in the extract annexed from Harper's Weekly, under the name of "rebel ship of war." Thirdly. It cannot be held, as you propose in your dispatch of the 9th of this month, that all vessels carrying the confederate flag are, without distinction, to be considered as privateers, because the principles of the law of nations, as well as the examples of history, require that the rights of war be accorded to those States. The Government of the United States holds that it should consider the States of the South as rebels. It does not pertain to the King's government to pronounce upon the subject of a question which is entirely within the domain of the internal regulation of the United States; neither has it to inquire whether, in virtue of the Constitution which rules that republic, the States of the South can separate from the central Government, and whether they ought then, aye or no, to be reputed as rebels during the first period of the difficulties.1 After referring to historical precedents, especially the case of the United States themselves in their struggle for independence, "is there need," he asks, "to remind you that at the outset of the war of Ameri can independence, in 1778, the English refused to recognize American privateers as lawful enemies, under pretense that the letters of marque which they bore did not emanate from the sovereign, but from revolted subjects? But Great Britain soon had to desist from this pretension, and to accord international treatment to the colonists in arms against the mother country." M. Van Zuylen cites also the precedent of the American privateer Paul Jones: This vessel, considered as a pirate by Englaud, had captured two of His Britannic Majesty's ships in October, 1779. She took them into the Texel, and remained there more than two months, notwithstanding the representations of Mr. York, ambassador of Great Britain at the Hague, who considered the asylum accorded to such privateer (pirate as he called it in his Memoir to the States-General of 21st March, 1780) as directly contrary to treaties, and even to the ordinances of the Government of the Republic. Mr. York demanded that the English vessels should be released. The States-General refused the restitution of the prizes. The United States, whose belligerent rights were not recognized by England, enjoyed at that period the same treatment in the ports of the Republic of the United Provinces as the Netherlands authorities have now accorded to the Confederate States. If the cabinet of the Hague cannot, therefore, by force of the preceding, class all the vessels of the Confederate States armed for war in the category of privateers, much less can it treat them as pirates, (as you call them in your dispatch of the 12th of this month,) or consider the Sumter as engaged in a filibustering expedition-" engaged in a piratical expedition against the commerce of the United States,” as it reads in your communication of the 2d of September.1 The subject was resumed in the ensuing October, when the Sumter had again put into a Dutch port, namely, Paramaribo, and, in spite of the remonstrance of the United States consul, had been allowed to coal and refit. Mr. Seward immediately directs Mr. Pike to demand explanations. Mr. Pike loses no time in writing in peremptory terms: The reappearance of the Sumter in a port of the Netherlands, after so brief an interval, seems to disclose a deliberate purpose on the part of the persons engaged in the 'British Appendix, vol. vi, pp. 76, 77. |